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PREFACE
There are only a handful of studies on the political history of 
Malaya during the interwar years. This is mainly due to the fact that 
until 1966 the official records for the period were closed to researchers. 
Based mainly on information gleaned from these records, this disserta­
tion studies an aspect of British policy in one limited area in Malaya 
during the period, 1920- 19 +^0 » The area referred to was the Federated 
Malay States (FMS) which comprised Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and 
Pahang. Affairs in the other two regions in Malaya, namely the Straits 
Settlements and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), have been omitted 
save when they had a bearing on the subject under discussion.
This is a study of British efforts to uplift the Malays politically 
in the FMS with particular reference to a policy of decentralisation 
and of training Malays for the public service. The core of the thesis 
deals with the decentralisation movement which attempted to loosen the 
highly centralised federal administration in the FMS, restore powers to 
the states, and enable Malays to play a more active role in public affairs. 
This movement began in 1920 and in effect ended in 19*+0 » This explains 
the choice of dates for this dissertation.
I wish to thank the Australian National University for the award 
of a research scholarship without which this piece of work could not have 
been undertaken. To Professor J.W. Davidson and Dr. C. Wright of the 
Australian National University I owe sincere thanks for their encouragement 
and advice. I am also grateful to Mr. Zain Mahmud, Head of Malay Drama, 
Television Malaysia, for kindly translating a bundle of Malay newspaper 
cuttings high useful/ to the present work. Above all, I am deeply indebted 
to my supervisor, Dr. A.J. Reid, whose many criticisms and suggestions
have proved invaluable to this study. Needless to say I am solely 
responsible for any errors and defects in the thesis.
Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the facilities 
offered and assistance rendered by the staffs of the Arkib Negara 
Malaysia, Singapore National Archive, Singapore National Library, 
University of Singapore Library, University of Singapore History 
Department, Straits Times Library, Public Record Office, British 
Museum, National Library of Australia, Menzies Library, and the 
Association of Malaysia and Singapore.
Australian National University 
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CHAPTER ONE
Transformation of the Federated 
Malay States under British Rule
The Establishment of British Rule
The British first acquired a foothold in Malaya in 1786 when Sir 
Francis Light, an employee of the East India Company, established a 
British settlement in Penang. Penang was founded both as a port for the 
British navy then seeking to counter French naval power in the Indian Ocean 
and as a collecting centre for British merchant ships plying between India 
and China, To ensure adequate food supply for Penang, a strip of the 
adjacent mainland, named Province Wellesley, was added in 1800. In 1919 
another adventurous individual, Sir Stamford Raffles, founded Singapore, and 
five years later the British acquired Malacca from the Dutch. Combined to 
form the Straits Settlements in 1826, these British territories were 
administered by the East India Company till 1867 when, as a result of local 
pressures, they were transferred to the Colonial Office.'*'
Until 1874 British policy towards the Malay States was one of non­
intervention. Imposed on the local authorities by Whitehall, this policy 
aimed to protect the China-India trade route through the Straits of Malacca 
without acquiring territorial responsibilities in the Malay Peninsula which
might prove uneconomic or which might provoke the intervention of a Third 
2Power. Despite this policy, British paramountcy over the Malay Peninsula 
had been firmly established by the mid-19th century. By the Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty of 1824, Malaya became a British sphere of influence, and by the 
Burney Treaty two years later, Siamese influence was restricted to the 
states north of Perak and Pahang. Subsequently British influence was 
gradually extended over the Malay States so that by the time Whitehall 
assumed responsibilities over the Straits Settlements, the British were 
bound by treaties to protect two of the five states south of Kedah and had
23acquired a right of control over the external relations of the others.
Meanwhile, Chinese immigrants ventured into the Western Malay States 
in search of tin and these mining communities developed into a major 
disruptive force in the Malay States, leading to major civil wars involving 
both the Malay Chiefs and Chinese miners. This brought to the fore the need 
for British control as a precondition for the growth of local commerce. A 
forward policy was therefore initiated by the Straits authorities for 
economic reasons, though Whitehall agreed to it in 1874 probably mainly to 
preclude intervention by other European Powers.^ The result was the Pangkor 
Treaty of 1874 signed by Governor Andrew Clarke, Abdullah (the British- 
appointed Sultan of Perak), and some of the Perak chiefs. Under this treaty, 
the Sultan agreed to accept a British Resident ’whose advice must be asked 
and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay Religion and 
Custom.1 Soon afterwards, Residents were similarly imposed on Selangor and 
Sungei Ujong.
The initial Anglo-Malay contact was disastrous, British plans to 
administer Perak were resisted not only by Sultan Abdullah but by almost all 
the other Malay Chiefs. Besides, the first Resident, J.W. Birch, was 
singularly unsuited for the task. Supremely tactless, contemptuous of Malay
5susceptibilities, and !a man in a hurry to carry Victorian light to Perak’, 
Birch pushed the Malay Ruler and Chiefs too hard and too fast which 
culminated in his murder in 1875* The so-called Perak War that followed 
re-established British control but halted the British forward movement till 
1880 when Sir Frederick Weld became Governor. Under his initiative, and 
supported by local officials and commercial interests, the forward movement 
resumed. To suppress local unrest in Negri Sembilan, a 'turbulant frontier' 
to Selangor and Malacca, British control was established in that state by 
1887. A year later, a Resident was forced on Pahang in order to open this 
'richest mineral state’ to ’commerce and civilisation' and to forestall
3fo re ig n  in te rv en tio n .^ *
D esp ite  th e  re p e a te d  warnings o f W h ite h a ll, th e  lo c a l  o f f i c i a l s  were
7
b e n t, from th e  o u ts e t ,  on ru l in g  th e  Malay S ta te s .  In  view of th e  absence 
o f a v ia b le  Malay a d m in is tra tio n  and o f th e  c h ao tic  c o n d itio n s  i n  th e  
s t a t e s ,  B r i t i s h  ru le  was unavoidable i f  th e  R esiden ts  were to  c a rry  out 
s u c c e s s fu lly  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of a sound ta x a t io n  system , m ain ta in  peace 
and o rd e r , and *open u p 1 th e  coun try . M oreover, th e  economic development of 
th e  s t a t e s ,  th e  most im portan t ta s k  in  th e  eyes of lo c a l  o f f i c i a l s  and 
commercial i n t e r e s t s ,  could not be r e a l is e d  w ithout an e f f i c i e n t  
a d m in is tra t io n . On h is  own i n i t i a t i v e ,  and backed up by th e  Governor o f th e  
Colony, th e  R esiden t proceeded to  e s ta b l is h  a c e n tr a l i s e d  European 
a d m in is tra tio n  in  th e  s t a t e .  While he excluded th e  R u le r from execu tive  
a u th o r i ty ,  th e  d i s t r i c t  a d m in is tra tio n  and th e  s ta t e  departm en ts, bo th  
c o n tro lle d  and d ire c te d  by B r i t i s h  o f f ic e r s ,  assumed th e  fu n c tio n s  and 
powers o f  th e  Malay C h ie fs . Only a t  th e  v i l la g e  le v e l  d id  th e  Penghulus 
( th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  Malay headmen) r e ta in  a la rg e  measure of a u th o r i ty  and 
in f lu e n c e . However, in c o rp o ra te d  in to  th e  European a d m in is tra tio n , th e  
Penghulu system  was su p erv ised  and c o n tro lle d  by th e  B r i t i s h .  In  o th e r  
words th e  R u lers  and C hiefs became in  p ra c t ic e  th e  a d v ise rs  to  th e  R esident 
and h is  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s ,  o p e ra tin g  la rg e ly  o u ts id e  th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  
m achine. As th e  r e a l  r u l e r ,  th e  R esident was under f a i r l y  t ig h t  c o n tro l and
g
su p e rv is io n  by th e  G overnor o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e ttle m e n ts .
N o n e th e less , th e  Malay S ta te s  were not annexed because of th e  
V ic to r ia n  p re fe ren ce  f o r  in fo rm al r a th e r  th an  form al r u le .  To th e  lo c a l  
a u th o r i t i e s ,  in fo rm a l ru le  was a ls o  p re fe r re d  because i t  enabled  them to  
m inim ise in te r f e r e n c e  by W h iteh a ll in  t h e i r  a d m in is tra tio n  of th e  s t a t e s .  
Both th e re fo re  con tinued  th e  myth th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  were in  th e  Malay S ta te s  
to  ad v ise  and te a c h  th e  R ulers and th e  Malay e l i t e  how to  govern th e  
coun try . As G overnor Robinson put i t  in  1878:
4The Residents have been placed in the Native States as advisers, 
not as rulers, and if they take upon themselves to disregard 
this principle they will most assuredly be held responsible if 
trouble springs out of their neglect of it.
After the Perak War the British endeavoured to legitimise their rule 
by associating the Malay elite with the new administration whenever 
convenient. The status and prestige of the Malay Ruler was therefore 
maintained and enhanced by increased wealth and by his role as the 
ceremonial Head of State. In the early days of Resident rule the Ruler and 
the Malay Chiefs enjoyed a vicarious sense of participation in the 
government since they were frequently consulted by the Resident. A minor 
attempt was also made to teach the Malay elite the art of modern 
administration. Malay Chiefs, for instance, sat as magistrates, and the two 
sons of ex-Sultan Abdullah, Raja Mansur and Raja Chulan, were sent to study 
at the Malacca High School and eventually joined the Civil Service. Perhaps 
the most significant instrument through which the Ruler and the Malay elite 
were brought into intimate association with the new order was the State 
Council. Though presided over by the Ruler, the State Council was 
dominated by the Resident who nominated its members and decided its agenda. 
In the early days of Resident rule, the Council helped to formulate 
policies, gave both the Malay members and the few Chinese representatives a 
real sense of participation in government, and provided the constitutional 
basis for Resident rule. By the 1890's, however, the increasing 
complexity of administration and the fact that the main lines of British 
policy had been determined reduced the State Council into a registering 
body for legislation and decisions taken in the state secretariat.^
The success of Resident rule was reflected in the remarkable increase 
in production, revenue and population. It was clear by the 1890's that 
Resident rule had passed its formative stage, and key local officials 
started to push the idea of a unification of the four states. Owing to the 
voluminous increase in administrative work, doubts arose as to whether the
5Governor could  con tinue to  cope w ith th e  P ro te c te d  S ta te s  in  a d d itio n  to
perfo rm ing  h is  d u t ie s  in  th e  Colony. More im p o rtan tly  th e  d e s ire  f o r  a
s p e e d ie r  economic development c a lle d  fo r  g r e a te r  u n ifo rm ity , economy and
e f f ic ie n c y  in  a d m in is tra tio n  which could be r e a l is e d  from a la rg e r
p o l i t i c a l  u n i t . 11 The immediate cause fo r  a f e d e ra t io n  o f th e  fo u r  s ta t e s
was th e  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  in  Pahang which had not been ab le  to  support i t s e l f
s in ce  i t  came under B r i t i s h  ru le .  By a fe d e ra t io n  o f th e  fo u r  s ta t e s  th e
B r i t i s h  aimed to  use th e  handsome su rp lu ses  o f P erak  and S elangor to  support
th e  p o o re r s t a t e s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  Pahang.12
The fe d e ra t io n  id ea  was f i r s t  ra is e d  in  th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  by a
ju n io r  o f f i c i a l ,  C .P. Lucas, ap p a ren tly  a f t e r  h is  d is c u s s io n  w ith  F.
12aSwettenham, R esiden t of Perak . I t  sought to  fe d e ra te  P erak , S e langor,
N egri Sem bilan and Pahang under a R esiden t-G eneral s ta t io n e d  in  Kuala
Lumpur. Swettenham was pushing th e  p ro p o sa l w ith  a view to  h is  own
prom otion to  th e  R esiden t-G enera lsh ip  and to  f r e e in g  h im se lf from c o n tro l by 
13S ingapore . I t  would appear th a t  Swettenham had th e  support o f h is  fe llo w  
R esiden ts  who a lso  chafed under th e  i n q u i s i t o r i a l  eyes o f  th e  S t r a i t s  
C o lo n ia l S e c re ta ry , W illiam  Maxwell. Though th e  fe d e ra t io n  p roposa l 
s p l i t  th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e , i t  was v i r t u a l ly  accep ted  by W h iteh a ll by 1894 
m ainly because o f th e  support o f  Lucas and Buxton, th e  P a rliam en ta ry  
S e c re ta ry . Buxton was a f irm  p ro ta g o n is t o f th e  id e a  th e n  in  vogue in  
B r i ta in  th a t  l a r g e r  p o l i t i c a l  u n i ts  denoted s tre n g th  and e f f ic ie n c y . 
Maxwell’ s id e a  of a c o n fed e ra tio n  o f th e  P ro te c te d  S ta te s  and th e  Colony, 
which had th e  su pport o f many S t r a i t s  o f f i c i a l s ,  th e re fo re  stood no chance 
of accep tance when i t  was propounded in  1894. ^
A y ear l a t e r  th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  a u th o rise d  th e  lo c a l  a u th o r i t i e s  to  
proceed w ith  th e  f e d e ra t io n  p ro p o sa l prov ided  th e  scheme d id  not im pair th e  
Governor’s a u th o r i ty  in  th e  S ta te s  and was ag reeab le  to  th e  Malay R u le rs . 
W ith rem arkable r a p id i ty ,  Swettenham secured th e  R u le rs ’ s ig n a tu re s  to  th e
6Treaty of Federation in July 1895. The Rulers were assured that the scheme
would neither diminish their powers nor encroach on the autonomy of their
states. Moreover, Swettenham advanced the idea that the Resident-General
would be a stronger representative than the Residents to support their
15interests and plead their cause against the authorities at Singapore.
The Federated Malay States (FMS) was inaugurated in 1896 and Swettenham was
appointed its first Resident-General. Till 1920, as we shall discuss in
Chapter Two, the British concentrated on building a centralised and highly
efficient federal administration in the FMS.
Though this study is confined to the FMS where British rule made its
greatest impact in the mainland, it is well to describe briefly the
extension of the Pax Britannica to Johore and the Siamese-controlled
northern Malay States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Kedah. During the
1880*3 and 1890's local ambition to bring the northern states under British
rule was blocked by the imperial government for fear that this might
provoke France into absorbing Siam. This would have brought French colonial
power in the Indo-China Peninsula to the frontier of British Burma and
caused the loss of British trade amounting to more than ninety percent of
Siam's external trade.^ However, a series of treaties with France and Siam
between 1896 and 1899 not only guaranteed the integrity of Siam proper (the
Menam Valley) but also ensured that no Third Power would be permitted to
secure a foothold in the northern Malay States with Siam's consent. The
way was therefore paved for bringing the northern states under British rule
in the 1900's in order to promote British commerce and avert foreign
intervention. Intervention was feared from Geraany which was then
challenging not only British global trade but also British naval supremacy
and which had attempted in 1900 to lease Pulau Langkawi from Siam to be used
17as a coaling station. The result was the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1902 
under which Siam had to appoint British officers from its own service as
7A dvisers i n  K elan tan  and Trengganu, whose ad v iso ry  power was s im ila r  to  th a t
o f an FMS R e s id e n t. Though Trengganu re fu sed  to  accep t an A dv iser, t h i s
t r e a ty  was a p re lu d e  to  th e  Anglo-Siamese Agreement o f 1909 which
t r a n s f e r r e d  th e  n o rth e rn  Malay S ta te s  to  B r i t i s h  r u le .  The d e s ire  to  curb
S u lta n  Ib rahim  of Jo h o re 's  a s p ir a t io n  to  f u l l  independence in  i n te r n a l
m a tte rs  a s  w e ll a s  B r i t i s h  am bition f o r  c o n tro l r e s u lte d  in  an A nglo-Johore
T rea ty  f iv e  y ea rs  l a t e r  which imposed on Johore a G eneral A dviser w ith  th e
18a d v iso ry  power o f  a R es id en t. Johore and th e  n o rth e rn  Malay S ta te s  came 
l a t e r  t o  be c a l le d  the  U nfederated  Malay S ta te s  (UMS). Hence though under 
u n i ty  o f c o n tro l ,  Malaya was s p l i t  in to  th re e  system s: th e  S t r a i t s
S e ttle m e n ts , th e  F ederated  Malay S ta te s  and th e  U nfederated Malay S ta te s .
The R ise o f a P lu r a l  Economy
The e s tab lish m en t o f B r i t i s h  ru le  was follow ed by an in f lu x  o f fo re ig n
c a p i ta l  and lab o u r which accounted f o r  th e  rem arkable economic growth in
P erak , S elangor and Negri Sem bilan. P o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  was r e s to re d ,  and
a European a d m in is tra tio n  h ig h ly  conducive to  the  development o f th e  s t a t e s
was e s ta b l is h e d . W ith a rem arkable degree of unan im ity , th e  R esiden ts
conceived t h e i r  c e n t r a l  ta s k  to  be .th a t o f ’opening up* th e  coun try  and
prom oting economic grow th. Hence l i b e r a l  land concessions and lo an s  from
s ta te  funds were g ran ted  Chinese and European m iners and p la n te r s  d u rin g  th e
l a t e  19th and e a r ly  20th c e n tu r ie s .  A ss is tan ce  was o ffe re d  Chinese
c a p i t a l i s t s  in  im porting  Chinese labou r m ain ly  from Kwangtung and Fukien ,
and in  1907 th e  government s e t  up an In d ia n  Im m igration Committee to
su p erv ise  and promote In d ian  im m igration to  Malaya. More th a n  h a l f  o f  th e
t o t a l  annual revenue o f  th e  s ta t e s  (amounting to  $5*4 m ill io n  in  1898) was
spen t on p u b lic  w orks. By 1909 $46 m il l io n  were spent on ra ilw ay s a lo n e , a
system  of 470 m ile s  l in k in g  P ra i  and S ingapore and p ass in g  th rough  th e  th re e
19W estern P ro te c te d  S ta te s .  Thousands o f b r id le  p a th s  and roads lin k e d  up 
th e  m ines, e s t a t e s ,  towns and a d m in is tra tiv e  c e n tre s  i n  th e  s t a t e s .  As
8Swettenham put it, this infrastructure made it profitable for Chinese and
western enterprise to exploit the mineral and agricultural potential of the 
20country. It contributed significantly to the rise of a thriving export
economy resting on the twin pillars of the tin and rubber industries, which
had emerged in the FMS by the second decade of the present century.
Up to 1900 economic development in the FMS represented chiefly the
21fruit of Chinese capital, skill and labour. The most significant industry
then was tin mining, a traditional Malay enterprise until it passed into
Chinese hands after the 1830fs. To meet the unprecedented demand for tin by
the tin-plate industry in Britain, Chinese miners ventured into Perak,
Selangor and Sungei Ujong in search of tin. The magnitude of this tin rush
was reflected in the fact that the Chinese population in Larut rose from three
in 1848 when the rich tin field was discovered to 20,000 in 1862. In the
19th century Chinese tin industry relied chiefly on open-cast mining and was
usually carried out by the tribute system. Under this system mine owners
leased out their mines to miners for a proportion of the output. The miners
were in turn financed and provided for by mines advancers, many of whom were
also the shopkeepers in the mining district, the tin-ore dealers, the owners
of revenue farms and at times the mine owners themselves. Assured of several
sources of auxiliary income, the mines advancers rarely lost in tin 
22ventures . Through this system the Chinese virtually monopolised the tin
industry for the first twenty years of British rule. This was realised
partly through control exercised by Chinese secret societies over Chinese
labour and partly because the abundance of shallow and easily accessible rich
tin deposits favoured their simple, flexible, and labour-intensive technique 
23and organisation. In addition the highly capitalised Western mines, which 
entered the industry in the mid-1880's, frequently collapsed because they 
were established on the basis of faulty prospecting. Out of a total 
production of nearly 40,000 tons in 1900, half of the world's tin output,
92  L
more th an  n in e ty  p e rcen t came from Chinese m ines. However, th e  European-
owned Stra its Trading Company succeeded in  edging out the Chinese smelters
25
and by 1910 was sm elting  f o u r - f i f t h s  of M alaya’s t in - o r e .
W estern  e n te rp r is e  began to  g a in  a fo o th o ld  in  th e  m ining in d u s try
after  1897. With the exhaustion of the shallow stanniferous s o i l ,  mining now
c a l le d  f o r  more advanced tech n iq u es  which could  mine a t  a g r e a te r  dep th .
This obviously favoured European miners with th e ir  large capital resources
and higher technological s k i l l .  Besides, by suppressing the Chinese secret
s o c ie t ie s  and a b o lish in g  th e  revenue farms in  th e  1 8 9 0 's , th e  government
c re a te d  a f r e e  labou r m arket, th e reb y  en ab lin g  Chinese la b o u re rs  to  seek
r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h e r wages in  European m ines. The b reak -th rough  f o r  European
e n te r p r is e  came w ith  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  dredge in  1912. The dredge made
i t  p o s s ib le  to  e x p lo it  swampy bu t r ic h  t i n  land u n p ro f ita b le  to  work o r
unworkable by p rev ious mining methods and to  re-w ork abandoned land  not
26exhausted  by Chinese m iners . Mainly owing to  d red g in g , European output
in c re a se d  from  1C$ o f th e  t o t a l  t i n  p ro d u c tio n  in  1900 to  36$ in  1920.^^
The 1920 's  w itnessed  a phenomenal in c re a se  i n  t i n  ou tpu t in  th e  FMS,
which rose  from 34,000 to n s  in  1921 to  67,000 tons in  1929. T his re s u lte d
from an unprecedented amount o f B r i t i s h  in v estm en t, e s p e c ia l ly  i n  th e  second
h a l f  of th e  decade when w estern  dominance in  th e  in d u s try  was e s ta b lis h e d .
World t i n  consumption in c reased  m arkedly d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d , p a ra l le le d  by
euphoria  o f unceasing  fu tu re  demand as w e ll as an i l l - fo u n d e d  f e a r  th a t  th e
world's t in  resources were being rapidly exhausted. In 1925 European mines
produced 44$ (Chinese -  56$) of the to ta l output, but th is  had increased to
2863$ (Chinese -  37$) by 1930. From 1925 onward the 100-odd European
companies a ls o  began to  be in te g ra te d  f in a n c ia l ly  and lin k e d  by in te r lo c k in g
directorates. For instance, the most important financial group, the Anglo-
Oriental Corporation, invested more than £7 m illion in Malaya in  the late
291920 's  and h e ld  sway over more th an  tw enty Malayan com panies. During th e
10
1930’s expansion in the tin industry was halted by various international
restriction schemes. It should be noted that the industry was in every sense
a Sino-British enterprise during the period under study.
During the last century Chinese also dominated the agricultural scene
in the protected states. Financed by Straits Chinese merchants, Chinese
planters owned nearly all the pepper and gambier estates in Selangor and
Negri Sembilan, the tapioca plantations in Negri Sembilan, and the sugar
30industry in Perak. The only crop introduced and nearly monopolised by
Europeans was coffee. Driven by the collapse of their coffee industry
because of disease, and wooed by the Malayan authorities, European planters
in Ceylon turned their activities to the protected Malay States in the late 
311870's. But after a short-lived boom in the early 1890‘s because of high 
prices arising from the temporary dislocation of the Brazilian coffee 
industry, coffee, together with sugar, pepper, gambier and tapioca began to 
be replaced by rubber after 1900.
The rubber seed was introduced to Malaya in 1877 but rubber remained
an experimental crop till the late 1890‘s. From 1888 onward R.N. Ridley,
Director of the Singapore Botanic Garden and a man of great determination and
vision, did much to popularise the rubber tree. He helped solve most of the
problems concerning rubber-planting, including inventing the ’herring bone’
tapping technique which allowed maximum tapping without damaging the bast of 
32the rubber tree. When the coffee boom collapsed in 1898 there was in
existence in the Malay States a group of professional European planters
33ready to cultivate rubber commercially. Hence many coffee estates and 
some gambier and pepper plantations were planted with rubber after that date. 
The rise of the rubber industry was then favoured by a strong demand for 
rubber by the motor-car industry in the West, an official policy geared to 
promoting plantation agriculture, and the existence of agency houses with 
intimate contacts with financial circles in London. For instance, during
11
the first rubber boom, 1905-1908, agency houses like Harrison and Crossfield 
floated a multiplicity of rubber companies in Malaya on behalf of London 
shareholders. By 1908 rubber had became Malaya’s chief export crop, its
01
acreage in the FMS having increased from 345 acres in 1897 to 168,048 acres.
The following decade witnessed vital changes in the rubber industry.
Apart from further expansion, most of the European companies began to be
amalgamated financially to reap the economics of scale. As in the tin
industry, the rubber industry came to be dominated by capital-intensive
European companies run mainly by agency houses on behalf of absentee owners 
35in London. Of the total estate area of 765,000 acres in 1921, about
36ninety percent was European-owned. Another crucial change was the rise of
Asian smallholdings in the rubber industry. Divided roughly equally between
Malays and non-Malays, rubber smallholdings in the FMS covered some 470,051 
37acres in 1921. There was no fundamental change in the structure of the
industry during the interwar years, and rubber expansion was halted by
various international restriction schemes after 1922. In brief, although
Malays had an important share in the rubber industry, the industry itself
was dominated by non-Malays, particularly Europeans.
During the 19th century, British policy did not seek to confine Malays 
38to rice cultivation. Nevertheless, padi-cultivation remained the mainstay
of the Malay economy and continued to be regarded as a way of life
surrounded by ceremonies and rituals. For one thing, the Malays preferred
the socially and materially more congenial life in the rice-field to that
39of a wage earner in the tin mine. The abundance of land and of Chinese 
(and later Indian) labour also enabled economic enterprise to operate 
independently of, and without disrupting, the Malay economy. However, 
important changes did occur within the Malay rice economy. Before British 
rule dry padi, grown on hill slopes as a shifting cultivation, was more 
important than wet padi planted in irrigated plots. Owing to official
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discouragement of all forms of shifting cultivation because of soil erosion, 
and to the marked decrease in the geographical mobility of the Malays, wet 
padi had almost completely replaced dry padi by the turn of the century. ^  
Furthermore, during the pre-British days the Malay economy was self- 
sufficient save for certain cash transactions in surplus foodstuff, tin and 
jungle produce. By the 20th century commercial agriculture had made some 
inroads into the Malay economy. Malays living near the town and the mines 
took to cash crops like fruits, vegetables, yams and coconuts to meet the 
demands of the immigrant l a b o u r e r s . T h i s  was both a forerunner to rubber 
smallholdings and to the combination of sawah (wet padi field) and kampong 
(where fruit trees were grown) that was officially considered the 1ideal 
homestead' in the interwar years. Finally, by the turn of the century the 
government began to be concerned about Malaya's marked reliance on imported 
rice to feed the large alien population. Hence the Krian irrigation scheme 
was constructed in the years 1897-1907, which transformed the Krian 
district, where cultivation was hitherto plagued by doughts, into one of 
Malaya's richest rice bowls. It brought nearly 50,000 acres under rice, 
thereby increasing the acreage in the FMS's foremost rice growing state of 
Perak to 75,000 acres in 1910. On the whole, however, the traditional 
pattern of Malay agriculture did not experience any fundamental change.
During the first two decades of the present century, state resources 
were devoted to creating the conditions conducive to the rise of the rubber 
industry. However official concern was aroused after 1910 by Malays taking 
increasingly to rubber mainly because rubber-planting required little 
capital, skill or labour but yielded a high margin of profit. British 
officials who had a genuine affection for the values and virtues inherent in 
Malay rural life feared that this might disrupt the Malay peasantry to the 
detriment of Malay interest. The government also sought to maintain a 
quiescent and contented rural base, a prerequisite, it believed, for the
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stability of British rule in the country. After the late 1920’s an adequate 
rice supply was further considered essential for the defence of the 
Singapore Naval Base and of Malaya in the event of a war with Japan whose 
growing sea power was seen as a serious threat. A policy was accordingly 
evolved to keep rice as a Malay preserve. As one pro-Malay official 
enuciated it in 1931s
The British, in their duty as trustees for the Malay people, 
demands that we administer the country on lines consistent 
with their welfare and happiness, not only for today but for 
the future ages. That end will be attained rather by 
building up a sturdy and thrifty peasantry living on the lands 
they own and living by the food they grow than by causing them 
to forsake the life of their fathers for the glamour of new 
ways ... to abandon their rice fields for new crops which they 
cannot themselves utilise and the market for. which depends on 
outside world conditions beyond their orbit. *
To this end, Malay youths were offered a free primary Malay
vernacular education which aimed to
improve the bulk of the people, and to make the sons of the 
fisherman or peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant 
than his father had been, and a man whose education will 
enable him to understand how his lot in life fits in with the 
scheme of life around him.^
This was reinforced by a land and agricultural policy which was intended to
confine Malays to padi-cultivation. The Rice Lands Enactment of 1917, for
instance, empowered the Residents not only to impose a rice-cultivation
condition on Malay-held lands but also to prohibit the alienation of
potential rice lands for other crops. Such laws did check the spread of
rubber smallholdings among Malays. The government also refused to alienate
A5land to non-Malays for rice-cultivation during the interwar years. The 
non-Malays, on the other hand, did not appear to be interested in the rice- 
industry, except during the slump of the early 1930’s, because it was the 
least profitable of Malayan industries. Finally, the government locked up 
the bulk of the Malay-held lands as Malay reservations. Under the Malay 
Reservation Enactment of 1913, no land within a reservation might be 
alienated, mortgaged or sold to a non-Malay. Initially enacted to prevent
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Malay ancestral lands from slipping into the hands of foreign rubber 
speculators, the law was widened in 1933 to include reserving sufficient 
land for future generations of Malays.^ The significance of the reservation 
policy is clear from the fact that by the late 1930!s there was practically
in
no land left in the Federated Malay States for alienation to non-Malays.
In short, the government succeeded in preserving the Malay rice economy and 
the continued strength of the Malay peasantry.
The interwar years witnessed two attempts to expand rice-cultivation 
in the FMS. The first was a response to the rice crisis in the early 1920’s 
brought about by crop failure in India and Siam and by a ban on rice export 
from Burma. This crisis cost the government $42 million, a third, of its
1 Ö
accumulated reserve. But the drive for rice self-sufficiency was 
abandoned during the boom of the mid-1920's. Lands brought under rice during 
the food crisis was re-planted with rubber, and the laxity with which the 
cultivation restrictions were enforced allowed Malays to plant rubber in 
many Malay reservations and a considerable portion of state land.^ The 
greater depression of the early 1930’s, with its attendant widespread 
distress among Malay rubber smallholders, led to the second and more 
sustained campaign for rice self-sufficiency. The more stringent enforcement 
of planting clauses, reinforced by rubber restriction, effectively checked 
the spread of rubber smallholdings among Malays. To expand rice acreage and 
improve irrigation in existing rice fields, a Drainage and Irrigation 
Department was established in 1932. In the 1930’s improved irrigation 
increased the rice acreage in Krian by more than 10,000 acres. At the same 
time irrigation work was also started to convert swampy lands in Sungei 
Manak and Batang Padang in Perak and Tanjong Kajang and Panchang Bedina in 
Selangor into rice lands. Owing to these and other measures, the rice 
acreage in the FMS increased from about 174,000 acres in 1930 to around 
210,000 acres at the close of the period under study. Moreover, yield per
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50acre had increased from 193 gantangs in 1925 to 301 gantangs in 1940.
However, rice continued to be a Malay preserve, and Malays were self- 
sufficient in rice. The non-Malay population, on the other hand, still 
relied on imported rice which amounted to more than half of the rice consumed 
in the FMS.
The existence of a plural economy is reflected in the 1931 population 
census.
TABLE 1
Employment by Race in the FMS^
Europeans Malays foyareürt, seMalaysians Indians
Fishermen 5,715 307 7,291 56
Rice Planters 
Rubber Estate Owners,
- 78,009
1,803
11,113 1,038
910 1,514
1,892
Managers, etc. 1,121 58
Others in Rubber 
Cultivation - 27,618 20,825 100,789 131,099
Coconut Estate Owners, 
Managers, etc. 11 744 669 23 9
Others in Coconut 
Cultivation 
Unclassified and
- 4,262 5,982 1,256 8,010
Multifarious
Agriculture
23 18,168 7,381 16,115 9,883
Tin Mine Owners, 
Managers, etc. 48 8 214 -
Others in Tin Mining 282 543 465 70,704 4,622
Proprietors and 
Managers of Business 246 475 574 16,894 4,428
Salesmen, Shop 
Assistants, etc. 144 541 105 16,576 3,790
It is clear from the Table that though rubber and coconut smallholdings had
53made significant inroads into the Malay economy, Malay activities centred
on the Sawah-kampong combination. The overwhelming majority of the Indians
worked in rubber estates as wage labourers. The export economy was
dominated by the Europeans and the Chinese. Furthermore, the Chinese
controlled the country's secondary industries (such as pineapple and saw
54mills), retail trade and market-gardening. In other words the Europeans
and the Chinese controlled the li*onTs share of the country's wealth
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55accuring from the rapid economic development under British rule.
Two economic systems existed side by side in the FMS namely, the
peasant economy of the Malay village and the export economy of the rubber,
tin and other industries. These were linked by an elaborate trading system
which imported and distributed foodstuffs and other goods from overseas and
collected, upgraded, packed and exported agricultural and mineral raw
materials to industrial countries, especially Britain and the United States.
At the apex of this system were the merchant firms, predominantly European,
at the sea ports and the wholesalers, predominantly Chinese, at the ports
and large inland towns. The points of contact between the Malay peasants
and the European and Chinese traders were the shopkeepers and local produce
dealers in the village. Chiefly Chinese, these middle-men bought rubber,
copra and surplus rice from the Malay peasants and provided the latter with
56consumer and other goods from overseas.
Socio-Political Change within the Plural Society
The remarkable economic growth, depending as it did on massive 
immigration from China and India, transformed the social landscape of the 
country. It is not intended here to examine in detail the plural society 
that had emerged under British rule, but only to describe briefly the major 
socio-political changes within it. The existence of this society is 
evident in the Table below:-
TABLE 2
Population by Race in the FMS^
Race 1921 1931 1941
Europeans 5,686 6,350 11,149
Malays & Malaysians 510,821 570,831 722,626
Chinese 494,548 711,540 989,635
Indians 305,219 379,996 466,056
At the apex of this multi-racial community was the small ruling caste 
of European (predominantly British) officials, miners, planters and
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businessmen who limited their role to * ruling, owing and managing'. Leading 
this group were the British administrators belonging to the Malayan Civil 
Service (MCS). These officials generally held themselves aloof from the 
European mercantile community because of their non-profit-making function 
and because of their middle-class origin which was higher than that of the 
majority of other Europeans. All Europeans, however, had a vested interest 
to maintain the status quo, coalescing into a single interest-group against
C Öany challenge to their position from the Asians. At all times the 
European commercial interests, owing to their dominance in the economy, 
exercised a powerful political influence on the colonial government.
The Malay Community
Below the European community lay the subject races, held together by 
British colonial policy, and each holding on to its culture and language, 
social institutions, economic functions and way of life. First and foremost 
were the Malays, the indigenuous people of the country, who are believed to 
have migrated to Malaya from Yunnan some 3 >000 years ago and driven the 
aborigines to the hills. In recent times successive groups of Menangkabau, 
Bugis, Mandeling and Javanese immigrants from the Archipelago settled in 
Malaya. They rapidly became assimilated to the local Malay community but 
made the Malay population as a whole a very mixed one. During pre-British 
days, Malays were scattered in villages along the banks of rivers, eking out 
a livelihood mainly from rice-cultivation and fishing. This riverine 
pattern of settlement was due to the existence of swamps and impenetrable 
forests over a large part of the country and to the fact that the rivers 
were a convenient means of communication and trade and a focus of political 
control. At the mouth or focal point of the river resided the territorial 
chief who was in charge of a district consisting of a number of villages.
He was assisted by minor chiefs and village headmen in administration, 
revenue-collecting and raising manpower for war or communal projects.
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U sually  o f  n o n -ro y a l o r ig in ,  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  c h ie f  was, as a r u le ,  th e  r e a l
r u le r  of th e  d i s t r i c t  s u b je c t to  paying p e r io d ic  obeisance and annual
59t r i b u t e  t o  th e  S u lta n . The S u ltan  was th e  h e re d ita ry  monarch o f th e  s ta t e  
which was made up of s e v e ra l  d i s t r i c t s .  He sym bolised th e  u n ity  of th e  
s t a t e ,  was th e  d e fen d er and a r b i t e r  of th e  Is lam ic  f a i t h ,  and took charge o f  
e x te r n a l  r e la t io n s  and d e f e n c e .^  S ince th e  S u ltan  was r a r e ly  more th an  a 
c h ie f  of th e  ro y a l d i s t r i c t ,  h is  im portance la y  m ainly in  h is  r i t u a l  and 
symbolic r o l e s . ^  I t  was in  th e  in te r e s t s  o f th e  c h ie fs  to  p re se rv e  th e  
S u lta n a te  as  a b a s is  f o r  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  v is - a - v is  one an o th e r and fo r  th e  
la rg e r  p o l i t i c a l  u n it  w ith  i t s  advantages fo r  tra d e  and d e fen ce .
The above system  p re v a ile d  in  Perak , S elangor and Pahang bu t d if f e r e d  
from th e  m a tr i l in e a l  system  in  Negri Sem bilan. In  N egri Sembilan (a 
c o n fed e ra tio n  o f n ine  s t a t e s )  each v i l la g e  c a lle d  a p e ru t ( lin e a g e )  was 
peopled by Menangkabau im m igrants r e la te d  by common d escen t and headed by an 
ib u  bapa ( v i l la g e  headm an). A number of lin e a g es  formed a d i s t r i c t  c lan  le d  
by a lembaga ( lin e a g e  head) e le c te d  by th e  ib u  bapas. The lembagas in  tu rn  
e le c te d  th e  fo u r  Undangs (law  g iv e rs )  fro n  among members of th e  o r ig in a l  
s e t t l e r s  c a l le d  W aris N egri (H eirs of th e  C ountry). Each o f th e  fo u r  Undangs
was in  e f f e c t  a so v ere ig n  in  h is  own s t a t e  even though he was under th e
_ 62o v e rlo rd sh ip  of th e  Yam Tuan B esar, th e  R uler of th e  co n fed e ra tio n .
The p o l i t i c a l  system  in  N egri Sembilan as w e ll a s  in  th e  o th e r  s ta t e s  
was b a s ic a l ly  p re se rv ed  by B r i t i s h  p o lic y . This p o lic y  was in te n s i f i e d  
during  th e  in te rw a r  y ears  owing to  th e  d e s ire  to  enhance in d i r e c t  ru le  in  
th e  FMS because of B r i t i s h  s e n s i t iv i ty  to  r e l a t iv e  Malay backwardness and to  
th e  in flu en c e  o f Lugard, th e  a r c h i te c t  of in d i r e c t  ru le  in  N ig e ria .
A lthough no r e a l  a ttem p ts  were made to  b rin g  th e  R ulers in to  th e  a c tu a l 
a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  s t a t e s ,  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  sought bo th  to  encourage th e  
R u lers to  ta k e  a more i n t e l l i g e n t  in te r e s t  in  p u b lic  a f f a i r s  and to  enhance 
t h e i r  p re s t ig e  and s t a t u s .  The aim was to  s tre n g th en  th e  Malay base of
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colonial rule as well as to utilise Malay political institutions as a buffer
between the Chinese and Government, thereby furthering the policy of
excluding the former from a share of political power in the country. Towards
this end steps were taken to modernise the Sultanates through an English
education mainly provided in the elite Malay College at Kuala Kangsar. In
the 1930's marriages between Malay royalty and European ladies, rendered
likely by the former's closer contact with Europe and Britain, were
officially discouraged. Such marriages were considered inimical to the
prestige and status of the Malay ruling class. To strengthen the
apparatus of traditional court hierarchies, the British also revived or
filled many court posts, long fallen into disuse, in Perak., Selangor and 
65Pahang. In Negri Sembilan the policy in the 1930's was to encourage the 
Undangs and lembagas to refer questions of Malay custom and religion to the 
Yam Tuan though the latter exercised no such authority according to custom. 
Above all, the Rulers were generously provided for primarily to help them 
keep up their pre-eminent position through ostentious competition with the 
more wealthy non-Malay commercial classes.^
On the whole the Rulers enjoyed larger incomes and had more dignity 
under colonial rule than when they were independent monarchs of separate 
Malay States. Their authority and status was also enhanced vis-a-vis the 
territorial chiefs who were emasculated under British rule. Not only were 
the Malay aristocrat^ less generously supported by the government but those 
trained in the traditional order were no longer competent to do more than 
assist in minor incidents in village life. Only those who made good through 
an English education, usually acquired at the Malay College, continued to 
play an active part in the government as members of the Malay Administrative 
Service (the junior a m  of the MCS) or of other services. Despite these 
changes, British policy succeeded in preserving the Malay feudal order.
Malay society therefore continued to be divided generally into two
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classes: an upper class of rulers, aristocrats and syeds (who were regarded
as the descendants of the Prophet Mohamed) and a subject class of 
predominantly Malay peasants. Based on birth, this class system was so
Zo
strictly adhered to that social mobility between the classes was negligible.
By keeping Malays on the land, British policy succeeded in isolating and
insulating Malay peasant society from the socio-economic forces transforming
the rest of the country. The bulk of the Malays therefore continued to live
in largely self-supporting villages in which the tenor of life was
substantially similar to that of early times. Leisure was highly valued in
Malay village life, and there was strong communal disapproval of any
68excessive wealth on the part of individuals. This attitude was reinforced
by a religious outlook, fostered by the mosque or surau where village
religious life was centred, which asserted that the rewards of the good
69muslims would be reaped in the next world. As of old, Malay villagers
continued to demonstrate their wealth by expensive marriage, circumcision,
70funeral or religious celebrations. Though British rule had ended debt-
slavery and removed petty oppression by the Chiefs and much of the
insecurity of life in early times, it had not affected the peasants' deep-
rooted and habitual attitude of obedience to the Rulers and the traditional
elite. Rather, pressure from the alien races tended to drive Malays in
search of safeguards for their customary way of life in traditional forms
and authority. Hence in addressing a member of the ruling class, Malay
commoners still observed certain forms of linguistic usage designed to
71emphasie their lowly status. While better communication and news media
had made Malay peasants conscious of the world beyond the village, their
emotional allegiance still lay with the Rulers and the states.
Malay society, however, did undergo important socio-political changes 
72in the 20th century. These changes were conditioned by Malay acute 
awareness that the control of nearly all aspects of life in the FMS had
21
slipped into non-Malay hands. The first movement to counter this was
essentially a religious movement of the evangelical modernist type based on
73the teachings of the renowned Egyptian reformer, Mohammed Abduh. Known as 
the Kaum Muda, this reformist movement was initiated by urban Arab, Arab-
rj)
Malay or Jawi Peranakan' leaders closely associated with Penang and
75Singapore and found strong support within the urban Malayo-Muslim community;
in the Peninsula, its strongholds were Negri Sembilan, Malacca and probably
76Trengganu. As a panacea to Malay backwardness, the Kaum Muda advocated a
progressive muslim education which would enable Malays to understand the true
doctrines of Islam and to compete effectively in the modern world. However,
its innovatory doctrines such as the equality of men, freedom for women and
religious practices guided by akal (reason) challenged the customary
authority of the Rulers, the traditional elite and the religious
77establishment known collectively as the Kaum Tua.
The ensuring controversy between the two groups which found expression 
in the newspapers and religious journals helped disseminate Kaum Muda ideas. 
The most important agency for spreading its influence, however, was the 
madrasah (the reformist religious schools) established throughout Malaya.
From these institutions came many Malay teachers and religious activists in 
the Malay villages. The Western States, especially Negri Sembilan, also 
fell under the influence of Sumatran immigrants sympathetic to the 
Indonesian Sarikat Islam. This along with the influence of the movement to 
form social and progress associations to uplift Malay welfare after the 
mid-1920's turned Kaum Muda’s interest to secular matters. For instance, 
apart fron intense proselytising, the Kaum Muda group in Lenggeng, Negri 
Sembilan, which was led by two Sumatran reformists, Haji Selami and Haji 
Akam, drew up a detailed program to form a »Persekutuan Melayu Lenggeng1 
(Malay Association of Lenggeng). The idea, however, came from two Malay 
clerks on leave from Kuala Lumpur., the hub of Malay socio-political
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78activities at the time. This was a kind of co-operative aiming to own and
run shops, sawah and kebun (rubber smallholdings) in the state and promote
the Kema.juan (progress) of its members. ' It was minor figures like Haji
Selami and Haji Akam, with their challenge to the status and even the income
of established ulamas, who spread the Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua controversy to most
80villages in the Peninsula. Though the Kaum Muda failed to gain mass
support, the controversy it aroused represented the most important
modernising force within Malay society during the first quarter of the
present century. Apart from stressing an ethnic and religious unity wider
81than local patriotism, the Kaum Muda significantly helped Malays realise 
the urgency of modernising their society in the face of the non-Malay 
challenge.
To understand the response of the Kaum Tua, it is necessary to note
that it was in the sphere of Malay custom and especially Islam that the
Rulers and the traditional elite played an active part under British
indirect rule. Deprived of powers in practically all aspects of
administration, they devoted their attention and energy to the only field -
custom and religion - left to them under treaty. They were actively
supported by the Government because their efforts in this sphere reinforced
British policy to strengthen the basis of Malay political and social
institutions. By the second decade of the present century, the Malay Rulers
had established an elaborate machinery run by religious officials for the
systematic enforcement of Islamic law and the propagation of religious
82doctrines in the states. Since such centralisation of religious authority
was absent in pre-British days, the Rulers' authority over religious matters,
subject to considerable British control obtained through legislation and 
83finance, J had by then immensely increased.
The reaction of the Rulers to the Kaum Muda challenge was, therefore, 
direct and sharp. Firstly, they resorted to the use of authority to suppress
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Kaum Muda activities. The Mohammedan Law Enactment of 1904, for instance,
was enforced to prevent reformist leaders from speaking in mosques and 
84public bodies. In 1932 the Rulers even succeeded in persuading the 
government to amend the Seditions Publications Ordinance so that action could 
be taken in t^ he Colony against publications directed against them. Though 
the British at times approved of the progressive character of the Kaum Muda, 
they opted for stability by supporting the Sultans. For instance, the 
Resident considered the co-operative scheme of the Lenggeng Kaum Muda an 
excellent idea and was convinced that the reformist movement was not
gc
communist as frequently alleged by official Islam. J Yet he banished Haji
Selami and Haji Akam to Sumatra because their activities were considered
disruptive of village peace and tending to foster disloyalty to the Ruler.
Secondly, and more constructively, the Kaum Muda intensified the
Rulers' activities in the sphere of religion. Efforts were made to improve
Koran and religious instruction in the Malay schools in the FMS. In
Selangor the Sultan even wrote a book for a course of instruction on
religion, morality and ethics which replaced traditional Koran instruction
86in Malay schools after 1933. To counter the spread of Pan-Islamic
doctrines from abroad, he also obtained the support of the other FMS rulers
to form a Religious Advisory Board to deliberate over any religious question
87referred to it by the Rulers. Its unanimous interpretations of doctrinal
questions were, after receiving the Rulers' approval, published for the
guidance of all muslims in the states. Most significant of all, the Rulers
secured more financial grants from the government to increase the number of
mosques in the states. Mosque administration was also reorganised and
improved in Perak and Selangor. For instance, in 1923 the Sultan of
Selangor established a single system of mosque administration consisting of
a mosque committee in each mukim, a district committee in each district,
88and a state committee for the whole state. The overall result of these
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endeavours, reinforced by the spread of Malay education, tended by the 1930's 
to turn Malays into 'good Mohammedans' who would adhere to the doctrine of 
Islam at the expense of adat (custom). Hence, steps taken to counter the 
Kaum Muda challenge had the ironical effect of revising to seme extent the 
aim of the reformists. From the point of the government, it was also 
ironical that the Rulers and their advisers now manifested a desire for 
greater independence from external authority in respect of religion.
Predicting that in the not too distant future a clear definition of the 
treaty clause - 'matters relating to the Mohammedan religion' - would be 
necessary, the Resident of Perak advised the government in 1935 to take
90tentative steps towards a separation of the ecclesistical and civil courts.
In other words, though the Kaum Muda failed to weaken the Kaum Tua's authority 
over religious matters, important changes did occur in this sphere during 
the interwar years.
By the mid-1920's Malays turned more directly to political questions.
The central concern of the Malay intelligentsia remained the alien
domination of the country. However, they concentrated on organising
cultural, welfare and progress associations which aimed to improve Malay
91educational and economic status. Overt political activities were under­
taken by Malay students in Cairo who had adopted a strongly anti-colonial 
posture. In Malaya communist activities among Malays were started in 1926
by prominent Indonesian communist refugees in Singapore such as Tan Malaka,
92Moesso and Alimin. Their initial failure, ascribed to racial and social
barriers among the races, persuaded these communists to organise front
organisations to woo Malay support. A Malay League Against Imperialism,
therefore, worked closely with the Chinese communists and made some head-
93way in Muar and Batu Pahat until it was smashed by the police in 1930.
In that year a Rahman Abdul Rahman, believed to be Bassa, the Chinese­
speaking Javanese colleague of Ho Chi-Minh, gathered in Singapore all the
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communist organisers from Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Trengganu to discuss
the formation of a Malay Communist Party independent of the Chinese-dominated
Malayan Communist Party (MCP).^ The plot was crushed by the police and all
the organisers, except Rahman, were arrested. The police followed up its
success by breaking up a communist organisation led by a Malay Committee of
Four believed to have 500 members in the Kuala Pilah District of Negri 
95Sembilan. These blows crippled communist influence within the Malay 
community.
The more important change after the mid-1920*s, therefore, concerned
the rise of an autochthonous intelligentsia educated mainly in the Sultan
Idris Training College and of a westernised bureaucratic elite trained
chiefly in the Malay College. Though strongly under the influence of the
Indonesian nationalist movement, the former, owing to lack of confidence, did
not take to direct political action but devoted their attention to a critical
analysis of Malay society and to developing a Malay literature. Neither did
the westernised elite, who were hampered by their intimate association with
both the traditional elite and British rule. However, British efforts to
restore a measure of power to the Malay elite under a decentralisation policy
in the early 1930's, coupled with a parallel demand by the Chinese for
political rights in the Federated Malay States, gave the incipient Malay
nationalist movement an overtly political orientation. Until 1937 the only
national Malay organisation was the Sahabat Pena (Brotherhood of Pen Friends),
a social body designed to promoting Malay unity, language and literature
96through the pages of the reformist newspaper, Saudara.
As discussed in latter chapters, the abandonment of the pronounced 
pro-Malay posture by government and a shift in official policy to meet non- 
Malay political aspirations after 1935 aroused strong Malay concern that 
unless they organised themselves their interests might be lost by default* 
Hence, the Brotherhood of Pen Friends gave way to political and quasi-
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political organisations after 1937. On the one hand, radical Malays trained
in the Sultan Idris Training College or in Cairo joined forces to found the
Young Malay Union or the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM). Led by Ibrahim Yaccob,
Ishak bin Haji Mohammed and Othman bin Abdullah, the KMM strongly opposed
both the 1bourgeois-feudalist1 traditional order and colonial rule. Its
ultimate aim was an independent Malaya through union with Indonesia, a
reflection of the influence of Indonesian nationalism. This radical
movement enjoyed no mass support, and in practice its activities were
97confined to Kuala Lumpur. The more important development was the rise of
quasi-political Malay State Associations organised by the westernised
bureaucratic elite. Enmeshed as they were in the feudal structure, they
relied upon the British, the Rulers and the traditional establishment to
defend Malay society from alien domination until such time as Malays could
98compete on equal educational and economic terms with non-Malays. They 
evinced little interest in the political unification of the Malay States or 
in working for a self-governing Malaya. Though they failed to merge into a 
Pan-Malayan organisation, the various associations provided both the 
leadership and the organisational framework for a popular movement after 
the Second World War.
The Non-Malay Community
Important socio-political changes also occurred within the non-Malay 
community during the interwar years. One of these was the stabilisation of 
their number, which was realised chiefly through immigration restriction. 
During the 1920's the government continued to pursue an 'open-door* 
immigration policy mainly because of the acute labour shortage in the tin 
and rubber industries. However, there was an official tendency to prefer 
Indian to Chinese labour in essential services such as Public Works because 
Indians were considered more politically reliable and an increase in their 
number would help counter-balance the Chinese preponderance in the country.99
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The depression in the 1930's persuaded Sir Cecil Clementi to enact in 1932
100an Aliens Ordinance directed solely at Chinese immigration. Restriction
was now considered advisable because the rush for economic development was
over and the country was less dependent than previously on immigrant labour.
The main reason behind the bill, however, appeared to be Clementi1s desire
to contain Chinese, especially Kuomintang (KMT) political influence in the
country. Through this law, the government regulated Chinese immigration to
Malaya by periodic quota. Meanwhile, the influx of Indians continued till
May 1938 when the Government of India imposed a ban on emigration of non-
manual Indians to Malaya in response to a unilateral wage cut affecting
101Indian estate labour. By 1940, Chinese and Indian immigration to Malaya 
had been reduced to a trickle. This development was not offset by any large- 
scale immigration from the Netherlands East Indies. In the 1930's the Rulers 
and the Malay newspapers urged this, but in vain because of the unfriendly 
attitude of the Dutch authorities, the prohibitive cost involved, and the 
official fear that Indonesian immigrants would prefer becoming independent 
smallholders to working as estate labourers. Thus, the population balance 
between the races was stabilised, making the FMS (and Malaya) a classic 
plural society.
Within this society now emerged a non-Malay domiciled population. This
sociological change was implicitly recognised in 1922 when the FMS Annual
Report noted the healthy tendency among the immigrants to make Malaya their 
102home. After the war, more women and even families migrated to Malaya 
resulting in a marked improvement in the sex-ratio and in the numbers of 
local-bom in the non-Malay community. This trend was encouraged by the 
government which, for instance, exempted Chinese women immigrants from the 
operation of the Aliens Ordinance until 1938 in order gradually to eliminate 
the social evils commonly associated with an unbalanced population. 
Furthermore, by the 1920’s non-Malays of all classes had acquired an economic
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TABLE 3
103Sex-ratio and Percentage of Malaya-born in the FMS
Race No. of Females to Males Per 100
1921 1931
% of Malaya-bom
1921 1931
Chinese
Indians
35
40
50
48
17 29
11 22
and social stake in the country.
But as a community, the non-Malays were still regarded officially as
transient. This was re-affirmed by the Population Census Report of 1931
which warned that it was dangerous to infer from the statistics of birth and
sex ‘a tendency to permanent settlement1 on the part of non-Malays. This
thesis was debunked during the slump when it became clear that an Indian
domiciled population existed in Malaya, a fact which might have remained
concealed indefinitely in normal circumstances. Despite hardships, low wages
and even unemployment, the bulk of the Indian labourers resisted repatriation
to India. This compelled even the pro-Malay Resident of Selangor, T.S. Adams,
who sought to perpetuate the Indians as a floating labouring force, to admit
grudgingly in 1935 that there were 90,000 domiciled Indians in the FMS
(250,000 in all Malaya) whose homeland was Malaya and who would go to India 
105only for a visit. If this was true of the Indians, how much truer it must 
be of the Chinese who had a lower migrational turnover, a higher percentage 
of local-bom, a better sex-ratio and a greater economic stake in the country. 
The government recognised this but gave no estimate of the Chinese domiciled 
population in Malaya. According to a former British official, Victor Purcell, 
the local-bom formed a third of the Chinese in the country in the 1930*s.^^
This development not only had a significant impact on socio-political 
changes within the non-Malay communities but also presented the government 
with many delicate political questions. The nature of these problems was not 
spelt out officially, but the government was aware at least of some of them.
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107As the Govemo-High Commissioner, Sir Shenton Thomas (1935-42), ' put it in
1935i the future needs of the 250,000 domiciled Indians warranted very-
serious considerations. The Controller of Labour, in agreement, referred to
’the procession of the Chinese school children on (the) Coronation Day (of
the British King which) have opened many eyes to the problems ahead of 
10ÖMalaya’. As shall be discussed in later chapters, British policy after
1935 tended to accommodate non-Malay aspirations such as admission to the
government service. However, the British refused either to introduce a
common citizenship granting non-Malays political rights or admit them to the
MCS on the ground that they were aliens in a Malay country. In reply to the
request of an Indian Federal Councillor in 1936 for the admission of
domiciled non-Malays to the MCS, Sir Shenton Thomas boldly asserted:
This is the sixth country in which I have served, and I do not 
know of any country in which what I might call a foreigner - 
that is to say, a native not a native of the country or an 
Englishman - has ever been appointed to an administrative 
post.“
In other words, to escape fron the delicate and complicated problems posed 
by the presence of a sizeable domiciled non-Malay community, the government 
deliberately adhered to a policy of drift. There was, after all, no urgency 
in the matter in the absence of any organised form of non-Malay dissent. On 
the contrary, any attempt to share political rights with the domiciled non- 
Malays would have aroused bitter and vociferous opposition fron the Malays 
who regarded all non-Malays, local-bom or otherwise, as aliens ineligible 
for such rights.
(i) The Chinese
Though Chinese first settled in Malacca in the 15th century, their 
numbers did not substantially increase until after the mid-19th century. 
During the period under study, the Chinese dominated the urban areas, and the 
big towns in the FMS were in many ways ’Chinese worlds'. However, the 
majority of Chinese were rural-based (61.5$ in 1931), scattered in isolated
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tin mines, rubber smallholdings and estates, and in mixed farms near the 
towns - regions generally away from the Malay kampongs and from the Indian 
coolie lines in European estates. The Chinese community was in many ways 
homogeneous, the diverse social classes being bound together by their plebian 
origin and their migrant experience. Almost all the Chinese millionaires 
such as Tan Kah Kee, Lee Kong Chian, Aw Boon Haw, rose from rags to riches, 
heading banks, mercentile houses, mines and estates not only in Malaya but 
often in Southeast Asia as well. Wealth however had not created class 
consciousness among the Chinese, and it was not uncommon to find Chinese 
towkays sharing meals with their employees at the same table during business 
hours or rubbing shoulders with workers as equals at social functions.
However regional, dialect and occupational differences divided the
Chinese into various groups. For instance, members of a trade often formed
a trade guild to safeguard their interests and negotiate with the government
over matters of canmon concern. Those from the same region in China
frequently formed village or province associations, and others with similar
surnames grouped into clan associations.^^ At the apex of these
organisations was the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC) dominated by Chinese
tycoons, who sought to promote the unity of overseas Chinese and Chinese 
112commerce. These organisations invariably attempted to advance the economic 
interests of their members, and their ability to co-operate, together with 
Chinese industry, expertise and drive, accounted not only for Chinese economic 
strength but for the racial exclusiveness of Chinese enterprise.
On the basis of their wealth, the CCC tycoons were the leaders of the
China-born Malayan Chinese. Though usually Chinese-speaking, foreign-born
and China-oriented, these leaders did play a fairly important part in the
11 qChinese Advisory Boards, Sanitary Boards and other official bodies. They 
were essentially community leaders and social workers.^'^4' One of their most 
important contributions in this field was to Chinese education.
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The modern Chinese school grew out of the Shu Po She (Reading Rooms)
started by the KMT after the Chinese Revolution. Taken up with great zeal by
Chinese business leaders, Chinese education spread throughout the country.
By the 1920*s, there was in nearly every major town and village a Chinese
vernacular school maintained by voluntary subscriptions from the Chinese 
115community. Chinese education aimed “to keep the young and rising
generation of Chinese as fully Chinese as possible and to vigilantly prevent
them from being denationalised“. " ^  It was modelled on the education system
in China which had as its cultural basis the teachings of Sun Yat Sen. The
Chinese schools relied totally on textbooks imported from China which dealt
117almost exclusively with China and Chinese culture. The overwhelming
majority of Chinese school teachers consisted either of China-bom (53# in
1935) or of local-bom Chinese whose outlook and sentiments had been moulded
in the same nationalistic schools in Malaya or China. Some of them were
political activists, others nursed a bitter resentment against foreign
ascendency in China, but one and all were pro-China. It was in these Chinese
schools that 85# (33*826 in 1936) of the Chinese student population obtained
a primary education. For secondary and higher education, those who could
afford it, enrolled in institutions in China, especially Chi Nan College and
Amoy University. Together with a larger number of China-bom educated in
China, the local school graduates constituted the majority of literate
118Chinese in Malaya. They had little in common with the minority of English- 
educated Chinese, and were noted for their China-oriented outlook and pride 
in their ethnic origin.
This development reinforced the fact that since the turn of the century, 
the attention of Malayan Chinese had been drawn increasingly to politics in 
China. Wooed by the famous revolutionary, Sun Yat Sen, Malayan Chinese 
generously helped finance the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and demonstrated 
their enthusiasm for it by cutting off their queues. A strong link was thus
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dramatically forged between Malayan Chinese and China*s political development
which lasted for the next three decades. During this time, continuous
efforts were made by the Nanking Government to turn their sympathies, thoughts
and allegiance to China. In doing this, the Chinese Nationalists had in
mind the generous financial contributions Malayan Chinese might make to
China1s national reconstruction as well as the desire to preserve the Chinese
119heritage and culture and improve the welfare of overseas Chinese in general.
But irrespective of these overtures, Malayan Chinese responded readily and
enthusiastically to developments in China. They felt the unequal treaties,
extraterritoriality, and alien occupation of the treaty ports in China to be
120wounding to their national pride. In all this, they saw something akin
to the beleaguered position of overseas Chinese in many Southeast Asian
countries, where periodic anti-Chinese outbursts were common. Hence, Malayan
Chinese, except probably the Straits-born, sympathised with the Chinese
nationalist movement and maintained close touch with China. This was
demonstrated frequently and in various ways. In 1926, for instance, Malayan
Chinese subscribed generously to the building of the Sun Chung Shan
Memorial Hall in Nanking and floated a loan of $30 million for Chiang Kai-
shek' s northern expedition. From time to time, Japanese aggression against
China led to Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods in Malaya, but the short
duration of such episodes earned the Chinese the Japanese-coined epithet "the
121five-minute enthusiasts". These activities reached their apogee during
the Sino-Japanese War which erupted in 1937. Several hundred technicians
and skilled artisans from Malaya volunteered for service in China. The
Chinese organised 207 “Save Nation Associations" and by November 1940 had
donated $146 million for the war effort, of the total of $228 million
122from overseas Chinese throughout the world. As Sir Lawrence Guillemard
put it, Malaya "might almost be described as a business and intellectual
123outpost of modern China."
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I t  i s  th e re fo re  not s u rp r is in g  th a t  th e  KMT, a branch o f th e  
N a tio n a l is t  P a rty  o f  China, was th e  most s ig n i f ic a n t  p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n is a tio n  
among Malayan Chinese during  th e  in te rw a r y e a r s .  Founded in  December 1912 
by Sun Yat Sen’s fo llo w e rs , th e  KMT was banned in  th e  Colony two y ears  l a t e r  
and rem ained moribund in  th e  FMS u n t i l  a f t e r  th e  War. T h e re a f te r  th e  p a r ty  
expanded r a p id ly , e s p e c ia l ly  fo llow ing  Chiang K a i-sh ek ’s trium phan t n o rth e rn  
e x p e d itio n  which re u n if ie d  China in  th e  mid-1920’s .  A part from a 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f p a r ty  b ran ch es , th e  p a r ty  ex e rc ise d  s tro n g  in f lu e n c e  in  
Chinese sch o o ls , Shu Po She, Chinese newspapers and tra d e  g u i ld s . Alarmed 
th a t  i t  m ight c re a te  an “ Imperium in  Im perio“ among Malayan C hinese, th e re b y  
endangering  B r i t i s h  ru le  in  M a l a y a , t h e  B r i t i s h  banned th e  KMT in  th e  FMS 
in  192$. But i t  remained f o r  S i r  C ec il C lem enti, as High Commissioner 
(1930-34), to  suppress i t  e f f e c t iv e ly  in  1930. T h is , coupled w ith  th e  
d e c lin e  o f Chiang*s p o s it io n  in  China owing t o  a s p l i t  in  th e  N a tio n a l is t  
P a r ty  i n  th e  e a r ly  1930*s ,  rendered  th e  KMT la rg e ly  in a c t iv e  t i l l  th e  S in o - 
Japanese War in  1937. The p a r ty  th e n  recovered  some o f i t s  in flu en c e  bu t 
does no t appear t o  have again  alarm ed th e  lo c a l  a u th o r i t i e s .
At th e  tim e Clem enti crushed th e  KMT, i t  had 16 b ranches, 113 sub-
125branches and 287 sec tio n a l-b ra n c h e s  w ith  a t o t a l  membership of 12,469.
Most o f  th e se  members came frcsn th e  m id d le -c la ss  C hinese, com prising
jo u r n a l i s t s ,  s c h o o l- te a c h e rs , s k i l le d  a r t i s a n s  and shopkeepers. The KMT
stro n g h o ld s  were th e  tra d e  g u ild s  in  S elangor and Perak which were a c t iv a te d
126by Sun Yat Sen in  1919» The p a r ty ,  however, was le d  by a few b u s in ess  
le a d e rs ,  th e  most n o tab le  being Teo Eng Hock, Teh Lay Seng and Tang Sze S h a t. 
I t  may be assumed th a t  because o f t h e i r  C h in a-o rien ted  o u tlo o k , th e  m erchant 
c la s s  as a whole sym pathised w ith  th e  aims o f th e  KMT s in ce  th e  p a re n t p a r ty  
was th e  government of China. T his seems to  be r e f le c te d  in  th e  s tro n g  
in f lu e n c e  ex e rc ise d  by th e  KMT in  th e  Trade D iv is io n  of th e  Perak Chinese 
Chamber o f  Commerce and in  th e  a ttem pt in  1931 by th e  le a d e rs  of th e
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Singapore Chinese Chamber o f  Commerce to  re o rg a n ise  th e  chamber along KMT 
127l i n e s .  Government p re ssu re  fo rced  th e  c lo su re  of th e  Trade D iv is io n  and 
th e  abandonment o f th e  proposed re o rg a n is a tio n . In  g en e ra l th e  merchant 
c la s s  re fu sed  to  a s s o c ia te  w ith  th e  KMT m ainly because t h e i r  prim ary in te r e s t  
la y  i n  t h e i r  b u s in esses  and not in  p o l i t i c s .  They fe a red  th a t  i t  m ight harm 
t h e i r  commercial i n t e r e s t s  to  an tag o n ise  th e  government by jo in in g  an i l l e g a l  
o rg a n is a tio n  l ik e  th e  KMT. At tim es c o n f l ic t  between th e  tra d e  g u ild s  and 
th e  Chinese Chambers o f Commerce, e s p e c ia l ly  in  S e langor, and p a r ty  p re ssu re  
on in d iv id u a ls  fo r  s u b sc r ip tio n  and on Chinese newspapers fo r  conform ity 
d iscouraged  involvem ent w ith  th e  KMT. R e f le c tin g  t h i s  s ta t e  of a f f a i r s ,  th e  
A ssoc ia ted  Chinese Chambers o f Commerce of Malaya kep t p o l i t i c s  o u ts id e
128t h e i r  sphere of a c t i v i t i e s ,  a p o lic y  h ig h ly  approved by th e  government.
The lack  o f b u siness le a d e r s 1 support must have s e r io u s ly  r e s t r i c t e d  th e
in flu en c e  o f  th e  KMT in  Malaya in  view o f the  immense in flu en c e  commanded by
129th e  form er w ith in  th e  Chinese community. Furtherm ore, th e  p a r ty  had no 
support among S tr a i ts - b o r n  C hinese.
A le s s  s ig n if ic a n t  group o f Chinese e x tre m is ts  were a c t iv e  in  
re v o lu tio n a ry  p o l i t i c s  in  Malaya. They f i r s t  m an ifested  them selves in  th e  
a n a rc h is t  movement, which drew i t s  fo llow ing  e x c lu s iv e ly  from young and 
d isco n ten te d  Chinese school te a c h e rs .  I t  ex e rc ised  l i t t l e  in flu en c e  in  
Malaya, and i t s  only  n o tab le  deed was a bomb ex p losion  in  th e  Chinese 
P ro te c to ra te  o f f ic e  a t  Kuala Lumpur in  1925 which in ju re d  two B r i t i s h  
o f f ic e r s .  More im portan t were communist a c t i v i t i e s  which began from th e  
a l l ia n c e  between th e  KMT and th e  Chinese Communist P a rty  (CCP) in  1924? when 
th e  l a t t e r  was persuaded by Tan Malaka to  send i n f i l t r a t o r s  to  Malaya.
These a g i ta to r s  worked under th e  cover of th e  KMT in  th e  hope of s h e lte r in g  
them selves under th e  p ro te c t iv e  wing o f th e  Nanking Government. T h e ir  aim 
was t o  overthrow  th e  c a p i t a l i s t  and c o lo n ia l i s t  system in  Malaya as p a r t  of 
th e  'p r o le ta r ia n  w orld r e v o lu t io n '.  These a g i ta to r s  were led  by a group
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called the Main School whose anarchistic activities centred in the private 
130night schools. Inspired by the Kheng Ngai Revolutionary Alliance, a
branch of the Chinese Communist Party which captured Hainan in 1926, the
Main School activists formed the Nanyang General Labour Union a year later.
This was an amalgamation of various small Hailam labour unions. Led by
Cantonese and chiefly Hailam leaders, the communist movement in the 1920's
relied almost completely on the support of the Hailam proletariat - house-
131boys, estate coolies, occasional skilled workers and seamen.
Following the KMT-CCP split in 1927, the various Main School groups
were welded into a Southsea Provisional Commission of the Chinese Communist
Party. At the same time the Chinese Communist Party, in co-operation with
the Comintern, laid down certain policy guide-lines which were to determine
communist policy in Malaya throughout the next decade. Instructed to drop
its anarchist tactics, the Malayan communists were instead advised to
concentrate on exploiting economic grievances before proceeding to attack
the political system. To be effective, they were henceforth to base policy
on the Malayan objective situation rather than on conditions in China as
hitherto. Finally, the communists were directed to woo Malay and Indian
support. As a prelude to carrying out these directives, the Southsea
Provisional Commission was replaced by a Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in
1930. But the arrest in 1931 of a Comintera agent, Duoronx, who was sent
to help reorganise the party, was followed by the round-up of twenty-four
133key communist leaders. This crippled the MCP throughout the depression.
After 1935 the MCP began to revive partly through exploiting the 
growing consciousness of workers for increased wages and better working
T O  I
conditions. J It was able to organise a co-ordinated strike by rubber 
estate labourers in Negri Sembilan and Selangor and by miners in Batu Arang 
in 1937. The latter strike threatened to paralyse essentially services and
a large part of the tin-mining industry and had to be crushed by the police. 135
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After 1937 the MCP further expanded its influence by riding on the wave of
Chinese patriotism that had arisen in Malaya over Japan’s invasion of China.
Through the Anti-Enemy Backing-up Society, the communists penetrated Chinese
schools, associations clubs and other forms of corporate life. Thus at the
close of the period under study, the MCP had gained a fairly strong foothold
136in the Chinese schools and the labour unions.'" The communists remained 
almost exclusively Chinese but were now drawn from nearly all dialect groups 
within the Chinese community.
Important political changes also occurred within the domiciled Chinese
community. This was most evident among the Straits-bom Chinese,
descendants of the early Chinese settlers in Malaya and intensely pro-British.
Most of the Straits-bom Chinese, by education and environment, were
divorced in ideas and sentiments from the China-born and the first-
137generation Malayan-born Chinese. It was within the Straits-born Chinese
community that political attitudes were most complex and varied. Owing to
the impact of Chinese nationalism, some of the Straits-bom Chinese became
re-sinicised in the sense that they re-learned the Chinese language, and
138came to know and admire Chinese culture more. J To that extent they had
become more Chinese in outlook. Others developed a deep and strong
attachment to the Colony. In 1931 Lim Cheng Ean, a prominent Straits-born
Chinese, succinctly put forward this point as follows:
The Chinese came to the land years ago and worked as coolies.
The early Chinese cleared all the jungles and brought the 
country to its present civilised form just as the Indians, the 
Europeans and the Malays have done. This is their country.
You should identify yourself with the interests of the people 
and the government of this country. If you do not wish to do 
so you are free to pack your belongings and go back to China 
leaving we the Straits-born Chinese here alone so that our 
position may not be jeopardised.
In accepting British nationality, Lim emphasised, the Chinese British Subjects 
should back the Empire in the event of a war between Britain and China. From 
such sentiments emerged a nascent sense of political loyalty to Malaya, which
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found ex p re ss io n  in  th e  id e a  o f a U nited Malaya w ith in  th e  B r i t i s h  Em pire. 
F i r s t  vo iced  by Lim Boon Keng in  1920, th e  id e a  was subsequen tly  propounded 
w ith  g r e a te r  in te n s i ty  and coherence by Tan Cheng Lock in  th e  S t r a i t s  
S e ttle m e n ts  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil.
Though sm all in  numbers, th e  S tr a i ts - b o rn  were th e  le a d e rs  of th e  
dom iciled  Chinese community. They were led  m ainly by su c c e ss fu l 
p ro fe s s io n a l  le a d e rs  who were in te n s e ly  conscious o f th e  s ta tu s  and i n t e r e s t s  
o f th e  lo c a l-b o rn  and dom iciled  in  Malaya. The s tro n g  in flu en c e  th e se  
p e r s o n a l i t ie s  ex e rc ised  w ith in  th e  Chinese community was p a r t ly  d e riv ed  from  
th e  prom inent ro le  they  p layed  in  th e  F ed e ra l C ouncil, S ta te  C ouncils , 
M u n ic ip a li t ie s ,  S a n ita ry  Boards and o th e r  o f f i c i a l  b o d ies. To an im p o rtan t 
degree th e y  th u s  became spokesman f o r  Chinese i n t e r e s t s .  F urtherm ore, to  
th e  e x te n t th a t  th e  S tr a i ts - b o rn  le a d e rs  sought to  s tren g th en  th e  p o s i t io n  
and s ta tu s  of th e  Chinese v is - a - v i s  th e  Malays, th e y  enjoyed th e  su p p o rt o f 
C hina-born business le a d e rs .  Hence in  1932 th e  A ssocia ted  Chinese Chambers 
of Commerce threw  in  i t s  support f o r  t h e i r  demand fo r  an u n o f f ic ia l  m a jo r ity  
in  th e  F ed era l C ouncil and fo r  Chinese adm ission to  th e  MCS.'^4'^ Such 
demands r e f le c te d  th e  growing in t e r e s t  among th e  dom iciled  Chinese a f t e r  
th e  m id-1920’s fo r  a g re a te r  say  in  a d m in is tra tio n  and government th a n  th e y  
had h i th e r to  en joyed. In  o th e r  w ords, th e  S tr a i ts - b o r n  le a d e rs  championed a 
tre n d  o f development which was in c re a s in g ly  to  challenge th e  M alays' 
p o l i t i c a l  s ta tu s  in  th e  FMS.
( i i )  The In d ian s
Like th e  C hinese, In d ian s  had s e t t l e d  in  th e  Malaya P en in su la  s in c e  
e a r ly  tim e s , and th e re  was a s iz e a b le  In d ian  se ttlem e n t in  M alacca in  th e  
15th cen tu ry . But i t  was not u n t i l  th e  l a t e  19th c en tu ry , e s p e c ia l ly  w ith  
th e  r i s e  of th e  rubber in d u s try , th a t  In d ian  im m igrants flooded  in to  th e  
Malay s t a t e s .  More th an  n in e ty - f iv e  p e rcen t o f Malayan Ind ian s  were Tamils 
of th e  low est c a s te  from South In d ia . The m a jo rity  o f them were ru ra l-b a s e d
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(75.3$ in  1931), m ostly  l iv in g  in  la b o u r l in e s  o f European rubber e s t a t e s .
The Tamil lab o u rin g  c la s s  had l i t t l e  in  common w ith  and was d iv o rced  from 
th e  non-labouring  groups which co n sis te d  o f va rio u s  North In d ia n  communities, 
as w e ll a s  some T am ils, M alayalees and Muslims. P o l i t i c a l ,  economic and 
s o c ia l  in f lu e n c e  w ith in  In d ian  s o c ie ty  was monopolised by a c o te r ie  of 
m erchan ts , f in a n c ie r s ,  c h e t t i a r s ,  law yers, and d o c to rs  belonging  to  th e  sm all 
commercial and p ro fe s s io n a l c l a s s . B u t  re g io n a l and p e rs o n a li ty  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  th e  la ck  o f common experience  o r o u tlo o k , and even c u l tu r a l  
b a r r ie r s  d iv id ed  t h i s  upper c la s s  in to  numerous m utually  a n ta g o n is tic  
f a c t io n s .  W ith in  th e  commercial group , which a lre a d y  kep t very  much to  
i t s e l f ,  e x is te d  a v i r t u a l ly  s e lf -c o n ta in e d  c h e t t i a r  community w ith  i t s  own 
s o c ia l  and r e l ig io u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s . " ^  The p ro fe s s io n a l m id d le -c la s s , on th e  
o th e r hand, was s p l i t  in to  r a d ic a ls  and c o n se rv a tiv e s , I n d o - c e n tr ic is ts  and 
th o se  whose lo y a l ty  was d iv id ed  between In d ia  and Malaya. In  a d d itio n  
In d ian  and Ceylonese n a tio n a lism s  d iv id ed  th e  In d ian s  and the  Ceylonese 
( c h ie f ly  shopkeepers and government c l e r i c a l  w orkers) in to  two r i v a l  groups 
squabbling  over th e  q u estio n  of re p re s e n ta tio n  in  th e  le g i s la tu r e  and
T I O
o th e r  o f f i c i a l  organs, J The In d ian  community was th u s  c h a ra c te r is e d  by 
a la ck  of le a d e rsh ip  and a h igh  degree of fa c tio n a lism . As a community, th e  
In d ian s  formed a lower c la s s  in  Malaya and were h e ld  in  m ild  contempt a l ik e  
by both Europeans and o th e r  A sians.
There d id  not e x i s t  an In d ian  Problem in  prewar Malaya. The In d ian  
masses remained unorganised  p o l i t i c a l l y  o r  in  tra d e  un ions. Accustomed to  
c e n tu r ie s  o f d o c ile  acceptance o f a u th o r i ty ,  and in c a p a c ita te d  by t h e i r  
i l l i t e r a c y  o r  by a su b -stan d a rd  v e rn acu la r ed u ca tio n  geared to  p rep a rin g
I  i  C
them as a g r ic u l tu r a l  la b o u re rs ,"^ ^  In d ia n  e s ta te  w orkers could no t a s p ire  
t o  a l i f e  beyond th e  rubber e s ta te s ,  th e  toddy-shops and th e  c o o lie  l i n e s .  
W ith lim ited  o p p o r tu n itie s  o f i n t e r - e s t a t e  movement and none w hatsoever o f 
occu p a tio n a l m o b ility , th e y  became members o f a v i r t u a l ly  c lo sed  e s ta te
39
social s y s t e m , W i t h i n  this system, the Indian or Ceylonese Kerani 
(clerks) and supervisors, who might have provided the leadership, 
deliberately kept aloof from the labourers. On the other hand the Kangany 
(the recruiting agents) the effective leaders of the Indian coolies, were 
too deeply entrenched in the estate bureaucracy to adopt an anti-establishment 
line. Hence, though the Indian labourer became more conscious of his rights
t in
and no longer stood in awe of authority by the late 1930's, ' the absence
of an independent leadership drawn from within the estate system remained
T» Ö
the major obstacle to the political mobilisation of the Indian masses.
This was reinforced by a policy of excessive supervision and paternalism
towards the labourers on the part of the Departments of Labour and Health
and of the planting community, Indian politics in Malaya was therefore
restricted to the commercial, professional and clerical classes, who evinced
strong sympathies with Indian nationalism. To an important extent, the
government succeeded both in isolating their influence within their own
circle and preventing it from spreading to the Indian masses. It took
drastic steps to prevent, whenever possible, the entry into Malaya of Indians
capable of leadership or political agitation, especially Northern Indians
who were subjected to specially stringent immigration r u l e s , P o l i t i c a l
“delinquents" were harassed, recalcitrant editors of Indian newspapers
150admonished, and suspected political agitators banished to India, In this 
way the government circumscribed the influence of Indian nationalism in 
Malaya,
Indian politics was primarily India-oriented and mirrored events in
India. For instance, during the non-cooperation movement in India in the
early 1920's, subscriptions were collected for the Tilak Swaraj Fund, and
photographs of Tilak and Gandhi graced many Indian homes, clubs and
151associations in Malaya, A. small group of United Province Indians, Bombay 
merchants and students in the King Edward VII Medical College in Singapore
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even tried to call a boycott of the ^rince of Wales’ visit to Malaya in
1922.^^ Like the KMT of China, the Indian National Congress (INC) wooed
Malayan Indian subscriptions, but such donations, as expected, never came
anywhere near to Chinese contributions to China. As defined by the various
Annual Conferences of Indian Associations in the 1920,s, the role of the
middle-class was one of championing the cause of the Indian labourers in 
153Malaya. Hence, Indian political groups in Malaya concentrated on Indian
emigration and the treatment of overseas Indians - an issue Indian
nationalists regarded as a blot on their national pride. They frequently
petitioned the Government of India to utilise its control over Indian
emigration to Malaya as a trump card to force the planting community to
concede increased wages and better conditions of service to Indian estate
labour. But Malayan Indian opinion was not organised during the 1920's and
was generally ignored by the local government and the planting interests.
Two political forces emerged among the Indians in the 1930's. This
was mainly a response to the rising tide of Indian nationalism in India and
to the depression with its attendent wage cuts among estate workers. It
was also motivated by what was regarded as a pro-Malay policy of the early
1930's which aimed to enhance the Malay role in public life and preferred
154Malays for the administration. In 1936 Indian leaders, assisted by the
Malayan Agent of the Indian Government, formed the Central Indian
Association of Malaya (CIAM) to safeguard and promote Indian interests in
155Malaya. 'A pure reflection of the INC' led by Indian professional and 
especially business leaders, the CIAM was a federation of sixteen existing 
Indian associations and chambers of commerce. Since politics was one of 
its avowed aims, the CIAM may be regarded as the first Indian political 
party in Malaya. However its attention was focused on improving the wages, 
education and housing conditions of Indian coolies. Though it failed to 
achieve any substantial improvement in these matters, the CIAM did add to
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the mounting tide of condemnation in India of Indian overseas emigration
and help keep Indian opinion informed of the latest development in the
treatment of Malayan Indians. When the planters slashed the coolies-1 wages
in 1938, it sent its president, N. Raghavan, to India to agitate for a ban
on Indian emigration to Malaya. Apparently these activities increased the
fear of the Indian Government of widespread unrest which led, as already
noted, to a total stoppage of non-manual Indian emigration to Malaya in
1938. The other group consisted of radicals drawn from the younger
generation of lawyers, doctors, journalists and teachers who openly worked
in opposition to the local government for reasons derived from Indian 
156politics. While the moderate CIAM concentrated on passing resolutions
and appealing to the Indian Government for action to counter the 1938 wage
cut, the radicals took to direct protest among the workers on the occasion.
Their most notable activity, led by an Indian journalist named Nathan, was
the first large-scale strike by Indian labourers in the Klang rubber estates 
157in 1941. It would seem, therefore, that the way was cleared for the rise 
of the Indian National Army during the Japanese Occupation, a Malaya-based 
Indian organisation seeking to liberate India from British colonialism by 
military means.
In conclusion it should be noted that there existed by the 1930's a
small group of local-born, English-educated and predominantly professional
158Indians who took pride in calling themselves ^traits-bom'.  ^ It was from 
this group that Indian demands for admission to the MGS, democratic 
constitutional reform and a Malayan citizenship were most loudly voiced. 
However, their Malaya-centred interest was overshadowed by similar demands 
advanced by other Indian groups and by the Indian Government. It also tended 
to be obscured by the fact that the loyalty and allegiance of these 
'Straits-born' Indians were split between India and Malaya. On the whole, 
they were far less important as champions of the domiciled non-Malay
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community than the Straits-bom Chinese,
Conclusion
The establishment of British rule in the FMS in the late 19th century 
led to the assumption of political power by the British. A prosperous and 
wealthy export economy based on the rubber and tin industries was also 
created by non-Malay capital, skill and labour. By the turn of the century 
the Malays were left far behind in the political sphere by the British, and 
in the economic sphere by the Europeans and the Chinese. At the same time 
the social landscape had been so radically transformed that the Malays were 
now a minority in their own country. The socio-political changes within the 
Malay community during the interwar years were therefore conditioned by 
their acute consciousness of their relative backwardness and of the 
challenge posed by the non-Malays, especially the Chinese. On the other 
hand, such changes among the non-Malays were mainly determined by events in 
India or China. However, there had emerged by the 1930's a sizeable 
domiciled non-Malay community desiring a share of political rights in the 
FMS. Before we examine British Malay policy against this background, we 
must first look at the administrative system of the Federation.
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CHAPTER TWO
British Rule in the FMS
British rule in the FMS is generally regarded as belonging to the 
system of administration called indirect rule. This system was officially 
accepted only after the so-called Perak War in 1875 when it gained a forceful 
exponent in the person of Frank Swettenham. Swettenham was mainly motivated 
by the vast political advantages that would accrue to the government from 
the legitimatisation of the new regime through the support and close 
association with it of the traditional Malay leaders. Besides, it was a 
cheap way to govern the states and, in the long run, to initiate refonns.^ 
Indirect rule, as Swettenham envisaged it, meant the preservation of Malay 
society and the governing of the states through indigenous leaders and 
institutions. In this sense British rule in the 19th century, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, was not indirect. The Rulers and Chiefs were cut 
off from the line of authority and were advisers to the British operating 
outside the administrative machine. The government was conducted through an 
European administration controlled and directed by British officers from the 
district level upwards. However, it was indirect to the extent that the 
Rulers and Chiefs were closely consulted and given a sense of participation 
in the government, that an attempt was made to teach them the art of m o d e m 
administration, that Malay interests were accommodated whenever advisable, 
and that the Malay hierarchies, such as the Penghuluship, were preserved and 
used.
After the FMS came into being in 1896, a föderal administration was 
established which was likewise British-controlled and directed. The 
rapidity with which this was erected showed that British officials were more 
interested in economic development than in ruling the country through 
traditional leaders and institutions. However, during the second decade of
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the present century, an important shift in colonial thinking occurred in
London and Malaya, British officials came increasingly under the influence
of Lugard who propounded the theme that colonial rule in Africa could be
made mutually beneficial to the British industrial classes as well as the
Africans, and that it was the duty of civilised administration to fulfill
2this dual mandate. The administrative system through which this dual 
mandate was to be realised was the system of indirect rule. At the same 
time Malayan officials became acutely conscious that in the rush for rapid 
economic development the Malays had been left far behind and had not been 
trained to play an active part in the administration of the FMS. This shift 
in colonial thinking was especially marked after 1918 since the First World 
War undermined the notion of the righteousness of empire and shook European 
confidence to some extent in the superiority and supremacy of the West.
Hence Milner, Amery, Omsby-Gore, the leading men in the Colonial Office for 
the greater part of the inter-war years, and top British Malayan officials 
sought to enhance indirect rule in Malaya.
However, in doing this the government was forced to grapple with the 
problems arising from the presence of dynamic and economically aggressive 
non-Malay communities in the FMS. Their presence imposed on British 
indirect rule the role of reconciling the legitimate interests foreign 
capital and the non-Malay communities with British treaty obligations to the 
Malays. Furthermore, British indirect rule was considered helpful in 
training the Malays to compete more effectively with the non-Malays in the
3economic and political spheres. Having taken for granted the long-term 
character of colonial rule in Malaya, the British did not regard indirect 
rule as an instrument by which they could lead the Malays to self-government. 
In fact the British believed that the introduction of any form of self- 
government would eventually bring the Malays under the domination of the 
non-Malays, especially the Chinese. Hence, to leading officials in London
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and M alaya, th e  m oral j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  in d i r e c t  ru le  in  th e  FMS was th a t  i t  
was th e  s tro n g e s t safeguard  a g a in s t t h i s  u n d e s ira b le  developm ent. In  h is  
famous ’Malay M onarchies’ speech in  th e  F edera l Council in  1927, High 
Commissioner C lif fo rd  d ec la red
These s t a t e s  were, when th e  B r i t i s h  Government was in v ite d  by 
t h e i r  R u lers and C hiefs to  s e t  t h e i r  tro u b le d  houses in  o rd e r , 
Mohammadan M onarchies; such th e y  a re  tod ay , and such th ey  must 
con tinue  to  b e . No mandate has ev er been extended to  us by 
R a jas , C h iefs o r People to  vary  th e  system o f government . . . .  
and I  f e e l  i t  incumbent upon me to  emphasise . . . .  th e  u t t e r  
in a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o f any form o f dem ocratic  o r popu lar government 
to  th e  c ircum stances o f th e se  s t a t e s .  The adoption  o f any k ind  
o f  government by m a jo rity  would fo r th w ith  e n t a i l  th e  com plete 
submergence o f th e  indigenous p o p u la tio n , who would f in d  
them selves h o p e le ss ly  outnumbered by fo lk  o f o th e r  ra c e s ;  and 
t h i s  would amount to  a b e tra y a l  o f th e  t r u s t ,  which th e  Malays 
/"h ad  reposed_J in  H is M ajesty ’s Government.
I r r e s p e c tiv e  of B r i t i s h  s in c e r i ty  in  t h i s  l in e  o f reaso n in g , t h i s  d e c la ra t io n
only se rves to  h ig h l ig h t  th e  sharp  d ivergence between th e  th eo ry  and
p ra c tic e  o f B r i t i s h  ru le  in  th e  FMS.
The F edera l A d m in istra tion
Though th e  T rea ty  o f 1896 pu rp o rted  to  have c rea ted  a fe d e ra t io n  o f
Malay s t a t e s ,  i t  p rovided no d iv is io n  o f  power between th e  c e n tr a l  and th e
s ta t e  governm ents. The FMS was th e re fo re  no t a genuine fe d e ra t io n  b u t was
m erely a dev ice  to  secure  g re a te r  u n ifo rm ity , e f f ic ie n c y  and economy. A fte r
i t s  fo rm ation , B r i t i s h  p o licy  sought to  develop th e  s ta t e s  on u n i ta ry  l in e s
w ith th e  hope th a t  th ey  would co a lesce  to  form sep a ra te  d i s t r i c t s  o f a
B r i t i s h  P ro te c to ra te  w ith a uniform  system o f a d m in is tra tio n , a common
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t re a s u ry  and a s in g le  l e g i s l a tu r e .  T his p o lic y  was re in fo rc e d  by th e  
sp read ing  network o f ra ilw a y s , roads and telecom m unication which speeded up 
both o f f i c i a l  b u s in ess  and economic grow th. The rap id  r i s e  o f th e  ru bber 
in d u s try  and th e  fu r th e r  expansion o f th e  t i n  in d u s try  a lso  ex erted  
in c e ssa n t p re s su re  on th e  government to  c e n t r a l i s e  th e  a d m in is tra tio n . The 
c o n tin u a tio n  of t h i s  p o lic y  was unavoidable d u rin g  th e  F i r s t  World War when 
th e  FMS su ffe red  acu te  shortage  o f B r i t i s h  o f f ic e r s  a r is in g  from th e
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d e p a r tu re  o f younger men to  th e  European war f r o n t .  Hence to  a l l  in te n ts
and purposes, th e  goa l o f B r i t i s h  p o lic y  during  th e  y ears  1896-1920, was a
p o l i t i c a l  union o f th e  fo u r Malay s t a t e s .
As a m ajor s te p  tow ards t h i s  g o a l, a R esiden t-G eneral was appo in ted  to
head th e  FMS. Under th e  F ed e ra tio n  T rea ty , th e  R esiden t-G eneral was a
re p re s e n ta t iv e  o f th e  B r i t i s h  Government ’whose adv ice must be follow ed in
a l l  m a tte rs  o f a d m in is tra tio n  o th e r  than  th o se  touch ing  th e  Mohammadan
r e l i g i o n . ’ He was expected to  t r a v e l  e x te n s iv e ly , to  keep in  touch  w ith  th e
R u le rs , R esiden ts  and a l l  m a tte rs  o f a d m in is tra tio n . Through h is  o f f ic e ,
th e  F edera l S e c r e ta r ia t ,  he i n i t i a t e d  works in  th e  FMS and ensured
u n ifo rm ity  and c o n tin u ity  of p o lic y . The Resid e n t-G eneral now rep laced  th e
C o lo n ia l S e c re ta ry  in  S ingapore both  as a channel o f communication between
th e  R esiden ts and th e  Governor and as th e  c o -o rd in a tin g  agent o f f in a n c ia l ,
l e g i s l a t i v e  and o th e r FMS a f f a i r s .  Both th e  R esiden ts and th e  heads o f
fe d e ra l  departm ents took in s t r u c t io n s  from and were re sp o n s ib le  to  him fo r
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th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f t h e i r  s t a t e s  and departm ents r e s p e c tiv e ly . In  s h o r t ,  
th e  R esiden t-G eneral was th e  c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e  o f f ic e r  in  th e  FMS su b je c t only 
to  th e  High Commissioner. Under th e  A dm in is tra tiv e  Scheme he had to  secure  
th e  l a t t e r ’s san c tio n  fo r  d r a f t s  o f proposed l e g i s l a t i o n ,  e s tim a te s , c e r ta in
Q
c la s s e s  o f appointm ents and expen d itu re  exceeding $5 ,000 .
Frank Swettenham, th e  f i r s t  R esid en t-G en era l, was 'a  man o f  tremendous
e b u llie n c e  and energy ' who was noted fo r  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  re a lism , sea rin g
o
am bition and in te n se  egotism . As mentioned in  th e  p rev ious c h ap te r , he 
advanced th e  F ed e ra tio n  id ea  in  p a r t  to  f r e e  h im se lf from th e  c o n tro l o f 
S ingapore. D uring h is  term  o f o f f ic e ,  1896-1899, he s tro v e  to  become a 
quasi-independen t head of th e  FMS and succeeded to  a g re a t e x t e n t . ^  He 
th e re fo re  s e t  a precedence which h is  successors, except T reacher, c lo se ly  
fo llow ed . The th i r d  Resid e n t-G en era l, "William T aylor, an o th er s e l f - w i l le d  
but unpopular f ig u re  among th e  R esid en ts , t r i e d  to  run th e  FMS along th e
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lines of a Crown Colony. Under his tight and centralised control, the
Residents found it extremely difficult to influence the federal administration.^
Though the title of Resident-General was changed to Chief Secretary in 1910,
as we shall see, the powers of the FMS chief executive officer remained
unimpaired. To a substantial degree, Chief Secretary Edward Brockman (1911-
20) continued as the quasi-independent head of the FMS. During his time it
was generally recognised that the Chief Secretary was de facto senior to the
Colonial Secretary. He enjoyed a higher salary and was entitled to wear the
second-class Civil Service uniform as against the third-class uniform of the
12Colonial Secretary.
That successive Resident-Generals (later Chief Secretaries) were able 
to retain a substantial degree of independence was due to two main factors. 
Firstly, the Administrative Scheme failed to define clearly the respective 
powers of the Resident-General, and the High Commissioner. Except for those 
matters which needed the sanction of Singapore, an assertive and determined 
Resident-General could refer to the High Commissioner as little as possible 
and thus allow the latter hardly any initiative in FMS affairs. Besides, 
there was no executive council to hamper him from below in the exercise of 
his authority. On the other hand, the absence of a division of authority 
between the Federation and the States permitted the Resident-General to 
centralise powers in his own hands. As Sir John Anderson, High Commissioner 
1904-11, described it, the Resident-General 'had to such a very large extent 
power to overrule the Residents that he became practically the final 
authority (in the FMS)'.^
The Resident-General stood at the apex of an elaborate federal 
administration at Kuala Lumpur, which began to be constructed under 
Swettenham. Among the most significant measures he took towards this end 
was the amalgamation of the four state civil services into a unified service. 
Henceforth the FMS Civil Service rivalled its counterpart in the Colony in
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size and importance.^4- Swettenham also appointed several federal officers
such as the Legal Adviser and the Financial Adviser who by 1903 were heads
of full-fledged federal departments or of departments in the process of being
federalised. It was Swettenham*s contention that federal departments were
compatible with state individuality and would not destroy initiative. 'I
do not think it will do so here,' he asserted, 'if the Federal officers use
their authority as it is intended it should be used, that is, rather as
inspectors and advisers to the local officers than as the heads of 
15departments'. The truth of the matter was that even in his time the
Federal Officers had begun to exercise executive power, and were rapidly
developing into administrative heads of departments.
This process of building a federal bureaucracy was pushed on under his
successor, Sir John Anderson, who was greatly impressed by the enormous
material advance in the FMS.^ Other federal departments were formed,
including some joint departments such as Education and Labour which exercised
jurisdiction over both the FMS and the Colony. By the second decade of the
present century nearly every important service had come under the centralised
17control of a single federal head. This process in fact continued right to
the early 1920's, when the Fisheries, Customs and Trade, and Museum
Departments joined the highly centralised federal bureaucracy. In scale and
efficiency this administration was comparable to the existing ones in the 
18West, but it had no organic relations with Malay society. It was erected 
over the heads of the state administrations and mainly served to protect and 
advance alien economic interests. As one Malayan officer described it in 
1922:
The present system is agreeable to the lawyers, the Europeans 
engaged in commerce, mining, planting and probably to the 
westernised Chinese. It is not to the great bulk of the 
population who are Asiatics and not western in their ideas; 
especially is it not agreeable to the,Malays for whose benefit 
we profess to administer the country.
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As noted in the previous chapter, the importance and the role of the
State Councils had greatly diminished by the 1890’s. This was further
accentuated under Federation since British policy aimed to convert them into
district councils and centralise powers in a federal legislature. However
no central legislature was created under Swettenham who apparently feared
that it might either hamper his own freedom of action or economic 
20development. The State Councils therefore continued as legislative bodies
without control over public expenditure. After proposed laws were drafted
by the Legal Adviser in consultation with the Resident-General and approved
by the High Commissioner, they were enacted by the State Councils. However,
in view of the strict adherence to uniformity and the great mass of laws
enacted (102 in 1904), the State Councils were clearly no more than
registering bodies. It was not until 1909 that Anderson formed a Federal
Council mainly to offer the growing European planting and mining interests
a say in the government of the FMS. The Rulers supported this measure on
the condition that the Federal Council would not encroach on the State
Councils’ ’present power and privileges’ and in the belief that it would
22increase the influence of the state legislatures.
The Federal Council was unique for the obscurity of its juristic
position. It is not intended here to examine this question in detail since
23it had been amply discussed by other writers. We need only note that 
except for the preamble which stated that the Council was created ’for the 
proper enactment of all laws intended to have force throughout the 
Federation or in more than one state’, the Federal Council Agreement of 1909 
gave no definite power to the Council to pass any law at all. The government, 
however, held the view that laws passed by the Federal Council were binding 
on all the states because the Federation was a single unit for which the 
Rulers jointly legislated. 4 While conceding that this was nowhere 
explicitly stated, it pointed out that it was clearly the intention of the
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1909 Agreement t o  s e t  up a f e d e ra l  l e g is la tu r e  w ith  l e g i s l a t i v e  power.
Since in  th e  i n te r p r e ta t io n  o f t r e a t i e s ,  th e  in te n t io n  o f th e  c o n tra c tin g
p a r t i e s  must p r e v a i l  over d e fe c t iv e  wording, th e  government concluded th a t
25th e  F ed e ra l C ouncil p o ssessed  l e g i s l a t i v e  a u th o r i ty .  What i s  in d is p u ta b le ,
however, was t h a t  th e  F ed e ra l C ouncil was th e  High Commissioner’s c o u n c il .
He p re s id ed  over i t ,  f ix e d  th e  d a te  of i t s  m eeting and decided i t s  agenda,
26nominated i t s  members and changed i t s  com position . Through an o f f i c i a l  
m a jo r ity , he a lso  ex e rc ise d  com plete c o n tro l over i t .  Moreover, bo th  th e  
High Commissioner and th e  R esiden t-G enera l took precedence over th e  R u lers  
in  th e  C ouncil. The R u lers  were in  f a c t  o rd in a ry  co u n c il members w ithou t 
any ve to  power, and t h e i r  absence d id  not a f f e c t  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f th e  
C o u n cil’s p ro ceed in g s .
Both in  in te n t io n  and in  e f f e c t  th e  F edera l C ouncil was a m ajor s te p
tow ards c e n t r a l i s a t io n .  I t  ra p id ly  came to  pass n e a r ly  a l l  laws in  th e  FMS.
F u rth e r , a c tin g  on th e  su g g es tio n  o f th e  u n o f f ic ia l  members, th e  government
i n i t i a t e d  th e  f i r s t  Supply Enactment in  1910 which e n tru s te d  c o n tro l o f FMS
27fin an ces  to  th e  C ouncil. T h e re a f te r  th e  expend itu re  o f p u b lic  funds o f
th e  F ed era tio n  and th e  S ta te s  were l im ite d  to  th e  p ro v is io n s  in  th e  Supply
B i l l .  A ll supplem entary p ro v is io n s  had to  be sanctioned  by th e  C o u n c il 's
Finance Committee c o n s is t in g  o f th e  Resid e n t-G eneral and th e  u n o f f ic ia l
members when the  sum ranged from $10,000 to  $50,000 o r by th e  F ed era l C ouncil
i t s e l f  when th e  amount exceeded $50,000. Moreover, su rp lu s  revenue was
pooled in  th e  fe d e ra l  t r e a s u r y  and u t i l i s e d  fo r  th e  b e n e f i ts  o f th e
F ed era tio n  as a w hole. The fo u r s t a t e  t r e a s u r ie s  however remained to  'th ro w
a v e i l  o f m ystery over our f in a n c e ' because th e  government was unable to
persuade th e  R ulers to  agree to  th e  c re a t io n  o f a common p u rse . But th e
poo ling  o f su rp lu s  revenue in  th e  f e d e ra l  t re a s u ry , coupled w ith th e
a p p ro p ria tio n  o f p u b lic  funds by th e  F ed e ra l C ouncil, meant th a t  in  e f f e c t
28such a purse  had come in to  e x is te n c e . In  sh o rt th e  F ed era l C ouncil
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centralised both financial and legislative powers in Kuala Lumpur by working 
closely with the Federal Treasury and the Legal Adviser's Department under 
the general oversight of the Chief Secretary. The State Councils were left 
with local matters concerning Malay religion and custom, mosques, political 
pensions, penghulus, death sentences, and conversion of agricultural and 
mining lands.
The Federal Administration and the Non-Malays
Within the federal administration two specialist departments - the 
Secretariat for Chinese Affairs and the Labour Department - warrant special 
attention. While some effort was made to rule Malays through indigenous 
symbols of authority, the governing of non-Malays was decidedly one of direct 
rule. This was because traditional Malay leadership and institutions were 
in the main irrelevant to the existence of non-Malays. The government had 
therefore to be advised and guided by the Chinese Affairs Secretariat and 
the Labour Department which specialised in Chinese and Indian affairs 
respectively.
The Chinese Affairs Secretariat was 'avoided like a plague' by members
of the Malayan Civil Service (MCS), and those serving in it were constantly
seeking an opening to get out. The work involved was notoriously
disagreeable and strenuous and deprived officers of much of their social 
29life. The main reason for its unpopularity was most interestingly
explained by Victor Purcell who on his arrival as a cadet in 1920
volunteered to join the department. When he informed the Under Secretary
with whom he was staying about it,
(The latter) was silent for a moment and when he spoke it was in 
solemn tones.
'Do you realise what you have done, Purcell?' he asked.
'No, Sir, what have I done?'
'You-have-ruined-your-career! You will never become a governor, 
or even a resident. You will be merely a specialist'.' 30
Hence at a time when the Chinese posed a major political problem, the
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government encountered increasing difficulties in finding good men for the 
department. The Labour Department was likewise unpopular and for very much 
the same reasons. To overcome this, the Controller of Labour and the 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs were upgraded to Class IA in the 1920’s, and 
their salary was increased to that of the Resident in 1935. During the 
interwar years about twenty percent of the MCS officers had experience in the 
Chinese Affairs and the Labour Departments. These officers either spent a 
year or two in China mastering one or two Chinese dialects or in Madras 
learning Tamil or Telegu.
For more than a decade after British intervention in the Malay States,
the government was compelled by lack of resources and of knowledge about
Chinese Affairs to control the Chinese through their leaders who were
virtually all capitalists-cum-heads of Chinese secret societies. This may be
considered a system of indirect rule. The first move to end this was the
creation of the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 to curb the gross abuses
connected with Chinese immigration and to control the Chinese secret societies.
But it was not until 1890 that the government smashed the ’imperium in
33imperio1 created by these societies within the Chinese community. There­
after the Government gradually tightened its grip over the Chinese especially 
after the Protectorate was reorganised into the Secretariat for Chinese
Affairs in 1897. This department was headed by a Secretary at Kuala Lumpur
33awho was assisted by a Chinese Protector in each state. As Victor Purcell 
described it, the governing of the Chinese underwent 'a transition from 
indirect to direct rule. ’
During the interwar years the Chinese Secretariats in Malaya were 
headed by efficient officers. For instance, A.M. Goodman, Secretary in the 
late 1920's, was a moderate and quietly efficient man who ’could practically
3Utwist Chinese leaders round his fingers' to support government policies.
As an executive organ, the Secretariat enforced the various ordinances and
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re g u la tio n s  a f f e c t in g  Chinese in  Malaya. Among th e se  were th e  p ro te c tio n
o f women and g i r l s ,  th e  su p p ress io n  o f th e  m u i- ts a i  custom, and th e
su p e rv is io n  and c o n tro l o f s o c ie t i e s ,  t r a d e  un io n s , a s s o c ia t io n s , Chinese
sch o o ls , Chinese im m igration , and a l ie n  re s id e n ts  in  th e  co u n try . For y ears
a good d e a l of th e  work o f  th e  departm ent was a lso  taken  up w ith th e
e ra d ic a tio n  o f g ro ss  abuses in  th e  system o f Chinese c o n tra c t labou r and in
s e t t l i n g  d isp u te s  between employers and Chinese w orkers. But by c o n tra s t
w ith Ind ian  la b o u r, Chinese lab o u r on th e  whole la y  o u ts id e  th e  prov ince of
th e  a d m in is tra tio n . The S e c r e ta r ia t  fo r  Chinese A ffa irs  had always assumed
th a t  Chinese Labour was p e r f e c t ly  capable o f talcing care  o f i t s e l f  and th a t
i f  i t  needed any th ing  i t  would b r in g  i t s  case to  th e  departm ent as i t  had
35done fo r  th e  l a s t  f i f t y  y e a r s .  This was a somewhat u n r e a l i s t i c  a t t i tu d e
sin ce  th e  absence o f com plain ts d id  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  mean th e  absence o f
abuses, bu t i t  p re v a ile d  u n t i l  1936 when a sp a te  o f s t r ik e s  exposed t h i s
d e fe c t in  th e  a d m in is tra tio n . To overcome t h i s ,  a l l  Chinese A ffa irs  o f f ic e r s
were in s tru c te d  to  in s p e c t c lo se ly  and re g u la r ly  a l l  p lace s  o f Chinese
employment. They were to  be a s s is te d  by D is t r i c t  O ff ic e rs  who were fo r  th e
36f i r s t  tim e d ire c te d  to  keep a c lo se  watch on Chinese w orkers. Furtherm ore, 
a sen io r Chinese P ro te c to ra te  o f f ic e r  was a lso  s ta t io n e d  in  th e  Labour 
Department to  work under th e  C o n tro lle r  o f  Labour and to  tak e  charge o f 
m a tte rs  a f fe c t in g  Chinese la b o u r . Apart from b rin g in g  about a c e r ta in  degree 
o f c o -o rd in a tio n  in  p o lic y  tow ards Chinese and In d ian  la b o u r, t h i s  move 
meant th a t  th e  S e c r e ta r ia t  fo r  Chinese A ffa irs  had begun to  assume 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  fo r  th e  g e n e ra l w elfa re  o f Chinese w orkers.
The S e c re ta ry  fo r  Chinese A ffa irs  was th e  c h ie f  a d v ise r  to  th e  government 
on th e  Chinese in  th e  FMS. With i t s  own corps of in fo rm ers and in te l l ig e n c e  
netw ork, i t  was th e  acknowledged a u th o r i ty  on Chinese A ffa irs  and was ab le  to  
keep a c lo se  watch on Chinese sen tim en ts  and a c t i v i t i e s  in  China and e s p e c ia l ly  
in  M alaya. ^  I t s  advice determ ined government p o lic y  tow ards Chinese
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p o l i t i c a l  movements, th e  Chinese C onsu la te , Chinese im m igration and Chinese
in  Malaya. As m entioned in  th e  p rev ious c h a p te r , i t  was p a r t i c u la r ly
concerned w ith  th e  p o l i t i c a l  th r e a t  posed by th e  KMT. I t  was th e  S e c re ta ry
of Chinese A ffa irs  who s u c c e s s fu lly  p ressed  High Commissioner G uillem ard to
ban th e  KMT in  1925 on th e  ground th a t  o therw ise  i t  would extend i t s
membership to  a l l  s t r a t a  o f  th e  Chinese community, in c lu d in g  Chinese
businessm en and S t r a i t s - b o r n  C hinese. When t h i s  ev en tu a ted , th e  S e c re ta ry
warned, th e  KMT would th r e a te n  B r i t i s h  ru le  by c re a tin g  'a  s e lf -c o n ta in e d
38and h ig h ly  o rgan ised  Imperium in  im p e rio 1 among Malayan C hinese. The
Chinese A ffa ir s  Department managed to  persuade successive  High
Commissioners to  endorse th e  ban, in c lu d in g  C lif fo rd  who i n i t i a l l y  d isag ree d  
39w ith  i t .  During th e  1930*s th e  departm ent s t r in g e n t ly  enforced  i t ,  
n ipp ing  in  th e  bud any KMT underground a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  happened to  emerge 
in to  th e  open.
The Chinese S e c re ta ry  a lso  fo rm ulated  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  tow ards th e  
Chinese C onsulates in  M alaya. This p o lic y  aimed to  confine th e  ju r i s d ic t io n  
o f th e se  co n su la te s  to  a l i e n  C hinese; t h a t  i s  to  say , to  Chinese who were 
no t B r i t i s h  su b je c ts  o r  B r i t i s h  p ro te c te d  s u b j e c t s . ^  In  t h i s  way th e  
departm ent scotched  e f f o r t s  made by Chinese consu ls to  get dom iciled  and 
a l ie n  Chinese to  work to g e th e r  or to  in f lu e n c e  Chinese members o f th e  F e d e ra l 
and S ta te  C o u n c i l s . I t  a ls o  p reven ted  th e  C o n su la te 's  a ttem p ts  to  g a in  
c o n tro l over Chinese ed u ca tio n  in  Malaya which, i t  fe a re d , might be used to  
undermine th e  a lle g ia n c e  o f lo c a l-b o rn  Chinese tow ards th e  government. Owing 
t o  p o l ic ie s  such as  th e  above, th e  fu n c tio n  o f th e  Chinese S e c r e ta r ia t ,  as 
P u rc e l l  put i t ,  came to  be fw idely  regarded  as being  not so much to  p ro te c t
I 2
th e  Chinese as to  p ro te c t  th e  country  a g a in s t th e m '.
In d ia n  a f f a i r s  in  Malaya came under th e  s p e c ia l  care  o f th e  Labour 
Departm ent. From th e  humble beg inn ing  o f an agency su p e rv is in g  In d ian  
im m igration to  Malaya in  1884, th i s  departm ent was p laced  under a
55
C o n tro lle r  o f Labour in  1911 who ex e rc ised  ju r i s d ic t io n  over th e  FMS and th e  
Colony. As th e  g o v e rn m en ts  c h ie f  a d v ise r  on Ind ian  a f f a i r s ,  h is  
j u r i s d ic t io n  was extended over th e  U nfederated Malay S ta te s  in  1925 in  o rd e r 
to  b r in g  about u n ity  in  In d ia n  p o lic y  over th e  whole o f M alaya. Based a t  
Kuala Lumpur th e  C o n tro l le r  o f Labour was a s s is te d  by a Deputy C o n tro lle r  in  
Penang who took  charge o f In d ia n  im m igration in to  th e  Colony, and a number 
o f A ss is ta n t C o n tro lle rs  s ta t io n e d  in  m ajor towns such as  Ipoh , Seremban and 
K lang. Two o f f i c e r s ,  th e  E m igra tion  Commissioner a t  Avadi and an a s s i s t a n t  
Commissioner a t  Nagapatam, l i a i s e d  w ith th e  Madras Government and su p erv ised  
In d ian  em ig ra tio n  to  Malaya a t  th e se  In d ian  p o r ts .  The departm ent 
corresponded d i r e c t l y  w ith  Chinese P ro te c to ra te  O ff ic e rs  in  th e  s ta t e s  who 
were known as A ss is ta n t C o n tro l le r s  o f Labour when th ey  en fo rced  th e  Labour 
Code r e la t in g  to  Chinese Labour.
Like th e  Chinese S e c r e ta r i a t ,  th e  Labour Department was run by
I Q
e f f i c i e n t  heads d u rin g  th e  p e rio d  under s tu d y . F . Gilman, C o n tro lle r  o f
Labour in  th e  e a r ly  1920*3, im pressed th e  G overnor-G eneral o f In d ia  as 'a
very  sym pathetic  guard ian  of In d ia n  labou r i n t e r e s t s 1. ^  His su ccesso r,
C.D. A heam e, a ro ugh-look ing  Irishm an  w ith  Sinn Fein  id e a s ,  was considered
by S i r  Shenton Thomas as ’m e n ta lly  b r i l l i a n t * ,  form idable in  d e b a te , and
L5popu lar w ith  th e  p la n tin g  community. The C o n tro lle r  of Labour helped  
government fo rm ulate  p o lic y  tow ards th e  In d ian s  in  Malaya. Since th e  In d ian s  
d id  not pose a th r e a t  to  B r i t i s h  r u le ,  t h i s  p o lic y  co n cen tra ted  on In d ian  
im m igration to  Malaya and th e  tre a tm e n t o f In d ian  la b o u r . In  t h i s  connexion, 
th e  C o n tro lle r  o f Labour made p e r io d ic  v i s i t s  to  In d ia  p r im a r i ly  to  persuade 
th e  In d ian  Government not to  tu r n  o f f  th e  flow  o f In d ian  la b o u r to  M alaya. 
Owing to  In d ian  n a t io n a l i s t  p re s s u re , th e  In d ian  Government now sought to  
re g u la te  In d ia n  em ig ra tio n  by th e  In d ian  E m igration  Act o f 1922. In  
persuad ing  th e  In d ia n  Government to  r e s t r a in  i t s  demand fo r  concessions to  
Malayan In d ian  la b o u re rs , th e  C o n tro lle r  o f Labour o f te n  warned In d ia  not to
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make the mistake of thinking ’that her people were the only pebbles on the 
Malayan beaches, and forget China' ^ . On the other hand, he urged the 
Malayan planters to meet India's demands as far as advisable. The success of 
this approach was reflected in important improvements not only in the 
mechanics and procedures of Indian immigration to Malaya but also in the 
welfare of Indian labourers. For instance, after 1923 Indian labourers were 
paid what were in effect minimum wages. In 1928 the government even accepted
in
India's request to grant an Indian seat in the Federal Council, and in 
1939 to exclude Ceylonese, hitherto qualified for nomination, from the seat. 
On the other hand, the government rejected India's demands for the closure 
of all toddy shops in estates, for government Tamil schools^-for estate 
children, the admission of Indians to the MCS, and the introduction of a 
Malayan citizenship. It informed India that the last two questions could 
not be met because the Rulers were opposed to them.
The Labour Department was essentially pro-employer. When the interests 
of the planters as a group and the Indian labourers came into conflict, it 
usually sided with the former. Moreover, the government being itself a 
major employer of Indian workers, the Labour Department shared the planters' 
interest in ensuring a large supply of cheap Indian labour in order to
J rt
depress wage rates. At the same time the government as well as the 
planters accepted the minimum moral responsibility for Indian labourers on 
the ground that the latter were temporary sojourners in Malaya. They felt 
that the Indian workers should have no cause for discontent. As the 
Government told India in 1938:
No one who has any knowledge of South India and of Malaya can 
deny that the conditions in which (the Indian labourers) live 
and work in India are immeasurably inferior to the conditions 
in this country. This applies not merely to earnings, housing 
and sanitation, but to social status and elementary human 
rights. '
Another primary function of the Labour Department was the enforcement 
of the Labour Code which was tightened in 1923 mainly because of pressure
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from In d ia . The v ig o u r w ith  which t h i s  was perform ed depended on th e
u n d ertak in g s  g iven  to  th e  In d ian  Government, on th e  long-term  in t e r e s t s  of
em ployers, and on th e  degree w ith  which th e  High Commissioner was p repared
to  support th e  C o n tro l le r  of Labour a g a in s t r e c a lc i t r a n t  p la n te rs  opposed to
th e  s t r in g e n t  enforcem ent of th e  law. As one w r i te r  po in ted  o u t, no
50C o n tro lle r  had ev er s t r i c t l y  and un ifo rm ly  ap p lied  th e  Labour Code. 
N e v e rth e le ss , th e  Labour O ff ic e rs  d id  s h ie ld  th e  In d ia n  c o o lie s  to  an 
im portan t e x te n t from i l l - t r e a tm e n t  by i r r e s p o n s ib le  o r unscrupulous p la n te r s .  
T h e ir  freq u en t v i s i t s  and in sp e c tio n s  o f e s ta te s  and o th e r  a re as  o f 
employment a lso  ensured  th a t  th e  s tan d a rd  wage o r an adequate one was pa id  
to  In d ian  w orkers. A f te r  1923 t h i s  su p e rv is io n  compelled th e  employers to  
p rov ide  accep tab le  s tan d a rd s  o f  housing , h o s p i ta l  accommodation, h e a lth  and 
s a n ita ry  a rrangem ents, and Tamil schools in  e s t a t e s .  In  1936 th e  Labour 
Department even s u c c e s s fu lly  persuaded th e  government to  in c re a se  g ra n ts - in -  
a id  to  Tamil ed u ca tio n  and re s to re  th e  post of In s p e c to r  o f Tamil Schools 
ab o lish ed  d u ring  th e  p rev ious slump. Much o f th e  tim e of th e  Labour 
Department was ta k e n  up w ith  h e a rin g , in v e s t ig a t in g  and s e t t l i n g  com plaints 
o f th e  In d ia n  la b o u re rs .  I t s  success in  t h i s  sphere was evidenced by th e  
sm all number of In d ia n  d isp u te s  th a t  had to  be s e t t l e d  in  c o u r ts .  O ther 
d u tie s  of Labour O ff ic e rs  concerned th e  p rev en tio n  o f th e  employment o f 
c h ild re n  below te n  y e a rs  o f age, th e  p ro v is io n  of m a te rn ity  allow ances to  
fem ale la b o u re rs , th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f garden p lo ts  to  in te r e s te d  la b o u re rs , 
and th e  mass r e p a t r ia t io n  o f In d ian s  to  In d ia  during  slum ps. In  perform ing 
a l l  th e se  ta s k s  th e  Labour Department adopted a markedly p a te r n a l i s t i c  
a t t i tu d e  tow ards In d ian  la b o u r.
I t  should be noted th a t  as s p e c ia l i s t s  in  In d ian  and Chinese a f f a i r s ,  
o f f ic e r s  o f th e  Chinese S e c r e ta r ia t  and th e  Labour Department tended  to  
sym pathise w ith  non-Malay a s p i r a t io n s .  They th e re fo re  c o n s t i tu te d  a 
p re ssu re  group u rg ing  th e  government to  recogn ise  th e  in c re a s in g  tendency
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among non-M alays to  s e t t l e  perm anently in  th e  coun try  and to  g rap p le  w ith
i t s  a t te n d a n t p roblem s. For in s ta n c e , in  1931 Goodman adv ised  th e  government
to  o f f e r  lo c a l-b o rn  Chinese c e r ta in  r ig h ts  such as  p re fe ren ce  fo r  government
51appointm ent in  o rd e r to  t i e  t h e i r  a lle g ia n c e  to  Malaya. I t  was C.D.
Ahearne who convinced th e  High Commissioner in  1935» as mentioned in  th e  
p rev io u s  c h a p te r , t h a t  th e re  were more th a n  250,000 dom iciled  Ind ian s  in  
M alaya. The two departm ents f a i l e d  to  persuade th e  government to  adm it 
non-Malays in to  th e  MCS o r  in tro d u ce  a Malayan c i t iz e n s h ip .  However, th e y  
seemed to  have in f lu e n c e d  th e  government, as d iscu ssed  in  C hapter S ix , to  
meet non-Malay a s p ir a t io n s  to  some e x te n t in  th e  l a t e  1 9 3 0 's .
The R esid en t-G en era l and th e  High Commissioner
The r e la t io n s  betw een th e  R esiden t-G eneral and th e  High Commissioner 
m erit d is c u s s io n  f o r  th e  l i g h t  th e y  throw  on subsequent FMS-Singapore 
r e l a t io n s .  The High Commissioner-Governor ex e rc ise d  a u n ity  o f c o n tro l over 
th e  whole o f B r i t i s h  Malaya. Under th e  A d m in is tra tiv e  Scheme, he decided  
a l l  im portan t q u e s tio n s  r e f e r r e d  to  him by th e  R esiden t-G eneral and 
approved a l l  annual r e p o r ts ,  d r a f t  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  s ta t e  and fe d e ra l  bu d g e ts, 
and th e  appointm ent o r  d is m is sa l  o f c e r ta in  c a te g o r ie s  of o f f i c e r s .  Though 
th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  r e c ru i te d  a l l  s e n io r  o f f ic e r s  in  London, th e  High 
Commissioner had s ig n i f ic a n t  say over the  t r a n s f e r  of such o f f ic e r s  from 
elsew here to  Malaya and alm ost a d e c is iv e  vo ice  in  prom otion w ith in  th e  
Malayan s e rv ic e s . Over g e n e ra l p o l ic ie s  in  th e  FMS th e r e f o r e ,  he e x e rc ise d  
v i t a l  c o n tro l and was ab le  to  b rin g  them in to  l in e  w ith  th o se  pursued i n  
th e  Colony and th e  UMS. However, th e  High Commissioner found th a t  in  
p ra c t ic e  h is  c o n tro l  over th e  a d m in is tra tio n  of th e  F ed e ra tio n  tended  to  be 
checked by th e  R esid en t-G en era l.
Though th e  R esid en t-G en era l and th e  C o lon ia l S e c re ta ry  stood on p a r in  
su b o rd in a tio n  to  th e  High Commissioner under th e  F ed e ra tio n  scheme, 
Swettenham, as a lre ad y  m entioned, was s u b s ta n t ia l ly  a q u asi-independen t head
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o f th e  FMS a f t e r  1896. This p o s i t io n  was fo rced  on High Commissioner
M itc h e ll who lacked  th e  d r iv e  and a s s e r tiv e n e s s  of h is  younger co lleague  in
Kuala Lumpur. When Swettenham succeeded Flit ehe 11 as High Commissioner in
th e  y ears  1900-03, he dom inated th e  new Resid e n t-G enera l, W illiam  T reacher,
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and m erely s h i f te d  c e n tr a l i s e d  c o n tro l over th e  FMS to  S ingapore. During 
t h i s  p e rio d  th e  r e l a t io n s  between Kuala Lumpur and S ingapore were on th e  
whole harm onious.
F r ic t io n  however emerged du rin g  A nderson 's t im e . Anderson was ’a man
53of c le a r  v is io n  and la rg e  v iew s’ , f o r c e fu l  and a u to c r a t ic .  His u ltim a te
aim was a u n ite d  Malaya c o n s is t in g  of th e  Malay S ta te s  and th e  Colony.
Supported by th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e , A nderson 's immediate p o lic y  s tro v e  to
p rev en t th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f th e  FMS from th e  Colony, lead in g  to  a sep a ra te
Governor in  each a re a , because of th e  c lo se  geo g rap h ica l and o th e r  t i e s
e x is t in g  between them . He was determ ined  to  e x e rc ise  r e a l  c o n tro l over bo th
th e  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  which soon brought him in to  c o n f l ic t  w ith  th e  R es id en t-
G enera l, S i r  W illiam  T ay lo r. C onfronted w ith  a s e r ie s  o f d e f i c i t s  in  th e
Colony a f t e r  1906, he was fo rced  to  use th e  handsome su rp lu ses  o f th e  FMS
to  finance  B r i t i s h  expansion  in to  Brunei and th e  n o rth e rn  Malay S ta te s .
This was a novel p r a c t ic e  s in ce  h i th e r to  FMS fin an ce  had been spen t s o le ly
in  th e  F e d e ra tio n . I t  was th e re fo re  s tro n g ly  r e s is te d  by T ay lo r who f e l t
i t  h is  du ty  to  p ro te c t  FMS i n t e r e s t s  from being  s a c r i f ic e d  fo r  non-
5UF ed era tio n  ends. But 'S i r  John was a u to c r a t ic ,  and could no t to le r a t e  
t h a t  th e  R esid en t-G en era l shou ld  be ab le  to  say him "nay” , when th e  C o lon ia l 
S e c re ta ry  in  th e  Crown Colony had no such p o w ers '. S ince T ay lor was ab le
to  m ain ta in  a s u b s ta n t ia l  degree o f independence, th e  High Commissioner
•A
decided  to  curb h is  s t a t u s .  He was supportA by th e  R esiden ts  who re sen te d
th e  t i g h t  c o n tro l imposed on them by T a y lo r. One o f them, E rn est B irch , a
56staunch  advocate o f s t a t e  r ig h t s ,  p ro te s te d  in  1905 th a t  T a y lo r 's  p o lic y  
in f r in g e d  on th e  Anglo-Malay t r e a t i e s .  The R ulers a lso  backed Anderson,
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probably in the belief that the change would check federal encroachment on 
57state autonomy. In 1910 therefore the title of Resident-General was 
changed to Chief Secretary to leave no room for doubt that he was the High 
Commissioner's 'principal adviser and mouthpiece in the FMS and not a quasi­
independent head of a separate administration.' As already mentioned, this 
failed to affect the de facto position of the Chief Secretary in the FMS.
To some extent, Anderson succeeded in bringing the FMS and the Colony 
into closer co-operation. This was realised partly through the formation 
of joint departments with jurisdiction over both areas. As the President 
of the Federal Council and the Residents' Conference, the High Commissioner 
entered into the actual administration of the FMS after 1909. However, 
Anderson's proposal of an Administrative Council chaired by the High 
Commissioner and consisting of the Residents and the Rulers, apparently to
enable him to become the Chief executive officer of the FMS, was rejected
58by the Colonial Office." Moreover, though Anderson appeared to have 
decided in 1910 to decentralise the federal administration with a view of
59inducing the newly-acquired UMS to join the FMS in a larger Malayan unit,
no step was taken towards that end after his departure from Malaya in 1911.
Four years later George Maxwell failed in an attempt to revive the idea.
60His policy outline, which was elaborated and submitted to the Colonial 
Office in 1920, as we shall see, failed to interest Brockman or the High 
Commissioner, Sir Arthur Young (1911-19).^ Presumably both Brockman and 
Young were too preoccupied with the vast increase in work during the war 
years and felt that it was not a time to introduce controversial issues in 
Malaya.
It became clear during the first decade of the present century that 
the relations between the Resident-General (later the Chief Secretary) and 
the High Commissioner were conditioned by two factors. The first was the 
undefined position of the High Commissioner vis-a-vis the Resident-General.
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This meant that in practice their relations depended to a considerable extent
on the personalities of the holders of the two posts. The second factor seems
to have been first voiced by Swettenham when he told the Rulers that the
Resident-General would champion FMS interests against the authorities in
Singapore. This idea spread during the conflict between Anderson and Taylor
which was known to officials and the public. By the late 1900's it was
widely held in the Federation that the Chief Secretary was essential to
safeguard FMS interests which differed from those of the Colony. Hence
Anderson's proposal to introduce the title of Chief Secretary was viewed by
the FMS commercial interests as an attempt by the High Commissioner to gain
62complete control of FMS finance for Colony or imperial ends. His assurance 
that the High Commissioner's role was to find and promote the 'common interest' 
of both areas failed to eradicate this belief. As discussed in later 
chapters, the above factors significantly affected British policy during the 
interwar years.
The Role of the Rulers in the Federal Administration
Deprived of nearly all authority and administrative functions, the 
Rulers played an almost wholly ceremonial role in the federal administration. 
They were used to grace the imperial scheme of things at occasional durbars, 
Federal Council meetings, and other public events. The first durbar was 
held in 1897 at Kuala Kangsar, the royal town of the Sultan of Perak, when all 
the Rulers and high-ranking chiefs assembled to discuss Islam, Malay customs 
and questions of Malay interest. It was an expensive affair 'crowded with 
fish drives, water sports, amateur theatricals, picnics at waterfalls,
6 o
displays of fireworks, and other forms of entertainment,' in which everyone 
thoroughly enjoyed himself. Though Swettenham enthused over the success of 
the durbar, it contributed little to the sphere of actual administration.
After they withdrew from the Federal Council in 1927, the Rulers were used to 
grace the annual opening of the Council. On this occasion they sat not at
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th e  C ouncil ta b le  bu t on a ra is e d  d a is  behind th e  High Commissioner, and a f t e r  
th e y  l e f t ,  th e  C ouncil go t down to  b u s in e s s . In  t h i s  and o th e r  ways th e  
B r i t i s h  succeeded in  p re s e n tin g  a facade o f in d i r e c t  ru le  and in  a s s o c ia tin g  
th e  S u lta n a te s  w ith  th e  f e d e ra l  governm ent. As Emerson pu t i t ,  'Under 
in d i r e c t  r u le  even more th an  in  c o lo n ia l and home governments i t  i s  necessary
to  c o n ce n tra te  on p lea san t ly  and sp len d o r in  th e  s e t t in g  o f th e  s ta g e , b u t
th e  r e a l  work a s  elsew here must be done la rg e ly  behind th e  s c e n e s . '^
Behind th e  s c e n e s , however, th e  R u lers  and th e  Malay e l i t e  p layed
p r a c t i c a l ly  no p a r t  a t  a l l  in  s e c u la r  a d m in is tra tio n . The t r u th  o f th e
m a tte r  was th a t  c e n t r a l i s a t io n  had s h i f te d  power to  a c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e  a t
Kuala Lumpur who was no t in  continuous and in tim a te  to u ch  w ith  th e  R ulers
and who d ire c te d  an a d m in is tra t io n  geared to  advancing in t e r e s t s  which th ey
were e i t h e r  in d i f f e r e n t  to  o r were no t competent to  in f lu e n c e . For t h i s
rea so n , th e  R u le rs  appeared to  want to  loosen  th e  F e d e ra tio n  as opposed to
65th e  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  o f c e n t r a l i s a t io n .  In  th e  sphere  of f e d e ra l
a d m in is tra tio n  th e  R u lers were th e re fo re  g e n e ra lly  n o t co n su lted  excep t in
cases p e r ta in in g  to  Malay custom o r r e l ig io n  o r of s p e c ia l  Malay i n t e r e s t .
I f  th ey  were a s s o c ia te d  w ith  m a tte rs  of a d i f f e r e n t  n a tu re , t h e i r  op in ions
were a t  tim es d e s ire d  to  s u b s ta n t ia te  opposing views among B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s
D uring such occasio n s  th e y  became pawns in  c o lo n ia l  squabbles as happened in
th e  power s tru g g le  between G uillem ard and C hief S e c re ta ry  Maxwell d iscu ssed
in  th e  next c h ap te r . At o th e r  tim es th e y  were m anipulated  in to  i n i t i a t i n g
m easures a lre a d y  dec id ed  by B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s .  For exam ple, in  1926 th e
R ulers were ' l e d '  t o  th e  id e a  o f ask ing  th e  FMS government to  c o n tr ib u te  £2
66m ill io n  to  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f th e  S ingapore Naval B ase. Nor d id  Malays 
p la y  an a c tiv e  p a r t  in  th e  f e d e ra l  a d m in is tra tio n , excep t in  th e  su b o rd in a te  
s e rv ic e . But even here  th e y  formed a m in o r ity , h o ld in g  la rg e ly  minor p o s ts  
l ik e  o r d e r l i e s ,  peons and p u n k a h -p u lle rs . In  o th e r  words the  fe d e ra l  
a d m in is tra tio n  to  a l l  i n te n t s  and purposes belonged to  th e  non-Malays who
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dom inated th e  FMS scen e .
During th e  20 th  c en tu ry  a new dim ension in  th e  r e la t io n s  between th e  
C o lo n ia l O ffice  and Malaya enab led  th e  R u lers  to  e x e rc ise  some in flu en c e  on 
B r i t i s h  p o lic y . S ince th e  advent of B r i t i s h  ru le  i n  Malaya, th e  lo c a l  
a u th o r i t i e s  had used th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  co m p lex itie s  o f th e  Malay S ta te s  
an d /o r th e  R u le rs ' views to  check W h ite h a ll 's  in te r fe re n c e  in  Malayan a f f a i r s .  
F o r in s ta n c e , ' l o c a l  knowledge' and 'in t im a te  a sso c ia tio n *  w ith  th e  R ulers 
were reasons s u c c e s s fu lly  used by th e  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  to  keep th e  key p o s ts  
in  th e  FMS in  th e  hands o f th e  Malayan o f f i c i a l s .  A fte r  y ears  of c o lo n ia l 
tu te la g e ,  th e  R u lers  had gained  an in s ig h t  in to  t h i s  a spec t o f th e  r e la t io n s  
between th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  and th e  High Commissioner. A ccordingly , th ey  now 
endeavoured to  p la y  London a g a in s t  th e  Malayan a u th o r i t i e s  by in f lu e n c in g  
p o lic y  th rough p e rso n a l d is c u s s io n  w ith  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  fo r  th e  
c o lo n ie s . T h is  course o f a c t io n  was made p o s s ib le  by f a s t e r  communication 
in  th e  20th  cen tu ry  which brought th e  Malay R u lers on freq u e n t v i s i t s  to  
London where th ey  in v a r ia b ly  met th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  and were p re sen ted  
to  th e  B r i t i s h  King. I t  was a lso  g r e a t ly  a s s i s te d  by th e  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  o f 
m ain ta in in g  th e  s ta tu s  and p r e s t ig e  of th e  Malay ro y a l f a m il ie s .  This p o lic y  
made i t  exped ien t to  pay c a r e f u l  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  views o f th e  r u le r s  and to  
meet t h e i r  s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s  as f a r  as p o s s ib le .  Moreover, t h i s  development 
came a t  a tim e when improved communication had kep t W h iteh a ll in  c lo se r  
touch  w ith  Malaya, t ig h te n e d  i t s  hold over th e  FMS and encouraged i t  to  
in te r f e r e  in  Malayan a f f a i r s  more r e a d i ly .  But u lt im a te ly  w hether p e rso n a l 
ap pea ls  to  th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  succeeded depended on th e  m e rits  of th e  case 
ra is e d  by th e  R u le rs , W h iteh a ll* s  a t t i t u d e ,  th e  need to  uphold th e  p re s t ig e  
of th e  High Commissioner, and v a rio u s  o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s .
An e f f e c t iv e  way to  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  development i s  to  examine b r i e f ly
Ln
th e  Selangor S uccession  D isp u te . In  1934 th e  government deposed Musa- 
ed d in , th e  Raja Muda ( h e i r  ap p aren t) o f  S e lan g o r, f o r  ex cessiv e  indeb tedness
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and a lle g e d  d ish o n e s ty . C onsidering  th e  S u l ta n 's  second son, th e  Tengku
Panglim a B esa r, as to o  's tu p i d ' to  succeed M usa-eddin, i t  s e le c te d  the  th i r d
son , th e  Tengku Laksamana, in s te a d .  Laksamana was e le c te d  by th e  C h iefs in
November 1934 only  because o f a s t ip u la t io n  imposed by R esiden t T .S . Adams
which in s t r u c te d  th a t  th e  p r in c e  e le c te d  must have t r a v e l le d  to  fo re ig n  
69c o u n tr ie s .  This made a fa rc e  o f th e  e le c t io n  because th e  only son o f th e
S elangor S u lta n  who had t r a v e l le d  overseas was th e  Tengku Laksamana. The
S u ltan  was s tro n g ly  incensed  w ith  th e  su p e rse ss io n  o f th e  Tengku Panglima
B esar whom he considered  q u a l i f ie d  by Malay s tan d ard s  to  become th e  fu tu re
R u le r. Supported by M usa-eddin and F. Douglas (h is  p r iv a te  c o n f id e n tia l
s e c r e ta r y ) ,  th e  S u lta n  re fu sed  to  endorse th e  e le c t io n  o f  th e  Tengku
Laksamana. In s te a d  he employed Roland B rad d e ll, a well-known S t r a i t s
law yer, e a r ly  in  1936 to  challenge  th e  governm ent's d e c is io n . Contending
th a t  B r i t i s h  a c tio n  had v io la te d  th e  custom of su ccessio n  in  S e langor,
B ra d d e ll 's  memorial t o  W h ite h a ll req u ested  th a t  th e  Tengku Panglima B esar be
appoin ted  th e  new Raja Muda. This p e t i t i o n  was re je c te d  by th e  B r i t i s h  King
on th e  adv ice  o f th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  f o r  th e  C o lon ies. The S u ltan  th en
fo rm ally  in s t a l l e d  th e  Tengku Laksamana as th e  new R aja Muda.
A fte r  th e  co n tro v e rsy  appeared to  have been s e t t l e d ,  th e  S u ltan  was
fo rced  to  leav e  f o r  London in  September 1936 f o r  tre a tm en t o f h e rn ia  and
u r in o - g e n i ta l  t r o u b le .  In  London he soon came under th e  in flu en c e  o f  Frank
Swettenham and o th e r  o ld  Malayan Hands whose o p p o s itio n  t o  th e  governm ent's
a c t io n  was p a r t ly  due to  t h e i r  d is l ik e  of T .S . Adams f o r  h is  o v er-zea lous
70advocacy of a p o lic y  o f d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  in  th e  FMS. But i t  was a f t e r  h is
d is c u s s io n  w ith  S u lta n  Ibrahim  of Johore and Roland B rad d e ll, bo th  on leave
in  London, t h a t  th e  S u lta n  decided to  r a is e  th e  successio n  q u e s tio n  w ith  th e  
71C o lon ia l O ff ic e . T his move opened th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  to  in te n s e  
c r i t ic is m s  by ' a l l  th e  ex-High C om m issioners', o th e r  r e t i r e d  Malayan o f f i c i a l s ,  
th e  R ulers o f Pahang, I’rengganu and Johore th en  in  London, and in f l u e n t i a l
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personalities connected with Malaya.
To obviate further embarrassments the Colonial Office made the
following concessions to the Sultan of Selangor. Firstly, the King was
induced to award the Sultan the highly coveted honour of KCVO. Secondly,
the Sultan had Adams removed from Malaya before his own return to Selangor
in December 1936. Thirdly, despite the High Commissioner’s objection, the
Colonial Office agreed to give a handsome sum to the Ruler on the occasion
72of the latter's jubilee celebration in 1937. After protracted negotiation 
in Malaya, the Sultan obtained a grant of $250,000 and a monthly increase 
in allowance of $2,500. Again despite the opposition of the High 
Commissioner, Whitehall permitted the Sultan to have a constitution drafted 
for Selangor on the lines of the Johore Constitution. Finally, the 
controversy led to a more attentive and conciliatory policy towards the 
ruling house of Selangor (as of the other states) and an attitude of great 
caution towards future interference in succession questions in the Malay
(Tö^rVw'a^ 0 ß  i ct-
States. On the succession itself, however, the GO did not concede a singleA
point to the Sultan. The Tengku Laksamana remained the Raja Muda till 1938 
when he succeeded his father as Sultan of Selangor.
The Selangor Succession Dispute shows that the closer contacts between 
the FMS Rulers and London could have important implications and effects on 
British policy. In this case a visit by a Ruler to London became an 
occasion which intensely embarrassed the Colonial Office and restricted the 
freedom of action of the Malayan government. To placate the Sultan and 
conciliate Malay opinion which had been badly shaken by the controversy, the 
Secretary of State was compelled to offer important concessions to the Ruler 
in the face of the High Commissioner's opposition to some of them. It should 
be noted, however, that events such as the Selangor Succession Dispute rarely 
occurred in the FMS, and there were few appeals by the Rulers to Whitehall 
during the interwar years. The new dimension in the Colonial Office-FMS
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r e la t io n s  th e re fo re  d id  not perm it th e  R u lers to  in flu en c e  g en e ra l B r i t i s h  
p o lic y  to  any s ig n if ic a n t  e x te n t .  Nor d id  i t  enable th e  R u lers  to  e n te r  in to  
th e  a c tu a l  a d m in is tra tio n  of th e  s t a t e s .
The S ta te  A d m in is tra tio n
Below th e  fe d e ra l  bureaucracy  was th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f  th e  s t a t e s .
The h e a r t  o f th e  a d m in is tra tio n  in  each s ta t e  was th e  R es id en t, who l ik e  th e
C hief S e c re ta ry , was a member o f th e  MCS on th e  l a s t  lap  o f h is  Malayan
c a re e r .  During th e  p e rio d  under s tu d y , a new breed  o f R esiden ts  had stepped
onto  th e  Malayan scene . None o f them e q u a lled  in  fo rce  o f p e r s o n a li ty  and
s ta tu r e  a Swettenham o r a C lif fo rd ,  and few e x ce lle d  in  sch o la rsh ip  l ik e  a
W illiam  Maxwell. For one th in g  th ey  w ielded  d ec id ed ly  le s s  a u th o r i ty  th an
t h e i r  p io n ee rin g  p red ecesso rs  and were g e n e ra lly  t i e d  to  t h e i r  h ead q u a rte rs ,
th e  S ta te  S e c r e ta r ia t ,  through which a l l  o f f i c i a l  bu sin ess  must p a ss . For
a n o th e r , th e  f r o n t i e r  co n d itio n s  o f th e  l a s t  cen tu ry  no lo n g e r e x is te d , and
a heap o f p recedences, ru le s  and re g u la tio n s  d ire c te d  t h e i r  energy and work
along  e s ta b lis h e d  a d m in is tra tiv e  ch annels . While th e  19th  cen tu ry  R esiden ts
h a ile d  from a wide v a r ie ty  o f s o c ia l  background, t h e i r  su ccesso rs  were now
drawn from a narrow s e c to r  o f B r i t i s h  s o c ie ty  -  th e  m id d le -c la s s . M artin
L i s t e r  (R esident o f N egri Sem bilan, 1889-96) was th e  younger son o f a p eer;
Swettenham and William  Maxwell were educated  only in  minor p u b lic  schoo ls;
J .P .  ^-odger (R esident of Perak , 1902-2) was born in  a c a s t le  and educated in
E ton and Oxford; and C aptain  T ris tram  Speedy, ’a rc h e ty p a l im p e r ia l is t
73f r e e la n c e ',  was a son o f a s o ld ie r  in  In d ia .  In  c o n tra s t ,  th e  in te rw a r 
R esid en ts  were in v a r ia b ly  men o f a m id d le -c la s s , p u b lic  school and u n iv e rs i ty  
background who shared a high degree o f u n ifo rm ity  in  v a lu es  and o u tlo o k .
They were re p re se n ta tiv e  o f a c o lo n ia l se rv ice  which, as we s h a l l  se e , no 
lo n g e r enjoyed th e  easy , in tim a te  and in fo rm al r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  A sian 
communities under i t s  ru le .
The R esident was re sp o n sib le  f o r  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  s t a t e .
67
B roadly speak ing , he con tinued  t o  perform  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f m a in ta in in g  peace 
and o rd e r , su p e rv is in g  th e  c o l le c t io n  o f revenue and re m itt in g  i t  to  th e  
F ed e ra l T reasu ry , d i r e c t in g  th e  d i s t r i c t  a d m in is tra t io n , and encouraging th e  
development o f th e  s t a t e .  However, by 1920 so much of h is  policy-m aking 
power had been absorbed  by th e  C hief S e c re ta ry  t h a t  even in  m a tte rs  o f a
n i
p u re ly  s ta t e  n a tu re , h is  o rd e rs  m ight be re v e rsed  by th e  F ed e ra l S e c r e ta r ia t .
Moreover, th e  R esiden t was now in te rp o sed  between th e  F e d e ra l Heads and th o se
in  charge o f s t a t e  dep artm en ts , bu t th e  r e la t io n s  between th e  p a r t i e s  were
no t c le a r ly  d e f in e d . D uring th e  e a r ly  days of th e  F e d e ra tio n  t h i s  meant ' i n
e f f e c t  an uneasy e q u ilib r iu m  between R esiden ts  in  danger of lo s in g  t h e i r
s t a t e s  and C hief O ff ic e rs  in  sea rch  o f t h e i r  d ep artm en ts , w ith  th e  R es id e n t-
75G eneral ho ld ing  th e  balance  between th em .1 The c e n t r a l i s a t io n  th a t
subsequen tly  developed and th e  ra p id  expansion o f f e d e r a l  departm ents had
by the  second decade o f th e  p re se n t cen tu ry  u p se t t h i s  d e l ic a te  b a lan ce . The
s ta te  departm ents were now m ainly  under th e  c o n tro l o f th e  F ed e ra l Heads.
These o f f ic e r s  even ten d ed  to  ig n o re  th e  R e s id e n t 's  e x is te n c e  when th e y  went
on to u r  in sp e c tin g  s t a t e  dep artm en ts, e s p e c ia l ly  in  S e lan g o r, th e  home of
th e  g re a t f e d e ra l  d ep artm en ts , where th e  R esid en t was fo rced  in  1929 to  g e t
'one F ed e ra l Head c a l le d  t o  account f o r  rep ea ted  d is re g a rd e d  of th e  G eneral 
76O r d e r s '. '  D eploring th e  lo s s  of th e  R e s id e n t 's  power, th e  A cting R esiden t 
of Pahang w rote in  1922:
There can be no d is g u is in g  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  R esid en ts  of th e  
v a rio u s  S ta te s  have been p ro g re s s iv e ly  shorn o f t h e i r  powers 
s in c e , not th e  d a te  of F e d e ra tio n  bu t th e  d a te  o f th e  
e stab lish m en t o f F e d e ra l departm ents . . . .  T h e ir  fu n c tio n s  
have g rad u a lly  a tro p h ie d  and t h e i r  p o s i t io n  i s  now comparable 
t o  th a t  o f th e  c la s s  o f su rfa ce  d w e lle rs  . . . .„ im a g in e d  by th e  
ingen ious Mr. H.G. W ells in  h is  Time M achine.
W hile th e  t r u t h  of th e  above sta tem en t cannot be den ied  th e re  i s  
c e r ta in ly  an elem ent o f e x ag g e ra tio n . A ll im p o rtan t m a tte rs  a f f e c t in g  th e  
FMS were in v a r ia b ly  c i r c u la te d  by th e  Under S e c re ta ry , th e  C hief S e c re ta ry 's  
r ig h t-h a n d  man in  th e  F e d e ra l S e c r e ta r i a t ,  to  th e  R esid en ts  and perhaps one
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o r more F ed e ra l Heads f o r  t h e i r  comments. U su a lly , th e  d e c is io n  f i n a l ly
a r r iv e d  a t  by th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  (o r  th e  High Commissioner where th e  m a tte rs
needed re fe re n ce  to  S ingapore) was in flu en ced  one way o r  an o th er by th e  views
of th e  R esiden ts  and th e  Under S e c re ta ry . Thus, th e  R esiden ts  continued to
e x e rc is e  a s ig n i f ic a n t  in f lu e n c e  on th e  decision-m ak ing  p ro c e ss , a lthough
th e y  were s t r ip e d  o f f  th e  power t o  make th e  d e c is io n  th em selv es . Furtherm ore,
th e  C hief S e c re ta ry  f r e q u e n tly  re so lv ed  d e l ic a te  and c o n tro v e rs ia l  p o lic y
q u e s tio n s  in  th e  Conference o f  R es id e n ts , sometimes w ith  th e  High
Commissioner p re s id in g , b u t u s u a lly  w ith  h im se lf as  chairm an. T h is conference
was a th e a t r e  where th e  R esid en ts  shared  w ith  th e  C hief S e c re ta ry  a d e c is iv e
78vo ice  over fe d e ra l  m a tte r s .  In  o th e r  words th e  R esiden t not only  continued  
to  be th e  key d i g i t  in  th e  s t a t e  a d m in is tra tio n  b u t a ls o  e x e rc ise  an 
im portan t in flu en c e  w ith in  th e  f e d e ra l  a d m in is tra tio n .
The R esident and th e  R uler
The F ed e ra tio n  T re a ty  d id  no t in  th e o ry  a f f e c t  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l
p o s i t io n  of th e  member s t a t e s .  Though under B r i t i s h  p ro te c t io n ,  th e
F edera ted  S ta te s  remained so v ere ig n  Malay S ta te s  i n  which th e  B r i t i s h  Crown
ex e rc ise d  no ju r i s d ic t io n .  L ikew ise, th e  R u le rs , a s  sovere ign  r u l e r s ,  were
79exempted from the  j u r i s d ic t io n  of th e  B r i t i s h  C o u rt. I t  was on t h i s  
ground th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  were th e o r e t i c a l ly  j u s t i f i e d  in  p o in tin g  out th a t  
th e  FMS was a Malay co u n try . In  p ra c t ic e  th e  B r i t i s h  Government was no t only 
re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  defence o f the  FMS but a lso  c o n tro l le d  i t s  in te r n a l  
a f f a i r s  th rough  th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  which was th e  approving a u th o r i ty  fo r  
g e n e ra l Malayan p o l i c i e s .  The F e d e ra tio n  T rea ty  a ls o  d id  no t a f f e c t  th e  
ad v iso ry  power of th e  R esiden t th rough  whom th e  C hief S e c re ta ry  and th e  High 
Commissioner g e n e ra lly  con tinued  to  o b ta in  th e  R u le r 's  view . A lthough th e  
R u ler was always co n su lted , th e  s e le c t io n  o f th e  R esiden t la y  w ith  th e  High 
Commissioner. The FMS R ulers had no say  a t  a l l  u n t i l  1937 when th e  Selangor 
S u lta n  began to  a s s e r t  h is  vo ice  in  t h i s  m a tte r  because of th e  su ccessio n
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d isp u te  d iscu ssed  e a r l i e r .  I t  was th e re fo re  ru le d  in  1940 th a t  th e  R u le r 's
w ishes in  th e  appointm ent of a R esident would be accep ted  ' so long as th ey  do
not c o n f l ic t  w ith  th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t s  or w ith  th e  ju s t  claim s o f o th e r 
BOo f f i c e r s . '  T h is  ru l in g  d id  not in  th e  l e a s t  weaken B r i t i s h  c o n tro l over 
th e  m a tte r .
However th e  myth was m ain tained  th a t  th e  R esiden t was an a d v ise r  to  
th e  R u le r , whose outward tra p p in g s  of so v e re ig n ty  were enhanced by pomp and 
ceremony. The ap p ara tu s  o f th e  co u rt h ie r a r c h ie s ,  as d iscu ssed  in  th e  
p rev io u s  c h a p te r , was no t on ly  p reserved  bu t tended  a lso  t o  be extended 
d u rin g  th e  in te rw a r  y e a r s .  The R ulers were awarded th e  honours of CMG and 
KCMG by th e  B r i t i s h  King, and th e se  o ccasions were c e le b ra te d  w ith  g re a t 
pomp and sp lendour. They were f re q u e n tly  held  in  co n junction  w ith  th e  annual 
Mengadap (obeisance) cerem onies du rin g  which each C hief o r  Penghulu perform ed 
in  tu rn  a p u b lic  a c t o f obeisance to  th e  R uler in  t r a d i t i o n a l  Malay fa sh io n  
in  th e  p resence of a la rg e  concourse o f people in  th e  1 s tana (P a la c e ) . In  
t h i s  way th e  R uler remained th e  Ceremonial Head of S ta te ,  and th e  S u lta n a te  
was as c lo se ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  c o lo n ia l  a d m in is tra tio n  as p re v io u s ly .
One of th e  main c o n tr ib u tio n  made by th e  R uler t o  B r i t i s h  in d i r e c t  ru le  was 
th e re fo re  to  a c t  as th e  nom inal c en tre  of power in  th e  s t a t e .  As th e  R u ler 
s t i l l  w ielded profound in flu en c e  among th e  Malay r a 1a y a t . t h i s  not only 
checked p o te n t ia l  a n t i - c o lo n ia l  h o s t i l i t y  among Malays bu t a lso  s tren g th en ed  
th e  Malay base o f B r i t i s h  r u le .  I t  a ls o  helped  to  p e rp e tu a te  th e  myth th a t  
th e  Federa ted  S ta te s  were Malay S ta te s  and to  j u s t i f y  th e  continued  ex c lu sio n  
o f th e  non-Malays from p o l i t i c a l  power in  th e  coun try .
In  th e  sphere o f s e c u la r  a d m in is tra tio n , th e  R uler continued to  
fu n c tio n  o u ts id e  th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  machine as a f r ie n d ly  and sometimes 
sagacious a d v ise r  to  th e  R esid en t. H is in tim a te  knowledge o f Malays and 
Malay s o c ie ty  and h is  underground access to  in fo rm atio n  not a v a ila b le  to  th e  
B r i t i s h  were p a r t i c u la r ly  v a lu a b le . By th e  1930's  many o f th e  R ulers were
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educated in the Malay College, showed a more intense and intelligent interest
in state affairs, and were more competent to advise their Residents. On the
other hand, as the Resident’s power diminished under Federation, the Ruler’s
influence on public affairs correspondingly declined. The same result was
evident from the further decline of the State Council after Federation and
the creation of the Federal Council. While the Ruler was invariably
consulted about affairs directly affecting Malays, the Secretariat records
show that he was usually ignored by the Resident in the general administration
of the state. In fact in many matters, such as the granting of land
concessions, the Ruler was treated in the same manner as any ordinary
resident in the state. For instance, in 1924 the Resident rejected an
application by the Yang Tuan of Negri Sembilan a prospecting licence over
8210,000 acres in Serting IIu. Despite the complaint of the Sultan of Perak
to the Colonial Office in the same year that this was derogatory to their
83prestige and status as Rulers, the practice continued.
In the sphere of practical administration, the Ruler still presided 
over the State Council and exercised a vital say in its recruitment of 
Penghulus and Kathis (religious magistrates). His seal was required to 
validate certain state documents like the Kuasas of Penghulus and Kathis, 
but such documents were prepared in the State Secretariat and needed to be 
first sanctioned by the Resident. The Ruler's signature gave legal force 
to laws enacted by the state and federal legislatures. He often endorsed 
government policies and tried to popularise them among the Malay ra1ayat.
He encouraged the Malays to accept vaccination, to join the co-operative 
societies, to plant more food crops during lean years; and performed other 
minor duties under British persuasion. Taken overall, however, the Ruler 
exercised much less influence on the state administration than during the 
pre-Federation days.
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The District Administration
Local government in the FMS was placed in the charge of the district
administration. This system was introduced into the Malay States in the
1870’s, probably modelled after the system in India.^ The FMS was divided
into twenty-four districts, each under a District Officer. The districts
varied in size and importance within a state and between states, ranging
from the densely populated districts of Kinta and Kuala Lumpur to the very
sparsely inhabited ones like Jelebu and Bentong. As in pre-Federation days,
the District Officer maintained peace and order in the district, performed
judicial duties of a First-class magistrate, took charge of land
administration and revenue-collecting, and supervised the Penghulu
administration. He was the leader of the social life in the district. Often
a guest at Chinese and Malay celebrations, he reciprocated in style. A
District Officer in Selangor explained that when stationed in Upper Perak he
had to ’entertain the District at Hari Raya (Malay New Year Day) and more
especially at Christmas which cost me three months' pay in three days. It 
85was the custom!'. * Above all, the District Officer was the political 
officer representing the government in the district. The success of British 
rule in each district depended on him, 'the backbone of the whole
rtZ
administration in the FMS.'
As a class, the District Officers had earned high esteem fron Lord
Lugard who credited them with having 'made and maintained the -Empire.' Their
Public school- Oxbridge training, he enthused, had made them 'English
gentlemen with an almost passionate conception of fair play, of protection
87of the weak, and of "playing the game".' As members of the MCS, the 
District Officers in the FMS no doubt cherished this high tradition and 
believed they were carrying it on. As a political officer, a good District 
Officer was expected to be in direct and intimate touch with the people and 
represent the government in their midst. He was responsible for the general
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a f f a i r s  of th e  d i s t r i c t s ,  e x p la in in g  and im plem enting government p o l ic ie s  on 
th e  one hand and keeping  th e  R esiden t inform ed of lo c a l  developm ents, needs
and problems on th e  o th e r .  He should  appear u b iq u ito u s  and om nipotent to  
th e  people he governed and should  hold  a l l  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r in g s  in  h is  hand.
The D is t r i c t  O ff ic e r  shou ld  aim a t  p o sse ss in g  complete 
in fo rm atio n  about th e  co n d itio n  and needs o f h is  d i s t r i c t  -  
every  ro a d , p a th , r i v e r ,  v i l la g e  and hamlet in  which he should 
know th o ro u g h ly . I t  i s  i n  h is  power . . . .  to  a cq u ire  very  
d e ta i le d  knowledge o f th e  c ircum stances and t r a d in g  and fam ily  
connections o f  th e  p r in c ip a l  n a tiv e  in h a b i ta n ts ,  and to  have 
such an acq u a in tan cesh ip  among them th a t  he w i l l  be ab le  to  
judge of th e  va lue  o f in fo rm a tio n  to  be o b ta ined  from, o r 
a s s is ta n c e  to  be a ffo rd e d  by each . . . .  Knowledge o f  one o r 
more of th e  n a tiv e  lan g u ag es , o f th e  p r in c ip le s  of E n g lish  
law , and o f th e  p ra c t ic e  o f book-keeping a re  e s s e n t ia l  . . . .
I f  he egg su rv ey , make ro a d s , s a i l  a b o a t, e t c . ,  so much th e  
b e t t e r .
I t  was e s s e n t i a l ,  th e r e f o r e ,  f o r  th e  D is t r i c t  O ff ic e r  to  be in c e s s a n tly  
on th e  move, m ixing, ta lk in g  and l i s te n in g  to  th e  people in  h is  d i s t r i c t .
Under R esident r u le ,  th e  D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e r  spen t a t  le a s t  h a l f  h is  tim e 
v i s i t i n g  roadw orks, mines and v i l l a g e s ,  but he found i t  in c re a s in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  
to  perform  t h i s  du ty  in  th e  p e rio d  under s tu d y . There was now th e  tendency 
to  reg ard  th e  D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e r  as be in g  a t  work on ly  when he was w ritin g  a t  
h is  desk . C onsequently , D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e rs  were no lo n g er as in t im a te ly
in  touch  w ith  th e  p eo p le , e s p e c ia l ly  M alays, as t h e i r  p re d e ce sso rs ; some, 
in  f a c t ,  had lo s t  touch  w ith  Malays a l to g e th e r .  The Malayan Bureau of 
P o l i t i c a l  I n te l l ig e n c e ,  fo r  in s ta n c e , was g r e a t ly  p e rtu rb ed  in  1922 to  re c e iv e  
only  scan ty  in fo rm atio n  from D is t r i c t  O ffice rs  on th e  common t~alk o f  th e  
people which i t  knew from o th e r  sou rces t o  be u n fr ie n d ly  t o  th e  government.
A m ajor cause o f t h i s  developm ent was th e  immense in c re a se  in  th e  
volume o f  work which b u ried  th e  D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e r  in  a mass o f paper in  h is  
o f f ic e .  This was p a r t ly  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  phenomenal growth of th e  rubber 
and t i n  in d u s t r ie s  in  th e  f i r s t  th re e  decades o f th e  p re se n t cen tu ry . I t  
was aggravated  by th e  sho rtage  of manpower d u rin g  th e  w ar. The 
c e n t r a l i s a t io n  of bo th  th e  f e d e ra l  and s ta t e  a d m in is tra tio n s  a lso  g re a t ly
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91in c re a se d  th e  amount of p aper work. The D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e r  was now fo rced
to  r e f e r  numerous m a tte rs ,  which were fo rm erly  w ith in  h is  pvtfer to  d ec id e ,
to  th e  S ta te  S e c r e ta r i a t ,  According to  th e  D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e r  o f K inta in
1922, n ine  out of every  te n  such re fe re n ce s  re q u ire d  on ly  th e  form al
92ap p ro v a l o f th e  R e s id e n t, Correspondence and ro u tin e  work were th u s  th e
cause o f en d less  com plain ts by D is t r i c t  O ff ic e rs ,
A nother v i t a l  f a c to r  was th e  u n p o p u la rity  o f  th e  o u t - s ta t io n  d i s t r i c t s
among MGS o f f ic e r s .  T his was p a r t ly  because by th e  1920*s improved tra n s p o r t
had enabled most MCS o f f ic e r s  to  have t h e i r  w ives and c h ild re n  w ith  them in
M alaya. T h e ir wives u n d e rs tan d ab ly  found l i f e  in  th e  u lu  w ith  i t s  absence
of w estern  s o c ia l  am en itie s  and European companionship uncongenial and 
93ta x in g . The sh o rtag e  o f  B r i t i s h  cad e ts  a r is in g  from d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  
rec ru itm en t a t  th e  im p e ria l end meant th a t  th e  n ew ly -a rriv ed  o f f ic e r s  from 
England u s u a lly  managed to  get h im se lf s ta t io n e d  n e a r  th e  to w n .^  F u r th e r ­
more, th e re  had emerged a s tro n g  d e s ire  among am bitious o f f ic e r s  to  ge t out 
o f th e  d i s t r i c t  as soon as  p o ss ib le  f o r  a p o s t in  th e  S e c r e ta r ia t s  o r th e  
F ed e ra l D epartm ents. I t  was w idely b e lie v e d , r i g h t l y  o r wrongly, th a t
c a re e rs  were made in  th e se  c e n tre s , and th a t  *to be sen t to  an is o la te d
95re sp o n s ib le  p o s t was to  be la b e l le d  a dud’ . This was m ainly re sp o n s ib le
fo r  th e  la rg e  number o f unnecessary  t r a n s f e r  o f D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e rs ,  which
formed a su b jec t o f p e r s i s te n t  c r i t ic is m s  by th e  R u le rs .
To he lp  D is t r i c t  O ff ic e rs  m a in ta in  c lo se  to u ch  w ith  th e  p eo p le , S i r
George Maxwell proposed two measures in  1922, C itin g  L u g ard 's  op in ion  to
support h is  view , Maxwell c a lle d  f o r  a d r a s t i c  re d u c tio n  in  th e  freq u en c ies
o f t r a n s f e r s  among D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e rs .  However no c o n c re te  a c tio n  appeared
to  have been tak en  to  check t h i s  t re n d  u n t i l  1934 when th e  Malayan
E stab lishm en t O ffice  was s p e c i f ic a l ly  d ire c te d  to  p rev en t unnecessary
t r a n s f e r s .  The second measure Maxwell proposed was th e  d ev o lu tio n  o f power
96from th e  fe d e ra l  c e n tre  p a s t the  R esiden t to  th e  D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e rs . But
74
decentralisation, as discussed in later chapters, failed to touch the district
administration in the states. About the same time Guillemard advised the
Colonial Office to bar young cadets from getting married during the first
three years of their service in order to facilitate their posting to the
97lonelier outstations. While refusing to sanction this since it would 
increase the unpopularity of Malaya among potential cadets, Whitehall ruled 
that only bachelors would be recruited into the MCS.
But it was Sir Hugh Clifford who was most concerned about British
officers losing touch with the Malays. As early as 1896 he had warned of a
situation in which a European could spend weeks in the country 'without
coming into contact with any Asiatics save those who wait at table, clean
his shirts and drive his cab' and years 'without acquiring any very profound
98knowledge of the natives of the country or (their) language. * Returning 
to Malaya after twenty-seven years spent in other parts of the Empire, he 
was forcefully struck by the race barriers that had emerged between Europeans 
and Asians. Hence he deplored the practice of stationing a young officer near 
the town which implanted in the latter a 'wholly mistaken impression of his 
raison d 1etre'. encouraged 'extravagant habits and ideas', and prevented him 
from acquiring the 'intimate knowledge of the people which is essential for 
a Civil Servant in British Malaya'. On Clifford's recommendation, the 
Colonial Office started in 1928 to send MCS recruits for a course of study 
in the Malay language at the School of Oriental Languages in London University. 
On their arrival in Malaya, the new officers were immediately posted to ulu 
for at least a year to work among Malays and acquire at first-hand and 
intimate knowledge of Malay customs and character. Though it was believed 
'that in his short time here Clifford got more out of the MCS officers) than 
anyone else for years', the problem in fact was beyond solution. All the 
above measures therefore failed to bring the district administration into 
closer touch with the people to any important extent.
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The t r u th  of th e  m a tte r  was th a t  much o f th e  tim e o f th e  D i s t r i c t  
O ff ic e r  was now sp en t w ith in  th e  s iz e a b le  European community th a t  had emerged 
by th e  second decade o f th e  20th c en tu ry . He was u su a lly  th e  p re s id e n t o f 
th e  European clubs in  th e  d i s t r i c t  and p a r t ic ip a te d  f u l ly  in  th e  r a c i a l l y -  
ex c lu s iv e  and snobbish  s o c ia l  l i f e  o f a tra n s p la n te d  E ng lish  so c ie ty  in  th e  
tow ns. The MCS o f f i c e r s  (a s  w e ll as o th e r  Europeans) l iv e d  ’a s o f t  l i f e  in  
good houses w ith every  am enity1; every household had a minimum of th re e  
s e rv a n ts , most had m o re .^ ^  As C lif fo rd  commented c r i t i c a l l y ,  th e  s tan d a rd s  
o f l i f e  in  th e  towns were 'u n d e s ira b ly  e x tra v a g a n t ' and sp o rts  and amusement 
occupied a 'v e ry  d is p ro p o r t io n a te ly  la r g e ' p a r t  o f th e  o f f i c e r s '  tim e . Even 
fo r  th o se  s ta t io n e d  in  th e  o u tly in g  d i s t r i c t ,  i t  was in  th e  towns th a t  th ey  
sought to  spend t h e i r  l e i s u r e .
Ease and r a p id i ty  o f communications have in c reased  so g re a t ly  
throughout th e  P en in su la  o f re c en t y e a rs  th a t  men a re  ap t to  
tak e  c a su a l leav e  w ith  a frequency th a t  was unknown even a 
q u a r te r  o f a c en tu ry  ago, and n a tu r a l ly  enough such leave  i s  
u s u a lly  spent in  th e  c e n tre s  where most Europeans a re  gathered  
to g e th e r , and compJ_gijely ou t o f touch  w ith  Malays and w ith 
t h e i r  environm ent.
By th e  1 9 1 0 's , th e r e f o r e ,  th e  r u r a l  in fo rm a lity  of th e  D is t r i c t  O f f i c e r 's
l i f e  o f  th e  e a r ly  days had been rep laced  by a r e la t io n s h ip  w ith th e  A sians
which was marked by race  p re ju d ic e s , snobbishness and c la s s  b a r r i e r s .  This
inw ard-look ing , a l l -w h ite  s o c ie ty  was in te n t  on p re se rv in g  w hite p r e s t ig e .
As one se n io r  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r  put i t :
I t  i s  alm ost im possib le  fo r  people in  England to  r e a l i s e  th a t  
one cannot economise h e re  below a c e r ta in  m argin . One must 
e i th e r  l iv e  l ik e  a European, which means c e r ta in  in e v ita b le  
expenses, o r 'go n a t iv e ' and lo se  a l l  th e  s ta tu s  o f a European.
The l a t t e r  a l t e r n a t iv e  i s  one no s e l f - r e s p e c t in g  man should 
contem plate fo r  a moment; b e t t e r  be a s to n e -b re ak e r on th e  roads 
in  England th an  s in k  below th e  European le v e l  in  th e  E as t: he
could r e t a in  h is  c h a ra c te r  and p r id e  of race  in  th e  one case bu t 
no t in  th e  o th e r .
I t  was th e  r i s e  o f t h i s  r a c i a l  o lig a rc h y  in  th e  FMS th a t  negated  a l l  e f f o r t s  
to  b rid g e  th e  gap between th e  Asian masses and t h e i r  D is t r i c t  O ff ic e rs .
D irec ted  and c o n tro lle d  by B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s ,  the  d i s t r i c t  a d m in is tra tio n  
was p a r t  o f a European a d m in is tra tio n . However, th e  Malay e l i t e  d id  p la y
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a s ig n i f ic a n t  ro le  in  i t .  A fte r 1920 D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e rs ,  a c tin g  on fe d e ra l  
in s t r u c t io n ,  tended to  c o n su lt Malay C hiefs more fre q u e n tly  about Malay 
m a tte rs .  More im p o rta n tly , a decade e a r l i e r  th e  B r i t i s h  s ta r te d  to  r e c r u i t  
Malay a r i s to c r a t s  t r a in e d  in  th e  Malay C ollege a t  Kuala Kangsar in to  a Malay 
A d m in is tra tiv e  Serv ice  (MAS). This p o lic y  i s  d iscu ssed  in  C hapter S ix  and 
i t  i s  on ly  necessa ry  to  m ention h e re  th a t  n e a r ly  a l l  th e  MAS o f f ic e r s  were 
posted  to  d i s t r i c t s  where Malays predom inated. As Malay O ff ic e rs , A ss is ta n t 
D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e rs  o r even D is t r i c t  O ff ic e rs , th e se  Malays were h e ld  in  h igh  
esteem  by th e  Malay r a 1 ay a t as n a tiv e  sons who had made good. At th e  d i s t r i c t  
l e v e l  th e re fo re  th e  B r i t i s h  d id  to  an im portan t e x te n t govern th e  Malays 
through t r a d i t i o n a l  le a d e r s .  But th e se  w este rn ised  le a d e rs  opera ted  w ith in  
th e  framework not o f ind igenous i n s t i t u t i o n s  b u t o f a European a d m in is tra tio n . 
Furtherm ore, th ey  imbibed much of th e  e s p r i t  de corps of th e  B r i t i s h  MCS, were 
encouraged to  fo llow  European h a b i ts  and custom s, and were tr a in e d  in  
European methods o f a d m in i s t r a t io n . '^ 4' Commanding wide re sp e c t and in f lu e n c e  
among th e  r a  *a v a t . th ey  helped  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  to  s tre n g th e n  th e  Malay base o f 
in d i r e c t  r u l e . On th e  o th e r  hand, by making i t  le s s  n ecessa ry  to  s ta t io n  
B r i t i s h  D is t r i c t  O ff ic e rs  in  th e  u lu  or fo r  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  su p e r io rs  to  d e a l 
in tim a te ly  w ith  Malays, th e  MAS o f f ic e r s  tended to  accen tu a te  th e  r i f t  
between B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  and M alays. This was one o f many fa c to r s  which was 
re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  f a c t  th a t  by th e  l a t e  1 9 3 0 's , B r i t i s h  C iv i l  S ervan ts were 
f a r  le s s  in tim a te  w ith Malays and knowledgeable about Malay c h a ra c te r , custom 
and way o f l i f e .
In d ir e c t  Rule in  th e  FMS and N orthern N ig e ria
I t  would be in s t r u c t iv e  a t  t h i s  ju n c tu re  to  compare in d i r e c t  ru le  in
th e  FMS w ith  t h a t  e s ta b lis h e d  by Lugard in  N orthern  N ig e ria . In  1942 S ir
Frank Swettenham claimed th a t  R esident ru le  in  th e  Malay S ta te s  was th e
105p re c u rso r  o f th e  l a t t e r  system . In  form a t  l e a s t  th e re  was an elem ent o f 
t r u t h  in  t h i s  a s s e r t io n .  In  both t e r r i t o r i e s  th e  ind igenous le a d e rs  and
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i n s t i t u t i o n s  were p re se rv ed  and used whenever a d v isa b le . Islam  and n a tiv e
custom were l e f t  to  th e  so le  ju r i s d ic t io n  of th e  Malay R ulers in  th e  FMS and
to  th e  S u ltan  o f Sokoto and th e  F u lan i Emirs (C h ief Heads) in  N ig e ria .
C h r is tia n  p ro s e ly t is in g  among Malays and Muslim A frican s  was o f f i c i a l l y
p ro h ib i te d . D esp ite  t h i s  however, th e  B r i t i s h  c o n tro l le d  succession  q u e s tio n s ,
which came under n a t iv e  custom, in  bo th  c o u n tr ie s , though t h i s  c o n tro l
encountered g re a te r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  N ig e ria  because o f th e  s tro n g e r  p o s it io n
o f th e  Emirs and t h e i r  m in is te r s .  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  a lso  sought to  m odernise
th e  ru lin g  c la s s  in  both  reg io n s  through an E n g lish  ed u ca tio n , and to  p re se rv e
th e  peasan t so c ie ty  th rough  a v e rn a cu la r  edu ca tio n  o r ie n te d  to  p rep arin g  th e
107commoners fo r  a g r ic u l tu r a l  p u r s u i ts .  E 'urthermore, land  p o lic y  aimed to
r e s t r i c t  th e  s a le  and t r a n s f e r  o f n a tiv e -h e ld  lan d s  in  o rd e r to  p rev en t th e
r i s e  o f a la n d le s s  Malay o r Hausa p r o l e t a r i a t . ^ ^
With show o f  pomp and cerem onial p ag ean try , th e  R u lers  in  bo th  a reas
were used to  g race th e  im p e ria l s ta g e . From tim e to  tim e they  assembled in
du rb ars  and conferences w ith  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  o v e rlo rd . While th e  f i r s t  Malayan
du rb ar prompted an o ld  c h ie f  to  remark th a t  Malays were no lo n g er l ik e  'th e
fro g  beneath  th e  coconut s h e l l  who though t th e  s h e l l  was th e  ro o f 
109th e  U n iv e rse ', th e  Emir o f Kano d esc rib ed  th e  f i r s t  N igerian  du rb ar in  
1912 as a m eeting of c h ie f s  'who had nev er p re v io u s ly  enjoyed any s h e l t e r  in  
common save th e  shades o f n ig h t .  Like th e  Malay R u ler who c e le b ra te d
th e  annual mengadan cerem onies w ith r i t u a l i s t i c  sp len d o u r, th e  F u lan i Emir 
observed th e  annual muslim f e s t i v a l .  On th a t  o ccasio n  'th e  Emir and a l l  h is  
b r i l l i a n t l y  appoin ted  horsemen r id e  ou t b e fo re  t h e i r  people  w ith  as much 
d ig n ity  as in  th e  o ld days and a re  re c e iv e d  w ith g re a t  a c c la m a tio n .'^ "^  
F in a lly , to  m ain ta in  t h e i r  p re s t ig e  and s ta tu s ,  th e  R u lers  in  both  c o u n trie s  
were g ran ted  la rg e  and handsome allow ances which were matched however by t h e i r  
p ro v e rb ia l  indeb tedness to  m oneylenders.
Beyond t h i s  fro n tag e  however, th e  system s o f in d i r e c t  ru le  in  th e  FMS
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and Northern Nigeria were glaringly different. Indirect rule in the Malay
States was prompted mainly by political expediency. In Nigeria it was almost
solely determined by economy, necessitated by Lugard's dependence on limited
112financial grants from London to govern the country. " In theory indirect
rule in the FMS, as defined by Swettenham, meant ruling through traditional
leaders and socio-political institutions. To Lugard however, it meant the
integration of indigenous institutions with the British administration into
'a single Government in which the Native Chiefs have clearly defined duties
113and an acknowledged status, equally with the British officials'. The 
ethical-philosophical justification for indirect rule in the two countries 
also differed to an important extent. In the FMS the principal contention 
for the system was that it would safeguard Malays from being swamped by 
dynamic and economically more aggressive non-Malays. In contrast to this 
implicitly static conception, Lugard justified indirect rule on the ground 
that it would soften the process of leading the relative backward African 
'by their own efforts, in their own way, to .... a higher plane of social 
organisation.'
In the sphere of practical government, the Nigerian administration 
stands out as an exemplary system of indirect rule, Lugard not only 
scrupulously put his principles into practice but devoted much time and 
energy to defining the relationship between the British officers and the Bnir 
and to demarcating their respective authority. In the FMS, however, 
Swettenham's theory was not applied from the district administration upwards, 
and the juristic position of the Ruler vis-a-vis the Resident and Chief 
Secretary was reputed for its ambiguity and vagueness. While traditional 
Malay institutions were generally not used for administration, the Fulani 
political institutions were integrated with the British administration and 
functioned as organs of government. In contrast to the Malay Ruler who stood 
outside the European state administration which was under the Resident, the
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Emir headed a Native Administration in each Province. The Emir was assisted
by his four or five ministers and ’advised’ by the Resident in the general
administration of the Province. He appointed subordinate chiefs (District
Heads) and officials, allocated land, settled land disputes and discharged
115a host of other duties. He was assisted in each district by a District
Head. While the Malay Chiefs (except the minority in the MAS) were deprived
of all administrative functions, the District Heads collected revenue, sat as
magistrates, and enforced government regulations under the guidance of a
British District Officer. The latter also supervised the Village Heads, each
of whom was in charge of a village.
The Emir also exercised judicial authority through an indigenous
institution - the Native Court. These courts enforced African law and custom
and dealt with the bulk of the criminal and civil cases in the Province.
However, government employees, non-Africans, and Africans who were not
subjects of the Emir came under the Provincial Court presided over by the
R e s i d e n t . I n  sharp contrast, the courts (except the Kathi’s court) in
the FMS were British institutions enforcing almost wholly British laws.
Finally, while the Resident directed and controlled the state treasury in
the Malay State, the Emir administered the Native Treasury. This body
prepared the budget of the Province, pooled all the taxes collected, and
discharged other financial functions. After part of its revenue (usually
about 50$) had been handed over to the central government, the rest was used
to pay the Emir’s and the officials’ salaries and to sustain the Native
Administration. The Native Treasury in fact was also a vital educative
organ through which the Enir and his officials learned the art of modem
118administration. It is clear therefore that, although his position had
119weakened under the strains of British control, the Emir remained very much
a ruler of the Province whose leadership and capacities vitally influenced
120the tone and efficiency of the Native Administration. The Ruler of the
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Malay State, on the other hand, was a mere figurehead whose personal
attributes did not seriously matter to the British administration.
It is of course true that general policy lay in British hands, and
121the Resident’s control over the Emir was indisputable. It also cannot be
denied that there were instances of Residents who usurped both the authority
and the functions of the Emir. To this extent the Nigerian system resembled
in practice British indirect rule in the FMS. But the spirit and the method
with which British control was generally exercised in the emirates attests
to the genuineness of indirect rule. Unlike the FMS Resident who generally
did not disguise his day-to-day governing of the state, his Nigerian
counter-part alwa3rs sought to keep the Native Administration functioning by
remote control. As Margery Perhan put it, it was necessary for him to stand
122behind the throne but keep his head well down. No efforts were spared to 
maintain the single chain of responsibility from the Emir through his 
ministers and the District Heads to the Village Heads. While the chain of 
command was sewn to British hands in the FMS, the position in the Emirate was 
different.
When on tour (the British officers) were to be accompanied by the 
Emir’s representative and to act with and through him. They were 
not to interview a subordinate chief except in the presence of his 
superior. Departmental subordinates should not give direct orders 
to Village Heads or to Chiefs. Thus the prestige and the sense of 
responsibility of the Emirs would be increased and reforms, suggested 
from outside, vrould„Rermeate the whole system, strengthening rather 
than weakening it. ^
In other words, while the British cut off the Malay Rulers and Chiefs from 
the line of authority, they generally endeavoured to bolster the prestige 
and authority of the Emir and his officials at every level of the 
administration.
It is not intended here to examine the drawbacks of indirect rule in 
Northern Nigeria, which have been emply analysed by scholars in recent years, 
but only to describe the system briefly in order to highlight the hollowness 
of indirect rule in the FMS. Apart from Lugard’s capacities and single-
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minded devotion to the system, the success of the Nigerian system sprang 
from the fact that the Fulani political institutions were stronger and more 
centralised than their Malay counterparts and that it operated in a 
virtually homogeneous cultural, Islamic environment. The FMS system on the 
other hand was fashioned at a time when imperial confidence was very high 
and when the Malay States were convulsed by political instability. Even so 
it is interesting to note that the FMS system had hardly anything in common 
with British indirect rule in the Indian Native State from where the title 
'Resident* was derived. In the Indian States the Resident was accredited to 
the court of the Raja, exercised a general diplomatic supervision, tendered 
general advice, but did not direct or control the general administration of
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the Raja's Government. One may conclude that compared with the Indian or
Nigerian system of indirect rule, British rule in the FMS from the districts
upwards should be more accurately regarded as direct rule. To a great
extent, therefore, Lugard was right in describing Resident rule in the FMS
125as 'the very antithesis of the Nigerian system.'
The Mukim Administration
At the village level however, indirect rule in the FMS closely 
resembled the Nigerian system. In pre-British days the Penghulu, as the 
village head, was a part of the political structure of Perak, Selangor and 
Pahang. Mainly for reason of economy and shortage of manpower, the Penghulu 
system was incorporated into the district administration. The Penghulu now 
became the link between the Malay ra'ayat and the District Officer who 
replaced the local chief. His jurisdiction was also enlarged to a few 
villages which formed a mukim (parish) into which the district was divided. 
The Penghulu continued to exercise strong influence in the village, 
provided the government with an invaluable fund of local knowledge, and was 
a highly useful instrument for local government. It would appear that at 
the village level, indirect rule in the FMS was more effective than its
Nigerian counterpart. In Nigeria indirect rule in the village was hampered
to some extent by the strong resentment of the Hausa peasants towards their
Fulami rulers for their over-display of superiority. The British District
Officer was also unable to maintain continuous contact with the tillage
126Heads who were *at once numerous, scattered, docile and parochial.' No
such hindrances existed in the FMS, and the Penghulu's importance in the
village was enhanced rather than weakened under British rule.
The Penghulu institution was alien to the matriarchal system in Negri
Sembilan and was only introduced in Sungei Ujong in 1884, the district least
affected by Menangkabau influence. During the last century the ancient
lineage system of Yam Tuan, Undang, Lembaga, Ibu Bapa continued to be in
charge of customary matters. One of the important changes in the FMS during
the present century was the gradual transplantation of the Penghulu system
into Negri Sembilan. The need for it was first felt after land holdings
were brought under the mukim register which necessitated the subdivision of
the district into mukims. Each mukim was inhabited by different clans, and
the lembagas could not therefore effectively assist in the land reorganisa-
127tion and settlement. To overcome this obstacle, Malay Assistants were
engaged in 1904. Under the impetus of increasing population and volume of
work, these officers gradually assumed the functions of Penghulus, and those
in the districts of Jelubu, Coast and Seremban were placed on a Penghulu
Scheme in 1913. Owing to stiff resistance from the District Officers who
insisted that the lembagas could play the role of Penghulus, the change was
not introduced in Tampin and Kuala Pilah, the strongholds of Menangkaban
influence. The rubber boom of the mid-1920's, however, forced the
government to try out the lembagas here as Penghulus. This experiment failed
mainly because the lembagas were neither able to undertake land cases
128effectively nor control areas peopled by members of different clans. In
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1929 therefore the Penghulus Scheme was extended to Tampin and Kuala Pilah
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Districts. However, the drawback of placing Penghulus in the state in charge 
of several mukims was not removed till the 1930’s when the Penghulu's 
jurisdiction was limited to one mukim as elsewhere.
Being a new institution, the Penghulus in Negri Sembilan carried less 
status and authority than those of the other states. Furthermore there 
existed the need of demarcating the respective authority and functions of 
the Penghulu on the other hand and the lembagas and ibu bapas on the other. 
This vexations problem was resolved to a great extent by the 1930‘s. The 
lembaga was placed in charge of customary matters and was therefore 
authorised to settle personal disputes involving members of his own clan.
The Penghulu, as a territorial authority, dealt with disputes which lay 
outside the Adat (custom) such as land matters. When the lembaga was also 
the Penghulu, he exercised jurisdiction over both spheres of duties. Since 
customary and secular questions frequently overlapped, the position of the 
Penghulu vis-a-vis the lembaga had still to be clearly determined in Negri 
Sembilan. Nevertheless, the status and power of the former increased year 
by year, and the Negri Sembilan Penghulu administration was clearly evolving 
towards the position of its counterparts in the other states.
The Penghulus in each state were appointed by the Ruler-in-C0uncil 
after they were recommended by a Penghulu Committee and approved by the 
Resident. The policy of Penghulu recruitment, however, varied from state 
to state according to local conditions. In general the recruitment was 
determined by three common criteria: local origin and popularity, force of 
character, and educational attainment. But the weight attached to each of 
these factors in the selection of Penghulus varied from state to state. In 
In Pahang, owing to the relatively undeveloped character of the state, the 
territorial factor was paramount and Penghulus were appointed from the most 
suitable men in the mukims. Only when there were no suitable local 
candidates or when the mukims were split into rival factions were outsiders
129appointed. In Perak and Selangor more attention was paid to the other
two factors. Owing to the presence of large communities of immigrant Malays,
130a strong man was considered essential in many mukims in Selangor. Negri
Sembilan also tended to appoint Penghulus who had a strong personality and
131had performed outdoor duties in the district. Apart from these qualities,
Penghulus were occasionally appointed on account of purely local
considerations. For instance, in the Tampin and Kuala Pilah Districts
Penghulus must be Rembau Malays because their duties invariably affected the 
132Adat. Until the 1930's the intervention of the Ruler or the Undang was at
times decisive in the appointment of a particular Penghulu, even against the
133vehement protest of the District Officer concerned.
After Federation the Penghulu administration gradually developed into 
a mukim bureaucracy. The Penghulu schemes of the various states came to 
embody terms of service somewhat similar to those of ordinary government 
servants. Hereditary successions, still important in pre-Federation days, 
were now rare. By the 1930's the practice was to appoint Assistant 
Penghulus who would eventually be promoted to Penghulus on grounds of 
efficiency. The recruitment of Penghulus came to resemble that of ordinary 
government officers at least in Selangor and Perak. In 1935 Selangor 
introduced a Penghulu Scheme in which the selection of Penghulus was mainly 
determined by educational qualification and general knowledge. Suitable 
candidates were selected as Assistant Penghulus after an oral and written 
examination on Malay composition, general knowledge and History of Selangor. 
To be promoted to a Penghuluship, these assistants were required to pass an 
oral examination on certain sections of the Land Code and Land Regulations, 
the Criminal and Civil Code, and the General Orders. Perak followed with 
a slightly different scheme, and Negri Sembilan and Pahang were moving in 
the same direction. Hence by the last 1930's a new class of better-educated 
Penghulus with few roots in the mukims under their charge had begun to come
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onto the scene. In Perak and Negri Sembilan, they tended to be rather
135young and less influential with the people. But the Resident of Selangor 
was deeply impressed with 'the Penghulus of the new school, young, smart and 
wearing an air of authority.* D As the mukim bureaucracy thus became more 
firmly ’set*, the Rulers and the Undangs exercised less influence on the 
selection of Penghulus.
Since the Penghulu operated by influence and persuasion, it was
essential for the government to maintain his status and prestige in the
mukim. To ensure that he was adequately provided for, his salary was
periodically raised during the interwar years, though he was better paid in
Perak and Selangor than in Negri Sembilan and Pahang. He was permitted to
hold a certain acreage of rent-free land and received financial grants and
loans to build his own house in order that he might hold court and settle
disputes. In the 1930's the government even started to provide and
maintain a house with a balai (reception hall) for the Penghulu except in
Pahang. Furthermore owing to resentment that his work often seemed to be
that of a glorified notice-server, the Penghulu in Selangor and apparently
in Perak was relieved of this function in 1920. Finally the government
tried to conserve the Penghulu1s influence in the mukim by not transferring
him elsewhere. For reasons which are not clear, this was only successful
in Selangor and Pahang where he usually remained for a long period in the 
137same mukim. Though the Penghulu was a hardworked officer, the 
position was keenly sought after by Malays during the interwar years because 
of its status and prestige, its privileges and rewards.
The Penghulu was the leader of social life in the mukim. His office 
and functions raised him above the ra1 ayat. and this was enhanced by a kuasa 
from the Ruler. In ceremonial life the Penghulu retained his ties with the 
Ruler, being present at the installation of a Sultan or a Raja Muda and paying 
obeisance and renewing loyalty to the Ruler at the annual mangadap
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ceremonies. To maintain his status, his house had to be among the best in
the kampong, and his family was expected to eat and dress better than others.
He had to give alms and subscribe to the mosque especially during Puasa
(fasting month) and come to the help of his poorer anak buah (parishioners).
Every stranger in the kampong made for the Penghulu's house where he could
138stay the night and get a meal according to the custom. During festive
seasons such as Hari Raja he had to entertain his anak buah lavishly, when
drinks were freely consumed, cigarettes replaced the sireh (betel) of earlier
139times, and a hired entertainer replaced the kampong dancers. As he 
usually was a man of some independent m e a n s , a n d  as his work occupied his 
time fully, he engaged others to till his land. It was important for the 
Penghulu to perform his social functions adequately, otherwise he would lose 
influence among his anak buah. and an unpopular Penghulu often had stones 
’thrown or dropped on (his) roof at night
As the agent of the government in the village, the Penghulu performed 
numerous functions such as maintaining order and settling disputes. However 
during the interwar years he no longer collected revenue in the mukim, a 
major function of his 19th century predecessor. After 1933 he also stopped 
sitting in judgement over Europeans guilty of petty offences. Though the
-] jt o
official reason was that Penghulus were reluctant to convict Europeans, 
this ruling was probably also influenced by the desire to maintain white 
prestige. In other directions the duties of the Penghulu increased 
enormously during the interwar period. For instance, he had to help enforce 
rubber restriction, assist land settlement and alienation, and supervise 
village night-markets. In undertaking these multifarious duties, the 
Penghulu was assisted by the kathis and (in Selangor and Perak) the ketuas 
kampong (village Elders). The kathi, a post which in the opinion of one 
District Officer ’perfectly suited the Malay temperament', settled religious 
disputes, solemnised muslim marriages, administered the law relating to
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d iv o rce  and in h e r ita n c e  o f p ro p e r ty , and t r i e d  m inor cases o f m atrim onial 
o ffen ces  and breaches o f r e l ig io u s  observances. The Ketuas Kampong were 
o f f i c i a l l y  appointed d u rin g  th e  f i r s t  decade of t h i s  cen tu ry  to  help  th e  
Penghulus ta c k le  th e  v a s t in c re a se  of work in  th e  mukim and c o n tro l th e  la rg e  
im m igrant Malay communities i n  Perak and S e lan g o r. The Ketua Kampong ad v ised  
th e  Penghulu on v i l la g e  developm ent, served  n o t ic e s , and d ischarged  o th e r  
m inor d u t ie s .  G en era lly  Penghulus found K etuas Kampong of lo c a l  Malay o r ig in  
easy  to  cope w ith  and a t  t im e s , when not c lo se ly  sup erv ised  by D i s t r i c t
T I O
O ff ic e r s ,  l e f t  a l l  th e  work to  them . ^ But K etuas Kampong o f immigrant 
s to c k , who formed th e  m a jo r ity  i n  S e lan g o r, were ex trem ely  d i f f i c u l t  to  
handle when th ey  were h o s t i l e  to  th e  Penghulu. Such f r i c t i o n s  fo r tu n a te ly  
were not f re q u e n t, and by th e  1930’s th e  Ketuas Kampong had come to  p rovide 
th e  ‘ lo c a l  to u ch ’ to  th e  mukim a d m in is tra tio n  in  S elangor and P e r a k . T o  
a s ig n i f ic a n t  e x te n t ,  what th e  new breed  o f Penghulus lacked  in  v i l la g e  t i e s  
was co rre c ted  by th e  Ketuas Kampong.
C onclusion
I t  w i l l  be noted  th a t  th e  d is c u ss io n s  on th e  fe d e ra l  a d m in is tra tio n  in
t h i s  ch ap te r d e a l w ith  th e  p e rio d  b e fo re  1920. The aim i s  to  s p o t l ig h t  th e
A
f a c t  th a t  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  b e fo re  th a t  y e a r aimed to  amalgamate th e  F edera ted  
S ta te s  in to  a union . C onsequently , a h ig h ly  c e n tr a l i s e d  and e f f i c i e n t  
f e d e ra l  bureaucracy  was e re c te d  over th e  heads o f th e  s ta t e  governm ents.
This f e d e ra l  a d m in is tra tio n  had no o rg an ic  r e la t io n s  w ith  Malay S o c ie ty , 
be ing  d ire c te d  and c o n tro lle d  by Europeans, p a id  fo r  by non-Malay ta x a t io n ,  
and in ten d ed  to  f u r th e r  a l i e n  economic i n t e r e s t s .  I t  absorbed much o f th e  
powers of th e  R esiden ts  and what l i t t l e  f in a n c ia l  and l e g i s l a t i v e  a u th o r i ty  
l e f t  to  th e  S ta te  C ouncils b e fo re  F e d e ra tio n . W hile th e  R ulers and C hiefs 
enjoyed a v ic a r io u s  sense of p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  s ta t e  a f f a i r s  under R esident 
r u le ,  th e y  e x e rc ise d  in c re a s in g ly  l i t t l e  in f lu e n c e  on th e  government a f t e r  
F e d e ra tio n . Hence, B r i t i s h  ru le  in  th e  FMS a t  th e  fe d e ra l  and s t a t e  le v e ls
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could not be regarded as indirect in the sense of ruling through traditional 
Malay leaders and institutions. Only at the mukim and, to a limited sense, 
the district levels could British rule be described as indirect. In any 
case, the governing of the Chinese and Indians through two federal organs 
- the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs and the Labour Department - was decidedly 
one of direct rule.
After the ^irst World War, the policy of developing the FMS along 
unitary lines became discredited. Instead British policy in the interwar 
years sought to loosen the federal administration with a view to creating a 
genuine federal system. This policy sought, among other things, to permit 
the Rulers a greater say in state affairs, if not to draw them into the 
sphere of practical administration. The British also intensified the policy 
of training a Malay administrative elite to share with British officials the 
direction and control of public affairs. To these policies we must now turn 
our attention.
♦
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CHAPTER THREE
The First Decentralisation Experiment, 1920-7
In February 1920 Sir Laurence Guillemard became the Governor of the
Straits Settlements and the High Commissioner of the Malay States.
Guillemard had spent his last thirty-four years in the Home Civil Service.
Except for a short spell in the Home Office, his career had been confined
to the Treasury. He was Private Secretary to Harcourt, Chancellor of
Exchequer, in the years 1892-1902; Deputy Chairman of the Board of Inland
Revenue 1902-8; and Chairman of Customs and Excise 1908-19. He arrived in
Malaya ‘with a freshness of outlook and an enthusiasm comparatively rare in
the Colonial Service’.'*' Guillemard regarded M s  long Treasury experience as
’an invaluable asset’ which compensated for his lack of experience of the
colonial dependencies. However, he stressed that his ’greatest asset' was
his 'close friendship of many years with /~LordJ  Milner*,^a the Secretary
2of State for the Colonies, to whom he owed his new appointment.
Guillemard caine to Malaya with only Milner's ideas to guide him in 
his new role of Governor-High Commissioner. He was in fact entrusted with 
the task of modifying the crown colony system of government in the Straits
o
Settlements in order to make it work more smoothly. In the Malay States 
he was advised to pay more attention to Malay interests as against the 
prevailing idea that the government's first duty was the promotion of 
European and Chinese capitalist interests.^" Guillemard therefore appeared 
to have been influenced by Milner's view that indirect rule should be 
strengthened in the FMS. In fact he arrived at a time when leading men in 
London and Malaya were seriously questioning the existing policy of 
amalgamating the federated states, which had caused the Malays to be left 
far behind in the political and economic spheres. In Malaya there were also 
dissatisfaction among the officials and European commercial interests with
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overcentralisation in the FMS administration. Indeed, overcentralisation
was so evident that the Public Service Salaries Commission of 1919 had
already recommended a measure of decentralisation. He was also aware that
even the Residents had begun to chafe under the restraints of overcentra-
5lisation at Kuala Lumpur and desired more power within their states. 
Apparently because of previous policy pronouncements on maintaining the 
authority of the states, Guillemard, like his chief advisers, came to the 
erroneous conclusion that neither centralisation nor amalgamation were 
intended by the founders of the FMS. Hence, the Government felt that it 
had violated the spirit of the Federation treaty and that the states had 
lost more of their individuality than the Rulers had bargained for.
This feeling was reinforced by the discontent of the Rulers and the 
Malay elite with the existing situation. In fact Malay disillusionment was 
evident as early as 1903 when Sultan Idris of Perak criticised administrative 
overcentralisation during a Conference of Rulers and demanded that "the 
affairs of each state may be managed by its own officers so that the 
Governments may be separate entities."^ But his dissatisfaction although 
evidently shared by the other Rulers, was ignored by the Government. By the 
second decade of the present century, dissent had turned into open protest. 
The Rulers and the Chiefs began to complain frequently that "they have less 
voice in the administration and legislation of their country; the dignity 
of their appointment has decreased and the financial recognition of their 
service has kept pace neither with the prosperity of the time nor the
7increased remuneration given to officers administering the government".
Their discontent was magnified by their awareness that their counterparts 
in the UMS continued to wield a far greater measure of real authority, 
Guillemard was himself forcefully impressed with the Rulers* discontentg
soon after his arrival in the country,
Guillemard felt the need to strengthen the Malay base of indirect rule 
in another direction in 1920. As discussed in the previous chapter, British
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officials as a whole were much less intimately associated with Malays than
previously, and some District Officers were out of touch with Malays
altogether. Among other reasons, administrative overcentralisation was
considered a crucial factor behind this undesirable development. The
government therefore committed numerous blunders “owing to want of knowledge
oof the most important part of our population.” The position was also 
considered potentially dangerous to British rule in the FMS."^ Guillemard’s 
proposal in 1920 for the creation of a Secretary for Malay affairs to advise 
the Government on Malay affairs reflected the significance he attached to 
this question.
At the same time that pressures for decentralisation began to be felt,
the need for a further extension of central authority through the formation
of a Malayan union comprising the Malay States paradoxically came to the
fore. The administrative and economic advantages of such a union were
realised as early as 1909 by Governor Anderson after he brought the UMS under
British rule.^ But then as later the UMS Rulers strongly opposed entry into
the Federation because it implied the loss of the greater degree of autonomy
and power they currently enjoyed. Guillemard was also aware that in this
matter the UMS had the sympathy, if not the support, of some 'parochial-
12minded’ British Advisers. Before his retirement in mid-1920, Sir Edward
13Brockman, the Chief Secretary, was unable to give Guillemard any definite
advice on a policy towards the UMS except that Anderson had hoped to extend
the Federation to the UMS. As rumours were then rife that the Government
was scheming to sweep the UMS into the FMS fold,^ Guillemard consulted
Whitehall about the question late in June 1920.
About the same time Guillemard recommended his Colonial Secretary,
15Frederick James, for the Chief Secretaryship. Following the High 
Commissioner’s instructions, James, as acting Chief Secretary, initiated a 
policy of decentralisation. One aspect of this policy aimed at bringing
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about a closer co-operation between the Colony and the FMS by removing the
jealousy and estrangement existing between them. To achieve this, James
worked closely with the acting Colonial Secretary, coming to an agreement
on all points before submitting the issue involved to the High Commissioner."^
In reality this was an attempt by Guillemard to establish real control over
the FMS. The other aspect sought to decentralise the federal administration.
In July 1920 James issued a circular to the Residents and the Federal Heads
17inviting their views on how to tackle this task. That both he and 
Guillemard at the same time supported a highly centralised scheme for the 
reorganisation of the Public Works Department seems to suggest that they did 
not have very clear ideas on how to proceed. It is important to note that 
this decentralisation step was taken before Whitehall answered Guillemard's 
query on a Pan-Malayan policy. Hence, Guillemard appears to be more 
concerned about strengthening the Malay base of British rule in the FMS than 
about the formation of a loose-knit Malayan federation. His move seems to 
have the support of the Malayan Civil Service (MCS) and was endorsed by the 
Retrenchment Commission in 1922.
Meanwhile George Maxwell, Resident of Perak, made a bid for the Chief
Secretaryship. A son of Sir William Maxwell, one of the most outstanding
pioneer Residents, George Maxwell had spent twenty-nine years in Malaya,
18serving in the FMS, the Colony, Kedah and Johore. As the first Adviser to 
Kedah, he had the harrowing experience of seeing his own attempts to exercise 
executive power in the initial stage foiled by the Malay elite. Thereafter, 
he co-operated with the latter in evolving a genuine advisory system of 
indirect rule in Kedah. His intimate knowledge of the UMS administration 
and his experience of watching how power came increasingly to be 
centralised in British hands in the FMS helped him to formulate a policy to 
solve the related problems of decentralising the federal administration and 
extending central control over the Peninsular. This policy sought to loosen
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the cast-iron Federation by restoring powers to the states in order to
reduce the contrast between the position of the Rulers and the State Councils
19with that of their counterparts in the UMS. In this way it was hoped to
wear away the strong aversion of the UMS to joining the FMS.
The idea behind this Pan-Malayan policy was not original, and Maxwell
himself attributed it to Anderson. Late in June he impressed upon Guillemard
that a Malayan union could only be realised through the policy he had
outlined. The reason was the UMS Rulers’ ’hatred’ of the existing FMS
system in which ’the Rulers and their Residents were mere marionettes worked
on wires pulled by an Under Secretary in Kuala Lumpur’. Confident of being
able to make a success of the policy, Maxwell declared that he ’would sooner
20be Chief Secretary than have any governorship'. Apparently impressed, 
Guillemard recommended that Maxwell be appointed to succeed James as Colonial 
Secretary.
It is clear that the Colonial Office at this juncture had neither a
full understanding of the UMS nor any clear idea of a Pan-Malayan policy.
Collins, head of the Far Eastern Department, minuted that ’we have been
waiting for things to ripen for further Federation’ and that he expected
21only Johore to oppose joining a wider political grouping. The Colonial 
Office was therefore greatly impressed by Maxwell, then on leave in London, 
when he outlined the policy he had already explained to Guillemard. To 
further strengthen his application for the Chief Secretaryship, Maxwell 
obtained the support of Sir Frank Swettenham and Sir Arthur Young, both of 
whom advised the Colonial Office that James was disqualified because he could 
not speak Malay. In October 1920 Collins successfully pressed for Maxwell's 
appointment as Chief Secretary so that the latter could carry out his Pan- 
Malayan policy. In fact Collins enthused over the policy, chiefly as a 
means towards inducing the UMS to federate with the FMS. To that end he 
recommended a drastic reorganisation of the federal administration, including
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converting the Chief Secretary into a co-ordinating Secretary for purely
federal matters and transferring substantial financial and legislative
22powers to the state Councils. The Colonial Office however preferred to 
await the outcome of the various steps suggested by Maxwell.
Acting on Maxwell’s advice, London advised Guillemard that the policy 
towards the UMS should seek to foster the growth of “a true federal feeling11 
in the hope that this would ultimately and spontaneously blossom into a 
loose-knit Malayan federation wherein each state would preserve its separate 
individuality, while combining with all other states in matters of common 
concern. As a first step, Guillemard officially recognised in the Federal 
Council in 1921 a policy of friendly co-operation among the several Malayan 
administrations. At the same time, he declared that the government had no 
intention to force any state to join the FMS. But the government, he
23continued, would welcome a request by any of the UMS to enter the Federation.
In July 1921 Guillemard endorsed Maxwell's ideas on decentralisation 
as a step towards a Malayan federation. Circulars were issued to the UMS 
instructing the Advisers to persuade their states to adopt the general policy 
of the Federation whenever desirable and to the FMS informing them that the 
government intended to restore powers to the Residents, Rulers and State 
Councils, The problem had in fact become more urgent as the deepening 
financial crisis evoked widespread public criticisms that the administration 
was overcentralised, top-heavy and extravagant. As one British official 
complained, this administration was suitable to commercial interests and 
westernised Chinese but "not agreeable to Malays for whose benefit we profess 
to administer the country1'. ^ In 1922 the Retrenchment Commission 
recommended that the administration be decentralised in order to reap 
substantial economies. This aim was shared by both the officials and 
European commercial interests in the FMS, and was endorsed by the Association 
of British Malaya in London. The Association added that the existing
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administration had failed to ’carry the Malays' along with it and warned
25that unless rectified, it might create an explosive situation in the FMS.
The Association's fear was not altogether unfounded since forces were
at work to shake the government’s confidence in the continued loyalty of
the Malays. During the rubber slump of the early twenties the Malays had
confidently expected the government to protect them from large-scale
foreclosures of their small holdings by the Chettiars from whom they borrowed
26and were disappointed. Unfriendly criticism of British rule began to 
appear in the Malay newspapers and among Malays in the districts. Those 
officials in close touch with their districts were aware of the widespread 
belief that Malays were only permitted to acquire as much education as would 
fit them for subordinate posts. A section of the Malay public even tended 
to believe that Malay interests were put aside in favour of those of the
28non-Malays who had the 'ear' of the federal administration in Kuala Lumpur,
British anxiety about these developments was aggravated by the
conviction that Malaya could not remain unaffected by the nationalist
29movements in the surrounding countries. Attention was focused on the
nationalist awakening in the Netherlands East Indies partly because of the
proximity of the Dutch colonies to Malaya. The nationalist movement there
was regarded as 'a fringe of the Pan-Islamic army and of the anti-White
movement ... the brunt of which must be borne by the British Empire' in 
30Asia. The government feared that the new mood of the Malays as well as 
their cultural and religious bonds with Indonesia might make them receptive 
to the overtures of the nationalist movement in the Netherlands East Indies. 
The unsuccessful attempts by Indonesian nationalists to set up branches of 
the Sarikat Islam in Malaya and by Indonesian communists to organise the 
Malays only convinced the British that every effort should be made to 
isolate and insulate the Malays from subversive influence from the Dutch 
colonies. Mainly for this reason, the government established a Malayan
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Bureau of P o l i t i c a l  In te l l ig e n c e  in  1921 ' t o  keep th e  Government inform ed
of a l l  p o l i t i c a l  a g i ta t io n  and movements in  Malaya (and) of a l l  such
31e x te r io r  p o l i t i c s  as may a f f e c t  ( th e  c o u n try ) '^  .
The o v e ra l l  impact o f th e s e  in te r n a l  and e x te rn a l  fo rce s  on Malay
a t t i t u d e s  tow ards th e  government was s u c c in c tly  d e sc rib ed  by th e  Malayan
Bureau o f P o l i t i c a l  In te l l ig e n c e  in  1922.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  r e s i s t  th e  im p ressio n  th a t  th e  M alays, a t  any 
r a te  in  th e  FMS, no lo n g e r f e e l  t h a t  a f f e c t io n  f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  
t h a t  th ey  undoubtedly f e l t  some y ea rs  ago , What has been c a lle d  
“th e  r i s in g  t i d e  o f co lour" may be p a r t ly  re sp o n sib le  b u t, in  
Malaya, th e  development o f a d m in is tra tio n  and th e  perhaps 
in e v i ta b le  c e n t r a l i s a t io n  has le ssen ed  th e  o ld  p e rso n a l to u ch , 
and th e  Malays can h a rd ly  be expected  to  accep t w ith  equanim ity 
th e  continued d im inu tion  of th e  powers o f th e  S u ltan s  and th e  
fe u d a l  C hiefs which has been a fe a tu re  of th e  p a s t few y e a rs .
W hether a r e s to r a t io n  o f th e  power i s  now p ra c t ic a b le  i s  not 
fo r  th i s  Bureau to  say, b u t some s te p s  in  th a t  d i r e c t io n  would 
c e r ta in ly  be h e a r t i ly  welcomed by th e  Malays and many o th e rs ,  
and would go f a r  to  p rev en t what ig  now a f e e l in g  o f in d if fe re n c e  
developing  in to  a c tu a l  h o s t i l i t y .
To t h i s  must be added th e  f a c t  th a t  educated Malays were now more
knowledgeable about w orld a f f a i r s ,  more s o p h is t ic a te d  and, to  some e x te n t ,
more am bitious. I t  was f e l t  i n  o f f i c i a l  c i r c l e  and by re p re s e n ta t iv e s  of
tiie  EPuopean commercial in t e r e s t s  th a t  th e se  M alays, e s p e c ia l ly  th o se  t r a in e d
in  England, would sooner o r l a t e r  demand a la r g e r  say in  th e  a c tu a l
33a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  FMS. As im p o rtan t as th e  d e s ire  f o r  economy, t h i s  
p o l i t i c a l  f a c to r  led  th e  government to  d e c e n tra l is e  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  in  
o rd e r to  s tre n g th e n  th e  Malay based o f in d i r e c t  ru le  in  th e  FMS. In  t h i s  
way th e  B r i t i s h  hoped to  p reven t th e  r i s e  o f 'a n o th e r  In d ian  s ta te  of 
a f f a i r s  in  Malaya'
The Maxwell I n i t i a t i v e
Maxwell was th e  moving s p i r i t  behind d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  during  th e  y e a rs  
1922-24. The p o lic y , however, had become en tan g led  w ith  th e  power s tru g g le  
between G uillem ard and Maxwell as d iscu ssed  l a t e r .  We have noted e a r l i e r  
th a t  G uillem ard had hoped to  secure  r e a l  c o n tro l over th e  FMS under the
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gu ise  o f  a d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  p o l ic y .  This appeared to  be an a d d it io n a l
reaso n  f o r  Maxwell to  push forw ard d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  a f t e r  1922 to  f o r e s t a l l
S in g ap o re ’s in te r fe re n c e  in  FMS a f f a i r s .  One a sp ec t o f t h i s  p o lic y  aimed to
devolve some powers and r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  from th e  fe d e ra l  a u th o r i t ie s  to
th e  s t a t e  a u th o r i t i e s .  The aim was to  s im p lify  th e  a d m in is tra tio n , l ig h te n
th e  work of th e  C hief S e c re ta ry , and enab le  him to  co n cen tra te  on p o lic y  and
f e d e r a l  m a tte rs . I t  sought a lso  to  enhance th e  p o s i t io n  and powers of th e
R es id e n ts . By th u s  g iv in g  th e  s t a t e s  a semblance of in d iv id u a l i ty ,  and by
more freq u e n t c o n su lta tio n s  w ith  th e  R u le rs , th e  government hoped to
s a t i s f y  Malay a s p ir a t io n s  a t l e a s t  to  sane e x te n t .
T his p o lic y  had th e  f u l l  support of th e  MCS and th e  High Commissioner.
What was im portan t to  th e  form er was th a t  i t  made no d r a s t ic  changes to  an
a d m in is tra tiv e  system to  which th e y  were w h o le -h earted ly  committed. They
p rid ed  them selves on having e s ta b lis h e d  an a d m in is tra tio n  th e  e f f ic ie n c y
and in t e g r i t y  of which could no t e a s i ly  be matched. The Chinese and
e s p e c ia l ly  th e  European commercial in t e r e s t s  p ressed  fo r  i t  m ainly because
i t  would r e s u l t  in  s u b s ta n t ia l  economies w ithout th re a te n in g  th e  p r iz e d
a d m in is tra tio n  which had f a c i l i t a t e d  economic development in  th e  FMS.
N e ith e r Maxwell nor th e  u n o f f ic ia ls  of th e  F ed e ra l C ouncil expected th i s
35p o lic y  to  lead  to  th e  e v en tu a l a b o l i t io n  o f th e  C hief S e c re ta ry sh ip .
This a sp ec t of d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  was e s s e n t i a l ly  an M C S-in itia ted  one.
To devolve some powers and r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  from th e  F edera l
S e c r e ta r ia t  to  th e  R esidencies and th e  F ed e ra l and S ta te  departm en ts,
a t te n t io n  was focused f i r s t  on a r e v is io n  o f th e  G eneral O rders . The most
im portan t changes in tro d u ced  in c re a se d  th e  powers of th e  R esiden ts  and
F ed era l Heads to  d ea l w ith  p e rso n n el m a tte rs ,  and d iv ided  c e r ta in  fu n c tio n s
36and powers between fe d e ra l  and s ta t e  a u th o r i t i e s .  The powers o f th e  
High Commissioner, th e  C hief S e c re ta ry  and th e  R esiden ts  to  in c u r 
supplem entary expend itu re  were d iscu ssed  bu t were not in c reased  t i l l  1926
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37partly because of financial stringencies. Secondly, a Chief Secretary
(Dispensing Powers) Enactment was passed in 1924 which enabled the Chief
Secretary, by notifications in the Government Gazette, to dispense with
reference to his office over matters where the Residents were empowered to
act only with his approval. The ten notifications issued in the 1920s
dealt with purely local matters such as drainage fees and the control of
pawn-brokers where uniformity was unnecessary. The most important
notification permitted the Residents a free hand in constituting Sanitary
38Board areas and in leasing and alienating town and village lands.
References to the Chief Secretary in such matters were obviously unnecessary.
It is clear, therefore, that this aspect of decentralisation affected
only the top levels of the state and federal administrations. In view of
the desire to strengthen the Malay base of British rule, it is surprising
that no effects were made to push decentralisation down to the district level.
The desirability of this had generally been recognised, and Maxwell himself
stressed in 1923, 'that the only way of carrying out the policy of
decentralisation is by carrying it past the Residents down to the District 
39Officers'. But nothing was done about it basically because of the very 
cautious and conservative nature of the decentralisation movement itself.
To the desire to 'go slow' was added the fear that too great a degree of 
decentralisation might * loosen the purse strings' and undermine the 
retrenchment policy. The financial slump, in other words, had contradictory 
effects on the movement. On the one hand it spurred the government to 
decentralise the federal administration, and on the other it placed obstacles 
against advance in that direction. Lastly, it should be noted that the 
resultant increase in the powers of the federal and state authorities only 
replaced those which had been eroded since Federation by the rising cost of 
living and the attendant upward revisions of salary structure of the whole 
public service. On the whole this aspect of decentralisation achieved very
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l i t t l e ,  and h a rd ly  a f fe c te d  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  C hief S e c re ta ry . Even in  a 
memorandum s p e c i f ic a l ly  w r i t te n  in  1925 to  c a s t  doubts on o v e rc e n tr a l is a t io n ,  
Maxwell adm itted  th a t  to o  many t r i v i a l  and unnecessary  re fe re n ce s  con tinued  
to  flow  to  h is  o f f i c e . ^
S teps were a lso  tak en  to  d e c e n tr a l is e  powers from th e  F ed era l D epartm ents 
t o  th e  R es id e n ts . This was s tro n g ly  urged by c e r ta in  d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  
e n th u s ia s ts ,  such as S i r  E. B irch , th e  form er Perak R esiden t, who were 
p rep a red , i f  n ecessa ry , to  see th e  a b o l i t io n  o f whole d e p a r tm e n ts .^  B irc h 's  
r e a c t io n  to  th e  Malayan s i tu a t io n  was a " 'ty p ic a l among th o se  o f h is  o ld  Malayan 
co lleag u es  o p e ra tin g  through th e  A sso c ia tio n  o f  B r i t i s h  Malaya who g e n e ra lly  
opposed such d r a s t i c  a c t io n s .  On th e  o th e r  extrem e stood th e  te c h n o c ra ts  who 
were h o s t i l e  to  d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  in  a l l  i t s  m a n ife s ta tio n s  because i t  was 
incom patib le  w ith  maximum e f f ic ie n c y  and i t  tig h te n e d  la y  c o n tro l over t h e i r  
dep artm en ts. U napprecia tive  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  im portance o f m eeting Malay 
d is a f f e c t io n ,  t h e i r  a t t i tu d e  was co n d itio n ed  by th e  obvious fa c t  th a t  in  a 
sm all country  l ik e  Malaya c e n tr a l i s e d  departm ents were conducive to  
e f f ic ie n c y  and economy.
Maxwell was ready to  go some way to  meet th e  problem, even i f  i t  meant
I p
a lo s s  o f e f f ic ie n c y . ^ For p o l i t i c a l  reasons he d e s ire d  to  enhance th e  
p o s i t io n  o f th e  R esiden t and reduce th e  prominence o f th e  F ed era l H eads. The 
d is c u s s io n  came to  be cen tred  on a c le a r e r  d e f in i t io n  o f th e  s ta tu s ,  powerd 
and d u tie s  of th e  F ed e ra l Heads v i s - a - v i s  th e  R es id e n ts . Maxwell f e l t  th a t  
t h i s  d e f in i t io n  was n ecessa ry  to  in c re a se  e f f ic ie n c y , l ig h te n  th e  work o f th e  
C hief S e c re ta ry , and enable th e  R esid en ts  b e t t e r  to  ca rry  out t h e i r  d u tie s
I Q
accord ing  to  th e  s p i r i t  o f th e  Anglo-Malay t r e a t i e s .  J  The aim was to  g ive  
" th e  R esiden ts th e  f u l l e s t  c o n tro l in  s t a t e  m a tte rs  com patible w ith p roper 
c o n tro l of th e  Departm ents concerned by th e  F edera l H e a d s " .^  This approach 
had a mixed re c e p tio n  among a s e c t io n  o f  th e  MCS and th e  u n o f f ic ia l  members 
o f th e  F ed era l C ouncil. For in s ta n c e , E .S . Hose, 'a  l i f e - lo n g  f r i e n d 1 o f
100
Maxwell and the shrewd but somewhat conservative Resident of Negri Sembilan, 
feared that the step might result in dual control, lack of coherence and 
uniformity, and probably a loss of efficiency in the departments.^ But far 
from convincing Maxwell, Hose was persuaded to head a Decentralisation
in
Committee4 ' to report on the matter.
Under the circumstances no radical decentralisation scheme could be 
expected from this Committee. Deploring the loss of state individuality in 
recent years as contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of Federation, the 
Committee urged that a certain degree of devolution was necessary to place
I rt
certain federal departments more directly under the control of the Residents.
It believed that this would renew the confidence of the Rulers and their 
people in British good faith towards their treaty obligations.
Under the Hose Scheme, as the committe's recommendations came to be 
called, the Federal Heads generally became inspecting officers and advisers 
to the Federal and State Governments. But they continued to exercise 
executive powers in the Federation and issue executive instructions to the 
state departments on federal matters; on state matters, however, such 
instructions would henceforth be issued by the Residents.^ In the latter
case the State Heads would be responsible to the Residents for their 
respective departments subject to instructions from their Federal Heads on 
technical issues. As most matters dealt with by the federal departments 
could be considered federal issues, the scheme had little practical 
importance. Besides, it seriously affected only five federal departments, 
namely Agriculture, Forests, Police, Medical and Survey.
While this scheme would lead to some increase in cost and loss of 
efficiency, these disadvantages clearly were not material. And to ensure 
that nothing would be done to imperil the existing administration, the 
Committee warned that its recommendations should be effected slowly and that 
no further instalment of devolution should be pressed for until
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decentralisation had passed the first purely experimental stage. Its report 
was approved with minor modifications by a Conference of Residents late in 
1923 and blessed by the Rulers as a step towards decentralisation. In 
endorsing this decision, Guillemard advised the Colonial Office that the
50scheme was "a very important step in the direction of decentralisation”.
To carry out the scheme, Maxwell appointed the Financial Adviser to
head a second committee of three to consider the transfer of financial
51control over the departments concerned to the States. This was only carried
through because of the determined stand of the Chief Secretary on the
question. For the committee at once ran into powerful opposition from the
technocrats who indirectly had the sympathy of the Financial Adviser. Always
a figure of prudence, the latter contended that central financial control
was essential in view of the Sterling Loan and of the prevailing austerity 
52drive. Only the Agriculture Department welcomed the change which was
53considered 'fool-proof* by A.S. Haynes, its pro-decentralisation Secretary,
who was significantly an MCS officer. The Survey-General, the Principal
Medical Officer, the Conservator of Forests and, to some extent, the
5kCommissioner of Police opposed the decentralisation scheme in general and
the budgetry transfer in particular. In their opinion, technical departments
should be under the unitary control of technical heads and should not be
affected by political considerations. They warned that decentralisation would
only inject dual control into their departments with all the attendant
55confusion and serious loss of efficiency. Despite this protest financial 
control over four of the above federal departments was transferred to the 
states late in 1923. Only the Surveyor-General managed to block the main 
proposal concerning survey officers, and only minor financial items in his 
department were to be transferred to State control in 1926. It should be 
noted, however, that the Federal Heads of the five departments involved still 
retained financial control over the headquarters staff, the senior officers,
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and certain essentially federal provisions.
In August 1925 Maxwell proposed to call another committee to recommend
56a second instalment of decentralisation. Possibly he aimed to undercut the
new decentralisation policy Guillemard was then known to be discussing with
the Colonial Office. The proposal was not acceptable to the Acting High
Commissioner, Hose, who instead instructed that the working of the 1923
57Scheme be reviewed. The review showed that the scheme worked effectively
58and smoothly in the Police and Agriculture Departments. The Surveyor-
General reported that it was too early to comment on its results, but managed
to persuade the government to remove the formal control over survey officers
which was invested in the Residents in 1923. The Conservator of Forests
complained that the scheme obscured his relations with the Chief Secretary
and the Residents, and caused delay and difficulties in budgetting for the 
59department. He suggested that the whole Forest budget be placed under
60federal control.
The most violent attack on the scheme, however, came from the Galloway
Committee, a committee of medical men appointed to report on the Medical
Department. For some time already the Medical Department had been in a state
of disarray, chiefly because of conflicts within the department and between
the Principal Medical Officer and the Chief Secretary.^ Decentralisation
aggravated the situation to some extent, as it introduced an element of dual
control into the department. The Committee, however, seized upon
decentralisation as the scape-goat, declaring that the most disturbing
aspect of the 1923 scheme was ’the splitting up of the Medical Department
62into smaller units, each unit working under lay control'. Despite its
excesses, the Galloway Report convinced the government that the
decentralisation scheme needed some adjustments. In 1926 the government
restored those officers placed under the state authorities three years ago
63to federal control. In other words the government narrowed the scope
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of the scheme as applied to the Medical Department.
We have hitherto examined what may be called the British side^of 
decentralisation in the sense that power was transferred from one group of 
British officials to another. The Residents were the protagonists partly 
because they were the main beneficiaries of the limited degree of power 
devolved to the states. There is however the ’Malay side’ of 
decentralisation which involved training the Rulers and the State Councils in 
the exercise of executive power. To understand this fully, it is necessary 
first to examine briefly Advisory rule in the UMS. Britain's treaty 
relationship in the UMS was similar to that in the FMS, But the UMS were 
already functioning states with a stable administration and a viable Malay 
ruling class at the time of their takeover by the British. The treaties 
signed by them were genuine contracts giving rights to each side. As 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, the Ruler and the Malay elite 
remained executive officers running the administration of the state. 
Legislative, financial and executive powers were in the hands of the Ruler- 
in-Council, while the state administration was directed by the Malay 
Secretariat headed by a Malay officer. Under this system the British 
Adviser was a real adviser without executive power. But as already discussed 
earlier, the Resident became the actual ruler of a federated state subject to 
control by the Chief Secretary and the High Commissioner. The Ruler and the 
Malay aristocrats in effect were his advisers operating almost wholly outside 
the administrative machinery. It should be noted, however, that British 
control was as effectively, albeit more subtly, exercised in the UMS as in the 
FMS.
It was Maxwell's intention to bring the Rulers and the State Councils 
into the Administration of the states. Viewing the whole movement in its 
perspective, he declared:
The problem of "Decentralisation" is really only one aspect of
the problem of the restoration to the Rulers of powers which
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they have lost, partly owing to the "Resident" system, and partly 
owing to the "Federation" system; and the Government is 
beginning to realise its importance, because of the unfavourable 
opinions of the existing system among the Rulers and State 
Councils both in the Federated and the Unfederated States, and 
because of the effect of this feeling upon the future of the 
British Malaya, ^
According to him, decentralisation should seek to transform the FMS
administration into a half-way house between the existing system and that in 
65the UMS. Under this scheme, the Residents should assume to a significant
extent the role of Advisers in the UMS, advising the Rulers and the State
Councils how to run the states. Since the intention was to place the two
groups of states on more or less the same footing, this policy implied a
tightening of British control in the UMS. This aspect of decentralisation
had the implicit support of the Colonial Office.
In September 1922 Maxwell, supported by Guillemard, recommended a
moderate measure of financial devolution to the State Councils. Firstly,
Maxwell proposed to confer certain financial items under the headings of
"Rulers and chiefs", "Residents", "District Officers", and "Sanitary Board"
from the control of the Federal Council to that of the State Councils. To
make the proposal workable, the Federal Council would be required to vote
annual lump sums for the transferred subjects, and these sums would be
allocated by the state legislatures.^ Secondly, he recommended that the
State Councils be empowered to sanction expenditure for mosques and other
matters concerning Islam and for political pensions, compassionate
67allowances, gratuities and rewards. The first proposal would not have 
freed state finance from federal control. The other would have conferred 
only a very limited power on the State Councils, which could be stringently 
regulated by the Residents.
Yet this largely nominal measure of devolution to the State Councils 
was rejected mainly because of the opposition of the Financial Adviser, This 
official felt that the State Councils should not be made sanctioning
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authorities at a time of financial stringencies. He also opposed the
lump-sum procedure on the ground that sound financial principles required
that the voting and allocation of expenditure be under unitary control.^
The Residents of all states except Perak rallied to his support, and the
matter came before the acting Chief Secretary, Hose, when Maxwell was on
leave. Hose ruled against it, adding that any far-reaching changes must
await the reorganisation of the financial machinery then under way. This
outcome indicated how little commitment there was on the part of the
government to the ’Malay side’ of the decentralisation movement.
However, as proposed by Maxwell, the State Councils were permitted some
formal say in financial matters. In 1923 the councils were empowered to
comment and even alter new items in the approved budgets within the limits
of the agreed sum total. To give a semblance of state individuality, the
Annual Supply Bill was divided into five major headings, one for the
69Federation and the others for the various states. But the most important
reform was the tabling of the State Estimates before the State Councils for 
information and comment in December 1925. In that year the State Councils 
were also authorised to deal with all special concessions concerning, for 
instance, paper, matches, china-clay, wood-distillation, and all
70agricultural and mining concessions beyond the Residents’ power to deal with.
In reality, however, these matters continued to be decided by the Residents
or the Chief Secretary before they were laid in the councils.
The above reforms were only introduced because they were both not
incompatible with efficiency and economy and would not encourage council
members to aspire for more than a formal Öay in council affairs. For
instance, fear of unnecessary work and of dissatisfaction arising from the
lack of power of the Councils killed the Raja-di-4Iilir of Perak’s suggestion
in 1923 that draft bills be tabled in State Councils for discussion before
71submission to the Federal Council for enactment.
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The key issue was Maxwell’s attempt to draw the State Councils into the 
administration to be trained in the exercise of executive powers. As he
explained, the Residential system as intended by the Anglo-Malay treaties
could succeed only when the Residents "cease to administer the country and
72take up the task of advising the Rulers how to administer”. Towards that
end, Maxwell initially endeavoured, before the enactment of the Chief
Secretary (Dispensing Powers) Enactment, to substitute the State Council’s
sanction for that of the Chief Secretary in matters concerning land
73alienation, Sanitary Board, drainage fees and other local issues. Unable 
to secure the Resident's agreement to this proposal, he even steam-rollered 
into effect the Forest (Amendment) Enactment of 1924 which bound the 
Residents to refer certain forest issues to the State Councils for sanction. 
If effected, the above proposals would only have invested the State Councils 
with formal control over purely local matters, which did not warrant 
reference to the Chief Secretary.
A more important move was Maxwell’s attempt to restore certain powers 
now vested in the Residents to the Rulers. For instance, Maxwell tried in 
1924 to transfer the Resident's’ statutory authority in land matters to the 
Rulers so that the latter could become both the alienating authority and the 
signatories of all land grants. Under the draft law, the Rulers could, by 
notifications in the Government Gazette, delegate their alienating authority
n I
to the Residents or other suitable officers. In view of the Residents' 
control over the State Councils, and of the treaty position, the change would 
only extend to the Rulers formal control over land administration in the 
states,
Yet Maxwell's proposals, particularly the land law reform, ran into the 
solid and vehement opposition of the Residents, Supported by Guillemard, the 
Residents were able to block decentralisation in the direction desired by the 
Chief Secretary.
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This aspect of decentralisation enjoyed the full support of Malays who 
envisaged the goal of the movement as Advisory rule analogous to that in the 
UMS. Had non-Malay commercial interests been consulted, they would have 
strongly opposed it since they believed Malay »rule1 impracticable and 
therefore dangerous to the country. Already, the European unofficials of the 
Federal Council had asserted that it would be injudicious to decentralise 
beyond the Hose Scheme of 1923. The MCS, however, was prepared to go further 
than this scheme provided the change was not fundamental. In this
75connexion, the comment of Wolff, the new Resident of Negri Sembilan, on
Maxwell1s proposals was illuminating. He declared:
Two important matters of policy are, it seems to me, being 
somewhat confused; they have in essence, little in common:
(a) Decentralisation, namely, the readjustment of an administration 
which has become too centralised and in consequence top-heavy and
(b) bringing the Malay Rulers and their councils more into the 
official machine. Both,are very desirable but both present 
separate difficulties.
Like the bulk of the MCS, Wolff insisted that decentralisation at this stage
should concentrate on readjusting the overcentralised administration.
Accustomed to the State Councils being merely registering bodies, the
Residents saw little point in Maxwell's proposals. Indeed, they felt it
77would only complicate matters and cause unnecessary delay. On the larger 
question of training the State Councils to govern the States, they declared 
that the legislatures, as constituted, would not be able to handle the 
sophisticated administration of the FMS. There were strong grounds for this 
belief as the Councils consisted predominantly of Malay aristocrats who had
78no administrative training, experience or the 'British desire for efficiency'. 
This being the case, they believed that Maxwell's goal of advisory rule in the 
FMS was realisable, if at all, only in the distant future. In other words, 
like the MCS in general, the Residents were not prepared to accept any policy 
that might eventually lead to a transfer of power from British to Malay hands 
or a drastic reorganisation of a system of administration which they and
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79their predecessors had pain-stakingly established.
Though Guillemardfs opinion on the practicability of Advisory rule in
the FMS is not clear, he agreed that decentralisation should currently
80concentrate on re-adjusting the official machine. Hence to him and to the 
MCS the preservation of an efficient federal administration seems to have 
been more significant than meeting Malay discontent or pursuing a Malayan 
federation. For unless the Rulers and the State Councils were brought 
directly into the administration, or better still Advisory rule established, 
the last two questions stood no chance of being resolved.
Maxwell's failure to have the Rulers made both the land alienating 
authority and the signatories of all land grants sheds some light on the 
attitude of the Residents and Guillemard. Since the reform was in itself 
insignificant, the Residents directed their opposition mainly at the larger 
question of transforming Resident rule at least in part into Advisory rule. 
Maxwell was informed by the Resident of Perak that his Sultan was quite 
satisfied with the current practice. On the larger question of administration, 
the Resident declared:
The present [_ ResidentialJ  system has stood the test of time, 
and His Highness the Sultan has repeatedly told me that he is 
quite satisfied^wlth it. He re-affirmed his satisfaction only 
a few days ago.
In the light of the Sultan of Perak1s complaints to the Colonial Office in 
August 1924 about his lack of power^ (see below, fp.in,-7), this statement was 
patently untrue. It shows how the Ruler was used as a pawn in the Residents’ 
dispute with Maxwell.
Unable to carry the Residents with him, Maxwell was forced to modify 
the draft land bill and make the Rulers only the alienating authority in 
land matters. As the Residents remained unmoved, the question was referred 
to the High Commissioner in November 1924. Guillemard ruled against Maxwell, 
declaring at the same time:
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So far as I am aware, no Ruler has suggested that he has 
insufficient power vis-a-vis his Resident. The problem may 
arise some day, but decentralisation is quite a stiff enough 
problem for us to fgge, without complicating it by such 
considerations now.
It is important to note that this declaration was made a month after 
Guillemard had submitted a radical decentralisation scheme to the Colonial 
Office on the basis of the Sultan of Perak*s complaints to Whitehall. In 
view of the Sultan*s demand for a larger degree of power, it is difficult to 
understand Guillemard's negative reaction to Maxwell's proposal except as a 
result of his personal animosity towards Maxwell. Alternatively, it casts 
doubts on whether Guillemard was interested in introducing Adivsory rule in 
the FMS.
In the final analysis, even if Maxwell had been able to implement all
his proposals no fundamental change in the administration would have
resulted. Carried to its logical conclusion Maxwell's policy would have left
the whole structure of the federal administration intact, though how that
would fit into the sort of Advisory rule he envisaged remains obscure. Should
a Malayan Federation eventually materialise, Maxwell expected to see the
Chief Secretary continue as the head of the FMS which would remain a distinct 
83entity within it. In other words, like his MCS colleagues, Maxwell was 
inherently conservative and had the same deep concern for efficiency. 
Furthermore, He was by temperament a centraliser, an administrator with a 
'love for details' and with boundless self-confidence, energy and drive who 
tended to act without consulting his advisers. ^ The puny measure of 
decentralisation effected did not at all inhibit his ability to exercise as 
centralised a control over the FMS as his predecessor, Sir bdward Brockman.
In short, credit was due to Maxwell for being more forward-looking and 
innovative than most of his MCS colleague, though it is doubtful whether even 
he penetrated to the root of the political dilemma facing the Malayan
administration
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The Guillemard Response
To understand the next stage of decentralisation, it is necessary first 
to turn to Guillemard*s relations with the FMS. Guillemard was eager to 
exercise real control over the FMS, and soon came to the view that his 
predecessor, Sir Arthur Young, ‘never had the brains to run the show ... and
C>C
that the longer (Young) stayed here the more his power failed1. A week or 
two after his arrival in Malaya, Guillemard was ’horrified1 by the limits of 
his power to sanction supplementary expenditure and ‘proposed to get this
rt/
altered at once1. This was followed by his decision to overrule Brockman’s
opposition to the FMS financing the construction of the Penang Hill Railway
and to order the latter to secure the necessary funds for the project. In
fact his determination to wield real authority in the FMS appears to have
87been mainly responsible for Brockman's retirement in mid-1920. When
Guillemard accepted the Malayan appointment, Milner told him that ’there was
88lots of work to be done and plenty of money to do it with’. Moreover, it
would appear that Brockman and the FMS Treasurer failed to inform him fully
about the Federations financial position. Accordingly he launched an
expensive programme of public works in the FMS early in 1920. When the slump
deepened and a financial crisis occurred Guillemard was seriously
embarrassed. He then not only accused Brockman and the Treasurer of
inefficiency but blamed the crisis on the financial policy of his predecessor.
Regarding himself as a hard-headed and prudent financier out to save the FMS
from financial ruin^ Guillemard was now more convinced than ever that
89effective control over the FMS was essential. It would also assist him to 
develop the Colony and the FMS in close and friendly co-operation.
In this connexion the appointment of Maxwell as Chief Secretary, as 
already discussed, had two unfortunate results. Firstly, it installed in 
the FMS an intensely egoistic, energetic and somewhat pugnacious Chief 
Secretary who was determined to head a quasi-independent administration.
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The result was a grim struggle for power between the Chief Secretary and the
High Commissioner. Secondly, it led to a period of intense feud between
James and Maxwell which exacerbated the Guillemard-Maxwell split.
The Guillemard-Maxwell power struggle came to be centred on the
movement to restore the title of Resident-General. Initiated by the European
unofficial members of the Federal Council, this movement had the support of
the Chinese members and the Association of British Malaya. For years
antagonistic to any Colony control over the FMS administration, the unofficial
councillors had their suspicion first aroused by the decision to equalise the
status of the Chief Secretary and the Colonial Secretary in 1920. This was
90a piece of face-saving for James for having been passed over, but amounted
to a lowering of the de facto status of the Chief Secretary who had hitherto
been generally recognised as senior to the Colonial Secretary. To make matter
worse, Guillemard ruled that James by virtue of his longer service was senior
to Maxwell. Distrust soon turned to fear when Guillemard, having failed to
persuade the British Government to accept an FMS loan of £10 million as
trustee security, was compelled to get the Colony to raise it on the FMS
behalf. The string attached to the loan was the appointment of a joint
Financial Adviser stationed in Singapore to advise Guillemard how to overoome
the financial crisis and organise an effective system of Treasury control 
91in the FMS. This was regarded by the European commercial interests as a
move by the High Commissioner to secure control over FMS finance and then
’fetter' the Federation to the Colony.^
In August 1921 the unofficials of the Federal Council petitioned
Whitehall for the restoration of the title of Res ident-General on the ground
that the title of Chief Secretary was unconstitutional under the Treaty of 
93Federation. The main motive behind the petition, however, was to re-affirm 
the chief executive officer in the FMS as the real head of the administration, 
thereby obviating centralised control from Singapore. Maxwell endorsed the
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petition and used it in his power struggle with Guillemard. He contended 
that,r “the Res ident-General was the real head of the FMS Government; and the 
fact that the Chief Secretary is still the real head of the Federal 
Government has been obscured by the change in his title1*.^ Hence the 
position should be clarified by the restoration of the title of Resident- 
General.
Guillemard advised Whitehall that it was essential for him to maintain
a unity of control over the Colony and the FMS in order to continue
Anderson*s policy of developing the two territories on similar lines in
friendly co-operation. He contended that the restoration of the title of
Resident-General would stultify this policy and lead ultimately to a separate
95FMS under a separate High Commissioner. Alleging that 'finance is Maxwell's
weakest point', Guillemard warned the Colonial Office that the FMS would
never fight its way back to solvency if he exercised no real control over the
FMS. He then explained the crux of the Matter:
The object aimed at by the Chief Secretary is perfectly clear.
He wishes to reduce the responsibility of the High Commissioner 
for the administration of the Federated Malay States and increase 
the responsibility of the Chief Secretary. He claims that the 
Chief Secretary ought to be the Head of the Government and that 
the High Commissioner ought to occupy much the same position in 
the Federated Malay States as in the Unfederated States, [_ that 
is_/ a position outside the Government with,vague and loosely 
defined authority over its administration.
The Secretary of State rejected the petition, declaring that it was
essential for the High Commissioner to maintain a unity of control over the
whole of Malaya.
The agitation, however, continued. It was intensified by the
arrangements made for the Prince of Wales' visit to Malaya early in 1922.
Owing to Guillemard's insistence the Rulers took formal precedence over the
97Chief Secretary during the visit. What infuriated the unofficial 
councillors and Maxwell most was that as a result the latter was assigned a 
relatively obscure position throughout the visit. This event was regarded
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by the unofficial councillors as another attempt to erode the Chief
Secretary’s status and as evidence of the High Commissioner’s aim to assume
98real control over the FMS administration. In 1923 the unofficials renewed 
their petition to the Colonial Office and published it in the newspapers, 
thus carrying their agitation into the open. Maxwell by now had also 
manoeuvred the Residents and the Malay Rulers behind him in support of the
petition. The Residents apparently supported it to prevent further erosion
(
of the status of the Chief Secretary. The Rulers' support was skilfully
obtained on the day the Hose Decentralisation Committee held its inaugural
session in November 1922. They were given to understand that the restoration
of the title would facilitate decentralisation and would expedite official
99business.
To strengthen the petition Maxwell emphasised that friction between
the Chief Secretary and the High Commissioner were likely to occur because
of the undefined position of the two officers and of the differing interests
of the two regions. To stabilise the relations between the above officers,
Maxwell suggested the introduction of an Administrative and Executive General
Order. Under this Order, any difference in opinion between the High
Commissioner and the Chief Secretary should, if the latter desired it, be
100referred to the Secretary of State. Thus, the High Commissioner would 
only be an equal of the Chief Secretary unable to enforce any order against 
the latter’s wishes without previous reference to the Colonial Office. 
Needless to say Guillemard opposec the petition, adding that the agitation 
had been instigated by Maxwell. ?he Colonial Office renewed its support for 
Guillemard, and instructed Maxwell., when next on leave in London, to accept 
the Secretary of State's decision.
Despite this setback, Maxwell succeeded in excluding the High 
Commissioner from many spheres of the FMS administration. The undefined 
relations between them enabled hilt to limit references to Guillemard to those
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important questions requiring the High Commissioner's sanction and to permit 
the latter little initiative in other matters. This was facilitated by the 
fact that Guillemard lost the support of the unofficial councillors and, to 
some extent, of official opinion in the FMS because of his policy of lowering 
the status of the Chief Secretary and events such as the FMS Sterling Loan.
Maxwell also managed to foil Guillemard*s attempts to continue Anderson's 
policy of developing the Colony and the FMS on close lines through the 
formation of joint departments with jurisdiction over both territories. He 
was not opposed to this policy initially and supported the establishment of 
a joint Survey Department in 1920 and a joint Fisheries Department a year 
later. But owing to the power struggle, he desired to free the FMS 
administration from the High Commissioner's control as far as possible.
Hence, he condemned this policy mainly because joint departments based in 
Singapore tended to increase the High Commissioner's control over the FMS.
For the rest of his term of office, Guillemard succeeded only in forming a 
joint Posts and Telegraphs Departments in 1924.
In this connexion two issues merit discussion. As already mentioned,
Guillemard proposed the appointment of a Secretary for Malay Affairs,
Malaya, to advise him on Malay affairs. Collins was keen on the idea,
suggesting at the same time that Maxwell should also become the Secretary
for Malay Affairs so that the latter would secure a standing in the UMS. It
was hoped that this would help Maxwell carry out his Pan-Malayan policy.
Maxwell however opposed the proposal partly because the Malay Secretary
might get in between the Rulers and their British advisers and mainly
because the new officer might enable the High Commissioner to centralise
102control over Malay affairs in*Singapore'. Apparently owing to his
opposition, the matter was in the end dropped. The most stormy issue of 
dispute concerned the proposal to form a Malayan Medical Service under a 
director with advisory powers. Maxwell did not directly oppose this at first,
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only declaring that the Medical Departments could continue to function
efficiently under a Principal Medical Officer in the FMS and a Principal
Chief Medical Officer in the C o l o n y . B u t  the Colonial Office, as though
to stir up a fire, desired to see the Director invested with executive
powers. This was regarded by the FMS as another attempt by the High
Commissioner to assume direct control of the FMS administration. Hence the
Chief Secretary, the Residents and the Unofficial Councillors now turned
solidly against the proposal. Reviewing the position, Guillemard comp^ined
to the Colonial Office, 'I could have carried (the proposal) through at the
101time, but since then Maxwell has done and will do all he can against me'.
He made another unsuccessful attempt in 1926 to form a joint Medical
Department under a Director with advisory powers. When he left Malaya in
1927, Maxwell still held the field.
The power struggle between Maxwell and Guillemard paved the way for a
new decentralisation policy. To a High Commissioner determined to wield
real control over the FMS, Maxwell*s intransigence must have appeared
particularly unwelcome and obstructive. Already in 1922 Guillemard attempted
105to remove Maxwell from the FMS over the Lucas case. The Chief Secretary*s 
inconsiderate treatment of this subordinate officer was held partly 
responsible for Lucas’ suicide. The Secretary of State, however, refused 
to accede to Guillemard's request since he attributed the suicide mainly to 
mental illness.
Despite the failure of the movement to restore the title of Resident-
General, the Guillemard-Maxwell antagonism intensified. It was aggravated
by the worsening feuds between James and Maxwell since the latter felt that
the High Commissioner sided with J a m e s . M a x w e l l ,  therefore, tended to be
increasingly insubordinate to the High Commissioner, and in mid-1923 went
to the extent of accusing Guillemard of having misled the General Manager,
107Railways, into an over-expenditure of $7 million. After James became
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Governor of Windward Islands, Guillemard successfully recommended Hose as 
Colonial Secretary in the hope that Hose would help restore harmony between 
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. This failed, and Guillemard continued his policy 
of reducing the Chief Secretary’s status whenever possible. In 1924* in the 
face of Maxwell’s opposition, he instructed that the Rulers should take
103precedence over the Chief Secretary in all public functions. His attempt
also to give precedence over the Chief Secretary to the General Commander of
Troops, Malaya, failed to obtain London’s support. These squabbles culminated
in 1924 when Guillemard severely censured Maxwell for two errors made in a
financial statement. Calling Maxwell ”an amateur in Finance”, Guillemard
warned him that ”if I have further ground for complaint, I may have to take 
109official action". ' Maxwell appealed to Whitehall against this censure but 
without success.
The power struggle gradually eroded Whitehall's confidence and trust 
in Maxwell. This was particularly significant because before 1922 it was to 
him that the Colonial Office had repeatedly turned for advice. Compared 
with his thirty-odd years of Malayan experience, Guillemard stood in a 
singularly disadvantageous position. However, the tables began to be turned 
because of Maxwell's agitation for the restoration of the title of Resident- 
General. The Chief Secretary's persistence in the matter was regarded as 
active disloyalty to the High Commissioner said the Secretary of State. 
Whitehall also strongly disapproved of Maxwell's repeated and blatant 
insubordination to the High Commissioner. Moreover the official feuds 
adversely affected the administrations of the Colony and the FMS,^"^ and 
Maxwell was held to be mainly responsible. It was against this background 
of growing Colonial Office alienation towards Maxwell, together with the 
High Commissioner's active hostility that an event of great significance 
occurred in August 1924.
During a visit to London the Sultan of Perak appealed to the Secretary
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of State for a policy of accelerated decentralisation in the FMS. The Sultan
requested that 'the {_ PangkorJ  Treaty be followed in its exact terms ....
The Ruler should be treated as a Ruler and the Resident carry out on his
behalf and with this co-operation the policy arrived at by them and in
112consultation with a more powerful State Council'. Complaining that a
113"chess-board king" was uneviable, the Sultan emphasised
"that it was clearly wrong that he, the Ruler of the richest 
and most important State in the Peninsula should have considerably 
less authority in his State than [_ for example J  the Sultan of 
Kedah had in his."
He desired, therefore, to be restored to a position of authority comparable
to that of the Sultan of Kedah or Johore. Towards that end he suggested
that the powers of the Chief Secretary be devolved to the Residents until
the Chief Secretary became a purely co-ordinating federal officer. Likewise,
the Perak State Council should be restored to its position during the pre-
Federation days when it could enact State laws and approve the State
115Estimates drafted and submitted by the Perak authorities.
In his discussion with the Colonial Office, the Sultan of Perak showed
signs of animosity towards Maxwell. The main reason,to have been the Chief
Secretary*s stringent regulation of the Sultan's finance to curb royal
extravagance.^^ But it is surprising that the Sultan should have gone out
of his way to plead with the Colonial Office that Guillemard's stay in
Malaya be extended by a few years to enable the latter to carry out
decentralisation. The High Commissioner had hitherto contributed very little
to decentralisation. It seems certain that Guillemard and the Sultan had
previously discussed the question of decentralisation, since the High
117Commissioner was aware of the Sultan's views. It is also possible that
Guillemard had informed the Sultan of a decentralisation scheme he claimed
11Bto have been engaged on for eventual submission to the Colonial Office.
If this scheme was similar to the one he subsequently sent to London, he 
could not have raised it himself with the Colonial Office without exposing
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his intention to remove Maxwell from the FMS. On the other hand if the 
Sultan would first appeal to Whitehall for a radical policy the way would 
have been paved for him to make his move. While the Sultan's desire for a 
larger degree of power cannot be questioned, one is tempted to conclude that 
his complaint to the Secretary of State might have been partly instigated 
by the High Commissioner.
Be that as it may, the Sultan's complaint shattered whatever confidence 
Whitehall still had in Maxwell. Even Collins complained that the Chief 
Secretary had been abusing his near autocratic powers and had not been 
treating the Rulers with the tact and attention they deserved. Not fully 
informed of the decentralisation movement in the FMS, Collins wrongly 
assumed that since his appointment as Chief Secretary Maxwell had turned his 
back on decentralisation. The lack of advance in decentralisation was 
attributed to Maxwell's greed for power. The Colonial Office feared that 
the Chief Secretary would be the principal obstacle to any drastic 
political reorganisation necessary to meet the susceptibilities of the FMS 
Rulers.
The Sultan's profound dissatisfaction also convinced the Colonial
120Office that a more radical decentralisation policy was essential. As
the Secretary of State advised Guillemard, the Sultan's aspirations could
be met fully only through "a break-up of the present Federation". This the
Colonial Office was not willing to concede at this juncture since it would
work against efficiency, economy and uniformity of policy in the four states
concerned. But Whitehall was ready to dissolve the Federation in the future
121if it would result in a new and wider federation. Once this wider unit
was realised British control could be re-tightened over the member states,
122though not to the extent of the present centralisation in the FMS. In 
other words, decentralisation was only a means to an end for the Colonial 
Office, and the Rulers' aspirations would be realised fully only if they
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did not involve substantial sacrifice of administrative efficiency.
Guillemard was instructed to discuss decentralisation with the Sultan of
Perak and fomulate a scheme to loosen the federal administration.
Reflecting its loss of confidence in Maxwell, the Colonial Office emphasised
that while the High Commissioner might consult his advisers, including the
Chief Secretary, it was his own views on the question that the Secretary of
123State was particularly interested in.
On 21st October 1924 Guillemard submitted a radical scheme of 
decentralisation to the Colonial Office, It began by pointing out that 
decentralisation originated with Sir John Anderson. But it had failed 
because Anderson did not alter the status and powers of the Chief Secretary, 
and the Federal Council “robbed the Rulers of even the semblance of
TOI
independent rule“. ^ To transform the present amaigmation that was the
FMS into a federation necessitated more radical changes. Guillemard
explained the crux of the problem:
I am convinced that the only effective decentralisation in the 
FMS and the only cure for the dissatisfaction of their Rulers 
lie in such devolution of the Chief Secretary's powers to 
State Councils, Residents, and, if necessary, to Federal Heads 
of Departments, as will in fact abolish the appointment and 
substitute for it an office analagous to that of the Secretary 
to the High Commissioner for the Undederated States. This 
change would gratify the Rulers by removing an officer who 
claims precedence over them, loosen the knot of the existing 
close Federation, and prepare i^ je way for a wider loose-knit 
union of all the Malay States, *
He therefore proposed that Maxwell's successor should be the last Chief 
Secretary and that thereafter a Secretary for the FMS without executive 
power should be appointed as a unifying agent and as a channel of 
communication with the High Commissioner. This officer would have a seat 
in the Federal Council but would be junior in status to the Residents, 
l/foile admitting that there would be a loss of efficiency initially, 
Guillemard felt that the Residents and the Secretariats would maintain 
efficiency in the long run. Under this arrangement, FMS interests would
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not suffer when they clashed with Colony interests because the High
Commissioner would always look at them from the FMS point of view and the
Conference of Residents could be relied upon to safeguard them more
effectively than the Chief Secretary. Guillemard also assured the Colonial
Office that FMS affairs would not be centralised in his office. He would
126direct the Federation with as light a hand as he directed the UMS.
In his scheme Guillemard made no attempt to define the federation he
had in mind. He only stated that, if practicable, all Federal Heads other
than those of purely technical departments would be advisory officers.
Further, a large measure of original legislative power and financial control
would be restored to the Rulers-in-Council. To assist in this, future
members of the Federal Council would be appointed from those of the State 
127Councils. But no division of powers and functions between the centre and
the states was made in the scheme. Guillemard intended that the detailed
planning of this question be worked out by official committees.
Since both the Rulers and the FMS commercial interests opposed the
amalgamation of their States with the Colony, Guillemard*s Malayan federation
would only comprise the nine Malay States. To achieve this federation, the
Rulers of the UMS would be invited to attend an annual durbar with their
counterparts in the FMS and, whenever possible, Malaya-wide departments
would be established. Since the heads of technical and certain other
128departments would retain their executive power, the extension of their 
departments into Malayan ones would encroach on the autonomy of the UMS.
This seems to indicate that Guillemard realised that, the FMS being a 
federation, it was not possible to place the Rulers and the State Councils 
on exactly the same footing as those in the UMS, and that a Malayan 
federation would necessitate some tightening of the federal bond on the UMS.
There is a studied vagueness in the scheme as to whether Guillemard 
intended to convert Resident rule in the FMS into Advisory rule. Even when
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challenged by Maxwell in February 1926, he refused to declare whether he had
such an aim. However, in his scheme, the High Commissioner rejected Maxwell's
policy because it would ‘'never give to the Rulers, the Councils, and the
Residents the same measure of power and dignity as are enjoyed by their
129counterparts in the Unfederated States". This implies that he did wish 
to convert Resident rule into Advisory rule.
On the other hand since he relied on Anderson's policy to justify his 
scheme, Guillemard appears to have had in mind a revival of the state 
authorities before or during the early days of the Federation. Even if it 
is conceded that he misunderstood the Resident rule of those days to be 
Advisory rule (which is highly improbable), other indications show that he 
apparently had Resident rule in mind. For instance, he regarded the 
unpopularity of the federal government, not Resident rule, as the central 
obstacle to the UMS joining the FMS. Unlike in the UMS where the 
administration was, to all intents and purposes, run by the State Councils 
and the Malay Secretariats, Guillemard looked to the Residents and their 
Secretariats to remain in control and ensure administrative efficiency. 
Administratively, his scheme would increase the powers of the Residents and 
that of certain Federal Heads. On the evidences presented, it may be 
argued that Guillemard either had no intention to transform Resident rule to 
Advisory rule or proposed to concentrate on decentralising the federal 
administration. Probably for this reason, tthe same Residents who opposed 
Maxwell's attempt to bring the Rulers and the State Councils into the 
administration supported Guillemard's policy as did) Sir E. Birch who 
desired a return to the Residential system during the early days of the 
Federation. If the above analysis is correct, the Guillemard Scheme stood 
little hope of getting the UMS to federate with the FMS. The UMS opposed 
this step not only because of the overcentralised federal administration but 
also because of Resident rule in the FMS.
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It is well to reiterate at this point that the Guillemard-Maxwell split 
hinged on the question whether the High Commissioner, as intended by 
Guillemard, should exercise real control over both the Colony and the FMS or 
whether the Chief Secretary should be the head of a quasi-independent admin­
istration in the FMS. As already discussed, Maxwell successfully foiled 
Guillemard’s policy of exercising real control over the FMS and of developing 
it in close co-operation with the Colony. In his despatch the High 
Commissioner advised the Colonial Office that his scheme would eradicate
the existing obstacles to the policy of establishing joint departments
131covering the Colony and the FMS.^ It seems clear from another despatch of 
22nd October 1924 that the paramount factor behind the scheme was Guillemard's 
eagerness to remove Maxwell from the FMS. Under the new order it would be 
easier for the High Commissioner to exercise real control over the FMS than 
in the past, when his actions were so effectively checkmated by a powerful 
Chief Secretary.
In the latter despatch the High Commissioner explained that his scheme
132could not be carried out so long as Maxwell remained the Chief Secretary.
In drafting the scheme he had been aware of Maxwell's view that the Chief
Secretary was the head of a quasi-independent administration and was essential
to the preservation of the federal administration. To substantiate his
case, Guillemard reiterated the opinions the Colonial Office had already
formed of Maxwell. Furthermore, he alleged that Maxwell, being by
temperament a centraliser, could not even implement the decentralisation
policy hitherto pursued. He charged that:
^ith a Chief Secretary whose heart is not in decentralisation, 
and whose actions, even in small matters, run counter to the 
sympathy with the Rulers he declares, it is impossible for a 
High Commissioner to make any substantial progress with the 
policy of devolution. It is more impossible still for the 
Rulers or any officers junior to the Chief Secretary to do 
anything. ^
As far as it concerned decentralisation, this evaluation was patently
123
untrue. Had the Residents and the Financial Adviser supported Maxwell, a 
larger degree of decentralisation would have been attained in the FMS. 
Guillemard himself had endorsed the Hose Scheme in 1923 and had supported the 
Residents against Maxwell’s efforts to bring the Rulers and the state Councils 
into the administration. Furthermore, he had hitherto advocated no policy of 
his own nor pressed for stronger measures of decentralisation. It seems 
clear that he had either been formulating a scheme which would necessitate 
Maxwell’s removal from the FMS before the Sultan of Perak pleaded with the 
Colonial Office for accentuated decentralisation, or had seized upon 
Whitehall's sympathy for the Sultan's views to draft such a scheme.
But the Guillemard scheme was conditioned by certain basic policy
considerations. It had been clear for some time to high British officials
in Malaya that there were two approaches to decentralisation. One was through
re-adjusting the parts without unduly disrupting the administrative whole.
This was precisely Maxwell’s approach towards the administrative aspect of
decentralisation. The other was through drastic reorganisation of the
administrative mechanism itself, J The first had been tried and, in the
view of the^££, found wanting. The second logically followed. This
necessitated radical changes in the position of the Chief Secretary -
untying the knot, as it were - without which no re-structuring of the
administration was feasible. And guillemard was not the first or the only
advocate of this approach. As early as October 1920 Collins arrived at the
conclusion that comprehensive decentralisation necessitated the abolition
135of the Chief Secretaryship. J Apparently in a bid for the last Chief 
Secretaryship, William Peel and Hose advocated the same move to the Colonial 
Office late in 1924.
The Colonial Office approved the Guillemard scheme, and extended the 
High Commissioner's term of office by two years to enable him to 
implement it. Acting on Guillemard*s advice, London decided to retire
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Maxwell prematurely. It tried to muzzle him with the post of Malay States
Information Agent in London, provided he took it up in November 1925. In
March 1925 Guillemard, acting on London1s instruction, secured the general
support of the Rulers, the Residents, and the Malay and European Unofficial
Councillors for the new policy. About the same time Maxwell was also
summoned to Government House in Singapore where Guillemard read out three
typewritten pages informing him of the gist of the Secretary of State's
decision. Maxwell opposed the new policy and rejected the Malay States
Information Agency. But his request for a Governorship in a major colony
failed to obtain London's approval. For a time the Colonial Office
anxiously hoped that Maxwell would not challenge its decision to remove him
from the FMS. As the Malay States were technically sovereign, the Chief
136Secretary could not be recalled at the King's pleasure. This
137constitutional obstacle was probably known to Maxwell but, knowing the 
futility of carrying opposition to that extreme, he agreed to leave Malaya 
by November 1925.
The Gathering Opposition to Decentralisation
In May 1925 Guillemard left for London to discuss his scheme with the
Colonial Office. During his absence, the Acting High Commissioner, Hose,
'drifted into the arms of Maxwell* and tried 'to run with the hare and
hunt with the h o u n d s . H o s e  advised Whitehall that it would be unwise
to make Maxwell a martyr for opponents of the new policy. While he had
accepted Guillemard's suggestion to stay beyond his retirement age so as to
succeed Maxwell and carry out the new policy, he now informed Whitehall
that he agreed with 'some of the best official opinion' in Malaya that the
government should not be committed to any drastic change in administration
139but should only accelerate decentralisation. In the end Hose decided to 
retire when he reached retirement age in December 1925. The result of this 
lengthy correspondence between Hose and London was that Maxwell was permitted
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to stay in Malaya till he retired in mid-1926 provided he undertook to co­
operate with Guillemard. In return Maxwell was given the right to comment 
officially on the policy, including the abolition of the Chief Secretaryship. 
Since this provided him with sufficient scope to oppose the Guillemard scheme 
indirectly, Maxwell agreed to remain in Malaya.
Guillemard1 s departure from Malaya was also followed by the first signs 
of opposition to his policy. Kindersley, a staunch supporter of Maxwell, 
protested to the Colonial Office about the embargo imposed on him and other 
unofficial councillors who were consulted by Guillemard, preventing them 
from discussing the policy among themselves or with anyone else except the 
Acting High Commissioner, When the Chinese unofficial councillors learned 
that they were the only ones not consulted, they protested strongly to 
London and threatened the government with Chinese public meetings, on 
Guillemard*s return, to demand a public a p o l o g y . I n  London Swettenham 
submitted a memorandum to Whitehall opposing Guillemard*s policy. He 
contended that overcentralisation could be overcome by restoring the title 
of Resident-General^by instructing the High Commissioners, the Resident- 
General and the Residents to adhere closely to their respective roles under 
Federation, and by frequently consulting the Rulers and their chiefs about 
public m a t t e r s . A c c o r d i n g  to him there was nothing wrong with the system 
of administration he established; the fault lay in his successors’ 
deviation from previous practice and policy. While recognising Swettenham 
as the leading authority on Malaya, the Colonial Office rejected his views 
on decentralisation as out-of-date. ^
On his return to Malaya, Guillemard was confronted with a lengthy
-JJ o
memorandum by Maxwell attacking the new policy. Partly because of the 
strong overtones of personal animosity, and partly because it might foment 
opposition to his scheme, the High Commissioner forbade Maxwell to 
circulate it among the unofficials of the Federal Council. On the 14th
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December 1925, ‘amid rumours of rows and re s ig n a tio n s  o f c e r ta in  u n o f f i c i a l s ' ,
th e  High Commissioner o u tlin e d  h is  scheme to  th e  F ed era l C o u n c i l . H e  was
c a r e fu l  however not to  m ention d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  as a s tep  tow ards a la rg e r
Malayan f e d e ra t io n . G uillem ard exp ressed  re g re t  f o r  not having consu lted
th e  Chinese u n o f f ic ia l  c o u n c il lo rs ,  and th e  in c id e n t was accep ted  as c lo sed .
Maxwell a lso  d id  not a t ta c k  th e  p o lic y  as G uillem ard fe a red  he would ‘ l ik e
145A jax in  th e  l im e lig h t d e fy ing  l ig h tn in g '.  The G uillem ard Scheme was 
warmly p ra is e d  by th e  Malay R u lers  and th e  lone Malay u n o f f ic ia l  member,
R a ja - d i - H i l i r .  To th e  l a t t e r  i t  seemed a f a r - s ig h te d  p o lic y  a t t e s t in g  to  
B r i t i s h  good f a i t h  towards t h e i r  t r e a t y  o b lig a tio n s  to  th e  M alays. But th e  
European and th e  Chinese u n o f f ic ia ls  jo in ed  in  a u n ite d  p ro te s t  a g a in s t th e  
new p o lic y . While su pporting  an in c re a se  in  th e  d ig n ity  and in flu en c e  of th e  
R u le rs  and a generous measure o f lo c a l  government fo r  th e  s t a t e s ,  th ey  were 
opposed to  any p o lic y  which would im p a ir th e  C hief S e c re ta ry sh ip . N everthe­
le s s  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  of th e  new p o lic y  was o f f i c i a l l y  regarded as on balance 
"a dec id ed ly  good s t a r t “ .
As a lread y  n o ted , th e  commercial communities supported  d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  
so long  as  i t  only t in k e re d  w ith  th e  a d m in is tra tio n . They had a v ested  
i n t e r e s t  in  en su rin g  th e  continued e x is te n c e  of th e  FMS a d m in is tra tio n  
because i t s  p r iz e d  e f f ic ie n c y  had immeasurably advanced t h e i r  economic stak e  
in  th e  coun try . Hence t h e i r  b a s ic  c r i t ic i s m  of th e  G uillem ard scheme was 
t h a t  the  d r a s t i c  re o rg a n is a tio n , e s p e c ia l ly  th e  a b o l i t io n  of th e  Chief
toft-S
S e c re ta ry sh ip , dangerous to  e f f ic ie n c y  and f in a n c ia l  s t a b i l i t y  and th u s  was
A
a th r e a t  to  t h e i r  economic i n t e r e s t s .
T his o p p o s itio n  was g re a t ly  in te n s i f i e d  by two f a c to r s .  As d iscu ssed  
e a r l i e r ,  G uillem ard had a lread y  an tag o n ised  commercial i n t e r e s t s  in  the  FMS 
by h is  e f f o r t s  to  w ie ld  r e a l  a u th o r i ty  in  th e  F ed e ra tio n  and e sp e c ia l ly  
h is  a ttem p t to  reduce the  s ta tu s  of th e  C hief S e c re ta ry . The G uillem ard 
scheme was th e re fo re  regarded as a cu lm in a tio n  of a p o lic y  which sought to
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pulverise the FMS chief executive officer and “fetter11 the Federation to
Singapore. On this point, the attitude of commercial interests was
succinctly explained by Maxwell:
When the position is that there is a Colonial Secretary in 
Singapore and no Chief Secretary in Kuala Lumpur, it is 
likely that the FMS' interests will suffer, if they do not 
coincide with the interests of the Straits Settlements. Even 
if they do not suffer, it is extremely probably that public 
opinion in the FMS will believe that they do suffer,
The second factor lay in the personality of the High Commissioner and the
Chief Secretary. Though an extremely approachable and hospitable man with
a keen sense of humour, Guillemard only managed to maintain excellent
relations with the Malay Rulers. He had no following outside the official
community, being regarded by the FMS commercial interests as an 'outsider1
and as far inferior to Maxwell as an administrator. ’ Maxwell, on the
other hand, was widely considered one of Malaya's most outstanding officials,
was strongly pro-business,"^ and wielded profound and far-reaching
influence within both the official and unofficial circles.
The views of the FMS commercial interests were shared to a great extent
150by the MCS. Except for the few 'more enlightened' members of the MCS,
the vast majority opposed the Guillemard scheme. There had always existed
a strong feeling of jealousy and mild contempt between MCS officers in the
FMS and those in the Colony,, The former were generally dissatisfied with
Guillemard's policy of lowering the importance of the Chief Secretary,
regarding it as an attack on the administration to which they belonged. To
aggravate the matter, Guillemard frequently ignored seniority in the question
of promotion, and relatively junior officers were promoted because they
happened to have 'caught ^lr Lawrence's eyes.1 J This tendency became more
marked after London approved the Guillemard scheme. As the High Commissioner
himself admitted, the success of the policy depended on appointing 'pro-
152decentralisation' officials to the key posts. Partly for this reason he 
offered the Chief Secretaryship to Hose and subsequently to Peel because they
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warmly supported his policy. But the majority of the MCS officers were not
decentralists, and Guillemard's promotion policy therefore antagonised them.
The promotion of a relatively junior officer, Heramant, to Under Secretary,
Straits Settlements, early in 1925 to enable him to help carry out the new
policy brought the discontent to a head. In a petition to the Secretary of
State, twenty-four MCS officers, most of them serving in the FMS,
unsuccessfully requested that seniority should be the deciding factor in
matters of promotion when the qualifications of deserving officers were 
153similar.' In other words, the new policy attracted MCS hostility which
stemmed from causes outside the decentralisation scheme.
The basic reason why most of the MCS officers opposed the Guillemard
scheme was that it sought to re-organise the administrative system over-
drastically. Though their alignment in the Guillemard-Maxwell split is not
known, most of the MCS apparently agreed with Maxwell that the new policy
was not only unrealistic but dangerous. According to Maxwell, the Chief
Secretarywhip was an indispensable part of the Federation which was the
logical growth of the Residential system. To abolish the Chief Secretaryship,
15ktherefore, would bring disastrous consequences in the FMS. It would also
centralise control over FMS affairs in Singapore. Needless to say the
technocrats vigorously opposed the Guillemard scheme, especially that part
of it which aimed to deprive them of executive authority.
After the December session of the Federal Council, Guillemard
appointed three official committees to work out the details of his scheme.
Meanwhile, Guillemard came under the most hostile and unrestrained attacks
by commercial interests and especially by the English newspapers in Malaya.
By the next Council session in March, however, the dispute had cooled to
some extent because of Guillemard's concentration on the least controversial
aspects of the scheme. It had also been affected by back-stage efforts to
155arrive at a compromise. That these efforts succeeded to some extent
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seems clear. For the High Commissioner went out of his way to emphasise
156that the differences between the two sides were matters of degree.
During this session the battle was joined when an unofficial introduce a
resolution passed in February by a meeting of various commercial bodies
157under the auspices of the Planters' Association of Malaya. This 
resolution proposed that the Council, recognising that the economic 
development of Malaya came largely from the confidence inspired by the 
Federation, should declare (l) that, while permitting the states full internal 
autonomy, that policy should not affect the maintenance of a strong Federal 
Government (2) that a full and efficient maintenance of Federal Services was 
essential to the country, and (3) that equally essential to the efficient 
working of the federal system was a resident executive head of the Federal 
administration, under the High Commissioner, having a status equal at least
1 eg
to that of the Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements. In reply, 
Guillemard signified his acceptance of the preamble and the first two clauses 
of the resolution. But declining to tie the hands of the government as to 
the future position of the chief officer of the FMS, he rejected the last 
clause. The resolution was accordingly taken to a division and was 
defeated by the official vote.
Meanwhile, the Association of British Malaya and Sir George Penny,
M.P. (a self-appointed spokesman for the Malay States), strongly urged the
Colonial Office to permit Maxwell to comment publicly on the Guillemard
scheme. Likewise the High Commissioner came under widespread accusation by
159the Malayan newspapers of having muzzled the Chief Secretary. To meet 
the situation half-way, Maxwell was allowed to circulate a bowdlerised 
version of his various memoranda on the Guillemard scheme during a Conference 
of Residents and unofficial councillors late in March 1926. This 
memorandum clearly showed that the new policy rested on false premises: 
namely that the Rulers and the State Councils had exercised real authority
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before Federation, and that Sir John Anderson had unsuccessfully pursued a
decentralisation policy. The first point had already been exploited by the
hostile Malayan n e w s p a p e r s G u i l l e m a r d ’s argument was thereby weakened
to some extent. On the question of the Chief Secretaryship, Maxwell had the
whole-hearted support of the unofficial councillors. But the latter were not
impressed by his insistence that he had pursued the correct decentralisation
policy since 1922, which would have succeeded "if it were not pulled up by
l62the roots for an examination of its growth". As the Colonial Office had 
rejected his policy, Maxwells approach was a negative one, offering no 
alternative to the Ouillemard scheme. Hence, the unofficial members seemed 
willing to co-operate in implementing the new policy provided the High 
Commissioner was willing to compromise on essentials. This Guillemard was 
willing to do in view of the formidable opposition to his policy.
In April Guillemard was further influenced by the adverse report of 
the Finance Devolution Committee convened three months earlier to report on 
ways to increase the financial authority of the State Councils. This 
standard Malayan practice of delegating detailed planning of policies to 
official committees on which the MCS invariably sat operated against 
decentralisation. As the reports of such apparently impartial committees 
were rarely rejected, this approach enabled the MCS to stultify the new policy. 
The Finance Devolution Committee was a particularly obvious case since it 
comprised the same conservative financial officers who had previously blocked 
Maxwell’s policy of financial devolution. Concerned chiefly with safeguarding 
the financial stability of the FMS, these MCS Officers were less affected 
than their colleagues by moral obligation towards the Malays. Hence the 
committee set out first to weaken Guillemard's case for financial devolution.
It argued, quite wrongly it would seem,  ^that when they signed the Federal 
Agreement the Rulers were fully aware that they were surrendering financial 
control of their states to the Federal Council. Moreover, the committee
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stressed, before federation the State Councils had very limited financial 
authority and at present still had little experience in financial matters,
It followed that there was no moral obligation to proceed with financial 
devolution to the extent that it would necessitate politically undesirable 
changes in Councils' membership,^4- and threaten the financial stability of 
the FMS.1d5
Having thus struck a note of caution, the Committee then proceeded to 
construct a scheme based purely on economic and financial considerations,^^ 
whereas the devolution policy was motivated primarily by political factors. 
This scheme divided the various services into three categories: Federal
Services to be provided in the federal estimates, Reserved (State) Services 
to appear in the State estimates, and Unreserved Services appearing 
separately and to be classified eventually in either of the other two 
categories. According to this scheme future devolution would involve 
bringing services within the Unreserved group into the Reserved (State) 
Services until there emerged state budgets of purely local services 
sanctioned by the State Councils. For a start, however, the services 
reserved to the states were so limited that they provided no risk of 
extravagance and necessitated no strengthening of Council membership. These 
services were to be financed by a lump sum appropriated by the Federal 
Council according to a preliminary budget drawn up by the Resident and 
approved by the High Commissioner. The State Council could then allocated 
these sums as it deemed fit to the various services reserved to the State. 1 
Since the State Councils still had no power to sanction supply, ultimate 
control over the Reserved (State) Service still remained in the hands of 
the Federal Council.
The Pountney Report, as it came to be called, was approved with minor
168modifications by the Federal Council as the basis for future action. 
Apparently disappointed with the report, the lone Malay Unofficial declared
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that financial devolution should be viewed in the light of the position of
169the State Councils in the UMS and of the future development of the FMS.
The Colonial Office was not impressed by the change but still cautioned the 
Malayan government against the over-early transfer of subjects from the 
Unreserved group to the Reserved (State) Services. 1 It should be noted 
that the central principle of the Pountney Report, namely the lump sum idea, 
had been advocated by Maxwell four years earlier.
Another factor which apparently induced Guillemard to abandon his 
intention to abolish the Chief Secretaryship was Maxwell’s retirement in 
May. It seemed to have taken out much of the steam behind the decentralisa­
tion movement, as reflected in the rapidity with which Guillemard1 s major 
objectives were dropped after mid-1926. Late in June the High Commissioner 
assured the Federal Council that the devolution policy ’’would ultimately 
produce as the Executive Head of the Federation under the High Commissioner
(such an office there must always be) an officer different from, though not
171necessarily less powerful than, the present Chief Secretary”. It is 
important to note that this assurance was given before the Legal and the 
Residents’ Committees on decentralisation reported to the government. One 
Colonial Office official minuted with understandable cynicism that very 
little would result from the new policy as ’it was gradually being
172whittled away into camouflage to satisfy the dignity of the Rulers'.
Guillemard's change of heart brought out a more candid report from 
the Legal Committee, comprising MCS officers, convened to report on 
legislative devolution to the State Councils. The conclusion the Committee 
came to was that for the present no effective extensions of legislative 
authority to the State Councils could be made. The Committee explained that 
it was too late to revert to the system during the pre-Federation days when 
identical lav/s were enacted by the various State Councils and too early to 
establish a real Federation wherein the Federal Council would enact federal
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173laws only, leaving state matters to be legislated by the State Councils.
While the devolution policy met with completely negative results in the
1U
legislative sphere, a by-product was re-constitution of the Federal Council.A
The Rulers withdrew from the Council in order to enhance their dignity and 
status. To this limited extent the constitutional change may be regarded as 
relevant to decentralisation. But in sharp contrast to his declaration in 
1925 that decentralisation would curtail the work and authority of the 
Federal Council, Guillemard now emphasised that the constitutional reform
17/,would have exactly the opposite result.
The Residents' Committee was instructed to report on decentralisation
from the Federal Secretariat to the State authorities. This committee
submitted no report and the reason is obvious. Once Guillemard had given an
undertaking to the Federal Council in June 1926 that he would take no steps
175to reduce the power and status of the Chief Secretary, the only thing 
left to the Committee to consider was another report on the pattern of the 
Hose Report of 1923. But there was no apparent reason for a re-definition 
of the status and powers of the Federal Heads vis-a-vis the Residents, and 
the Pountney Report had advised against further transfer of departments to 
State control.
Taking a last look at decentralisation before he retired early in 1927*
Guillemard informed the Colonial Office that the financial devolution scheme
and the reform of the Federal Council were the essential portions of his
policy. He emphasised, however, that much remained to be done, such as the
gradual extension of the financial control of the State Councils. According
to him these Councils also needed to be strengthened, among other things, by
vesting in them increased legislative powers. As for the key question of
the Chief Secretaryship, he explained that the issue would practically settle
T *7 Aitself as decentralisation proceeded. ' On the whole no substantial 
decentralisation was accomplished, and the limited degree of financial
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d e v o lu tio n  which d id  tak e  p lace  b e n e f ite d  th e  R esiden ts  and not th e  S ta te  
177C ouncils . '
S ta tu s  Quo Under C lif fo rd
G u illem ard 's  su ccesso r was th e  o u ts tan d in g  Malayan p io n ee r , S ir  Hugh 
177aC lif fo rd , who appears to  have been appoin ted  to  c a r ry  forward th e
178d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  p o lic y . His r e tu rn  ra is e d  keen hopes among M alays, and
th e  R a ja -d i -H il i r  o f Perak d ec la red  th a t  to  th e  Malays C lif fo rd  was 'th e
179long lo s t  Batu Sahmora re g a in e d ' .  But w hile paying l ip - s e r v ic e  to
d e c e n tr a l is a t io n ,  th e  Batu Sahmora was in  p ra c t ic e  a staunch su p p o rte r of
th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  system he had helped  to  e s ta b l i s h .  Shocked by th e
dem ora lis ing  e f f e c t s  o f th e  recen t squabbles and th e  d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  fu ro re ,
he a lso  re a c te d  ag a in s t f u r th e r  advance in  d e v o lu tio n . C lif fo rd  was in  f a c t
s u f fe r in g  from c y c l ic a l  in s a n i ty  and appeared to  have channelled  w hatever
energy he s t i l l  had to  revamping th e  m orale and improving th e  perform ance o f
th e  MCS. In  August 1927 he advised  th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  th a t  i f
d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  was to  proceed s u c c e s s fu lly , a s tro n g  and e f f i c i e n t  C hief
S e c re ta ry  was most e s s e n t i a l .  R e f le c tin g  t h e i r  lack  of commitment to  th e
m a tte r , th e  R esiden ts now swung round to  th e  High Com m issioner's view . In
1927 C lif fo rd  th e re fo re  req u ested  London to  r a is e  th e  s ta tu s  o f C hief
S ec re ta ry  to  L ieutenant-G overnor o r a t  l e a s t  to  re s to re  th e  t i t l e  of 
180R esid en t-G en era l. Both th e  re q u e s ts  were re je c te d  by th e  C o lon ia l O ff ic e .
Not convinced th a t  th e  C hief S e c re ta ry 's  d u tie s  w arranted a r i s e  in  s t a tu s ,
W hitehall in  any case though t i t  in ex p ed ien t to  re s to re  th e  t i t l e  o f
R esiden t-G eneral because o f th e  c ircum stances surrounding i t s  a b o l i t io n .
N ev erth eless  th e  C o lon ia l O ffice  seems to  have t a c i t l y  agreed th a t  a s tro n g
181c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e  o f f ic e r  was e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  FMS a d m in is tra tio n . This
182view was now advocated by P ee l who was appoin ted  to  succeed Maxwell to
183b rin g  about th e  a b o l i t io n  o f th e  C hief S e c re ta ry sh ip . During C l i f f o r d 's  
tim e d e c e n tr a l is a t io n  was to  a l l  i n te n t s  and purposes tucked away in  a
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pigeonhole.
On the other hand efforts were made to see that administrative practices
did not deviate significantly from the official policy of decentralisation.
18LAttempts by Federal Heads to centralise their departments or to free them
from the Residents’ control were resisted. For instance, the Director of the
Electrical Department attempted in 1927 to eliminate lay control over his
department by proposing to federalise all electrical undertakings and pool
all revenues for future development under the supervision of an autonomous 
18*5Electrical Board. This effort to create what one Resident termed ’an
electrical ’’imperium in imperio’1 ’ was immediately scotched by the government.
The Director was informed that he could not expect to see the Residents
relinquishing their control over institutions operating within their states
and that he had ignored the policy of decentralisation.^^ In 1929 the
government disagreed with the Surveyor-General that it was time to transfer
the Survey Department from the Unreserved Services to the Reserved (Federal)
Services. On the same ground that it was too early to review the policy of
financial devolution, it also rejected the suggestion of Raja-di-Hilir that
187some unreserved services be transferred to the Reserved (State) Services. 
Hence, no efforts were made to strengthen the State Councils or to extend 
their financial authority. In short the government maintained the status 
quo during the years, 1927-30.
Conclusion
In 1920 began a decentralisation movement which was to dominate the FMS 
political scene during the interwar years. Maxwell>as the moving spirit 
behind the movement until 1924 and had a clearer idea than Guillemard and the 
Residents about the means and ends of decentralisation. In fact his policy 
was repeated in various forms over the ensuing two decades. The power 
struggle between Maxwell and Guillemard became entangled with decentralisation 
from the outset, and this enhanced decentralisation as an issue although not
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helping to solve practical problems. In the long run it would have 
discouragecjfMaxwell from carrying decentralisation to the extent of impairing 
his own position and making it harder for him to resist Guillemard's attempts 
to exercise effective control over the FMS. Late in 1924 the Maxwell- 
Guillemard split paved the way for a radical decentralisation policy with the 
main targets of abolishing the Chief Secretaryship and devoluting federal 
powers to the states. This policy was blocked by the FMS commercial interests 
and the MCS. It had the unfortunate effect of causing Maxwell to attack the 
decentralisation movement, including Advisory rule and other aspects of it he 
had previously advocated. After 1924 Maxwell became one of the most 
vociferous opponents of the movement, exerting pressure on the Colonial Office 
through the Association of British Malaya and belittling it through 
pejorative articles in Malayan newspapers. Guillemard succeeded in snatching 
the initiative of the movement from Maxwell in that year, and thereafter 
decentralisation came to be directed from Singapore. To Maxwell's policy vras 
now added the aim of abolishing the Chief Secretaryship. The 1920s therefore 
defined the problems of decentralisation but failed to solve them. After 
Guillemard's departure from Malaya, the decentralisation movement 
temporarily came to a standstill.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Clementi's Decentralisation Policy
In 1930 Clifford's successor, Sir Cecil Clementi^ revived the
decentralisation policy. This seems to have been partly influenced by
2Guillemard's despatch of 21 October 1924, His move came at a time when 
British officials in the FMS were still bent on maintaining the status quo 
in the Federation,^ Nor were the commercial interests inclined to support 
a decentralisation policy when the country had just come under the great 
depression of the early 1930s, Only the Malays favoured the move since 
their discontent with overcentralisation had not been overcome by Guille­
mard's policy. According to Clementi, they appealed to him individually
soon after his arrival in Malaya and collectively during the Klang Durbar
4in September 1930 for a policy of decentralisation. Under the circum­
stances Clementi's policy was bound to meet strong opposition from official 
and unofficial circles.
Clementi and His Objectives
A nephew of a former Malayan Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith,
Clementi was a headstrong, forceful and determined personality. He was
the most intransigent Governor-High Commissioner in 20th century Malaya,
who was in the habit of committing the Government publicly to policies
5before consultation with the Secretary of State. This autocratic 
approach was also evident in his relations with the Malayan British offi­
cials and with unofficial community representatives. Clementi was 
particularly impatient of the Rulers' susceptibilities and tended to 
hurry them into taking measures without adequate consultation. Such a
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G overnor-H igh  Com m issioner was u n l ik e ly  to  r e s t  c o n te n t u n le s s  he e x e rc is e d  
r e a l  c o n t r o l  ov er b o th  th e  Colony and th e  Malay S t a t e s ,  But h i s  approach  
was c e r t a i n  to  e n co u n te r  immense d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  a  co u n try  w ith  such  a 
w ide range  o f  d i f f e r i n g  and a t  tim e s  c o n f l i c t i n g  r a c i a l  and o th e r  i n t e r e s t s  
as  M alaya. I t  was s p e c ia l ly  u n s u i ta b le  in  th e  UMS where th e  custom ary 
approach  in  p u b lic  a f f a i r s  was one o f  c o n s u l t a t io n ,  c o n c i l i a t io n  and 
accommodation betw een th e  B r i t i s h  and th e  Malay e l i t e .
O x fo rd - t r a in e d ,  C lem enti had se rv e d  in  Hong Kong, I n d ia ,  C hina and 
Ceylon b e fo re  he came to  M alaya. As C o lo n ia l S e c re ta ry  in  Ceylon 1922-25 , 
C lem en ti w itn e sse d  th e  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  a ro se  from th e  in t r o d u c -
g
t i o n  o f  an u n o f f i c i a l  m a jo r ity  in  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  Owing to  th e  c o n s ta n t
o p p o s it io n  o f  th e  C eylonese members, th e r e  were 'f r e q u e n t  d e a d lo c k s ' betw een
th e  l e g i s l a t u r e  and th e  e x e c u t iv e .  The Ceylon Government was reduced  ' t o
im potence w ith o u t p ro v id in g  any means o f  t r a i n in g  th e  u n o f f i c i a l  members
7
in  th e  assum ption  o f  e x e c u tiv e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ’ . L ike S i r  Hugh C l i f f o r d ,
g
h is  s u c c e s s o r  as G overnor o f  Ceylon 1925-27, C lem enti seemed to  have l e f t  
th e  c o u n try  w ith  a  s tro n g  d i s t a s t e  f o r  th e  id e a  o f  an u n o f f i c i a l  m a jo r i ty  
in  a  c o lo n ia l  l e g i s l a t u r e .
In  O ctober 1925 C lem enti was prom oted G overnor o f  Hong Kong w here he
a r r iv e d  in  th e  m idst o f  a  p o w erfu l a n t i - B r i t i s h  moverment w hich b ro u g h t th e
i s la n d  to  a s t a n d s t i l l .  The g e n e ra l  s t r i k e  and th e  b o y c o tt o f  B r i t i s h
sh ip p in g  d id  n o t end t i l l  l a t e  in  1926 .^  T h is  e x p e rie n c e  seems to  have
in c re a s e d  h i s  f e a r  and h o s t i l i t y  to  th e  KMT, and s tre n g th e n e d  h i s  d e s i r e
10to  s e e  a  s t r o n g  im p e r ia l  p o l ic y  tow ards N a t io n a l i s t  C h in a . Though he had
11a r e p u ta t io n  as a C hinese s c h o la r  who u n d e rs to o d  th e  C h in e se , C lem en ti 
seems to  have come to  M alaya d e te rm in ed  to  d e a l  s e v e re ly  w ith  i n t r a n s ig e n t  
C h in e se . A few days a f t e r  h is  a r r i v a l  in  F eb ru ary  1930i he e n fo rc e d  th e  
ban imposed on th e  KMT f iv e  y e a rs  e a r l i e r  w ith o u t th e  p r i o r  s a n c t io n  o f  th e  
C o lo n ia l O f f ic e .  H is ex p e rie n c e  in  Ceylon and Hong Kong ap p ea rs  to  have
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had an im p o rtan t b e a r in g  on h is  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y  in  th e  FMS.
H aving sp e n t th e  most im p o rtan t p e r io d s  o f  h i s  c a r e e r  in  w e l l - e s ta b l i s h e d
crown c o lo n ie s ,  C lem en ti seemed to  f in d  th e  d iv e rs e  r e s t r a i n t s  in h e re n t  in
th e  M alayan s i t u a t i o n  irksom e to  h i s  d e s i r e  to  e x e rc is e  u n d iv id ed  c o n t ro l
o v e r th e  whole c o u n try . By th e  1930s th e  patch-w ork  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t -u p
a ls o  app ea red  in c re a s in g ly  anom alous in  a  co u n try  th e  s i z e  o f  M alaya. The
c e n t r a l  g o a l o f  C lem enti*s d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l ic y  th e r e f o r e  was a  M alayan
u n io n  co m p ris in g  th e  Colony and th e  Malay S t a t e s .  To b e g in  w ith  he p o in te d
o u t t h a t  in  an a re a  n e a r ly  as  la rg e  as England th e re  were no few er th a n  te n
a d m in is t r a t io n s :  th e  Colony and th e  n in e  Malay S t a t e s .  Even i f  th e  FMS
were ta k e n  as a  s in g le  e n t i t y ,  th e r e  were s t i l l  seven  a d m in is t r a t iv e  u n i t s ,
e x i s t i n g  (a s  i t  w ere) in  w a te r - t ig h t  com partm ents, and r e la t e d  to  each  o th e r
12on ly  th ro u g h  th e  s in g le  G overnor-H igh C om m issioner. The u n i f i c a t i o n  o f 
th e s e  s e p a ra te  s t a t e s  would s im p lify  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  r e s u l t  in  s u b s t a n t i a l  
econom ies , and reduce f r i c t i o n  betw een th e  v a r io u s  u n i t s . As C lem enti 
s t a t e d  in  1931:
I  look  forw ard  indeed  to  th e  em ergence o f a  b ro th e rh o o d  o f 
Malay n a t io n s , each  p ro u d ly  g u a rd in g  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  i n d i v i ­
d u a l i ty  and autonomy, b u t jo in in g  hands w ith  th e  r e s t  in  
e n t e r p r i s e  t h a t  may be f o r  th e  good o f  th e  M alays o f  t h i s  
P e n in s u la  as a  whole and o f th e  im m igran ts o f  o th e r  ra c e s  
who have made t h i s  co u n try  t h e i r  home. In  such  a M alayan 
League th e  Colony w i l l ,  I  t r u s t ,  ta k e  i t s  p l a c e . 13
I n i t i a l l y  t h i s  M alayan f e d e r a t io n  would be a lo o se —k n i t  u n i t .  Subse­
q u e n tly  th e  f e d e r a l  bond would be r e t ig h te n e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  o v e r th e  member 
s t a t e s .  T h is  f e d e r a t io n  was in ten d ed  to  be a  s t ro n g  one s in c e  C lem en ti 
hoped to  earm ark th e  more im p o rtan t revenue i te m s , such  as custom s re v e n u e ,
14
fo r  th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent. Under th e  new c o n s t i tu t io n a l ,  o r d e r ,  th e  
c e n tre  o f  governm ent would be lo c a te d  in  S in g ap o re  u nder a  S e c re ta ry  to  th e  
High C om m issioner. C lem enti v is u a l i s e d  th e  High Com m issioner as  th e  s tro n g  
head o f  t h i s  M alayan f e d e r a t io n ,  e f f e c t i v e l y  d i r e c t in g  i t s  a f f a i r s  from 
S in g a p o re . Somewhat c o n t ra d ic to ry  to  t h i s  was h is  d e s i r e  to  r e v i t a l i s e  th e
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Malay S u lta n a te s  by r e s to r in g  pow er to  th e  S ta te s  and tra n s fo rm in g  R esid en t 
r u l e ,  a t  l e a s t  in  p a r t ,  i n to  A dviso iy  r u le  analogous to  th a t  in  the.UMS.
d e m e n t i 's  aim to  r e v iv e  th e  s t a t e  governm ents was m ainly  m o tiv a ted  
by th e  d e s i r e  to  overcom e th e  o p p o s it io n  o f th e  UMS to  jo in in g  th e  FMS.
As n o ted  in  C h ap te r T h re e , th e  UMS fe a re d  th a t  t h i s  s te p  would d e p riv e  them 
o f  th e  l a r g e r  d eg ree  o f  autonomy and power th e y  c u r r e n t ly  e n jo y e d . They 
a ls o  opposed th e  sy stem  o f  R e s id e n t r u le  as  p r a c t i s e d  in  th e  FMS. C lem enti 
was convinced  th a t  u n le s s  th e  FMS a d m in is t r a t io n  was d r a s t i c a l l y  d e c e n tra -
15l i s e d ,  th e  UMS co u ld  n e v e r  be p e rsu ad ed  to  e n te r  a  l a r g e r  M alayan f e d e r a t io n .  J  
In  t h i s  se n se  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  was on ly  a  means to  th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f a 
M alayan u n io n .
C lem enti a l s o  d e s i r e d  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  to  h e lp  him curb  C hinese 
p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e  in  M alaya. Owing to  h i s  ex p e rien ce  in  C hina and Hong 
Kong, he was p a r t i c u l a r l y  h o s t i l e  to  th e  KMT. B e lie v in g  th a t  th e  KMT sought 
to  c r e a te  an 'iraperium  in  im perio* among th e  M alayan C hinese and u l t im a te ly  
to  c o n v e rt M alaya in to  C h in a 's  n in e te e n th  p ro v in c e , he a c te d  s t ro n g ly  in  
F eb ru ary  1950 to  c ru sh  th e  p a r t y .  By 1952 th e  KMT had v i r t u a l l y  become 
in a c t iv e .
16
T his f e a r  o f  th e  'Y ellow  P e r i l '  seems to  have c o lo u re d  h i s  a t t i t u d e
tow ards C hinese demands f o r  e q u a l p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  w ith  th e  M alays and f o r
a  g r e a t e r  sh a re  in  governm ent and a d m in is t r a t io n  th a n  th e y  had h i t h e r to
e n jo y e d . H is a t t i t u d e  was a l s o  in f lu e n c e d  by th e  p reco n c e iv ed  id e a  he
formed in  Ceylon t h a t  i t  was p o l i t i c a l l y  unw ise to  in tro d u c e  an o f f i c i a l
m a jo r ity  in  a c o lo n ia l  l e g i s l a t u r e .  But th e  S t r a i t s - b o r n  C h in ese , su p p o rted
by C hinese economic i n t e r e s t s  o p e ra t in g  th ro u g h  th e  A sso c ia te d  C hinese
17Chambers o f Commerce, had a lre a d y  demanded f o r  an u n o f f i c i a l  m a jo r ity  in
th e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  o f  th e  Colony and th e  FMS as w e ll  as non-M alay adm ission
18in to  th e  M alayan C iv i l  S e r v ic e .
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Though sm a ll in  num bers, th e  S t r a i t s  C hinese were among th e  w e a l t h ie s t ,  
b e s t  ed u ca ted  and most i n f l u e n t i a l  o f  th e  M alayan d o m ic iled  com m unities. 
Through th e  S t r a i t s  C hinese B r i t i s h  A s s o c ia t io n , th ey  s to o d  f o r  th e  view s 
and i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  perm anen tly  d o m ic iled  C h in ese . T h is A sso c ia tio n  s t a r t e d  
to  p re s s  C leraen ti f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  re fo rm s in  th e  Colony s h o r t ly  a f t e r  h i s  
a r r i v a l  in  M alaya. I t  demanded th e  r ig h t  to  e l e c t  an a d d i t io n a l  C hinese 
member to  th e  L e g i s la t iv e  C ouncil from each  o f  th e  th r e e  S e t t le m e n ts ,  th e  
appo in tm en t o f  a  C hinese to  th e  E x e c u tiv e  C o u n c il, and th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f 
an u n o f f i c i a l  m a jo r ity  in  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  C lem enti reg a rd ed  such  p ro p o s a ls  
as th e  b eg in n in g  o f  C hinese p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a t i o n  and ex p ec ted  i t  to  sp re a d  
from th e  Colony to  th e  Malay S t a t e s .  To s a t i s f y  C hinese demands was c o n s i­
d e red  dangerous becau se  he b e l ie v e d  i t  would le a d  to  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y
as  in  C eylon , to  dom ination  ov er th e  M alays by th e  C h in e se , and to  th e  ev en -
19t u a l  e v ic t io n  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  from M alaya. A ccord ing ly  C lem enti r e j e c te d  
a l l  th e  demands o f  th e  S t r a i t s  C hinese B r i t i s h  A s s o c ia t io n . In  1932, a  s e a t  
in  th e  S t r a i t s  E x ec u tiv e  C ouncil was f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e c r e a te d  f o r  an A sian  
u n o f f i c i a l  b u t C lem enti nom inated a  M alay , le a v in g  th e  C hinese to  be r e p r e ­
s e n te d  by th e  S e c re ta ry  fo r  C hinese a f f a i r s .  T hus, he sough t to  p re v e n t
f u r th e r  A sian a g i t a t i o n  f o r  in c re a s e d  u n o f f i c i a l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  on th e
20L e g is la t iv e  C o u n c il.
In  th e  IMS C lem enti r e l i e d  m ain ly  on a  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l ic y  to  curb  
C hinese p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e .  He f e l t  t h a t  th e  e x i s t in g  c e n t r a l i s e d  a d m in is tr a ­
t i o n  and th e  p o s i t io n  o f  th e  F e d e ra l C o u n c il ten d ed  to  encourage a g i t a t i o n  
f o r  d e m o c ra tis a tio n  o f  th e  governm ent. He im p lie d  th a t  t h i s  was a ls o  
d i f f i c u l t  to  r e s i s t  u n d er th e  e x i s t in g  sy stem . Through d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  
C lem en ti sough t to  in te rp o s e  r e v i t a l i s e d  Malay S u lta n a te s  betw een th e  
B r i t i s h  and th e  dangerous d em o cra tic  developm ents he th o u g h t he saw in  
C eylon . I t  would a ls o  s tre n g th e n  th e  b u f f e r  betw een th e  Government and th e  
C h in e se , th e re b y  p ro lo n g in g  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  th e  l a t t e r  from a  sh a re  o f
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21p o l i t i c a l  power in  th e  IMS. In  t h i s  way th e  C hinese would have to  come 
to  te rm s w ith  th e  Malay R u le rs  as a p re lu d e  to  any advance to  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  
governm ent. To t h i s  e x te n t  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  may be reg a rd ed  as a  p o lic y  o f  
d iv id e  e t  im p e ra .
The r e v iv a l  o f  th e  s t a t e  governm ents would meet Malay d is c o n te n t  w ith
22o v e r c e n t r a l i s a t io n  in  th e  FMS. C lem en ti r e i t e r a t e d  to  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  
t h a t  th e  R u le rs  w ere d i s s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  th e  FMS were u n d er t i g h t  B r i t i s h  con­
t r o l  and th a t  they  w ie ld ed  much l e s s  a u th o r i ty  th a n  t h e i r  c o u n te rp a r ts  in  
th e  UMS. He a ls o  warned th a t  advance in  e d u c a tio n  would make M alays u n w ill in g  
t o  t o l e r a t e  th e  g la r in g  d iv o rc e  betw een th e  t r e a t y  and th e  a c tu a l  p o s i t io n s  
o f  th e  R u le rs  in  th e  FMS. F u rth e rm o re , s e v e r a l  m ild ly  ’n a t i o n a l i s t i c '  Malay 
new spapers had em erged in  M alaya w hich w ere v e ry  a r t i c u l a t e  about M alays' 
s u b o rd in a te  r o le  in  p u b lic  l i f e  and abou t th e  danger o f  t h e i r  dom ination  by 
th e  C h in e se . C lem en ti warned th a t  i t  was im p e ra tiv e  to  meet Malay d is c o n te n t
23by a  p o l ic y  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  in  o rd e r  to  s ta v e  o f f  Malay p o l i t i c a l  'u n r e s t ' .  
W hile he ap p ea rs  to  be g e n u in e ly  concerned  about t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  i t  was n o t 
a  m ajor m otive b eh in d  h is  p o l i c y .
W h i te h a l l 's  r e a c t io n  to  th e  C lem en ti Scheme
In  O c to b er 1930 C lem en ti l e f t  M alaya to  d is c u s s  h i s  'new ' p o lic y  w ith
W h ite h a l l .  The to p  men in  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e ,  in c lu d in g  th e  Labour C o lo n ia l
24S e c r e ta r y ,  Lord P a s s f i e ld ,  w ere th e n  ready  to  g iv e  a  new d i r e c t io n  to
M alayan p o l i c y .  As th e  Labour P a r lia m e n ta ry  S e c r e ta r y ,  Dr S h ie l ,  s t a t e d ,
th e  M alayan s e t -u p  was c l e a r ly  a  pa tch -w ork  and i t  was w ise  to  i n i t i a t e
refo rm s b e fo re  th e y  were fo rc e d  on th e  G overnm ent. " In  a  se n se  th e r e f o r e ,
C lem en ti had come a t  an o ppo rtune  tim e  to  p u t h i s  d r a s t i c  scheme to  th e
C o lo n ia l O f f ic e .  On th e  o th e r  h and , th e  change a n t ic ip a te d  by Dr S h ie l  and
26th e  A s s is ta n t  P r in c ip a l  U n d e r-S e c re ta ry , W alte r E l l i s ,  was in  th e  d i r e c t io n
27o f  accommodating C hinese demands f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s .  1 Under th e se  c i r ­
cum stances d e m e n t i 's  p o l ic y  would meet s t i f f  o p p o s it io n  from a  s e c t io n  o f
th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e
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L a te  in  November C lem en ti o u t l in e d  h i s  id e a s  to  a  m eeting  in  th e  C o lo n ia l
O f f ic e  p re s id e d  o v er by th e  Perm anent A s s is ta n t  U n d e r-S e c re ta ry , S i r  G ilb e r t
28
G r in d le .  The g i s t  o f  C lem en ti* s ca se  was t h a t  a  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y
was n e c e s s i t a te d  by o v e r c e n t r a l i s a t io n  w hich had tran sfo rm e d  th e  F e d e ra tio n
in to  a b u r e a u c ra t ic  am algam ation . T h is  was th e  p r in c i p a l  o b s ta c le  to  th e
fo rm a tio n  o f  a  M alayan u n io n . He p roposed  to  devolve pow ers to  th e  s t a t e s
to  th e  e x te n t  o f  p la c in g  th e  FMS on e x a c t ly  th e  same fo o t in g  as  th e  UMS.
T h is  co u ld  on ly  be ach iev ed  by a  d i s s o lu t io n  o f th e  F e d e ra t io n .  F or a  tim e
th e n  a l l  th e  Malay S ta te s  would e x i s t  as  s e p a ra te  e n t i t i e s  t i l l  th e  UMS
R u le rs  w ere conv inced  o f th e  bona f id e s  o f  h is  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l i c y .  A
d u rb a r  o f  a l l  th e  Malay R u le rs  and B r i t i s h  A dv ise rs  would su b se q u en tly
be convened d u rin g  w hich C lem enti f e l t  c e r t a in  an agreem ent cou ld  be o b ta in e d
29
to  form a  lo o s e - k n i t  f e d e r a t io n  o f  th e  n in e  Malay S ta te s  and th e  C olony.
C lem en ti d id  n o t in form  th e  m eeting  th a t  once t h i s  f e d e r a t io n  was 
form ed , th e  f e d e r a l  kn o t would be r e - t ig h te d *  But as th e r e  would be a d iv i s io n  
o f  powers betw een th e  f e d e r a l  and th e  s t a t e  governm ents u n d er t h i s  new 
f e d e r a t io n ,  a  r e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  was im p lie d  w ith  member s t a t e s  s u r re n d e r in g  
pow ers o v e r c e r t a in  s u b je c t s  to  th e  c e n t r e .  A pparen tly  C lem enti was d o u b tfu l 
w hether th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  would su p p o r t a  scheme w hich would r e s u l t  in  
th e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  Malay S ta te s  b e in g  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  c e n t r a l i s e d  in  S in g a p o re .
In  h is  e f f o r t s  to  s e l l  h i s  id e a s  to  th e  m e e tin g , he r e l i e d  m aih ly  on th e
ir\
argum ent t h a t  th e  am algam ation in  th e  FMS was n o t acco rd  w ith  th e  Anglo- 
Malay t r e a t i e s .  H is p la n  would r e s to r e  B r i t i s h  good f a i t h  to  t h e i r  t r e a ty  
o b l ig a t io n s  and draw th e  UMS in to  th e  f e d e r a l  n e t .  C lem enti a l s o  s tro n g ly  
em phasised  t h a t  on ly  th e  system  o f  i n d i r e c t  r u le  he en v isag ed  would p re v e n t 
a g i t a t i o n  f o r  a  more r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  form o f  government in  M alaya which would
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le a d  to  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t r o u b le s  o f  Ceylon and u l t im a te ly  to  dom ination
30by th e  C h in ese .
W hile G rin d le  g e n e r a l ly  sym path ised  w ith  C le m e n ti 's  p ro p o s a ls ,  th e
o th e r  o f f i c i a l s  were s t r o n g ly  c r i t i c a l  o f  them . The l a t t e r  were
u n fav o u rab ly  im p ressed  by th e  f a c t  th a t  C lem enti was unab le  to  g iv e  a
co h ere n t o u t l in e  o f  th e  f e d e r a t io n  he had in  m ind. In d eed , h i s  id e a s  were
g e n e ra lly  vague, in c o n s i s t e n t  in  p a r t s ,  and h a s t i l y  fo rm u la te d . For
in s ta n c e ,  though th e  aim was to  e s t a b l i s h  a  r e a l  f e d e r a t io n ,  th e re  was to
be no c e n t r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  n o r e x e c u tiv e  o f th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent. Under
th e  schem e, th e  F e d e ra l  C o u n c il and C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  would be a b o lis h e d .
The C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  o f f i c i a l s  were a l s o  c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  High
Comm issioner had s e r io u s ly  u n d e r -e s tim a te d  th e  o p p o s itio n  tow ards th e
proposed  r e o r g a n i s a t io n .  The t r u t h  o f th e  m a tte r  was th a t  C lem enti had
an in a d eq u a te  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  M alayan s i t u a t i o n .  He exp ec ted  only
a  s e c t io n  o f th e  lo c a l  E uropean community to  oppose h is  scheme and th e
C hinese to  be i n d i f f e r e n t  to  i t .  F u r th e r ,  he f a i l e d  to  a p p re c ia te  th a t
th e  FMS R u le rs  had alw ays opposed a m erger o f t h e i r  s t a t e s  w ith  th e  C olony.
Even more s t r i k i n g  was h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  UMS R u le rs  would be in c l in e d
to  fav o u r th e  schem e. In  f a c t ,  th e  c o n tra ry  was e v id e n t from t h e i r  views
d u rin g  an A ll« R u le rs  d u rb a r  in  O ctober 1930 on C le m e n ti 's  p ro p o sa l to
e s t a b l i s h  M alayan d ep a rtm en ts  u n d er a d v iso ry  h e a d s . E i th e r  C lem enti had
f a i l e d  to  g ra sp  t h i s  p o in t  o r  had so  u n d e r - r a te d  t h e i r  h o s t i l i t i e s  th a t
he th o u g h t i t  cou ld  be e a s i l y  b ru sh ed  a s id e .  The on ly  o p p o s itio n  he took
s e r io u s ly  was t h a t  o f  h i s  d e p u ty , th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  in  th e  FMS. To
c o u n te r  t h i s  , he s u c c e s s fu ly  p re s s e d  f o r  th e  r e t i r e m e n t  o f  C h ie f S e c re ta ry
31Cochrane b ecau se  th e  l a t t e r  was n o t 'h e a r t  and s o u l w ith  th e  p o l i c y ' .
A ll th e  o f f i c i a l s ,  in c lu d in g  G r in d le ,  opposed th e  d is s o lu t io n  o f th e  
F e d e ra t io n  u n le s s  t h i s  c o in c id e d  w ith  th e  fo rm atio n  o f th e  l a r g e r  Malayan u n i t .
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The main reason was that this step would be^serious blow to the efficiency
of the Malayan public service. Besides, there was no certainty that it
would lead to a Malayan union. As the officials rightly anticipated, the
destruction of the Federation would be powerfully opposed by commercial
interests in Malaya and London. The meeting therefore suggested an
alternative approach that the Federation be loosened in the hope of drawing
32in the UMS. The question then went up to Lord Passfield. who was prepared 
to support Clementi provided a practical scheme could eventually be 
formulated. But Passfield preferred the safer approach of decentralising 
the Federation as a means towards a Malayan union.^
One is inclined to see in this decision a fairly important setback 
for Clementi. If the UMS could at all be enticed to enter a larger 
political grouping, they would be more likely do so when the Federation 
was abolished and all the nine Malay States put on the same footing than 
when the FMS remained intact. Much would, of course, depend on the 
introduction of Advisory rule in the hitherto federated states, the rise 
of national consciousness among the Malays, and various other considerations. 
But the approach adopted, as we shall see, could not even have placed the 
federated states on practically the same footing as the UMS because of the 
opposition of the MCS and the commercial interests. In any case the process 
of eroding the Clementi scheme had commenced.
As advised by Grindle, a committee of two Colonial Office officials 
and Gibson (the FMS Legal Adviser on leave in London) was appointed to 
work out a practicable scheme. Gibson was not in favour of dementi's 
proposals, an understandable thing since he was the chairman of the Legal 
Committee which rejected any legilative devolution to the State Councils m ^ . 
in
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Nevertheless, the committee submitted a draft treaty, written by Gibson, 
which aimed to convert the FMS into a real federation that would allow 
the entry of the UMS.
This draft treaty was based on dementi’s ideas and was endorsed by
him. But it differed from his proposals in two important aspects. Firstly,
the committee decided to exclude the Colony for the time being from the
proposed Malayan Federation. This appeared to be due to Whitehall’s
uncertainty as to whether Clementi's original proposal would involve passing
an Act in the British Parliament in which the Labour Government was in the
minority and to concern for the free port status of Penang and especially
34of Singapore.' Secondly, the new federation would have a federal council 
to legislate federal laws. The draft treaty also differed from the 
Guillemard scheme. It was the first attempt to create a true federation with 
a clear divisions of powers between the federal and the state governments. 
Further the new draft treaty clearly stated that Resident rule in the FMS 
would be transformed into advisory rule similar to that in the UMS, whereas 
the Guillemard scheme had been vague on this point.
As far as advisable, only those matters which concerned the federation 
as a whole would be placed under the control of the central government. But 
for reason of ’political advisability’ or substantial economies, subjects 
not primarily of common interest, such as mental hospitals, would also come
7 C
under federal control.''7 On this basis twenty-three subjects7 were allocated 
to the federal government. The federal legislature would legislate for these 
subjects while theoretically the federal executive would administer them.
In practice, however, the federal executive would only comprise a few 
federal departments such as Customs, Labour, Posts and Telegraphs. The 
rest of the subjects would be administered by the states. Under the plan, 
the residual powers left to the states were considered very large, and all
147
s t a t e  s u b je c t s  would be l e g i s l a t e d  and a d m in is te re d  by th e  s t a t e  governm ents. 
To avo id  th e  flaw s in  th e  p re v io u s  t r e a t i e s ,  th e  scheme em phasised th a t  th e  
powers s u rre n d e re d  by th e  S ta t e s  sh o u ld  be as c l e a r ly  and e x a c tly  d e fin e d  
as p o s s ib le  in  o rd e r  to  p re v e n t d is p u te s  o r  encroachm ent on s t a t e  autonomy
rem ained to  be worked o u t by e x p e r t s .  C le a r ly ,  u nder th e  new c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  
o r d e r ,  th e  fe d e ra te d  s t a t e s  would be p la c e d  on much b u t n o t e x a c t ly ,  th e  
same p o s i t io n  as th e  UMS. By jo in in g  th e  new f e d e r a t io n ,  th e  UMS would have 
to  s u r re n d e r  c o n t ro l  o v e r th o s e  s u b je c t s  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  th e  c e n t r a l  governm ent. 
I t  i s  h ig h ly  d o u b tfu l  w h e th er th e y  would have v o lu n ta r i ly  ag reed  to  do s o .
The p o s i t io n s  o f th e  FMS and th e  UMS would be f u r th e r  a s s im i la te d  
u nder th e  scheme in  a n o th e r  v i t a l  d i r e c t i o n .  Owing to  th e  puny s i z e  o f th e  
f e d e r a l  e x e c u t iv e ,  th e  C ie f  S e c re ta ry s h ip  would be redundan t and would be 
a b o l is h e d , T h is  would e n a b le  th e  IMIS R u le r s ,  l i k e  th o se  in  th e  UMS, to  have 
d i r e c t  a cc ess  to  th e  High C om m issioner. The R esid e n t r u le  in  th e  FMS would 
a ls o  be tra n s fo rm e d  in to  A dvisory  r u l e .  The s t a t u to r y  and e x e c u tiv e  powers 
over s t a t e  m a tte rs  h i t h e r to  v e s te d  in  th e  R e s id e n ts  would th e r e f o r e  have to  
be r e s to r e d  to  th e  R u le r s - in -C o u n c il ,  Through th e  S ta te  C o u n c ils  and th e  
n e w ly -c o n s tru c te d  Malay S e c r e t a r i a t s ,  th e  R u le rs  would have to  'work*
Under th e  d r a f t  t r e a t y  th e  f e d e r a l  o r  c e n t r a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  would be
p la c e d  u n d er a S e c re ta ry  to  th e  High Com m issioner who would perfo rm  p u re ly
s e c r e t a r i a t  d u t i e s .  Though n o t m entioned in  th e  t r e a t y ,  C lem enti in ten d ed
th a t  t h i s  o f f i c e r  sh o u ld  be ju n io r  to  th e  R e s id e n ts  and A d v ise rs  and be
s ta t io n e d  in  S in g a p o re . The d r a f t  t r e a t y  a ls o  p la c e d  th e  p u re ly  f e d e r a l
dep artm en ts  such  as P o s ts  and T e le g ra p h s , Labour and Customs u nder th e
39High C om m issioner. As th e  d e p a r tm e n ta l heads would rem ain e x e c u tiv e
by th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent 37 But th e  f in a n c ia l  b a s is  o f th e  new f e d e ra t io n
p e r s o n a l ly  and c o n tin u o u s ly  a t  th e  governm ent [of t h e i r
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o f f i c e r s ,  t h i s  s te p  would in c re a s e  th e  High Com m issioner’ s  c o n t ro l  ov er 
th e  s t a t e s *  F u rth e rm o re , C lem enti p roposed  to  c o n s t i tu te  an E x ecu tiv e  
C ouncil o f  R u le rs  and R e s id e n ts  s im i la r  to  th e  one in  th e  C olony. T h is  
would in c re a s e  th e  R u le r ’ s  p r e s t i g e ,  a s s i s t  th e  High Com m issioner in  th e  
fo rm u la tio n  o f Pan-M alayan p o l i c i e s ,  and p ro b ab ly  en ab le  him to  e n te r  
d i f e c t l y  in to  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  th e  s t a t e s .
Among th e  s u b je c t s  re s e rv e d  to  th e  s t a t e s  u n d er th e  scheme were 
s e v e r a l  c u r r e n t ly  a d m in is te re d  by f e d e r a l  d e p a rtm e n ts . These in c lu d e d  th e  
n in e  d ep artm en ts  C lem en ti l a t e r  earm arked f o r  t r a n s f e r  to  th e  s t a t e s  as  
w e ll  as  p o l i c e ,  la n d  and o th e r  s u b je c t s .  These d ep artm en ts  would be 
b roken  up in to  s e p a r a te  and d isc o n n e c te d  o r g a n is a t io n s ,  each  c o n t ro l le d  
by a s t a t e  head r e s p o n s ib le  to  th e  s t a t e  government co n ce rn ed .
Two m easures w ere p roposed  to  en su re  th e  e s s e n t i a l  deg ree  o f  p o lic y  
u n ifo rm ity  and m inim ise any lo s s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y .  F i r s t l y ,  a l l  European 
o f f i c e r s  o f  th e  d ep a rtm en ts  concerned  would rem ain  f e d e r a l  o f f i c e r s  in  
o rd e r  to  p re s e rv e  th e  u n i ty  o f  th e  s e r v ic e s  and en su re  th e  b e s t  u t i l i s a ­
t i o n  o f  s k i l l e d  m an-pow er. The High Com m issioner would depend on them as 
w e ll  as th e  MCS o f f i c e r s  to  h e lp  m a in ta in  p o l ic y  u n ifo rm ity .  S eco n d ly , 
th e  M alayan d e p a r tm e n ta l heads would c o n tin u e  to  w ie ld  e x e c u tiv e  powers 
in  th e  Colony b u t in  th e  n in e  Malay S ta te s  they  would become p u re ly  
a d v iso ry  and c o -o rd in a t in g  a g e n ts ,  a c t in g  by ad v ice  ad d re ssed  to  th e  
R e s id e n ts  o r  A d v ise rs . D isp u te s  betw een s t a t e  governm ents and th e s e  p ro ­
f e s s io n a l  a d v is e r s  would be s e t t l e d  by r e fe re n c e  to  th e  High Commissioner* 
C lem enti was c o n f id e n t t h a t  u n ifo rm ity  in  e s s e n t i a l s  co u ld  be sa feg u a rd ed  
s in c e ,  when n e c e s s a ry ,  'a d v ic e ' co u ld  be te n d e re d  to  th e  s t a t e  government 
concerned  th ro u g h  th e  R e s id e n t o r  A d v ise r . A dm itted ly  th e re  would be a 
lo s s  o f  e f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  FMS, b u t s in c e  th e  M alayan heads would now be 
a b le  to  v i s i t  and a d v ise  th e  UMS w henever n e c e s s a ry , C lem enti f e l t  t h a t
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t h i s  lo s s  would be more th a n  c o u n te r-b a la n c e d  by in c re a s e d  u n ifo rm ity  in
40p o l ic y  th ro u g h o u t Malaya* M oreover, th e  move would a s s im i la te  th e  p o s i­
t i o n  o f  th e s e  d ep a rtm en ts  in  b o th  th e  FMS and th e  UMS, th e re b y  prom oting  
M alayan u n i t y .  Si.nce most o f  th e  M alayan heads would be b ased  in  S in g a p o re , 
th e  r e o r g a n i s a t io n  o f  th e s e  s e r v i c e s ,  l i k e  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  C h ie f 
S e c r e ta r y s h ip ,  would s h i f t  p a r t  o f  th e  pow ers h i t h e r to  c e n te re d  in  K uala 
Lumpur to  S ingapore*
Not m entioned  in  th e  d r a f t  t r e a t y  b u t d is c u s se d  w ith  th e  C o lo n ia l
O f f ic e  was d e m e n t i ’ s  id e a  o f  a  custom s u n io n  co v erin g  th e  Malay S t a t e s .
I n i t i a l l y  C lem en ti c o n s id e re d  th a t  a  custom s u n io n  e x c lu d in g  S ingapo re
and Penang would n o t be c o m p le te ly  e f f e c t i v e .  Hence he hoped th a t  a  u n i te d
f r o n t  on th e  M alayan m ain land  would fo rc e  th e s e  two f r e e  p o r ts  to  jo in  th e
p rop o sed  u n io n . The r e s u l t a n t  lo s s  to  th e  C olony’s t r a n s i t  t r a d e  w ith  th e
su r ro u n d in g  r e g io n s ,  C lem enti a s s e r t e d ,  would be more th a n  com pensated by
th e  encouragem ent o f  i n t e r n a l  t r a d e ,  by in c re a s e d  re v e n u e , and by th e
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  th e  custom s a d m in is t r a t io n s .  The p ro p o s a l ,  hov/ever,
was n o t fav o u red  by th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  m ainly  becau se  o f  concern  f o r  th e
C olony’s  e n tre p o t  t r a d e .  Hence th e  scheme excluded  th e  Colony from th e
4lp ro p o sed  custom s u n io n . A lthough n o t s t r i c t l y  a  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n
m easu re , a custom s u n io n  would f o s t e r  th e  grow th o f  M alayan u n i t y .
C lem enti in fo rm ed  th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  th a t  u n d er h i s  scheme a l l
s e n io r  European o f f i c e r s  would b e lo n g  to  a  common e s ta b lis h m e n t lo c a te d  in
S in g ap o re  and would be seconded  to  th e  Malay S t a t e s .  But i t  was n o t u n t i l
h i s  r e tu r n  to  M alaya th a t  he re v e a le d  h is  in t e n t io n  to  t r a n s f e r  a  l a r g e r
p a r t  o f  th e  pow ers o f  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  to  th e  above e s ta b l is h m e n t , th e
42F in a n c ia l  A dv iser and th e  L eg a l A d v ise r . Through th e s e  b o d ie s ,  C lem enti 
would en su re  th e  e s s e n t i a l  d eg ree  o f  u n ifo rm ity  in  f in a n c e ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  
and s e n io r  p e rs o n n e l m a tte r s  th ro u g h o u t th e  f e d e r a t io n .  When n e c e s s a ry , 
'a d v ic e ' would a l s o  be te n d e re d  in  th e s e  and o th e r  c r u c i a l  m a t te r s .  As
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we s h a l l  s e e ,  C lem enti in te n d e d , as a  s t a r t ,  to  t r a n s f e r  on ly  n in e  f e d e r a l  
d ep a rtm en ts  to  th e  s t a t e s .  T h is  meant t h a t  th e  f e d e r a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  which 
he d e s i r e d  to  t r a n s f e r  to  S in g a p o re , would c o n t ro l  more f e d e r a l  s e rv ic e s  
th a n  th e  ones o u t l in e d  in  th e  d r a f t  t r e a t y .  The r e s u l t  would have been 
s u b s t a n t i a l  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  in  S in g a p o re . I t  sh o u ld  be n o te d  th a t  th e  number 
o f  d ep a rtm en ts  to  be t r a n s f e r r e d  to  th e  s t a t e s  was n e i t h e r  s p e c i f ie d  in  th e  
d r a f t  t r e a t y  n o r d is c u s se d  w ith  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e .
Under th e  new o rd e r ,  th e re  would be l e s s  u n ifo rm ity  in  p o lic y  th a n  
u n d e r th e  e x i s t in g  F e d e ra t io n .  However, sh o u ld  th e  UMS e n te r  i t ,  th e  degree  
o f  u n ifo rm ity  in  Pan-M alayan p o l ic y  would be g r e a t e r  th a n  th e  u n ifo rm ity  
h i t h e r t o  m a in ta in ed  in  th e  M alayan s e t - u p .  In  p r a c t i c e  th e  new f e d e r a l  
system  would be n eg a ted  to  a s u b s t a n t i a l  e x te n t  by th e  c o n t ro l  o v er s t a t e  
m a tte r s  e x e rc is e d  by th e  M alayan h e a d s , th e  L ega l A d v ise r , th e  F in a n c ia l  
A d v ise r and th e  High C om m issioner. In  th e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  th e  C lem enti 
scheme p ro v id ed  s u f f i c i e n t  scope f o r  an a s s e r t iv e  and f o r c e f u l  High Com­
m is s io n e r  to  e x e rc is e  r e a l  c o n t ro l  o v e r th e  s t a t e s .  I t  seems c l e a r  th a t  
u n d er C le m en ti, th e  f e d e r a l  bond would be r e - t ig h te n e d  c o n s id e ra b ly  o v e r 
th e  new f e d e r a t io n .
The C lem enti p la n  s p l i t  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e .  Led by Dr S h ie l  and
W alte r E l l i s ,  d e m e n t i ’ s  opponents q u e s tio n e d  th e  p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty  f o r
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  In d e e d , th e y  w ere n o t even conv inced  th a t  th e  R u le rs
43were r e a l l y  d is c o n te n te d  w ith  th e  e x i s t in g  a d m in is t r a t io n  in  th e  FMS. "
W hile a g re e in g  g e n e ra l ly  w ith  d e m e n t i ’s  s e n tim e n ts  f o r  im p e r ia l  s e l f -  
p r e s e r v a t io n ,  th e y  were no t im p ressed  by th e  p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t  posed by 
th e  C hinese o r  th e  M alays, d e m e n t i ’ s  c r i t i c s  conceded on ly  th a t  o v e r­
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  was in c o n s i s te n t  w ith  th e  Anglo-M alay t r e a t i e s .  But as one 
C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  o f f i c i a l  p o in te d  o u t ,  th e  t r e a t i e s  w ith  th e  R u le rs  were 
g e n e ra l ly  ’ co n v en ien t f i c t i o n s * .  M oreover th e  R u le rs  owed t h e i r  p re s e n t  
p o s i t i o n  to  th e  B r i t i s h  who had tra n s fo rm e d  them from d i s t r i c t  p o te n ta te s
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in pre-British days to rulers of their respective states. More important 
they cited the words of the Butler Commission report of 1919 which rejec­
ted a similar plea by the Indian states: 'The Paramount Power has of 
necessity to make decisions and exercise the functions of paramountcy
beyond the terms of Treaties in accordance with changing political, social
44and economic conditions'. In brief dementi's critics were not convinced 
that it was necessary to avoid bad faith with the Malays on this point.
The Colonial Office critics opposed Clementi partly because they 
considered his approach both unrealistic and impracticable. They believed 
that it was not feasible to place the EMS in the same position as the UMS. 
For unlike the UMS, the FMS was an economic and political whole linked by 
a network of common economic interests. Since the Clementi scheme would 
adversely affect these interests, they rightly anticipated widespread non- 
Malay opposition to it. They were convinced that, as in Guillemard's 
time, this opposition v/ould be sufficiently powerful to block the extent 
of decentralisation desired by Clementi. In their view, the correct 
approach was to preserve the existing centralised administration but to
45devolve some of its powers and functions to the states. With inadequate
46knowledge of Malayan affairs, dementi's critics asserted that once this
had been effected, it would be easy to federate the Colony, the FMS,
Kelantan and Trengganu. In due course the forces working for Peninsular
unity would bring in Kedah, Johore and Perlis on similar terms. Even if
the latter states preferred to remain separate entities, these new grou-
47pings were considered better than dementi's federation.
Even if the approach was practicable, and though they endorsed the 
goal of Malayan unification, dementi's critics would still have opposed 
the proposed larger federation. In this connexion it would seem that 
they did not fully understand dementi's intention to re-centralise the 
federation subsequently. For this the High Commissioner was partly to
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blam e s in c e  he does no t seem to  have d is c u s s e d  t h i s  is s u e  w ith  th e  
W h ite h a ll o f f i c i a l s .  On th e  b a s is  o f th e  d r a f t  t r e a t y ,  h i s  c r i t i c s  
c o n s id e re d  th e  concept o f  n in e  o r  te n  s t a t e  a d m in is tr a t io n s  under a  weak 
f e d e r a l  governm ent as an u n u su a lly  cumbersome and expensive  s t r u c t u r e .
They fe a re d  i t  would in c re a s e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  c o s t ,  le a d  to  lo s s  o f 
e f f ic ie n c y  and p o lic y  u n ifo rm ity ,  and harm commerce and economic
48dev e lo p m en t. Even i f  C le m e n ti 's  r e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  aim was f u l l y  u n d e rs to o d ,
th e  system  would p ro b ab ly  s t i l l  be reg a rd ed  as u n s a t i s f a c to r y .  H is c r i t i c s
b e l ie v e d  th e  High Com m issioner would have l i t t l e  tim e f o r  c o -o rd in a t in g
th e  f e d e r a l  and s t a t e  a d m in is t r a t io n s .  In  o th e r  w ords, they  f e l t  t h a t  th e
d e s i r a b le  degree  o f  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and u n ifo rm ity  cou ld  no t be a t ta in e d
48au n d er th e  p roposed  f e d e r a t io n .  W alte r E l l i s  even a s s e r te d  th a t  th e  b e s t
s o lu t io n  was to  fa sh io n  M alaya as a c e n t r a l i s e d  co lony  s in c e  th e  c o u n try
49was no l a r g e r  th a n  I r e la n d .
C le m en ti’ s c r i t i c s  a ls o  a t ta c k e d  th e  concep t o f  A dvisory r u le  in  th e
FMS. In  f a c t  t h i s  was d i r e c t l y  opposed to  th e  w il l in g n e s s  o f D r. S h ie l  and
W alte r E l l i s  to  i n i t i a t e  reform s to  accommodate non-M alay p o l i t i c a l
a s p i r a t i o n s .  As th e  non-M alays outnum bered th e  M alays, C le m e n ti 's  opponen ts
con tended  th a t  th e  FMS cou ld  no t r e a l l y  be c o n s id e re d  Malay S t a t e s .  I t
was r i g h t ly  p o in te d  ou t th a t  th e  r e in  o f  power had alw ays been  h e ld  by th e
B r i t i s h ,  w h ile  economic developm ent was r e a l i s e d  by B r i t i s h ,  C hinese and
In d ia n  e f f o r t s .  I n d i r e c t  r u le  as o u t l in e d  by C lem enti cou ld  n o t ,  they
a rg u e d , be a p p lie d  e f f e c t iv e l y  to  th e  non-M alays who n e i th e r  ca re d  f o r  n o t
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owed lo y a l ty  to  tie  R u le rs  and t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  A ccord ing ly  i t  was 
to o  l a t e  to  in tro d u c e  an ad v iso ry  system  o f  in d i r e c t  r u le  in  th e  FMS 
e s p e c ia l ly  when non-M alay i n t e r e s t s  th e r e  cou ld  r i g h t ly  c la im  a s tro n g  
say  in  p u b lic  a f f a i r s  and when Malay f i t n e s s  to  r u le  was s e r io u s ly  d o u b te d . 
W alter E l l i s  took  an extrem e p o s i t i o n .  In  h is  view th e  fu tu r e  o f M alaya 
la y  w ith  th e  C hinese and In d ia n s  to  whom th e  governm ent would soon be
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fo rc e d  by in f lu e n c e  from C hina and In d ia  to  g ra n t a  m easure o f  r e p re s e n ta ­
t i v e  governm ent in  th e  c o u n try .  T h is  developm ent would be co m p lica ted  by
C le m e n ti 's  e f f o r t  to  e n tre n c h  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  ’ a n a c h ro n is t ic  Malay
51R u le rs  and t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n s '  . To what e x te n t h i s  view was sh a re d  by
o th e r  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  o f f i c i a l s  i s  by no means c l e a r .  The p o s i t io n  o f 
th e  non-M alay com m unities was c e r t a in l y  re c o g n ise d  and was a  v i t a l  c o n s i­
d e r a t io n  b eh in d  th e  o p p o s i t io n  tow ards th e  C lem enti schem e.
On C le m e n ti 's  s id e  s to o d  Lord P a s s f i e ld  (S idney  Webb), S i r  G ilb e r t
5?G r in d le ,  and th e  Perm anent U n d e r-S e c re ta ry , S i r  Samuel W ilson . S ix
y e a rs  e a r l i e r ,  G rin d le  and W ilson had g iv en  f u l l  su p p o rt to  G u ille m a rd 's
r a d i c a l  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l i c y ,  P a s s f i e ld  was s t r o n g ly  im pressed  by
55C lem enti d u rin g  a  w eek-end m eeting  a t  h is  home in  F eb ruary  1931' when th e  
G overnor a p p a re n tly  d is c u s s e d  h i s  in t e n t io n  to  r e - c e n t r a l i s e  th e  new fe d ­
e r a t i o n .  These p e r s o n a l i t i e s  w ere as  concerned  as  C le m e n ti 's  c r i t i c s  
about th e  economy, e f f ic ie n c y  and u n ifo rm ity  o f  th e  FMS p u b lic  s e r v ic e .  
Though n o t a l to g e th e r  conv inced  by th e  High C om m issioner, th e y  were w i l l in g  
to  p e rm it him to  sound th e  R u le rs  and u n o f f i c i a l  o p in io n  in  th e  IKS about
th e  schem e. As a re fo rm in g  L abour M in is te r ,  P a s s f i e ld  was more w i l l in g
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to  in tro d u c e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  changes in  M alaya." He f e l t  t h a t  th e  s t a t u s
quo cou ld  n o t be b e n e f i c i a l l y  c o n t in u e d , and th a t  th e  C lem enti p ro p o sa ls
m ight s e rv e  as th e  b a s i s  f o r  a  r e o r g a n is a t io n  o f  th e  patchw ork s e t-u p  in
M alaya. He in te n d e d  th a t  once th e  p la n  had been e f f e c t e d ,  th e  la r g e r
55f e d e r a t io n  would be g ra d u a l ly  r e - c e n t r a l i s e d .  In  o th e r  w ords, to  P a s s -
f i e l d  as w e ll as G rin d le  and W ilso n , d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  was v i r t u a l l y  only
a  means to  a more r a t i o n a l  and r e - c e n t r a l i s e d  regim e in  M alaya. As G rin d le
e x p la in e d , such  a f e d e r a t io n  'c o u ld  n o t b u t be s t r o n g e r ,  more e f f i c i e n t ,
56more l a s t i n g  th a n  th e  p re s e n t  sy stem * .
154
The opposing  v ie w p o in ts  came to  g r ip s  in  a C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  M eeting
in  May 1931* The scheme a t  once came u n d er heavy a t ta c k s  by Dr S h ie l  and
W alte r  E l l i s .  But i t  was i n  th e  end a c c ep ted  because  o f  P a s s f i e ld ’s  s u p p o r t .
However, th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta t e  a p p a re n tly  d e s ir e d  n o t to  a g g ra v a te  th e
57p re c a r io u s  p o s i t io n  o f th e  Labour G overnm ent' o r  h i s  own r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
h i s  c a b in e t  c o lle a g u e s  by an  u n p o p u la r  move in  M alaya, A lready  h is  hand-
^  • f l  (TV*
l i n g  o f  th e  P a le s t in e  had caused  him to  lo s e  c o n t ro l  o v e r Dominion a f f a i r sr
to  a  c a b in e t  com m ittee in  December 1 9 3 0 ^  He th e r e f o r e  w ished to  be f a i r l y
s u re  t h a t  th e  n in e  Malay R u le rs  would su p p o rt th e  scheme and th a t  th e  lo c a l
59European community would no t * r a i s e  a howl* a g a in s t  i t .  A ccord ing ly  he
a u th o r is e d  C le m en ti, on th e  l a t t e r * s  r e tu r n  to  M alaya, to  sound ou t th e
R u le rs  and lo c a l  i n t e r e s t s  concerned  about th e  p r o p o s a ls .  When s u f f i c i e n t
lo c a l  su p p o rt was a s s u re d ,  th e  scheme would be approved  s u b je c t^  to  th e
agreem ent o f  th e  Labour C a b in e t. M eanwhile an a c t in g  C h ie f S e c re ta ry
m ight be ap p o in ted  on th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  t h a t  th e r e  was a  chance o f  ap p ro v a l
f o r  th e  schem e. However, C lem en ti was a u th o r is e d  to  s t a r t  a t  once w ith
th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  a  custom s u n io n  an d , i f  d e s i r a b l e ,  o f  M alayan d epartm en ts
60as w e l l .
Back in  M alaya C lem enti o u t l in e d  and d is c u s s e d  h i s  p la n  w ith  th e  
C o lo n ia l S e c r e ta r y ,  th e  C h ie f S e c r e ta r y ,  th e  R e s id e n ts ,  o th e r  to p  o f f i c i a l s  
and th e  u n o f f i c i a l  members o f  th e  F e d e ra l and L e g i s la t iv e  C o u n c ils . Accor­
d in g  to  him h is  key a d v is e r s  u n h e s i t a t in g ly  endorsed  h i s  schem e, w h ile  th e  
u n o f f i c i a l  c o u n c i l lo r s  ag reed  w ith  i t  in  p r i n c i p l e .  The p o s t  o f  A cting  
C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  was th e n  o f f e r e d  t o ,  and a cc ep ted  b y ,  C a ld e c o tt on
c o n d i t io n  t h a t  he would su p p o rt d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  and work tow ards th e
61a b o l i t i o n  o f  h is  o f f i c e .  As an A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  in  th e  F e d e ra l 
S e c r e t a r i a t  in  th e  e a r ly  1920s, C a ld e c o tt  had e a g e r ly  su p p o rte d  Maxwell*s 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l i c y .  A b u o y a n t, adep t and p o p u la r  a d m in is t r a to r  w ith
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a 'gift of polished and endless word-spinning at a moment's notice', he 
was loyal to Clementi throughout the acrimonious controversy that was soon
to emerge in Malaya. Thus, Clementi averted the kind of trouble that
Guillemard suffered at the hands of Maxwell.
In August 1951 almost the whole scheme ' was presented to an FMS 
Durbar at Sri Menanti as arising from the wishes of the Rulers. Clementi
made no mention of the Chinese threat or the aim to lure the ÜMS into the
federal net. He relied mainly on the need to avoid bad faith with the 
Malays to win support for his policy. This was partly because British 
officials and European commercial interests during the early phase of 
decentralisation had to a great extent agreed that the existing amalgama­
tion of the FMS had violated the spirit of the Federation Treaty of 1896. 
Furthermore, it would gratify Malay opinion and mobilise the Rulers behind 
the new policy. Above all, Clementi could not have publicly explained all 
the reasons behind his scheme without both scaring the UMS and antagoni­
sing the Chinese.
During the durbar, Clementi did not mention the aim to introduce 
Advisory rule in the FMS. He only stated that his scheme would place all 
the nine Malay States on very much the same constitutional basis. In the 
meeting Clementi became the first Governor-High Commissioner to campaign 
publicly for a 'brotherhood of Malay nations'.^ Clementi diverged from 
the original proposals in only two respects. Firstly, he intended to 
include the Colony in the proposed customs union, declaring that the ex­
clusion of Singapore and Penang would render the union not completely 
effective. Secondly, though not authorised to do so, he specified nine 
federal services such as Education, Agriculture, Public Works, Electricity, 
Medicial, for transfer to the states by 1933* As expected, the Sri 
Menanti Scheme was warmly welcomed by the Rulers. The Sultan of Perak, 
however, qualified his support by repeating his suggestion to Clifford in
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1927 that the FMS should be granted an even greater degree of autonomy
65than the UMS.
It should be noted that the means by which Clementi sought to ascer­
tain reactions to his policy were partly responsible for the acrimonious 
dispute that was soon to arise between Malaya and London, The durbar 
method, which had Colonial Office approval, was not quite appropriate.
Once the Rulers’ support had been secured, Clementi would have been placed 
in an embarrassing position if the new policy was eventually dropped. The 
main reason for the dispute, however, was the impulsive and over-confident 
manner in which he approached the Rulers. He appeared to be thrusting 
forward a ’cut-and-dried* scheme approved by the Secretary of State for 
speedy execution. To make matters worse, the Sri Menanti scheme was pub­
lished along with the Rulers’ endorsement of it. Unless the views of the 
unofficial councillors were regarded as representative of public opinion, 
Clementi had no other means of ascertaining popular reactions to his plan.
But in so doing, he appeared to commit the British Government to a policy 
of decentralisation. In this sense he had exceeded the terms of his instruc­
tions from the Colonial Office.
Passfield immediately reminded Clementi that no approval had as yet
been given to his policy.^0 He was in turn assured by the High Commissioner
that the proposed reorganisation enjoyed general local support. This was
true only to the extent that the Malayan newspapers expressed ’cautious
67approval* for decentralisation and certain aspects of the scheme. But
Clementi played down the Colony’s opposition to the proposed customs
union and ignored the strong hostility to the abolition of the Chief
Secretaryship. On the basis of this assurance, the Colonial Office agreed
that the scheme might be submitted to Cabinet once the response of the UMS
68Rulers was known
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As we s h a l l  s e e ,  C lem en ti by th e n  had en co u n te red  s t i f f  o p p o s i t io n  
from  th e  UMS R u le rs  tow ards h is  p o l i c y .  H ence, th e  d u rb a r  w ith  th e s e  
R u le rs  w hich he had in  mind was n e v e r convened . N e v e r th e le s s ,  he had 
begun to  im plem ent h i s  p r o p o s a ls .  The R e s id e n ts  and th e  R u le rs  w ere 
d i r e c te d  to  r e -o rg a n is e  th e  S ta te  C o u n c ils  by th e  end o f  1931» The a d v i­
so ry  heads o f  th e  M edica l and P u b lic  Works D epartm ents were ap p o in te d  to  
a c t  in  O ctober 1931* S tep s  were a ls o  ta k e n  to  form a  Railw ay Board and a 
P o s ts  and T e leg rap h s  Board by 1 Jan u a ry  1932. The d e ta i le d  ex am in a tio n  o f  
th e  Customs U nion and o f  th e  f i n a n c i a l  b a s i s  o f  th e  new f e d e r a t io n  was 
d e le g a te d  to  o f f i c i a l  com m ittees . By 1933 C lem enti d e s ir e d  to  see  th e  
S ta t e  C ou n c ils  p a ss  S ta te  E s tim a te s  w hich would p ro v id e  f o r  a l l  th e  s t a t e  
s u b je c t s  in c lu d in g  th e  earm arked n in e  f e d e r a l  d e p a rtm e n ts . Once th e s e
*b ro ad  fo u n d a tio n s  o f  th e  f u tu r e  sy stem ' had been l a i d ,  he ex p ec ted  to
69s e e  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  d is a p p e a r  by 1935* I t  was obvious by now
th a t  th e  High Comm issioner was n o t on ly  a c t in g  in d e p en d en tly  o f  th e  C olo-
70n i a l  O f f ic e  b u t was 'w i ld ly  ru sh in g  h i s  f e n c e s ' .  A gain he was w arned 
by W h ite h a ll ,  b u t on no o cca s io n  was he d i r e c te d  to  e la b o ra te  h is  d e t a i l e d  
scheme f o r  su b m issio n  to  th e  B r i t i s h  C a b in e t. Presum ably P a s s f i e ld  con­
s id e r e d  th e  d r a f t  t r e a t y  d is c u s s e d  w ith  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  s u i t a b l e  f o r  
71t h a t  p u rp o se .
At t h i s  ju n c tu re  th e  Labour Government was re p la c e d  by a  N a tio n a l-  
C o n se rv a tiv e  G overnm ent. C lem enti l o s t  h is  two most e n th u s i a s t ic  s u p p o r te r s  
in  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e ,  no t on ly  Lord P a s s f i e ld  b u t a ls o  S i r  G i lb e r t  
G r in d le , who r e t i r e d  a t  th e  same t im e . To make m a tte rs  w o rse , th e  new 
S e c re ta ry  o f  S t a t e ,  S i r  P h i l ip  C u n l i f f e - L i s t e r , ^  had l i t t l e  sympathy f o r  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  On th e  c o n tra ry  he s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  deepen ing  w orld  
d e p re s s io n  was a  tim e no t to  r e o rg a n is e  th e  M alayan governm ent m ach in ery , 
b u t to  c o n c e n tra te  on so lv in g  th e  numerous economic problem s in  th e  c o u n try . 
T h is  r e f l e c t e d  h i s  p re o c c u p a tio n  w ith  economic developm ent and h i s  c lo s e
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t i e s  w ith  m e tro p o li ta n  c a p i t a l i s t  i n t e r e s t s  w ith  v a s t  in v estm en t in  M alaya’s 
t i n  and ru b b e r  i n d u s t r i e s .  In  g e n e ra l C u n l i f f e - L is te r  was s e r io u s ly  con­
ce rn e d  t h a t  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  m ight a d v e rse ly  a f f e c t  e f f ic ie n c y  in  an a r e a
w here B r i t i s h  in v e s tm e n t c o n c e n tr a te d .  As Chairman o f  th e  T in  P ro d u c e rs '
73A s s o c ia tio n  " b e fo re  he became S e c re ta ry  o f  S t a t e ,  he had worked h a rd  w ith  
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  B r i t i s h  m ining i n t e r e s t s  in  M alaya and o th e r  c o u n t r ie s  
in  g e t t in g  th e  Im p e r ia l  Government to  a c c e p t an I n te r n a t io n a l  T in  R e s t r i c ­
t i o n  Scheme e a r ly  in  1931» He now w itn e sse d  h is  e f f o r t s  th re a te n e d  by a  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  p o l ic y  w hich h is  a d v is e r s  warned him would make i t  more
d i f f i c u l t  to  -en fo rce  th e  t i n  r e s t r i c t i o n  scheme and c o n t ro l  over ru b b e r
7 4
p ro d u c tio n  th e n  u n d e r c o n te m p la tio n . To a g g ra v a te  th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  he
f e l t  t h a t  C lem enti was t r y i n g  to  dragoon him in to  en d o rs in g  a  q u e s tio n a b le
experim en t w ith o u t c o n s u l t a t i o n .  C u n l i f f e - L is te r  th e r e f o r e  became th e  most
v o c ife ro u s  W h ite h a ll opponent o f  C lem en ti.
C u n l i f f e - L i s t e r  was a lm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  in t e r e s te d  in  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n
and u n ifo rm ity ,  and was in c l in e d  to  fa v o u r ,  i f  p r a c t i c a b l e ,  th e  id e a  o f  a
M alayan f e d e r a t io n  ( in c lu d in g  th e  Colony) w ith  a  custom s u n io n  and B r i t i s h
75p r e f e r e n c e .  But he r e j e c t e d  th e  new p o lic y  becau se  he g e n e ra l ly  sh a re d  
th e  view s o f C le m e n ti 's  W h ite h a ll c r i t i c s ,  in c lu d in g  d oub ts  about th e  p o l i ­
t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  W hile P a s s f i e ld  c o n s id e re d  th e  
C lem enti scheme ' c u t - a n d - d r i e d ' , a  C o lo n ia l o f f i c e  c o n fe ren c e  c h a ire d  by
C u n l i f f e - L i s t e r  h im s e lf  in  December 1931 c r i t i c i s e d  i t  as vague , i n d e f i n i t e
76and u n r e a l i s t i c .  The S r i  M enanti programme was a ls o  co n s id e re d  im p ra c t i ­
c a l  as  a b a s is  f o r  a  r e o r g a n is a t io n  o f  th e  Malay S t a t e s .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  
th e  co n fe ren c e  a t ta c k e d  th e  absence o f  c o n c re te  f i n a n c i a l  p ro p o s a ls  and o f  
c o n s id e ra t io n  fo r  th e  r o le  o f th e  non-M alays in  th e  'b ro th e rh o o d  o f  Malay 
n a t i o n s '.  I t  was r i g h t l y  p o in te d  o u t t h a t  h i t h e r to  C lem enti had g iv e n  no 
r e a l  in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  non-M alays and o f  th e  UMS tow ards 
h is  p o l i c y . ^
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Led by C u n l i f f e - L i s t e r , th e  whole C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  tu rn e d  s o l id l y
78a g a in s t  C le m e n ti. Even W ilso n , who su p p o rte d  some o f  th e  p ro p o s a ls ,
was a l ie n a te d  by th e  High C o m m iss io n e rs  in c re a s in g  in t r a n s ig e n c e .  The
im m ediate problem  was to  s to p  C lem en ti from im plem enting h i s  p ro p o s a ls  in
th e  FMS. At t h i s  juncture C u n l i f f e - L i s t e r  gave the C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  instruC'
t i o n  to  C leraen ti a  v i t a l  t w i s t .  F o r th e  f i r s t  t im e , th e  High Com m issioner
was d i r e c te d  to  su b m it f o r  th e  a p p ro v a l o f  th e  B r i t i s h  C ab in e t a com plete
scheme o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  c l e a r l y  show ing i t s  im pact on th e  M alayan f in a n -
79c i a l ,  a d m in is t r a t iv e  and p o l i t i c a l  s p h e re s .  To t h i s  w ere added two 
in su rm o u n tab le  g u id e l in e s  f o r  th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  g ro u n d -p la n . I f  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  co u ld  in d eed  e v e n tu a l ly  le a d  to  a  M alayan f e d e r a t io n ,  
W h ite h a ll d i r e c te d ,  th e  scheme sh o u ld  a s c e r t a in  how much d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  
was n e c e ssa ry  to  ach iev e  t h i s .  O th e rw ise , i t  sh o u ld  be d r a f te d  from th e  
s ta n d p o in t  o f  m a in ta in in g  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  th e  FMS p u b lic  s e r v ic e .  W hile 
p ay in g  l i p - s e r v i c e  to  m eeting  th e  R ulers*  w ish e s , C u n l i f f e - L is te r  a t  th e
80same tim e em phasised th a t  th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent must n o t be im p a ire d .
In  p r a c t i c e ,  i t  was im p o ss ib le  to  a s c e r t a in  th e  d eg ree  o f  d e c e n tra ­
l i s a t i o n  n e c e ssa ry  to  induce th e  h ig h ly  s u s p ic io u s  UMS to  jo in  a l a r g e r  
M alayan u n i t .  In d e e d , even i f  a l l  th e  n in e  Malay s t a t e s  were p la c e d  in  
e x a c tly  th e  same p o s i t i o n ,  th e  UMS m ight s t i l l  oppose such  a move f o r  f e a r  
t h a t  th e  f e d e r a l  bond would su b se q u e n tly  be r e - t i g h te n e d .  And as  C lem en ti 
had a lre a d y  a d m itte d  th a t  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  would low er e f f ic ie n c y  a t  l e a s t  
to  some e x t e n t ,  C u n l i f f e - L is te r * s  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  e f f ic ie n c y  would a ls o  
s e r io u s ly  hamper th e  High C om m issioner’s  freedom  o f  a c t io n .  I t  seems c l e a r  
th e r e f o r e  t h a t  w h ile  u n d e rta k in g  to  g iv e  an u n p re ju d ic e d  c o n s id e ra t io n  to  
a l l  th e  S r i  M enanti p ro p o s a ls ,  C u n l i f f e - L is te r  had a lre a d y  re so lv e d  to
81oppose them .
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Having undertaken publicly to decentralise the Federation, Clementi 
was now placed in an extremely difficult position. He chose nevertheless
Op
to * go blandly on',' and on the 1st January 1932 gazetted the appointment 
of Directors-Advisers for the Public Works, Medical, and Irrigation Depart­
ments, Late in February the State Councils in the FMS were also reconsti­
tuted. A lengthy and acrimonious controversy therefore followed between 
Clementi and the Colonial Office, It was dementi’s contention that once 
announced, the policy had to be effected in order to assure the Rulers 
that the government was earnest about it. He blamed Whitehall for failing 
to obtain Cabinet approval once it was clear that there was no vigorous 
opposition to the policy. In reply to Cunliffe-Lister's instructions, the 
High Commissioner asserted that it was impossible to gauge the UMS attitude 
until his plan had been fully implemented. He rightly pointed out that it 
was impractical to present in advance a complete scheme of decentralisation 
for Cabinet approval. However, he did send a scheme, in the main similar 
to his Sri Menanti speech, which was considered by the Colonial Office as
unsuitable for submission to the Cabinet. His implication that he had ver-
83bal assurance from Passfield in acting as he did was denied by the latter*
By now agitation against the new policy had arisen in Malaya and
84London, which appeared to be co-ordinated to some extent. In London this
was conducted by the London editor of the Straits Times, Captain Campbell,
M.P., and especially the Association of British Malaya. Led by Frank
Swettenham and Sir George Maxwell, the Association stressed to Cunliffe-
Lister that the existing administration was basically sound. It warned
that the Clementi proposals would result in centralising control over the
FMS in the hands of the High Commissioner. Partly through the London editor
of the Straits Times, the Colonial Office learned of the vigorous local
opposition towards decentralisation as well as the anxiety of the UMS 
85Rulers. Cunliffe-Lister was particularly sensitive to pressure from 
London critics, especially the Association of British Malaya which had
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close ties with British economic interests in Malaya. By going out of his
way to inform them that the Colonial Office had not approved dementi’s 
or
scheme, he encouraged opposition in London and even in Malaya. Moreover, 
he feared that Clementi might proceed further in decentralising the FMS 
administration. Cunliffe-Lister therefore warned Clementi that he might be 
compelled to state in Parliament that the various pronouncements on decentra­
lisation in Malaya represented the latter*s personal, opinions.
Thereupon, the controversy switched to whether the Malayan Government 
had already been committed to a decentralisation policy. Clementi contended 
that this was the official policy since 1920, drawing heavily on Maxwell*s 
and Guillemard*s pronouncements on decentralisation to substantiate his 
case. Cunliffe-Lister, however, maintained that the government was not com­
mitted to abolishing the Chief Secretaryship because Guillemard had been 
forced by local opposition tacitly to drop the move. Ironically it was Max­
well who was cited to show that that the retention of the Chief Secretaryship 
was necessary to prevent a greater centralisation at Singapore and the 
conversion of the High Commissioner into a Governor. Cunliffe-Lister further 
ruled that the government was not committed to any policy of decentralisation
O n
in the FMS# To emphasise his point, he announced in Parliament in March 
that:
The High Commissioner was authorised by the late 
Government to discuss decentralisation with a view 
to submitting detailed proposals for consideration 
by His Majesty’s Government if it was found that 
ojmion in the FMS was generally favourable to some 
further measure of decentralisation.88
The Secretary of State was no doubt right that the abolition of the 
Chief Secretaryship had been tacitly abandoned by Guillemard, and that 
Whitehall had acquiesced in this. On the other hand the government still 
officially pursued a decentralisation policy in the FMS which included the 
strengthening of the State Councils and the transfer of unreserved subjects
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t o  th e  s t a t e s .  Even s o ,  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  co u ld  j u s t i f i a b l y  c la im  
t h a t  i t s  p r i o r  consen t sh o u ld  have been o b ta in e d  b e fo re  th e  C lem enti p ro ­
p o s a ls  were e f f e c t e d .  But on one is s u e  i t  co u ld  n o t b u t r e lu c ta n t ly  
co n ced e . As C lem enti p o in te d  o u t ,  to  abandon th e  S r i  M enanti scheme a t  
t h i s  ju n c tu re  would s e r io u s ly  d is a p p o in t  th e  R u le rs  and th e  M alays and 
i n f l i c t  g r e a t  damage on B r i t i s h  p r e s t i g e  th ro u g h o u t M alaya. In  o th e r  
w ords, C lem enti had succeeded  in  com m itting  th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  to  a t  
l e a s t  some m easure o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .
By e a r ly  1932 a dead lock  emerged betw een th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  and 
C le m en ti. At th e  same tim e W h ite h a ll became s e r io u s ly  concerned  w ith  th e  
r i s i n g  u p ro a r  o v e r th e  S r i  M enanti scheme in  london  and in  M alaya. The
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  was u n ab le  to  s to p  C lem enti co m p le te ly  from im plem enting 
89h is  p ro p o sa ls  b u t a t  th e  same tim e d id  n o t w ish  to  fo rc e  him to  r e s ig n .  
The C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  fe a re d  th a t  such  a move would b ad ly  damage th e  High 
C om m issioner^  p r e s t i g e  in  th e  eyes o f  th e  M alays. To b reak  th e  dead lock  
i t  d ec id ed  to  send  S i r  Samuel W ilson to  M alaya to  s tu d y  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a ­
t i o n  co n tro v e rsy  on th e  s p o t .
Non-Malav r e a c t io n  to  th e  C lem en ti Scheme
Meanwhile C lem enti was m eeting  v ig o ro u s  o p p o s it io n  from non-Malay
i n t e r e s t s  in  M alaya. The i n i t i a l  r e a c t io n  to  th e  S r i  M enanti programme
had been  c a u tio u s  and h e s i t a n t .  In  November 1931 th e  u n o f f i c i a l s  in  th e
F e d e ra l C ouncil m erely  a d v ise d  th e  High Com m issioner to  work ou t h is  p la n
90in  f u l l  b e fo re  p u t t in g  i t  in to  m o tio n . O p p o s itio n  began  to  emerge a t  
th e  tu r n  o f  th e  y e a r  and grew more w id e sp re a d , s t r o n g e r  and lo u d e r  as 
tim e p a s s e d . Indded th e  S r i  M enanti p ro p o s a ls  aro u sed  a  f a r  more in te n s e ,  
b i t t e r  and w idesp read  o p p o s itio n  th a ii th e  more o r  l e s s  s im i la r  G u illem ard
scheme
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T h is  stemmed in  th e  main from f a c to r s  o u ts id e  th e  p la n .  As we have 
d is c u s s e d ,  G u illem ard  was w i l l in g  to  c o n s u lt  and c o n c i l i a t e  h is  o p p o n en ts , 
and h i s  p o l ic y  was i n i t i a t e d  d u rin g  an economic boom in  M alaya. The 
C lem en ti schem e, on th e  o th e r  h an d , came a t  a  tim e o f  a c u te  economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  w hich caused  a g e n e ra l  u n re s t  ready  to  f in d  a  s p e c i f i c  o u t l e t .  
As in  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e ,  i t  was g e n e ra l ly  f e l t  in  M alaya th a t  th e  tim e
91was in a p p o rtu n e  to  launch  a  p o l ic y  o f  d r a s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  r e - o r g a n i s a t io n .
To t h i s  must be added d e m e n t i 's  f a u l ty  diplom acy w hich h e lp e d  to  d r iv e
d iv e rs e  e lem en ts  in to  a common o p p o s it io n  to  h is  p la n .  Not on ly  d id  he
make no e f f o r t  to  c o n su lt lo c a l  o p in io n  a d e q u a te ly ; a t  tim es  he was con-
92tem ptuous in  o v e r ru lin g  i t .  He made no e f f o r t s  a t  a l l  to  c o n c i l i a t e
o r  d iv id e  h i s  o p p o n en ts . He a ls o  lumped many ex tra n e o u s  is s u e s  u nder th e
d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  u m b re lla  th e re b y  te n d in g  to  d iv e r t  a l l  c r i t i c i s m s  in to
93th e  g e n e ra l s tream  o f  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  h is  p l a n . '^  C onsequently  an atm osp­
h e re  o f  s tro n g  s u sp ic io n  and m isap p reh en sio n  as to  th e  in te n t io n s  o f  th e
94Government was c re a te d  in  th e  FMS.'
In  view o f  th e  c o n se rv a tism  o f  th e  MCS C lem en ti, l i k e  G u illem ard
b e fo re  him , was fo rc e d  to  ig n o re  s e n io r i t y  and s e l e c t  men as R e s id e n ts  and
A dv ise rs  who were c o n s id e re d  'b e s t  s u i te d  to  c a r ry  in to  e f f e c t  th e  Pan-
95M alayan p o l i c y ' .  The r e s u l t  was th e  r i s e  in to  prom inence o f  a  m in o rity
o f  M alayoph ile  o f f i c i a l s  who were s tro n g ly  p re d isp o se d  tow ards th e  s im p le r
and more n a t iv e  a d m in is tr a t io n  o f th e  UMS and a c u te ly  s e n s i t i v e  to  th e
96com para tive  backw ardness o f th e  M alays. T .S . Adams, th e  R esid en t o f
S e la n g o r , was reg a rd ed  as 'a  pro-M alay f a n a t i c '  b u t was an a d m in is tr a to r
97o f  g r e a t  a b i l i t y ,  d e te rm in a tio n  and i n d u s t r y . '  The most f o r c e f u l  o f  th e
98R e s id e n ts ,  Adams e x e r te d  s tro n g  in f lu e n c e  on o f f i c i a l  p o l i c y ,  and h is
99'i l l - c o n c e a l e d  an tagon ism ' tow ards th e  non-M alays even w o rried  C lem en ti.
100A.S. Haynes became A dviser to  K e lan tan  in  1930 and a c t in g  C o lo n ia l 
S e c re ta ry  th r e e  y e a rs  l a t e r .  A d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  e n th u a s ia s t  s in c e  1919,
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Haynes was c o n s id e re d  by G u illem ard  as 'ray b e s t  man' b u t f e l l  ou t o f  fa v o u r
w ith  C l i f f o r d .  H is d e c is io n  to  b a r  th e  non-M alays from o b ta in in g  governm ent
c o n t r a c ts  in  K elan tan  in  1932 caused  w idesp read  concern  among Malayan
C h in e se . By t h e i r  p ronounced pro-M alay p o s tu r e ,  th e se  o f f i c i a l s  fo rc e d  th e
non-M alays to  f ig h t  fo r  th e  r e t e n t io n  o f th e  e x i s t in g  system  o r f o r  an
im p o rtan t sh a re  in  th e  reform ed s t a t e  governm ents. F in a l ly ,  news th a t  th e
C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  was no t com m itted to  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y  e a r ly  in
1932 se rv e d  as a f u r th e r  b o o s t to  c o n tro v e rsy . In  1932 a d ead -lo ck  a ls o
appeared  in  M alaya betw een C lem enti and h is  M alayoph ile  o f f i c i a l s  on th e
one s id e  and non-M alay economic i n t e r e s t s  on th e  o th e r .
101In  m id -1932 fo u r te e n  p u b lic  o r g a n is a t io n s  met in  C onference to
draw up a p e t i t i o n  a g a in s t  th e  S r i  M enanti schem e. T h is  p e t i t i o n ,  w hich
was su b se q u en tly  su b m itted  to  S i r  Samuel W ilson , re p re s e n te d  th e  view s o f
non-M alay p r o f e s s io n a l  and com m ercial i n t e r e s t s  w ith  an in v estm en t o f
102s l i g h t l y  more th a n  $100 m i l l io n  in  th e  FMS. The movement was o rg a n is e d
by th e  P la n t e r s ' A sso c ia tio n  o f M alaya and d e r iv e d  i t s  s t r e n g th  m ain ly  from
th e  European com m ercial i n t e r e s t s .  By s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  argum en ts , th e s e
European i n t e r e s t s  came to  b a s ic a l ly  s im i la r  c o n c lu s io n s  to  th e  C o lo n ia l
O f f ic e .  In  t h e i r  view th e re  was n e i th e r  m oral n o r p r a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty  to
103d e c e n t r a l i s e  in  th e  FMS. The F e d e ra t io n ,  th e y  em phasised , had proved  
'a  g r e a t  s u c c e s s ' and would c o n tin u e  to  do s o .  L ike  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e ,  
th e y  a ls o  s e r io u s ly  doubted  Malay f i t n e s s  to  govern  th e  c o u n try . To them , 
t h e r e f o r e , th e  id e a  o f  fo u r  autonomous s t a t e  governm ents under th e
104le a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  S u lta n s  seemed 'a r c h a i c ,  absu rb  and im p r a c t i c a l . '
The European i n t e r e s t s  showed no conce rn  d u rin g  th e  co n fe ren ce  f o r  th e  
R u le rs ' d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  o v e r - c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  in  th e  FMS o r f o r  Malay 
backw ardness in  th e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  s p h e re s .
W hile th e  u s u a l l i p - s e r v i c e  was p a id  to  th e  r e tu r n  o f  a m easure o f  
autonomy to  th e  s t a t e s ,  th e  European i n t e r e s t s  made no su g g e s tio n  as to  
th e  degree  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  th a t  m ight be e f f e c te d  in  th e  FMS. The
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t r u t h  o f  th e  m a tte r  was t h a t  u n lik e  in  th e  1920s, th e y  w ere now opposed
to  any m easure o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  T h is  was p a r t l y  due to  th e  wordy
c o n f l i c t  ov er d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  betw een th e  C hinese on th e  one s id e  and
th e  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  and th e  M alays on th e  o th e r  w hich aro u sed  concern
th a t  r a c i a l  harmony might be d is ru p te d  and p o l i t i c a l  u n re s t  in je c te d  in to
105th e  M alayan s c e n e . In  th e  main i t  was a  r e a c t io n  to  th e  r a p id i ty  w ith
w hich changes were in tro d u c e d  in  th e  FMS, d e m e n t i 's 1suprem ely  t a c t l e s s
106t r e a tm e n t o f  p u b lic  o p in io n ',  and th e  slum p.
The m ajor is s u e  o f  c o n f l i c t  rem ained th e  f e a r  o f  th e  European 
i n t e r e s t s  th a t  any r a d ic a l  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y  would a d v e rse ly  a f f e c t ,  
i f  n o t d e s t ro y ,  t h e i r  economic s ta k e  in  th e  c o u n try . I t  was em phasised 
t h a t  th e  S r i  M enanti scheme m ight weaken f in a n c ia l  c o n t ro l  and rock  th e  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  FMS. On th e  o th e r  hand , i t  was obvious th a t  
th e  more c e n t r a l i s e d  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  was in  so sm a ll an a re a  as Malaya 
th e  more e f f i c i e n t  and econom ical i t  would b e .  Indeed  th e  European i n t e ­
r e s t s  were in c l in e d  to  th e  view t h a t  th e  a d m in is tr a t io n  sh o u ld  be f u r th e r  
c e n t r a l i s e d  to  overcome th e  manpower s h o r ta g e  a r i s in g  from re tren ch m en t 
and th e  s e r io u s  economic prob lem s caused  by th e  d e p re s s io n .  T h e ir  p rim ary  
i n t e r e s t  in  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and e f f ic ie n c y  o f  th e  f e d e r a l  a d m in is tr a t io n  was 
c l e a r ly  r e f l e c te d  in  a rev iew  o f  th e  co n fe ren c e  by a contem porary  j o u r n a l i s t :
In  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  d a ta  th e  on ly  p o s s ib le  
c o n c lu s io n  i s  th a t  th e  co n fe ren c e  has  n o t been  a b le  to  
su b o rd in a te  i t s  own com m ercia l, i n d u s t r i a l  and p r o f e s ­
s io n a l  i n t e r e s t s  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  th e  
F e d e ra t io n ,  and th a t  i t  e x p e c ts  to  en joy  in  a  f e d e r a t io n  
o f  p ro te c te d  Malay S ta te s  a l l  advan tag es  t h a t  a re  o f fe re d  
by a  B r i t i s h  co lo n y . In  o th e r  words i t  has demanded a l ­
most e x a c tly  th e  same d eg ree  o f  c e n t r a l i s e d  c o n t ro l  in  a l l  
th e  m a tte rs  w ith  w hich i t s  members w ere p e c u l ia r ly  concerned  
as i s  e x e rc is e d  o v e r th e  S t r a i t s  S e tt le m e n ts  by th e  C o lo n ia l 
S e c re ta ry  in  S in g a p o re • W ?
The European i n t e r e s t s  w ere su p p o rte d  by S i r  F rank Swettenham and 
S i r  George Maxwell who w ro te  e x te n s iv e ly  to  th e  M alayan n ew spapers . Being 
th e  a r c h i t e c t  o f  th e  f e d e r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  Swettenham u n d e rs ta n d a b ly
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d e s ir e d  to  se e  th e  system  c o n tin u e  unchanged . Maxwell a s s e r te d  th a t  th e
d is s o lu t io n  o f  th e  F e d e ra t io n  would b r in g  d is a s t r o u s  consequences to  th e
FMS. T h e ir  b a s ic  i n t e r e s t ,  how ever, was econom ic developm ent in  th e  FMS,
and t h i s  had been g r e a t ly  f a c i l i t a t e d  by th e  f e d e r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n .
Swettenham r e i t e r a t e d  h i s  r e a c t io n a r y  view t h a t  Malay d is c o n te n t  w ith  th e
a d m in is t r a t io n ,  if an y , c o u ld  be amply met by more f re q u e n t c o n s u l ta t io n
w ith  th e  R u le rs  as in  h i s  t im e . M axw ell, who had in  C le m e n ti 's  o p in io n
108assumed th e  p o s i t io n  o f  M alaya’s  'E ld e r  S ta te sm a n , was more s u b t le  in
a rg u in g  against d ecen tra lisa tio n  .C a llin g  d ecen tra lisa tio n  'a  p etty  b u s in e ss ',
M axwell s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  be conducted  a lo n g  th e  l i n e s  s e t  ou t by th e
109Hose R eport o f  1923* Both o f  them w ie ld ed  immense in f lu e n c e  w ith in  
o f f i c i a l  and u n o f f i c i a l  com m unities in  M alaya.
d e m e n t i 's  European opponents c o n c e n tra te d  t h e i r  a g i t a t i o n  a g a in s t  
th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f th e  C h ie f  S e c r e ta r y s h ip .  As th e y  r i g h t l y  p o in te d  o u t ,  t h i s  
move would in c re a s e  th e  H igh C om m issioner's  c o n t ro l  o v e r th e  FMS. A lready  
t h i s  had been  a r e s u l t  o f  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  p a r t l y  a b se n te e  d epartm en ts  
le d  by jo i n t  heads in  S in g a p o re . W ith c o n s id e ra b le  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  th e y  
fe a re d  th a t  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  coup led  w ith  th e  ex­
te n s io n  o f  t h i s  system  would amount to  th e  com plete  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  th e
110e x i s t in g  f e d e r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n .  They charged  th a t  once t h i s  was
a c h ie v e d , th e  High Com m issioner would r e c e n t r a l i s e  pow ers com p le te ly  in
S in g a p o re . T h is  was c o n s id e re d  u n d e s ir a b le  b ecau se  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e
FMS d i f f e r e d  from th o s e  o f  th e  C olony. F u r th e r ,  as Maxwell s k i l f u l l y
e x p lo i te d ,  th e  a t ta c k  on th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  had an anti-FM S p ro v o ca-
111t i o n  because  i t  had alw ays come from S in g a p o re . As in  th e  1920s, a  
s t r o n g  r e s id e n t  head was c o n s id e re d  n e c e ssa ry  to  re p re s e n t  th e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  th e  F e d e ra t io n  as s t r o n g ly  as th e  C o lo n ia l S e c re ta ry  re p re s e n te d  th o se  
o f  th e  Colony to  th e  G overnor-H igh C om m issioner. The European i n t e r e s t s  
b e l ie v e d  th a t  w ith o u t t h i s  c o u n te rp o is e ,  th e  High Com m issioner would
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s u b s t i t u t e  governm ent from S in g ap o re  in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  Colony f o r
th e  p r e s e n t  governm ent from K uala Lumpur in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  FMS, As
one w r i t e r  p u ts  i t ,  • as a g a in s t  th e  Malay S ta te s  / " th e y  7  i n s i s t e d  on th e
m ain tenance o f  a c e n t r a l i s e d  European c o n t ro l  and as a g a in s t  th e  Colony*s
112t r a d in g  i n t e r e s t s  th e y  a s s e r te d  t h e i r  independence as  p ro d u c e rs* .
The non-M alays g e n e ra lly  sh a re d  th e  o b je c t io n s  to  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n
r a i s e d  by th e  E uropean i n t e r e s t s  in  th e  FMS. T h is  was e v id e n t from th e
s ta te m e n ts  made by In d ia n  members o f  th e  F e d e ra l C ouncil and v a r io u s
In d ia n  o r g a n is a t io n s .  C hinese view s were re p re s e n te d  by th e  A sso c ia ted
C hinese Chambers o f  Commerce and th e  C hinese u n o f f i c i a l  c o u n c i l lo r s .  L ike
t h e i r  European c o l le a g u e s , th e s e  non-M alay i n t e r e s t s  were concerned  about
t h e i r  economic i n t e r e s t s  and l ik e '- 'w ise q u e s tio n e d  Malay c a p a c ity  to  r u le
th e  c o u n try . But d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  was on ly  one o f  a h o s t o f  o th e r  f a c to r s
w hich drove th e  C hinese in to  th e  a n t i-C le m e n ti  camp. T h e ir  d i s t r u s t  o f
C lem enti was f i r s t  a roused  by th e  l a t t e r ’s  o n s lau g h t on th e  KMT in  M alaya
w hich was reg a rd ed  as  an in d ic a t io n  o f an a n ti-C h in e s e  b ia s  on h is  p a r t .
As tim e p a s s e d , h i s  government adop ted  one m easure a f t e r  a n o th e r  w hich
w ere c e r t a in l y  a n t i-C h in e s e  and pro-M alay in  t h e i r  im p l ic a t io n ,  i f  n o t in
in t e n t i o n .  Among th e s e  were th e  a tte m p ts  to  r e s t r i c t  C hinese im m ig ra tio n
in to  M alaya and to  b r in g  C hinese e d u c a tio n  u n d er t i g h t e r  c o n t r o l ,  th e
ban n in g  o f  c r a c k e r s - f i r i n g ,  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  th e  C hinese from p a d i - c u l t i v a -
113t i o n ,  th e  im p o s itio n  o f a  r i c e - t a x ,  th e  s t i f f e n i n g  o f  th e  Malay Lands 
R e se rv a tio n  Law, and th e  d e l ib e r a t e  r e f u s a l  to  a p p o in t a C hinese to  th e  
S t r a i t s  E x ecu tiv e  C o u n c il. At th e  same tim e th e  M alayoph ile  o f f i c i a l s  
b eh in d  C lem enti s t a r t e d  to  e n fo rc e  th e  Malay Lands R e se rv a tio n  Law in  a 
more a g g re s s iv e  manner and to  adop t a  v ig o ro u s ly  pro-M alay s ta n c e  in  
r e c ru i tm e n t and re tre n ch m en t o f  governm ent o f f i c e r s .
On th e  o th e r  h and , th e  C hinese were a c u te ly  s e n s i t i v e  to  any p o lic y  
o f d i s c r im in a t io n .  They f e l t  no m oral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th e  fu tu r e  o f 
th e  M alays, and w ere convinced  th a t  t h e i r  d o m ic ile  a n d /o r  t h e i r  c o n t r ib u t io n
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to  M a lay a 's  developm ent had e n t i t l e d  them to  e q u a l t r e a tm e n t .  F u r th e r ,  
th e  c ry  o f  'M alaya f o r  th e  M a la y s ',  w hich had a r is e n  d u rin g  th e  d e c e n tra ­
l i s a t i o n  cam paign, engendered C h inese  ap p reh en sio n s  th a t  th e  S r i  M enanti 
scheme would pave th e  way to  a more v ig o ro u s  a n ti-C h in e se  p o lic y  by th e
114refo rm ed  s t a t e  governm ents. As Tan Cheng Lock d e c la re d  in  th e  C o lo n y 's  
l e g i s l a t u r e ,  th e  scheme would c o n c e n tra te  powers in  th e  hands o f  th e  R es i­
d e n ts  su p p o rte d  by th e  R u le rs  and c h i e f s , and would c r e a te  S ta te  C ouncils  
dom inated by Malay and o f f i c i a l  members* He co n tin u e d :
'S o  one n a tu r a l ly  f e a r s  t h a t  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  scheme 
w i l l  te n d  to  d e v e lo p , p roduce and p e r f e c t  in  th e  Malay 
S ta te s  a p u re ly  a u to c r a t i c  form o f  governm ent b ased  on 
th e  ta x a t io n  o f  th e  p e o p le ,  whose e n e rg y , la b o u r ,  c a p i t a l  
and e n t e r p r i s e  a re  th e  m a in s tay  o f  th o se  s t a t e s , w ith o u t 
t h e i r  adeq u a te  and e f f e c t iv e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  th e r e in  as 
i s  la r g e ly  th e  case  in  th e  U M S*.^5
As th e y  s to o d  to  lo s e  b o th  p o l i t i c a l l y  and econom ica lly  u n d er th e  schem e, 
th e  C hinese jo in e d  th e  f r a y  in  d e fe n se  o f  th e  e x i s t in g  system *
Malay R eac tio n  in  th e  MS
On th e  o th e r  hand d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  foreshadow ed a l a r g e r  deg ree  o f
pow ers in  th e  hands o f  th e  R u le rs  and th e  S ta te  C o u n c ils . Hence i t  en joyed
th e  g e n e ra l  su p p o rt o f  th e  R u le rs  w hich was r e a d i ly  r e -a f f i rm e d  a t  th e
Pekan D urbar in  1932* But t h e i r  e x a c t a t t i t u d e  tow ards th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n
c o n tro v e rsy  i s  ex trem ely  d i f f i c u l t  to  a s c e r ta in *  As tim e p a s s e d , i t  would
seem t h a t  C lem enti f a i l e d  even to  c a r ry  th e  R u le rs  co m p le te ly  along  w ith
him in  th e  im p lem en ta tio n  o f  h i s  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l i c y .
The R u le rs  a p p re c ia te d  t h a t  th e  co n v e rs io n  o f  R es id e n t to  A dvisory
r u le  sh o u ld  be g ra d u a l ly  and c a r e f u l ly  e f f e c te d  in  th e  FMS. As th e  S u lta n
o f P erak  d e c la re d  a t  th e  in a u g u ra tio n  o f  th e  r e c o n s t i tu te d  Perak S ta te
C o u n c il in  F eb ru a ry  1932, th e  sudden and e x te n s iv e  d e v o lu tio n  o f e x e c u tiv e
pow ers to  th e  c o u n c i l  was n e i th e r  w a rra n te d  n o r welcomed. The P erak  S ta te
116C o u n c il, he c a u t io n e d ,  must n o t be ex p ec ted  to  ru n  b e fo re  i t  cou ld  w alk . 
A p p aren tly  f o r  th e  same re a s o n , th e  R u le rs  in form ed th e  A cting  C h ie f 
S e c re ta ry  and th e  R e s id e n ts  in  Septem ber 1931 t h a t ,  in  p r a c t i c e ,  they
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d e s ir e d  th e  R es id e n ts  to  c o n tin u e  to  w ie ld  th e  same deg ree  o f  e x e c u tiv e
117
power in  t h e i r  s t a t e s  as a t  p r e s e n t .  In  such  a  fram e o f  m ind, th ey  became
r a th e r  concerned a t  th e  r a p id i ty  w ith  which in n o v a tio n s  were ru shed  in  th e
FMS. They re p e a te d ly  ap p ea led  in  v a in  to  C lem enti to  slow  down th e  im p le-
118m e n ta tio n  o f th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  schem e.
M oreover C lem enti was u n a b le  to  han d le  th e  Malay R u le rs  sm oo th ly .
E ager to  use  th e  R u le rs  as pawns in  su p p o rt o f  h i s  d e c i s io n s , th e  High 
Com m issioner was s in g u la r ly  i n d i f f e r e n t  to  t h e i r  s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s  when t h e i r
119
view s d i f f e r e d  from h i s .  " In  d e a l in g  w ith  them h is  u s u a l  t a c t i c  was to
c o n fro n t them w ith  f a i t  accom pli and th e n  s te a m ro lle re d  th e  m easures on
t h e i r  b e h a l f .  As th e  R a j a - d i - H i l i r  w arned in  th e  F e d e ra l  C ouncil in  March
1932» f u l l  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  th e  M alays was e s s e n t i a l  in  o rd e r  to  win t h e i r
f u l l  co n fid en ce  in  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l i c y .  By m id -1932 th e  R u le rs
appeared  to  have begun to  r e s e n t  b e in g  pushed in to  e n d o rs in g  a c t io n s  th ey
had n o t been a d e q u a te ly  c o n s u l te d .  An in d ic a t io n  o f  t h i s  was th e  S u lta n  o f
P e ra k 's  d i s l i k e  o f  an n u a l d u rb a r s ,  a d ev ice  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  u t i l i s e d  by
120C lem enti to  secu re  th e  R u le r s ’ c o l l e c t i v e  endorsem ent o f  h i s  p ro p o s a ls .
In  s h o r t  th e  S u lta n s  seemed to  have been  a l ie n a te d  by th e  High C om m issioner's 
la c k  o f  t a c t  and c o n s id e ra t io n  in  h i s  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  them .
F in a l ly ,  th e  R u le rs  w ere alw ays a g a in s t  th e  fu s io n  o f  th e  FMS and th e  
Colony f o r  f e a r  o f  th e  lo s s  o f th e  s o v e re ig n  s t a t u s  o f  t h e i r  s t a t e s .  As 
a c o r o l la r y  th e y  w ere n o t in  fav o u r o f  S in g ap o re  e x e rc is in g  t i g h t  and cen­
t r a l i s e d  c o n t ro l  o v e r t h e i r  s t a t e s .  To some e x t e n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  th e y  were 
in c l in e d  to  d i s t r u s t  dep artm en ts  le d  by jo i n t  heads s ta t io n e d  in  S ingapo re
because  o f  th e  a l le g e d  s u b o rd in a t io n  o f  FMS i n t e r e s t s  to  th o se  o f  th e  
121C olony. F or t h i s  re a s o n , th e  S u lta n  o f  P erak  was e a g e r  to  know th e  lo c a ­
t io n  o f  th e  A dvisory Heads when C lem en ti f i r s t  announced h i s  in te n t io n  to  
form M alayan d ep artm en ts  in  O ctober 1930. C onsequently  th e  R u le rs
became nervous o f  th e  way C lem enti t r a n s f e r r e d  th e  e x e c u tiv e  h ead sh ip  o f
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one departm en t a f t e r  a n o th e r  from K uala Lumpur to  S in g a p o re , I n i t i a l l y  
th e y  had su p p o rte d  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip ,  w hich th ey  
re g a rd e d  as  *a f i f t h  s u l t a n a t e ’ , because  o f  th e  l a r g e r  d eg ree  o f s t a t e  
autonomy th e y  were ad v ised  would r e s u l t  from th e  move. S u b seq u en tly , 
th e y  seemed to  sh a re  th e  f e a r  t h a t  th e  d isa p p e a ra n c e  o f  th e  p o s t and th e  
c r e a t io n  o f j o i n t  d ep artm en ts  m ight le a d  to  a new c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o f  powers 
in  S in g a p o re , The S e c re ta ry  f o r  C hinese A f f a i r s  h ea rd  t h a t  th e  R u le rs
123w ere f ig h t in g  f o r  th e  r e t e n t io n  o f th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  in  mid-1932*
W hatever th e  t r u t h  o f  t h a t  a l l e g a t i o n ,  th e  R u le r s ’ n erv o u sn ess  in d ic a te d
a f a i l u r e  in  C le m en ti’ s r e l a t i o n s  w ith  them*
The resp o n se  o f  o rg a n ise d  Malay o p in io n  tow ards th e  S r i  M enanti
scheme was s c a n ty  and r e l a t i v e l y  s t r a ig h t f o r w a r d .  M ainly th ro u g h  th e
M alay n ew spapers , p o l i t ic a l ly - m in d e d  M alays d e c la re d  t h e i r  f u l l  su p p o rt
f o r  th e  schem e. F o r som etim e, th e y  had fe a re d  th a t  o v e r c e n t r a l i s a t io n
124m ight le a d  to  th e  co n v ers io n  o f  th e  FMS in to  a Colony o r  i t s  amalgama­
t i o n  w ith  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts .  They w ere a ls o  aware t h a t  th e  f e d e r a l  
system  prom oted m ain ly  non-M alay i n t e r e s t s .  The Malay i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  
th e r e f o r e  w ished to  see  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  and th e  f e d e r a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  
a b o lis h e d  and th e  s t a t e  governm ents m odelled  a f t e r  th e  Jo h o re  sy stem . Once 
t h i s  was a c h ie v e d , new t r e a t i e s  sh o u ld  be c o n tra c te d  betw een th e  B r i t i s h
and th e  R u le rs  w hich shou ld  embody a  c l e a r  e x p o s it io n  o f  th e  s t a t u s  o f  th e
125FMS as  Malay S ta te s  and o f  th e  a n c e s t r a l  r i g h t s  o f  th e  M alays. Behind
t h e i r  s u g g e s tio n s  la y  th e  t a c i t  assum ption  th a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  changes
126were a  m a tte r  co n ce rn in g  on ly  th e  B r i t i s h  and th e  R u le r s .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  
i t  was conceded th a t  th e  S ta te  C o u n c ils  had to  be s tre n g th e n e d  by more 
non-M alay members in  o rd e r  to  en ab le  them to  sh o u ld e r  t h e i r  in c re a s e d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  e f f e c t i v e l y .  As th e s e  C o u n c ils  would become th e  new 
f o c i  o f  pow ers u n d er th e  schem e, much Malay a t t e n t i o n  was p a id  to  c a l l i n g  
f o r  th e  appo in tm en t o f  cap ab le  M alays as members in  o rd e r  th a t  th ey  m ight
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127n o t be swamped by t h e i r  non-M alay c o lle a g u e s  in  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  *«,
To what e x te n t  o rg a n ise d  Malay o p in io n  in f lu e n c e d  the government i s  
by no means c l e a r ,  though th e  R u le r s ’ view s were c e r t a in l y  more im p o rta n t , 
Malay o p in io n , a f t e i r a l l ,  was p o o rly  o rg a n ise d  because  o f  th e  la c k  o f 
p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h ip .  T h is  was c l e a r ly  r e f l e c t e d  in  th e  new spaper d i s ­
c u s s io n  o f  a p roposed  Malay c o n fe ren c e  to  m a rsh a ll  Malay view s fo r
128p r e s e n ta t io n  to  S i r  Samuel W ilson* T h is  co n fe ren ce  in  f a c t  was n o t 
h e ld .
Malay R eac tio n  in  th e  U n fed e ra te d  Malay S ta te s
The U n fed era ted  Malay S ta te s  n a tu r a l ly  were m ain ly  in t e r e s te d  in  
th e  M alayan u n ion  p lan k  o f  th e  S r i  M enanti schem e. In  t h i s  connexion t h e i r  
re sp o n se  was c o n d itio n e d  by c e r t a in  b a s ic  f a c t o r s .  The r i s e  o f  a  b u reau ­
c r a t i c  am algam ation and o f  a  In d ian -E u ro p ean -C h in ese  com m ercial complex 
in  th e  FMS engendered  s tro n g  s u s p ic io u s  among them o f  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  
tow ards th e  Malay s t a t e s .  S in ce  th e y  came u nder B r i t i s h  p r o te c t io n ,  th e  
UMS had been  e v e r  v ig i l a n t  o f ,  and were p re p a re d  to  r e s i s t  to  tie  h i l t ,  
any B r i t i s h  a tte m p t to  draw them in to  th e  FMS n e t .  Such a  move, they
f e a r e d ,  would le a d  to  th e  lo s s  o f  t h e i r  c h e r ish e d  autonom y, o f  Malay r u le
129under B r i t i s h  a d v ic e , and o f  th e  Malay c h a r a c te r  o f  t h e i r  s t a t e s .
Even o u ts id e  th e  purv iew  o f  a  M alayan u n io n , th e  UMS were ex trem ely  r e lu c ­
t a n t  to  ta k e  common a c t io n  w ith  th e  FMS in  m a tte rs  where u n ifo rm ity  was 
o b v io u s ly  m u tu a lly  b e n e f i c i a l .
U n d e rs ta n d a b ly , d e m e n t i 's  a c t iv e  cam paign f o r  a  M alayan un ion
aro u sed  w id esp read  n erv o u sn ess  among Malay r u l in g  c i r c l e s  in  th e  U n fed era ted  
130S t a t e s .  They r ig h t ly  p e rc e iv e d  t h a t  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  was a  p re lu d e  to
131a w id e r f e d e r a t io n  and a  r e - c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o f  a l l  th e  n in e  Malay s t a t e s .
T h is  s u s p ic io n  was i n t e n s i f i e d  by th e  r a p id i ty  w ith  w hich C lem enti c a r r i e d  
ou t h i s  p ro p o s a ls  and by h is  t a c t l e s s  and im p a tie n t tre a tm e n t o f  th e  
Malay R u le r s .  To a c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t  th e  UMS R u le rs  were j u s t i f i e d  in
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th in k in g  t h a t  im p o rta n t m a tte r s  were f i r s t  th ra sh e d  ou t by th e  High
Com m issioner w ith  th e  FMS and th e n  imposed on them as  f a i t  accom pli in
132a  c u t-a n d -d rie d . f a s h io n .  C le m e n te s  approach  th e r e f o r e  hardened
s h a rp ly  th e  UMS o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  Malay u n io n  schem e. .
T h is  o p p o s it io n  came to  be c e n tre d  in  Kedah and J o h o re . Kedah was
th e n  u n d er an a b le  and p ro g re s s iv e  R egen t, Tengku Ib ra h im , who was 'v e ry
in t e n t  on p re s e rv in g  th e  M alay c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  s t a t e  and ( th e )  adm in is-
133t r a t i o n  in  th e  hands o f  Kedah M a la y s '.  He was a s s i s t e d  by h is  u n c le ,
Tengku Mahmud, one o f  th e  most o u ts ta n d in g  Malay a d m in is tr a to r s  o f  th e
tim e whose p e r s o n a l  a u th o r i ty  and in f lu e n c e  in  Kedah was 'so m eth in g  q u i te  
134e x c e p t io n a l ' .  Jo h o re  was u n d er S u lta n  Ib ra h im , 'a n  a r b i t r a y  man' f u l l
135o f rude common s e n s e ,  c ru d e  in  m anners, and im p a tie n t o f c r i t i c i s m s .
N e v e r th e le s s ,  Ib rah im  was c o n s id e re d  by b o th  C l i f f o r d  and the C o lo n ia l O ff ic e
136as th e  'm ost e n e r g e t ic  and c a p a b le ' Malay R u le r . ' Through r e g u la r  con­
t a c t s ,  S u lta n  Ib rah im  and Tengku Ib rah im  m a in ta in ed  a  'u n i t e d  f r o n t '
137a g a in s t  th e  c o lo n ia l  governm en t. In  a  memorandum to  S i r  Samuel W ilson , 
Kedah d e c la re d :
The Government o f  th e  S ta t e  o f  Kedah i s  
d e f i n i t e l y  opposed to  any p ro p o s a l w hich 
would in  any way combine th e  s t a t e  o f  Kedah 
w ith  any S ta t e  o r  C olony , o r  w hich would 
m odify in  any d eg ree  th e  r i g h t s  and p r iv i l e g e s  
now en joyed  by th e  S t a t e . /'3o
T here i s  no doubt t h a t  t h i s  s ta n d  r e f l e c t e d  t h a t  o f  th e  o th e r  U nfed era ted  
Malay S t a t e s .
The r e l a t i o n s  betw een S u lta n  Ib rah im  o f Jo h o re  and C lem enti were
c o n s ta n t ly  in  a  s t a t e  o f  n e a r  c r i s i s .  In  no sm a ll m easure t h i s  was due to
a  c la s h  o f  p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  H ead s tro n g , f o r c e f u l  and im p a tie n t o f th e  R u le r s '
s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s ,  C lem en ti c o u ld  n o t be ex p ec ted  to  m a in ta in  smooth and
am icab le  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  an e n e r g e t i c ,  independent-m inded  and troub lesom e
139in d iv id u a l  l i k e  S u l ta n  Ib ra h im . d e m e n t i 's  h a b i t  o f  d ragoon ing  th e  
R u le rs  in to  a d o p tin g  m easures w ith o u t c o n s u l ta t io n  was p a r t i c u l a r l y
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o b je c t io n a b le  to  Ib ra h im , A lready  in  J u ly  1930 C lem enti u n s u c c e s s fu lly  
t r i e d  to  induce th e  S u lta n  to  a b d ic a te  w ith  an in c re a s e d  a llow ance on th e
i4oground o f  i l l - h e a l t h .  T h ree  months l a t e r ,  Ib rah im  was th e  on ly  S u lta n  
who was ab sen t from th e  A ll-R u le r s  D urbar in  S in g a p o re . The p e rs o n a l an­
tagon ism  o f  th e  two men su b se q u e n tly  became e n ta n g le d  w ith  Ib ra h im 's  
s t ro n g  o p p o s itio n  to  p a r t s  o f  th e  S r i  M enanti schem e.
The S u l t a n 's  o p p o s i t io n  to  a  M alayan Union was based  on th e  t r a d i ­
t i o n a l  independence o f  Jo h o re  and on t r e a t y  r i g h t s .  At no tim e had th e s e  
is s u e s  been so s tro n g ly  em phasised  as d u rin g  C le m e n ti 's  g o v e rn o rsh ip . The
aim was o b v io u s ly  to  p u t Ib rah im  in  a  s t ro n g  p o s i t io n  to  s ta n d  up to
h
C lem enti o v e r is s u e s  Jo h o re  d is a g re e d  w ith  and th e  p re v e n t th e  s t a t e  from
b e in g  dragged  in to  a  w id e r M alayan f e d e r a t io n .  S upported  by h i s  Malay
a d v is e r s ,  Ib rah im  con tended  th a t  he was an independen t s o v e re ig n  s im i la r
to  th e  King o f S iam , T h is  was c o n s id e re d  e v id e n t from th e  t r e a t i e s ,  u nder
141w hich Jo h o re  had d e a l in g s  s o le ly  w ith  th e  G overnor o f  th e  C olony.
He c laim ed  th a t  t h i s  p la c e d  Jo h o re  on a d i f f e r e n t  and h ig h e r  p la n e  from 
th a t  o f a l l  th e  o th e r  Malay S ta t e s  w hich had r e l a t i o n s  on ly  w ith  th e  High 
C om m issioner. I t  was t r u e  t h a t  Jo h o re  was in  a c l a s s  by i t s e l f  among th e  
Malay S ta te s  b ecau se  o f  i t s  su c c e s s io n  o f  o u ts ta n d in g  R u le r s ,  i t s  R u le rs ' 
s t a t u s  o f a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m onarch, i t s  c lo se  economic t i e s  w ith  S in g a p o re , 
and i t s  f i n a n c i a l  s t r e n g t h .  But Ib ra h im 's  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  J o h o re 's  
t r e a t y  p o s i t i o n  ig n o re d  th e  f a c t  t h a t  Jo h o re  was as much u n d er B r i t i s h  
p r o te c t io n  as th e  o th e r  Malay S t a t e s .
T h is  s ta n d  p ro p e l le d  Ib rah im  in to  a  c r i s i s  in  h i s  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
th e  High C om m issioner. In  1931 C lem enti in tro d u c e d  a  new R oyal Commission 
w hich re p la c e d  th e  one p rom ulgated  in  1897« The o ld  com m ission had made 
th e  G overnor e x - o f f i c io  th e  High Com m issioner to  th e  FMS a lo n e .  But under 
th e  new com m ission, th e  G overnor became e x - o f f ic io  High Com m issioner to  a l l  
th e  n in e  M alay S t a t e s .  T h is  in  e f f e c t  on ly  fo rm a lis e d  th e  G o v ern o r 's
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e x i s t i n g  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  fo u r  n o r th e rn  u n fe d e ra te d  s t a t e s ,  b u t i t  
v io l a te d  th e  A nglo -Johore  t r e a t i e s  o f  1885 and 1914. Under th e  1931 
R oyal Commission Jo h o re  would have r e l a t i o n s  no lo n g e r  w ith  th e  G overnor, 
b u t  w ith  th e  High C om m issioner. To make m a tte rs  w orse , C lem enti d id  no t 
c o n s u l t  Ib rah im  about th e  change even though he was aware t h a t  in  o f f i c i a l
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m a tte r s  th e  l a t t e r  i n s i s t e d  on a d d re s s in g  him as G o v e rn o r* . The S u lta n
s t r o n g ly  p r o te s te d  a g a in s t  th e  new com m ission, f e a r in g  th a t  i t  m ight le a d
to  f u r th e r  e ro s io n  o f  h i s  t r e a t y  r i g h t s .  He th e re f o r e  re fu s e d  to  re c o g n ise
th e  change and p e r s i s t e d  in  a d d re s s in g  C lem enti as 'G o v e rn o r1.
As a r e a c t io n  to  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  cam paign, th e  S u lta n  o f  Joh o re
a l s o  p re s se d  h i s  t r e a t y  r i g h t s  in  y e t  a n o th e r  d i r e c t i o n .  Under th e  1914
t r e a t y  a l l  o f f i c e r s  seconded  to  h i s  s t a t e  w ere reg a rd ed  as Jo h o re  o f f i c e r s ,
Ib rah im  now c la im ed  th a t  th e  G en era l A dv iser was h is  o f f i c e r  and shou ld
s to p  w earing  th e  B r i t i s h  u n ifo rm . L ik ew ise , he w ished to  see  th e  G enera l
143A d v iser d is c o n t in u e  f ly in g  th e  Union Jack  a t  th e  l a t t e r ' s  r e s id e n c e .
I n  t h i s  d e f ia n c e  o f  th e  High C om m issioner, Ib rah im  en joyed  th e  sym pathy, 
i f  n o t th e  open s u p p o r t ,  o f  th e  M alay , C hinese and European u n o f f i c i a l s  
o f  th e  Joh o re  S ta t e  C o u n c il.
G re a tly  an gered  by th e  S u l ta n ,  C lem enti p re s s e d  W h ite h a ll to  r e g u la ­
r i s e  th e  t r e a t y  p o s i t i o n  o f  J o h o re .  He warned th a t  t h i s  sh o u ld  n o t be 
d e lay ed  u n t i l  th e  r e ig n  o f  Ib ra h im 's  s u c c e s s o r  b ecause  i t  would s e r io u s ly  
damage th e  p r e s t i g e  o f  th e  new r u l e r .  F i r s t l y ,  he d e s ir e d  p e rm iss io n  to  
d i r e c t  th e  S u l ta n  to  a d d re s s  him as 'H igh  C om m issioner'. Secondly  Ib rah im  
sh o u ld  be c l e a r l y  inform ed t h a t  th e  G enera l A dv iser was a B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r  
r e p re s e n t in g  B r i t i s h  a u th o r i ty  in  J o h o re . A cco rd in g ly , th e  G enera l A dv iser 
sh o u ld  c o n tin u e  to  w ear th e  B r i t i s h  un ifo rm  and to  f l y  th e  Union Jack  a t
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- th is  r e s id e n c e .  T hus, C lem en ti aimed to  o f f i c i a l l y  p la c e  a l l  Malay 
S ta t e s  on an e q u a l fo o tin g  and to  im p l ic i t l y  s t u l t i f y  th e  S u l t a n 's  a s p i r a ­
t i o n  to  be an in d e p en d en t r u l e r  l i k e  th e  King o f  Siam . He seems to  have
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hoped that Ibrahim would thereafter be more amenable to control.
However, it appeared absurd to the Colonial Office to face a crisis
in Johore over what one official described as ’the trifling idiosyncracies
145of the Sultan’• Clementi was therefore advised to defer the question
until after the Wilson mission to Malaya. As we shall see in the next
chapter, the proposal was rejected by the Colonial Office.
Clementi was no more happy in his relations with Ibrahim over the
appointment of advisory heads of Malayan departments. In this matter the
other unfederated Malay States shared Johore's suspicion of ultimate
British intentions, as evident during the All-Rulers Durbar in Singapore.
During the durbar Tengku Ibrahim of Kedah argued that the proposed Malayan
heads would violate the Anglo-Kedah treaty of 1923» He feared that the
advisory functions of such officers would, under the pressure of changing
146circumstances, evolve into executive ones. Nevertheless officers of
long Malayan experience believed that the UMS could have been cajoled by
•oersuasion and conciliation into accepting the proposal. As they pointed
out, the UMS had already been seeking technical advice from the Straits
14?heads of departments.
But despite his advisers’ warning against any precipitate action, 
Clementi insisted on the speedy announcement of the appointment of advi­
sory heads for the Medical, Public Works, and Drainage and Irrigation 
Departments. In fact he did not expect opposition from the Unfederated 
States nor did he consult the UMS Rulers about the matter. This move
stiffened considerably the UMS resistence to any ’interference' or advice
148from these Malayan heads. The situation was aggravated by moves to 
standardise the pattern of stamps issued by the UMS, to prepare their 
budgets according to the Gregorian Calender, to include them within the 
definition of British Malaya in some FMS legislation, and to change their 
contributions to the expenses of the office of the Secretary to the High
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Com m issioner* N e v e r th e le s s ,  in  1932 Kedah, P e r l i s ,  K e lan tan  and Trengganu
r e l u c t a n t l y  acc ep ted  th e  ap p o in tm en ts  o f  th e  ad v iso ry  heads o f  th e  M ed ica l,
P u b lic  W orks, and D rainage and I r r i g a t i o n  D epartm ents*
S u lta n  Ib rah im , how ever, rem ained adamant* A ccording to  th e  G en era l
A d v ise r , he im m ediately  w ithdrew  h i s  v e rb a l  su p p o rt when th e  appo in tm en ts
150o f  th e  th r e e  Malayan heads were p r e c i p i t a t e l y  g a z e tte d  in  Johore*  ^ He
f e l t  t h a t  Jo h o re  co u ld  n o t accd p t th e s e  a d v is e r s  s in c e  n e i th e r  he n o r h is
151S ta t e  C o u n c il^  had been c o n s u l te d .  " H is o p p o s itio n  was g r e a t ly  hardened  
by d e m e n t i ’s  a c t iv e  cam paign f o r  a  M alayan u n io n .
Ib rah im  rem ained unmoved by re p e a te d  a ssu ra n c e s  t h a t  ex cep t f o r  th e  
t i t l e  o f  M alayan a d v is e r s  th e  p ro p o s a l d id  n o t in  th e  l e a s t  a f f e c t  th e  
e x i s t i n g  p r a c t i c e .  He was aware t h a t  th e s e  a ssu ra n c e s  were n o t a l to g e th e r  
a c c u r a te .  W hile th e  e x i s t in g  p r a c t i c e  would p e rm it F e d e ra l Heads to  v i s i t  
th e  UMS on ly  when in v i t e d ,  i t  was i n i t i a l l y  in te n d e d  th a t  th e  Malayan 
a d v is e r s  sh o u ld  have f r e e  a cc ess  to  th e s e  s t a t e s .  F u rtherm ore  i t  was a lso  
in te n d e d  th a t  when an UMS R u le r d is a g re e d  w ith  a  M alayan h ead , th e  m a tte r  
sh o u ld  be r e f e r r e d  tto th e  High C om m issioner. Owing to  s t ro n g  UMS o p p o s i­
t i o n ,  th e s e  two o b je c t iv e s  were su b se q u e n tly  abandoned. W hile t h i s  was 
welcom ed, Ib ra h im , l i k e  th e  Kedah R eg en t, s t i l l  fe a re d  t h a t  ev en ts  m ight 
im p e rc e p t ib ly  tra n s fo rm  th e  a d v iso ry  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  M alayan heads in to  
e x e c u tiv e  o n e s . To f o r e s t a l l  t h i s  e v e n tu a l i ty ,  he would a c c e p t th e  p ro p o sa l 
on ly  w ith  s a fe g u a rd s  to  p re s e rv e  th e  ’p o l i t i c a l  independence* and o th e r  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  h i s  s t a t e .  ' He c o n s id e re d  t h i s  re q u e s t re a so n a b le  because  
o f  th e  u n iq u e  p o s i t io n  o f  Jo h o re  among th e  Malay S ta te s  v i s - a - v i s  B r i t i s h  
a u t h o r i t y .
Among th e s e  sa fe g u a rd s  was h i s  w ish  to  be c o n su lte d  in  th e  a p p o in t­
ment o f  heads o f  M alayan d e p a rtm e n ts . T h is  would s u b je c t  th e  Malayan 
heads to  J o h o re ’s c o n t ro l  to  some e x t e n t ,  and im p l ic i t l y  would enab le  th e
S u lta n  to  w ithdraw  su p p o rt f o r  t h e i r  app o in tm en ts  when any tr e n d  tow ards
155e x e c u tiv e  c o n t r o l  by them em erged. As t h i s  was u n a c c e p ta b le  to  th e
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governm en t, a  dead lock  r e s u l te d «  No 'a d v ic e ' however was te n d e re d  in  t h i s
c a se  b ecau se  o f  W h iteh a ll* s  d e s i r e  n o t to  a ro u se  UMS s u s p ic io n  about any
M alayan u n io n  scheme* H ence, Jo h o re  co n tin u ed  no t to  re c o g n ise  th e
M alayan heads o f  th e  M ed ica l, P u b lic  Works and D rainage and I r r i g a t i o n
D epartm en ts lo n g  a f t e r  t h e i r  appo in tm en ts  had been  approved by th e  C o lo n ia l
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O ff ic e »  In  t h i s  m a tte r  as w e ll  as in  th e  la r g e r  is s u e  o f  a  M alayan 
u n io n , Ib rah im  had the  f u l l  su p p o rt o f  th e  u n o f f i c i a l s  o f th e  Jo h o re  S ta te  
C ouncil*  The non-M alay u n o f f i c i a l s  f e a re d  th a t  th e se  p ro p o sa ls  would 
r e s t r i c t  t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  and th e r e f o r e  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  in  Jo h o re * 1^
O f f i c i a l  R eac tio n  in  th e  FMS
The S r i  M enanti scheme a ls o  met c o n s id e ra b le  o p p o s itio n  among
governm ent o f f i c i a l s .  The p ro p o s a l to  b reak  up n in e  m ajor f e d e r a l
d ep a rtm en ts  in to  s t a t e  d ep artm en ts  u n d er a d v iso ry  heads was g e n e ra lly
condemned by th e  te c h n o c r a ts .  Only th e  heads o f  th e  M edical and P u b lic
Works D epartm ents were on th e  whole s a t i s f i e d  w ith  t h e i r  a d v iso ry  s t a t u s .
A ccord ing  to  them , th e r e  would be l i t t l e  lo s s  in  e f f i c i e n c y ,  b u t a w ider
156c o -o p e ra t io n  and u n ifo rm ity  in  p o l ic y  th ro u g h o u t M alaya would r e s u l t .  '
T h e ir  v ie w s, how ever, were f a r  from b e in g  sh a re d  by o f f i c e r s  in  t h e i r
d e p a r tm e n ts . The l a t t e r  gave th e  r e o r g a n is a t io n  p ro p o sa l a most c h i l l y
r e c e p t io n  though th e y  were unab le  to  d em o n stra te  any a c tu a l  lo s s  o f
e f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  d e p a r tm e n ts . In  f a c t  o p p o s itio n  in  th e  P u b lic  Works
D epartm ents was a g g ra v a te d  by th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  ad v iso ry  head was a  Colony
o f f i c e r .  Many s e n io r  FMS o f f i c e r s  f e l t  t h a t  th ey  had e i t h e r  been p assed
ov er o r  had had t h e i r  p rom otion  p ro s p e c ts  damaged by th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f th e  
157f e d e r a l  h e a d s h ip . ' The r e o r g a n is a t io n  was j u s t  as s t r o n g ly  opposed by 
th e  heads o f  th e  o th e r  te c h n ic a l  d e p a rtm e n ts .
L ike  t h e i r  p re d e c e s s o rs  in  th e  1 9 2 0 's , th e  te c h n o c ra ts  were c h ie f ly  
i n t e r e s t e d  in  a t t a i n i n g  maximum e f f ic ie n c y  in  t h e i r  d e p a rtm e n ts . They 
b e l ie v e d  th a t  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  would r e s u l t  in  lo s s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y ,  a d v e rse ly
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a f f e c t  re c ru itm e n t e s p e c ia l ly  o f  s p e c i a l i s t s ,  and narrow  down th e  prom otion
158p ro s p e c ts  o f s e rv in g  o f f i c e r s .  '  D uring d e m e n t i ’s  t im e , t h e i r  o p p o s itio n
was s t i f f e n e d  by th e  g e n e ra l  f e a r  o f  re tre n c h m e n t, one o f  th e  rea so n s
g iv en  to  j u s t i f y  th e  r e o r g a n is a t io n  o f  t h e i r  d e p a rtm e n ts . L ess s e n s i t i v e
p o l i t i c a l l y  th an  t h e i r  MCS c o l le a g u e s ,  and im p a tie n t o f  la y  c o n t ro l  o v e r
them , th ey  contended  t h a t  t e c h n ic a l  s e r v ic e s  sh o u ld  n o t be s u b je c t  to
p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e .  T h e ir  o p p o s itio n  to  th e  C lem enti scheme came to  be
159c e n tre d  on th e  a ttem p t to  d e p r iv e  them o f  t h e i r  e x e c u tiv e  a u th o r i ty .
They were convinced th a t  w ith o u t e x e c u tiv e  pow er, th e y  would be u n ab le  to  
e n su re  th e  d e s i r a b le  deg ree  o f  u n ifo rm ity  and c o -o rd in a t io n  o f  p o lic y  and 
th e  maximum u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  s k i l l e d  manpower. F u r th e r  th e  te c h n o c ra ts  
r i g h t l y  fe a re d  t h a t  th e  move would in c re a s e  la y  c o n t ro l  o v er t h e i r  d e p a r t­
m en ts . In  t h e i r  r e s i s t e n c e  to  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  th ey  en joyed  th e  sympathy 
o f  C u n l i f f e - L is te r  ahd th e  su p p o rt o f  non-M alay com m ercial i n t e r e s t s .
The S r i  M enanti scheme s p l i t  th e  MCS. Those who su p p o rted  C lem en ti, 
e s p e c ia l ly  th e  m in o r ity  o f  pro-M alay o f f i c i a l s ,  c o n s id e re d  th e  g o a l o f 
B r i t i s h  r u le  to  be th e  g e n e ra l  advancement o f  th e  M alays who would in  due 
co u rse  ta k e  o v e r th e  management o f  t h e i r  m odernised b u t s t i l l  e s s e n t i a l l y
<« £ r \
Malay S t a t e s .  They con tended  th a t  A dvisory r u le  m odelled  on th e  UMS
system  could  be e s ta b l i s h e d  in  th e  FMS w ith  due re g a rd  f o r  f e d e r a l  commit-
161m ents and th e  need f o r  u n ifo rm ity  in  p o l i c y .  But most o f  th e  MCS as 
w e ll  as o th e r  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  sh a red  C u n l i f f e - L is te r * s  view  th a t  M alaya 
sho u ld  be developed  as a  b u s t l i n g  economic o u tp o s t o f  th e  E m pire. Hence 
th e y  opposed th e  S r i  M enanti scheme and in s te a d  d e s ir e d  to  see  th e  c e n t r a ­
l i s e d  b u reau c racy  m a in ta in ed  i f  no t s tre n g th e n e d  in  th e  FMS. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
a la rg e  number o f  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  ag reed  w ith  th e  non-M alay i n t e r e s t s  
t h a t  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry s h ip  shou ld  n o t be a b o lish e d  u n le s s  a n o th e r  s tro n g
162e x e c u tiv e  head was ap p o in te d  to  ta k e  h is  p la c e .
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dementi's opponents in the MCS and other services contended that 
the British should continue to wield political power in the FMS while 
permitting the Chinese to play their dynamic role in the economic sphere. 
They generally shared the concern of the Colonial Office and non-Malay 
interests for maintaining the financial stability and the prized efficiency 
of the Federation. This was considered essential to the further economic
development of the FMS. They also seriously doubted the practicability of
a £L-t
Advisory rule in the FMS. In fact many tended to look to a future in 
which the Chinese would edge the Malays completely out of public life. The 
views of two officials recorded by Emerson seem to reflect the 'pro-Chinese' 
school of thought among British officials which closely resembled those of
Clementi's opponents in the Colonial Office:
[ O.J A
1. To talk of it Malay country is ridiculous: 
even in population it is heavily non-Malay, 
in government it is British, and in economics 
it is Chinese. John Chinaman doesn't want to 
be bothered with politics - he knows that the 
British do that better than he does. But turn 
back the country to petty Malay rulers with a 
few British Advisors, and in ten years the Chinese 
will demand to rule the country, not because they 
want to govern, but because the Malays are making 
such a rotten job of it.
The Sultans should be bought out and the whole 
area made into a colony run in more or less 
unitary fashion. The Sultans are anachronisms 
and in their best days by no means had control 
over the whole area now represented by their 
States and their present position is infinitely 
beyond anything their fathers could have imagined.
Now we are encouraging the Malays to dislike the 
other races and to expect Malay power in a Malay 
State which never can exist. In not many years 
this will lead to disaster, with the Malays then 
regarding the British as their worst enemies.1^4
In the case of the MCS there were yet other reasons behind the oppo­
sition to the Clementi scheme. As in Guillemard's time, many MCS officers
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were antagonished by Clementi'a^promotion policy. The main opposition 
stemmed from the fact that as a body the MCS were as strongly wedded to 
the administrative system they had helped to establish as to the virtual
monopoly o f  powers they  w ie ld ed  in  th e  JUS, H ence, th e y  were g e n e ra l ly  
opposed to  any d r a s t i c  o v e r- th ro w  o f  th e  FMS a d m in is tr a t io n  o r  a  d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  o f  t h e i r  powers to  o th e r  g ro u p s . But th e  C lem enti p la n ,  c a r r i e d  
to  i t s  l o g i c a l  c o n c lu s io n , would have reduced  th e  p r iz e d  f e d e r a l  ad m in is­
t r a t i o n  to  a  shadow o f  i t s  fo rm er s e l f .  And even i f  on ly  a  p a r t i a l  
a d v iso ry  system  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t io n  o f  th e  pow ers 
w ie ld ed  by th e  MCS would have been  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  Malay h an d s . D uring 
th e  in te r - w a r  y e a rs  th e  MCS was n o t p re p a re d  to  e n t e r t a i n  e i t h e r  o f  th e s e  
e v e n t u a l i t i e s .
The C o n tro v ersy  up to  th e  W ilson R eport
By m id-1932 C lem enti had s u f f e r e d  im p o rtan t s e tb a c k s  a t  th e  hands o f  
l o c a l  o p p o s i t io n .  The f i r s t  concerned  h is  id e a  o f  u n ify in g  th e  seven  
s e p a ra te  custom s a d m in is tr a t io n s  in  M alaya. From th e  o u ts e t  t h i s  p ro p o s a l  
was condemned by th e  S t r a i t s  t r a d in g  i n t e r e s t s  as a t h r e a t  to  th e  e n t re p o t  
t r a d e  o f  Penang and e s p e c ia l ly  o f  S in g a p o re . In  th e  FMS th e  p ro p o s a l 
a t t r a c t e d  th e  h o s t i l i t y  o f  economic i n t e r e s t s  tow ards o th e r  f e a tu r e s  o f  
th e  S r i  M enanti schem e. O p p o s itio n  in  th e  UMS was le d  by Jo h o re  and 
Kedah. The u n o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  Jo h o re  S ta te  C ouncil r e fu s e d  to  e n t e r t a i n  
th e  p ro p o sa l u n le s s  th e  Colony jo in e d  th e  p roposed  custom s u n io n  b ecau se
165a l l  J o h o r e 's  economic t i e s  w ere w ith  S in g a p o re . Kedah was p r im a r i ly
concerned  about i t s  ex p o rt d u t ie s  on r i c e ,  c a t t l e  and o th e r  a r t i c l e s  o f
M alayan consum ption w hich y ie ld e d  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  amount o f  re v e n u e . By
r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  ex p o rt o f th e s e  consum ption goods, th e  t a r i f f  a l s o  m ain-
166ta in e d  th e  c o s t  o f  l i v in g  in  Kedah a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  low l e v e l .  E n try  
in to  a M alayan custom s u n io n , Kedah f e l t ,  would s e r io u s ly  endanger th e  
g e n e ra l s o c i a l  and economic p o l ic y  w hich i t  had a d o p te d . More im p o rta n t 
was th e  f e a r  o f  a l l  th e  U n fed e ra te d  Malay S ta te s  t h a t  a M alayan custom s 
u n io n  m ight e v e n tu a lly  le a d  them in to  a M alayan f e d e r a t io n .
The Colony Customs Union Committee c h ie f ly  composed o f  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
from lo c a l  t r a d in g  i n t e r e s t s , and a p p o in ted  to  c o n s id e r  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y
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o f  a  u n io n  from th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f  th e  S t r a i t s ,  r e p o r te d  e a r ly  in  1932.
The com m ittee s t r o n g ly  condemned a custom s u n ion  as E s s e n t i a l l y  opposed 
to  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  Colony and u n d e s ir a b le  in  any c irc u m s ta n c e s  th a t  
can  be fo re s e e n * • F o r Penang and S in g ap o re  were a t r a d e  fo cu s f o r  an 
immense and w ealthy  a re a  s t r e t c h in g  from th e  Madras C oast to  C hina and 
em bracing  th e  whole o f S o u th e a s t A s ia . T h is  e n tre p o t t r a d e  in  t r o p i c a l  
p roduce  o f  th e  su rro u n d in g  re g io n s  and im ported  m anufac tu red  goods from 
th e  West was th e  backbone o f  th e  Colony*s economy ju s t  as th e  t i n  and 
ru b b e r  in d u s t r i e s  were th e  l i f e - b lo o d  o f  th e  m a in lan d ’s  e c o n o m ic - l i f e .
T h is  t r a d e  depended f o r  i t s  s u r v iv a l  on th e  f r e e  p o r ts  o f  Penang and 
e s p e c ia l ly  o f  S in g a p o re . Any custom s u n io n , even one w ith  a  system  o f  
bonded w arehouses , would endanger th e s e  two f r e e  p o r t s  w ith  i t s  consequen­
t i a l  i r r e p a r a b le  lo s s  o f  t r a d e ,  and would e v e n tu a lly  p ro v e  d is a s t r o u s  to  
th e  C o lo n y 's  p r o s p e r i ty .  The com m ittee th e r e f o r e  co n c lu d ed , 'The Colony 
p o s se s s e s  a  t r a d e  w hich i s  much g r e a t e r  th a n ,  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  from , 
and q u ite  in d ependen t o f  i t s  t r a d e  w ith  th e  Malay S ta t e s  and to  e f f e c t  
ad v e rse  changes in  re g a rd  to  th e  fo rm er to  o b ta in  t h e o r e t i c a l  im provem ents
/ I  C r y
i n  th e  l a t t e r  would be a  m is tak en  p o l i c y • '
The in s u p e ra b le  o b s ta c le  to  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  a M alayan custom s u n ion  
w as, th e r e f o r e ,  th e  dichotom y betw een th e  S t r a i t s  e n t r e p o t  economy and th e  
m ain land  economy. W ithin  th e  l a t t e r  la y  a l e s s  im p o rta n t dichotom y betw een 
th e  F e d e r a t io n 's  and J o h o r e 's  c o n c e n tra t io n  on p ro d u c tio n  f o r  fo r e ig n  
m arket and th e  IJMS's p ro d u c tio n  f o r  i n t e r n a l  consum ption . T h is  in  i t s e l f  
was n o t a s e r io u s  b lo ck  to  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  a  M alayan custom s u n io n . But 
h e re  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  UMS was o f  g r e a t  im p o rtan ce . F o r one th i n g ,  th e  
UMS would have s t ro n g ly  opposed a common s c a le  o f  d u t i e s  t h a t  would in v a ­
r i a b l y  r e s u l t  from e n try  in to  a custom s u n io n . Nor would th e y  have
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a llo w ed  custom s m a tte rs  to  be a d m in is te re d  by a c e n t r a l  a d m in is tr a t io n
b ased  in  S ingapore*  These s te p s  would have been  reg a rd ed  as an a t ta c k
on t h e i r  l e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m in is t r a t iv e  p r e r o g a t iv e s .  On th e  o th e r
h a n d , to  fo rc e  UMS in to  a custom s u n io n  would have aro u sed  d is c o n te n t
and s u s p ic io n  in  th e  UMS t h a t  B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  sough t to  fo rc e  them in to  a
168M alayan f e d e r a t io n .  In  s h o r t  th e  g r e a te r  a d m in is tr a t iv e  e f f ic ie n c y  
and economy th a t  would acc ru e  from a  Malayan custom s u n ion  was co n s id e re d  
ou tw eighed  by th e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  c o m p lic a tio n s  t h a t  would a r i s e  
i n  th e  Colony and th e  UMS.
T h is  Committee r e p o r t  r u le d  ou t a  M alayan custom s u n io n  in c lu d in g  
S in g ap o re  and Penang. But i t  d id  no t p re v e n t C lem enti from a p p o in tin g  
a  M alayan com m ittee to  s tu d y  th e  p ro p o sa l o f  a P e n in s u la r  custom s u n ion
4
o f  th e  Malay S t a t e s ,  M alacca, P ro v in ce  W elle s ley  and th e  D in in g s . T h is
A
com m ittee concluded  th a t  a P e n in s u la r  u n io n  was p r a c t ic a b le  b u t q u e s tio n e d
i t s  d e s i r a b i l i t y .  I t  p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th e  r e s u l t a n t  a d m in is t r a t iv e  economy
would be l im i te d  because  th e  two main t r a d e  fo c i-P en a n g  and S ingapore  -
would be excluded  from th e  u n io n . The b e n e f i t  to  i n t e r n a l  t r a d e  would
a ls o  be l im ite d  because  th e  b u lk  o f  th e  M alayan t r a d e  was w ith  Penang and 
169S in g a p o re . ' T h is  t r a d e  was conducted  m ainly  by s e a  and p assed  th rough  
a  s in g le  t a r i f f  b a r r i e r  betw een th e  Colony*s f r e e  p o r t s  and each o f  th e  
M alay S t a t e s .  The on ly  s u b s t a n t i a l  b e n e f i t  was an e n la rg e d  and in t e r n a l l y  
f r e e  m arket f o r  th e  p ro d u c ts  o f  l o c a l  i n d u s t r i e s ;  b u t t h i s ,  th e  com m ittee 
s u g g e s te d , would be as e f f i c i e n t l y  se c u re d  by a  scheme o f  M alayan p r e f e ­
re n c e .  Though n o t m entioned by th e  Com m ittee, UMS o p p o s it io n  was a  
p r in c i p a l  f a c to r  a g a in s t  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f a  P e n in s u la r  custom s u n io n . As 
one C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  o f f i c i a l  commented, th e  f in d in g s  o f  t h i s  M alayan body
s h a t t e r e d ,  f o r  th e  moment, a l l  hopes o f  a common custom s u n io n  in  M alaya. 170
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By itself the proposal of a Malayan customs union was not relevant
to decentralisation in the FMS. But central to the new policy was the
financial scheme presented by the Financial Devolution Committee of 1932.
171As in the 1°20s the three financial experts in the committee were 
prudent officers reluctant to introduce any change in the financial system 
of the Federation. This reluctance was sharply accentuated by the 
depression which had severely shaken federal finance and threatened to 
force the FMS into dependence on loans for future development. Under­
standably, the committee was 'guided throughout by the essential principle 
that in no circumstances should the policy of administrative decentralisa­
tion be applied in such a manner as to impair in any degree the financial
17?stability and credit of the Federation'.
To ensure the financial stability of the Federation, the committee
felt that state finance must be subject to stringent control from the
centre. It was feared that otherwise the reconstituted State Councils
would be inclined to be unduly extravagant or to undertake undesirable
173schemes of expansion at the first sign of economic recovery. Accor­
dingly the committee placed state finance under a system of very stringent 
supervision exercised by the Financial Adviser, the High Commissioner 
and, to some extent, the Federal Council, Under the plan, prior approval 
of the High Commissioner was necessary before the state budgets could be 
laid in the State Councils. Furthermore, virtually all state surpluses 
would have to go to a Federal Reserve Fund until the reserve reached 
$35 million.174
The report of the Financial Devolution Committee was received with 
a sign of relief by Whitehall and the non-Malay commercial interests.
They knew it was a major setback to the decentralisation policy. As 
Cunliffe-Lister jubilantly minuted, 'If this financial plan holds the 
field I should think devolution will be dead before Sir Samuel Wilson
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175arrives^. " Since the states were held at every point by the central
government, one Colonial Office critic emphasised that there was nothing
in the reform 'which corresponds to the idea of largely independent states,
federalised’ • In fact the financial plan was severely castigated by the
Colonial Office as 'a complicated, unreal, and therefore dangerous and
undesirable system of make-believe' which left 'things otherwise substan-
"1tially as they were'. ' The Financial Devolution Committee itself admitted
that its recommendations did not take the states very far towards state
financial autonomy. But it asserted that 'political devolution cannot be
177purchased at the price of financial dissolution*.
Nevertheless, the scheme would have extended state financial powers 
in three directions. Firstly, the State Councils, for the first time, 
would be empowered to sanction supply for the States, instead of having the 
state estimates sustained by lump sums voted by the Federal Council. 
Secondly, the Committee ear-marked certain revenue items for the federal 
services with the rest of the revenue implicitly belonging to the states.
But whether the states had the power to impose new taxation on the revenue 
items reserved to them was not stated. According to the sample estimates 
for 1935 slightly more than $30 million were allocated to the Federation 
as against nearly $23*5 million to the states combined. The last important 
change, therefore, was that this sum substantially exceeded the lump sums 
hitherto granted to the states.
The scheme, however, restricted the scope of decentralisation by re­
legating to the federal government practically all departments not publicly 
ear-marked by Clementi for transfer to the states. Many of these, in fact,
were not listed as Federal services under the draft proposals the High
178Commissioner discussed v/ith Whitehall in 1930* More important, the 
plan did not provide for future extension of financial powers to the states. 
As one Whitehall official rightly emphasised, this meant that the member
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u n i t s  o f  th e  F e d e ra t io n  c o u ld  no t be p la c e d  on n e a r ly  th e  same fo o tin g  as 
t h a t  o f  th e  UMS. In  t h i s  s e n se  th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  and th e  non-M alay 
com m ercial i n t e r e s t s  r i g h t l y  c o n s id e re d  th e  f in a n c ia l  p ro p o sa ls  as hav ing  
s p e l le d  th e  doom o f  d e m e n t i ’ s  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o l i c y .
By th e  tim e  W ilson a r r iv e d  in  M alaya in  November 1952, p a r t s  o f  th e  
C lem enti scheme had been e i t h e r  ch ipped  away o r  s e r io u s ly  im p aired  by 
lo c a l  o p p o s i t io n .  F or two m onths, W ilson to u re d  n e a r ly  every  p a r t  o f 
M alaya and came in to  c o n ta c t  w ith  every  shade o f  o p in io n  on d e c e n t r a l i s a ­
t i o n .  D uring  h i s  to u r ,  th e  C lem enti scheme s u f f e r e d  a n o th e r  s e tb a c k .
T h is  concerned  h i s  p ro p o s a l to  u n ify  th e  M alayan j u d i c i a l  sy s tem s .
The p ro p o s a l was no t announced d u rin g  th e  S r i  M enanti D urbar b u t came to  
be t i e d  to  th e  p o l ic y  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  L ike  th e  custom s u n io n , i t  
was one o f  s e v e r a l  m easures o f  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  as d is c u s se d  in  th e  n ex t 
c h a p te r ,  p re s e n te d  u n d er th e  g u ise  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  By so d o in g , 
C lem enti in c re a s e d  o p p o s it io n  to  b o th  th e  p ro p o sa l i t s e l f  and th e  decen­
t r a l i s a t i o n  p o l i c y .  To a s i g n i f i c a n t  e x te n t  t h i s  approach  je o p a rd is e d  
th e  r e o r g a n is a t io n  o f  th e  M alayan ju d ic a l  sy s te m s .
The e s se n c e  o f  th e  j u d i c i a l  p ro p o s a l was th e  rep lacem en t o f  th e  
Supreme C o u rts  o f  th e  FMS and o f th e  C olony, each headed by i t s  own C h ie f 
J u s t i c e ,  by a  ’Supreme C ourt o f  M alaya ' u n d er a s in g le  C h ie f J u s t i c e  who 
would spend h a l f  h is  tim e in  S in g ap o re  and th e  o th e r  h a l f  in  K uala Lumpur. 
T h is  new Supreme C ourt would com prise a H igh Court o f  J u s t i c e  o f  th e  Colony,
th e  S ta t e  High C o u r ts , and a  M alayan C ourt o f  Appeal to  h e a r  a p p ea ls  from
179a l l  th e  h ig h  c o u r t s .  As th e  C h ie f J u s t i c e  o f  th e  Colony e x p la in e d :
The o b je c t  o f th e  p ro p o s a ls  i s  a u n i f i e d  
s im p le  system  o f  C o u rts  c o n s tru c te d  on th e  
E n g lish  model w ith o u t d is tu rb a n c e s  o f  law , o r  
j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  o r  v en u e , o r  even o f  th e  lo c a l  
c o n t ro l  o f  Bar C om m ittees. These p ro p o s a ls ,  
i t  i s  b e l ie v e d ,  w i l l  form th e  framework o f  a 
l e g a l  system  w hich w i l l  p o s s ib ly  in  tw enty  o r  
t h i r t y  y e a rs  g ra d u a l ly  r e s u l t  in  th e  a s s im i la ­
t i o n  o f a l l  C o u r ts , most law s and a l l  j u r i s d i c ­
t i o n s  in  M alaya u n d er one harm onious and compact
sy s te m .180
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The p ro p o s a l was th e  b r a in - c h i ld  o f  th e  r e t i r i n g  C h ie f J u s t i c e  o f
th e  FMS and o f  h is  c o u n te rp a r t  in  th e  C olony, As they  r i g h t l y  s t r e s s e d ,
th e  r e o r g a n i s a t io n  would in c re a s e  e f f ic ie n c y  and s tre n g th e n  th e  in d ep en -
181dence o f  th e  ju d ic ia r y  v i s - a - v i s  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n .  I t  was su p p o rted  
by th e  Penang and th e  S in g ap o re  B ar C om m ittees, though th e  l a t t e r  doubted 
i t s  p r a c t i c a b i l i t y .  But i t  en co u n te red  d e term ined  o p p o s itio n  in  th e  FMS 
w hich c o n c e n tra te d  on th e  p ro p o s a l o f  a  s in g le  C h ie f J u s t i c e  f o r  M alaya.
The re fo rm  was a ls o  opposed by th e  FMS R u le rs  who fe a re d  t h a t  i t  would
18?en cro ach  on t h e i r  d ig n i ty  and s o v e re ig n  r i g h t s  in  th e  s t a t e s ,  ~ As th e  
M a jl is  com plained , th e  r e o r g a n is a t io n  would ta k e  th e  FMS a  s te p  n e a re r  
to  th e  s t a t u s  o f  a  Crown Colony sind would c o n t r a d ic t  th e  p o l ic y  o f 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .   ^ ^
The FMS B ar Committee and th e  A cting  C h ie f J u s t i c e  o f  th e  FMS emp­
h a s is e d  th a t  in  th e  Malay S ta t e s  th e  fo u n t o f j u s t i c e  was th e  r u l e r ,  th e  
Supreme C ourt was c o n s t i tu te d  and e x e rc is e d  such powers as c o n fe rre d  on 
i t  by e n a c tm e n ts , and th e  lav; a d m in is te re d  was Mohammedan law tem pered by 
Malay custom . But in  th e  Colony th e  fo u n t o f  j u s t i c e  was th e  B r i t i s h  King 
and th e  Supreme C o u rt, c o n s t i tu te d  by R oyal C h a r te r ,  e x e rc is e d  a l l  th e  
pow ers o f  i t s  c o u n te rp a r t  in  E n g land , and a d m in is te re d  a law , th e  b a s is  
o f  w hich was th e  common law o f  E n g land . I t  was im p r a c t i c a l ,  C le m e n ti 's  
opponents a s s e r te d ,  to  merge two e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  c o u r ts  and j u r i s d i c -  
t i o n s  i n to  a h y b r id .  T h is  a s s e r t io n  was met by a governm ent e x p la n a tio n  
t h a t  th e  law s o f  th e  two a re a s  w ere s u b s t a n t i a l l y  s i m i l a r ,  and by an
184a s su ra n c e  th a t  no m erger o f  th e  c o u r ts  and ju r i s d i c t i o n  was in te n d e d .
But t h i s  f a i l e d  to  a l la y  th e  f e a r  o f  th e  FMS s t a l w a r t s , e s p e c ia l ly  in  
view o f  th e  p r iv a te  d e c la r a t io n  o f  th e  C olony’s  C h ie f J u s t i c e  th a t  i t  was 
d e s i r a b le  to  a s s im i la te  th e  law s and c o u r t  p ro ced u re  o f  th e  FMS to  th o se  
in  th e  C olony. ^ The main re a so n  b eh in d  th e  o p p o s itio n  was t h a t  C le m e n ti 's  
c r i t i c s  s t r o n g ly  f e l t  th a t  th e  FMS was a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  im p o rtan t com m ercial
18?
and i n d u s t r i a l  a re a  to  d e se rv e  i t s  own C h ie f J u s t i c e .  They fe a re d  t h a t ,  
u n d er th e  r e o r g a n i s a t io n ,  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  IMS would be su b o rd in a te d  
to  th o s e  o f  th e  C olony.
In  November 1932 th e  p ro p o s a l was d is c u s s e d  d u rin g  a K uala Lumpur 
co n fe re n c e  c h a ire d  by C le m e n ti. W ilson a t te n d e d  as an o b s e rv e r ,  w h ile  
th e  main p r o ta g o n is ts  w ere th e  C h ie f J u s t i c e s  o f  th e  Colony and th e  FMS. 
C a ld e c o tt was p a r t i c u l a r l y  concerned  about th e  s tro n g  s u sp ic io n s  o f  non- 
Malay i n t e r e s t s  and o f  th e  FMS R u le rs  tow ards th e  p ro p o s a l .  Hence he 
su g g e s te d  th a t  th e  r e o r g a n is a t io n  be d e fe r re d  l e s t  i t  je o p a rd is e d  th e
186w id er p o l ic y  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  ‘ As t h i s  s u g g e s tio n  was su p p o rted  
by W ilson , C lem enti r e lu c t a n t ly  a cc ep ted  i t .  However, two m inor changes 
were in t ro d u c e d .  F i r s t l y ,  to  improve ap p ea l w ork, a  r o s t e r  o f  th e  more 
ex p e rie n c e d  judges was drawn up from w hich ap p ea l judges were h e n c e fo rth  
a p p o in te d . S eco n d ly , a  law  was p a sse d  in  193^ w hich made th e  C h ie f 
J u s t i c e  o f  th e  Colony an e x - o f f i c io  judge in  th e  FMS, a  r ig h t  a lre a d y  
en joyed  by h is  ju n io r  c o l le a g u e s .
W ilson re tu rn e d  to  London in  December 1932 and a lm ost im m ediately  
su b m itte d  h i s  r e p o r t  to  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e .  T h is  r e p o r t  endorsed  a 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y  on p o l i t i c a l  g ro u n d s . I t  r e i t e r a t e d  d e m e n t i ’s 
view s t h a t  o v e r - c e n t r a l i s a t io n  had caused  d is c o n te n t  among th e  R u le r s ,  
t h a t  th e  m ain tenance o f  i n d i r e c t  r u le  was n e c e ssa ry  to  p re v e n t th e  
dom in a tio n  o f M alays by non-M alays, and t h a t  in  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  la y  th e  
on ly  hope o f  form ing a M alayan u n io n . P e rh a p s , th e  most im p o rtan t reaso n  
b eh in d  W ilso n 's  su p p o rt was h i s  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  th e  Government was to o  
deep ly  com m itted to  th e  S r i  M enanti scheme to  w ithdraw  co m p le te ly  from 
i t .  As W ilson a d m itte d , to  have r e je c te d  th e  scheme would have s e r io u s ly  
shaken  th e  R u le r s ' co n fid en ce  in  B r i t i s h  good f a i t h  tow ards t h e i r  t r e a t y
187o b l ig a t io n s  and damaged B r i t i s h  p r e s t i g e  th ro u g h o u t M alaya. The W ilson
188
r e p o r t  was a cc ep ted  by C u n l i f f e - L is te r  who, how ever, demanded th e  r ig h t  
to  r e c o n s id e r  th e  whole m a tte r  i f  i t  en co u n te red  s tro n g  o p p o s it io n  in
188M alaya, The r e p o r t  re c e iv e d  c a b in e t  approved in  March 1933* F o rtu n ­
a te ly  f o r  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s t s  i t  was g e n e ra l ly  w e ll re c e iv e d  in  M alaya as 
a compromise betw een opposing  p o s i t io n s  and as a  p la tfo rm  fo r  f u tu r e  
a c t io n .  The W ilson R eport th e r e f o r e  ended th e  c o n tro v e rs y , and th e  r e s u l t s  
and e f f e c t s  o f  C le m e n ti 's  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y  a re  exam ined in  th e  
fo llo w in g  c h a p te r .
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C h a p te r  F iv e
The R e s u lts  and E f f e c ts  o f  
D e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  in  th e  1930s
We have d is c u s s e d  in  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  c o n tro ­
v e rsy  w hich ended w ith  th e  W ilson  re p o r t*  T h is  r e p o r t  recommended th e  
c r e a t io n  o f  a r e a l  f e d e r a t io n  in  th e  FMS by a  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y  phased  
o v e r  a  lo n g  p e r io d  o f  tim e* The u l t im a te  aim o f  t h i s  p o l ic y  rem ained a  
M alayan f e d e r a t io n .  D uring th e  p o s t-W ilso n  e r a ,  th e  c o lo n ia l  Government 
c o n c e n tra te d  on im plem enting  th e  f i r s t  p hase  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  o u t l in e d  
in  th e  r e p o r t • I t  sh o u ld  be n o te d  th a t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  had a lre a d y  been 
e f f e c t e d  d u rin g  th e  c o n tro v e r s y .  C lem enti rem ained in  M alaya f o r  a n o th e r  
y e a r  a f t e r  th e  W ilson r e p o r t  to  c a r ry  fo rw ard  h is  p o l i c y .  S u b se q u e n tly ,
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  was im plem ented more c a u t io u s ly  by th e  a c t in g  High
1C om m issioner, C a ld e c o t t ,  and was th e n  slow ed down and m o d ified  by C lem enti*s 
s u c c e s s o r ,  S i r  Shenton  Thomas.
D e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  under* C lem en ti: The S ta te  C ouncils
C e n tra l  to  th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t o f  a  r e a l  f e d e ra t io n  in  th e  FMS was th e  
s tr e n g th e n in g  o f th e  s t a t e  governm en ts. The essen ce  o f  th e  movement was 
to  lo o s e n  th e  c a s t - i r o n  f e d e r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  and m odern ise th e  v a r io u s  
S ta t e  C o u n c ils  in  th e  F e d e ra t io n .  I t  was g e n e ra l ly  re c o g n ise d  a f t e r  1920 
t h a t  u n t i l  t h i s  was acco m p lish ed , no e f f e c t iv e  d e v o lu tio n  o f  powers to  th e  
s t a t e  a d m in is tr a t io n s  was p r a c t i c a b l e .  Very l i t t l e ,  how ever, was ach iev ed  
t i l l  1932 when C lem en ti r e o rg a n is e d  th e  S ta te  C o u n c ils .
C lem en ti m odern ised  th e  S ta t e  C o u n c ils  in  two d i r e c t i o n s .  The c o u n c ils  
w ere r e c o n s t i tu te d  th ro u g h  th e  a d d i t io n  o f  non-M alay o f f i c i a l s  and u n o f f i ­
c i a l s .  The aim was to  improve th e  com petence o f  th e  c o u n c i ls  and acco rd  
more r e p r e s e n ta t io n  to  non-M alay i n t e r e s t s .  To s e c u re  u n ifo rm ity  in  b o th
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s t a t e  and f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  th e  L eg a l A dv iser was made a  member o f
a l l  th e  c o u n c i l s .  F u r th e r ,  th e  u n o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  F e d e ra l C ouncil were
ap p o in ted  from t h e i r  s t a t e  c o u n te rp a r ts  p ro v id e d  t h i s  was n o t a g a in s t
2
‘ th e  p u b l ic  i n t e r e s t s 1• A f te r  1932 th e  s t a t e  c o u n c i ls ,  excep t in  Pahang, 
no lo n g e r  c o n s is te d  p re d o m in a n tly  o f  Malay a r i s t o c r a t s  b u t were ‘made up 
o f k e e n -w it te d  and h u s t l i n g  businessm en  and o f f i c i a l s  on one s id e  and 
Malay c h ie f s  on th e  o the r*  The p ro cee d in g s  in  th e  c o u n c i ls  were now 
conducted  in  e i t h e r  E n g lish  o r  M alay. The most dynamic e lem en ts  in  th e  
m odern ised  s t a t e  c o u n c i ls  w ere th e  non-M alay u n o f f i c i a l s  and o f f i c i a l s .
The s t a t e  c o u n c i ls  w ere a ls o  r e s t r u c tu r e d  in  1932. T h is  was c o n s i­
d ered  n e c e s s a ry  p a r t l y  b ecau se  non-M alay u n o f f i c i a l s  co u ld  n o t ad eq u a te ly  
d e a l  w ith  m a tte r s  r e l a t i n g  to  Malay custom  and Is la m . F urtherm ore  in  
N eg ri Sem bilan  i t  was f e l t  t o  be d e ro g a to ry  to  th e  fo u r  Undangs to  s i t  
a lo n g s id e  o rd in a ry  members o f  th e  S ta te  C ouncil s in c e  th e  form er w ere in  
f a c t  r u l e r s  o f  t h e i r  own r e s p e c t iv e  r e g io n s .  To overcome th e se  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s ,  c o u n c i ls  o f  two cham bers were c r e a te d  in  P erak  and N egri S em bilan , 
M a tte rs  co n c e rn in g  Malay custom  and Is lam  were d e a l t  w ith  in  Perak and 
N egri Sem bilan  o n ly  by an u p p e r chamber c a l le d  th e  C ouncil o f  C h ie fs  and 
Uiamas and th e  C o u n c il o f  Yam Tuan and Undangs r e s p e c t iv e ly .  In  S e la n g o r
t h i s  ta s k  was re s e rv e d  to  a  sub-com m ittee  w ith in  th e  S ta te  C ouncil c a l le d
4
th e  R e lig io u s  and Customary C om m ittee. In  t h i s  connexion  B r i t i s h  p o lic y
d id  no t p e rm it th e  te rm  ‘Malay custom  and Is la m ’ to  co v er many s u b je c ts
s in c e  t h i s  m ight d e s tro y  th e  re v iv e d  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  th e  re o rg a n ise d  c o u n c ils
5
and weaken B r i t i s h  c o n t r o l .
In  1934 a f u r t h e r  s te p  to  s tr e a m lin e  th e  c o u n c ils  was ta k e n  in  P erak
and S e la n g o r . The c o u n c i ls  th e r e  had become r a th e r  unw ieldy  in s tru m e n ts
because  o f  th e  la rg e  m em bership. M oreover, th e  v a s t  volume o f  r o u t in e
b u s in e s s  to o k  up to o  much tim e , and in a d eq u a te  a t t e n t i o n  was devo ted  to
£
p o lic y  m a t te r s .  In  th e s e  two s t a t e s  Perm anent o r S ta n d in g  com m ittees
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headed by the Rulers and consisting both of officials and unofficials
were formed to take over part of the executive functions of the councils
such as confirming death sentences and appointing Kathis and Penghulus.
In this way the state councils could concentrate on debates, finance,
7legislation and policy matters. The four State Councils, as reorganised 
by Clementi, remained unaltered before World War II. The only change 
introduced by Sir Shenton Thomas was the formation of Finance Committees 
of official and unofficial members in 1935 to advise the councils on 
financial matters.
The legislative powers of the reconstituted state councils began 
to be extended in 1933* To understand this fully, it should be noted 
that as late as 193*1 the Perak State Council, which was the most active 
in the Federation, passed only two supply enactments. And before Clementi's 
time, official and unofficial opinion in the FMS would never have per­
mitted the state councils to enact laws concerning matters of common 
concern to the FMS. Under the Wilson report, the councils were entrusted 
with the sole right to pass laws of purely state interest such as town 
site laws. Moreover, they could also legislate on matters of common con­
cern to all the states where uniformity was not absolutely necessary. 
Included in this category were legislation relating to the nine federal 
services transferred to the states. The legislative devolution to the 
state councils could become substantial, at least in form, as more services 
were transferred to the states in the future. In the early stage of 
decentralisation, Clementi opposed any division of federal or state legis­
lation. As the Residents pointed out in 193 +^1 this was inadvisable until
decentralisation had formalised relations between the state and federal 
o
governments. But the four state councils enacted laws in identical terms. 
These enactments were drafted by the Legal Adviser, agreed to by the resi­
dents and approved by the High Commissioner. During dementi's time,
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legislative devolution was in practice largely nominal, though this might 
become considerable in the future if Advisory rule could be established 
in the FMS.
The financial power of the state councils was also extended under 
the Wilson report. Endorsing the general principles behind the Financial 
Devolution Report of 1932, Wilson added that in the immediate future, 
financial changes should be strictly limited to those which would tend to 
check extravagant expenditure and strengthen the financial position of
9the FMS. Further, in the short term the Wilson Report lagged behind the 
Financial Devolution Report in refusing to make the state councils sanc­
tioning authorities for revenues earmarked for the States. Instead it 
desired the existing practice of financing the state budgets by lump sums 
from the Federal Council to continue for another four years. But in the 
long term the Wilson Report was more progressive in providing for further 
extension of financial power to the states. The Financial Devolution 
Report ignored this point, thereby blocking progress to a true federation 
of the FMS.
The Wilson Report phased financial devolution to the states into 
three periods. During the first period of four years there would be no 
basic change in the financial relations between the Federation and the 
States. The federal government would continue to collect and appropriate 
all revenues and the Federal Council would vote a lump sum to each state 
to finance the state services. During the second stage the states would 
be permitted to collect and appropriate certain revenues not required for 
federal purposes. Thus, the states would become financially more inde­
pendent but would still rely on federal aid to balance their budgets or 
meet contingent expenditure. During the last phase the states would 
become financially self-supporting through taking over more revenues from 
the centre and through the right to impose taxation. By then a true
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federation with clear-cut division of financial and other powers between
the states and the centre was expected to have emerged in the FMS.
In 1933 Clementi started to implement the first phase of financial
decentralisation. He abolished the volume of Estimates called 'Unreserved
Services', thereby leaving all services in either the federal or the state
estimates. The process was completed by Caldecott who passed the 1935
Supply Bill late in 193*+« The main increase in the block grants to the
states resulted from the transfer, as discussed later, of nine federal
departments to the states. The total state estimates increased from
eleven percent in 193*+ to about fifty percent of the total Federation esti- 
11mates in 1935» But the states were stopped from spending more than the
block grants, as hitherto, through supplementary votes. This was effected
through transferring the Residents* power to call for supplementary supply
to the state councils which would exercise that function under the survei-
12llance of the State Finance Committees. Hence, the increases in the 
block grants were smaller than they appeared. Furthermore British control 
over state finance remained as tight as ever. The block grants were deter­
mined by the Residents' Conference and authorised by the High Commissioner 
before they were sanctioned by the Federal Council. In other words, no 
extensive financial power was devolved to the state councils under decen­
tralisation.
Transferring federal departments to the States
Under the Wilson report, the states were to be further strengthened
by the transfer of certain federal services to them. As earmarked by
Clementi, the following federal services - agriculture, co-operatives,
education, electrical, forestry, medical, mining, public works, veterineury,
13prisons and drainage and irrigation - were to be transferred to the states 
during the first four years of decentralisation. This was to be followed
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by f u r th e r  t r a n s f e r s  in  th e  f u tu r e  t i l l  th e  e x i s t in g  am algam ation in  th e  
FMS was re p la c e d  by a r e a l  f e d e ra t io n *  The W ilson R ep o rt, how ever, d id
n o t c h a r t  o u t th e  fu tu r e  changes s in c e  th e s e  must be gu ided  by th e
14e x p e rie n c e  and r e s u l t  o f th e  f i r s t  phase  o f d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  By th e
end o f  1934 a l l  th e  above s e r v i c e s ,  ex cep t c o - o p e r a t iv e s ,  had been
15
t r a n s f e r r e d  to  th e  s t a t e s *
W ilson a ls o  endo rsed  d e m e n t i 's  p ro p o sa l th a t  th e  t r a n s f e r r e d  s e rv ic e s  
sh o u ld  be c o -o rd in a te d  by M alayan heads* But C le m e n te s  concep t o f Malayan 
heads e x e r c is in g  a d v iso ry  fu n c tio n s  in  th e  Malay S ta te s  and e x e c u tiv e  power
by
in  th e  Colony was acc ep ted  o n ly / th e  M ed ica l, P u b lic  Works and P riso n s
D epartm ents*  The heads o f th e  f i r s t  two d ep artm en ts  ag reed  w ith  th e  id e a
16because  i t  b rou g h t l i t t l e  change to  t h e i r  e x i s t in g  p o s i t io n s *  But C lem enti 
en co u n te red  s t i . ^  o p p o s it io n  from th e  heads o f th e  o th e r  d e p a rtm e n ts , 
e s p e c ia l ly  W .J. W illiam s , D ire c to r  o f  th e  E l e c t r i c a l  D epartm ent* As in  
C l i f f o r d 's  tim e , W illiam  d e s ir e d  to  p la c e  h i s  departm en t u n d er th e  c o n tro l  
o f an autonomous c e n t r a l  e l e c t r i c a l  board* T h is  was b locked  by C a ld e c o tt
who reg a rd ed  th e  p ro p o s a l as tan tam oun t to  an a b ro g a tio n  o f  th e  fu n c tio n s
17o f th e  f e d e r a l  and s t a t e  governm ents* The o p p o s itio n  o f  th e  d e p a rtm e n ta l
heads to  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  how ever, was s e r io u s ly  banning  't h e  p u b lic
l8i n t e r e s t * .  C a ld e c o tt th e re f o r e  d e v ise d  a compromise to  a v e r t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
o b je c t io n s  to  th e  e x i s t in g  system  w here in  th e  f e d e r a l  heads a c te d  in  th e  
s t a t e s  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f th e  s t a t e  governm en ts . Each d e p a rtm e n ta l head would 
h e n c e fo rth  be an a d v iso ry  o f f i c e r  in  th e  f e d e r a l  sp h e re  and e x e c u tiv e  o f f i c e r  
in  each  s t a t e  r e s p o n s ib le  to  the  s t a t e  governm ent* However, h is  e x e c u tiv e  
power would be d e r iv e d  from th e  R u le r - in -C o u n c il  and cou ld  be revoked a t
th e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  th e  S ta te  C ouncil*  T h is  compromise was a c c ep ted  by th e
19
d e p a rtm e n ta l h e a d s , and was en do rsed  by th e  W ilson r e p o r t
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In the final analysis, department devolution was not fundamental.
It only enhanced the sense of state's control over the various services
involved. The heads of the various departments continued to wield virtually
the same degree of executive authority in the states. This meant that they
were better able to ensure uniformity in policy and practice in their
departments and to obviate any material loss of efficiency. In addition
the relations between the various departmental heads and the UMS remained
basically unchanged. The UMS retained their right, as hitherto, to reject
the advice from the former. It was generally admitted late in the 1930s
that decentralisation did not adversely affect the various services trans-
20ferred to the states.
Centralisation in Singapore
To Clementi must be credited the strengthening of the state governments 
in the 1930s. At the same time Clementi succeeded to a considerable extent 
in centralising power in Singapore. For instance, decentralisation trans­
ferred the executive headships of several departments such as Public Works, 
Medical, Prisons, Veterinary and Customs from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore.
This also tended to enhance Singapore's control over these departments in 
the IMS. Even more important were several centralisation measures which 
Clementi tied to his decentralisation policy in 1931* These proposals had 
little direct bearing on decentralisation and were implemented either for 
reasons of efficiency or economy. But they were effected under the guise 
of decentralisation. The result was enhanced centralisation in Singapore.
One of these measures was the formation of a Malayan Postal Union 
in 1934. Owing to UMS opposition, this union covered only the Colony and 
the FMS. In charge of this union was a Director-General of Posts and 
Telegraphs stationed in Singapore who was empowered to direct the postal
196
department (including control of postal finance) in each state and Colony. 
Under the scheme each state in the Federation was returned the right it 
lost in 1896 to issue its own stamps which would circulate throughout 
Malays* However, all stamps now bore the standard superscription Malaya*. 
With much fanfare, Clementi declared this to be symbolic of his whole
22policy of restoring ’full political individuality to each local Government*'
Except for the separate issue of stamps and some shadowy control over local
buildings and subordinate officers, the reorganisation in reality was
centralistic* As one Colonial Office official minuted:
This scheme is a colossal piece of window-dressing 
in that while Sir Cecil Clementi is advertising 
to the Rulers his readiness to maintain and extend 
local autonomy, he is in fact preparing a scheme 
which completely centralise the Postal Administrations 
in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits Settlements*23
To some extent, this was true of the other proposals* The dispersion of
the Chief Secretary’s control over personnel matters to other authorities
was in form decentralising. But the most important personnel matters
concerning European officers were placed under the control of a Malayan
Establishment located in Singapore. Under this system, European officers
24were seconded to the various Malay States* In substance, this was a
centralising step* Even more glaringly so was the amalgamation of the
various Chinese Protectorates in Malaya in 1934* The two Secretaryships
for Chinese Affairs in the FMS and the Colony combined to become the new
25Secretaryship for Chinese Affairs in Malaya stationed in Singapore. All
the three measures were readily accepted by the Colonial Office, though it
was clear they centralised power in Singapore.
The crux of the decentralisation movement remained the abolition of
the Chief Secretaryship. Wilson sanctioned this on the ground that it was
26essential to the success of any decentralisation policy. In the Chief
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S e c r e t a r y 's  p la c e ,  he p roposed  a s e n io r  e x e c u tiv e  o f f i c e r  r e s id e n t  in  K uala
Lumpur, a c c e s s ib le  to  th e  p u b l i c ,  and concerned  w ith  th e  c o -o rd in a t io n  o f
f e d e r a l  a f f a i r s .  Taking th e  s ta n d  th a t  th e  High Comm issioner cou ld  n o t do
th e  n e c e ssa ry  c o -o rd in a t io n  h im s e lf ,  he d e c la re d ,  ' t h e  day i s  a long  way o f f ,
i f  i t  e v e r  a r r i v e s , b e fo re  an e x e c u tiv e  head o f th e  f e d e r a l  machine a t  K uala
27Lumpur can be d isp en sed  w ith  a l to g e th e r .  W ilson b e l ie v e d  th a t  ttiis  would
be r e a l i s e d  when a  M alayan u n io n  was c re a te d  in to  which th e  f e d e r a l  machine
cou ld  be ab so rb ed . F in a l ly ,  to  a s s i s t  in  th e  c o -o rd in a t io n  o f  p o lic y  was
an FMS A dvisory C ouncil p re s id e d  over by th e  High Com m issioner and c o n s is te d
28o f  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  th e  s t a t e s .
T h is  was c l e a r ly  a compromise s o lu t io n .  I t  i s  lo g i c a l  to  assume th a t
W ilson was aware t h a t  in  a sm a ll co u n try  l i k e  M alaya i t  was p r a c t ic a b le  f o r
29th e  High Com m issioner to  c o -o rd in a te  p o lic y  p ro p e r ly  from S in g a p o re . The 
r e a l  re a so n  beh ind  th e  c r e a t io n  o f a  new r e s id e n t  head in  K uala Lumpur 
th e r e f o r e  ap p ea rs  to  be W ilso n 's  d e s i r e  to  meet th e  view o f FMS com m ercial 
i n t e r e s t s  and o f  th e  MCS th a t  th e  F e d e ra t io n  must no t be d e s tro y e d . F or 
a long  w ith  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  j o i n t  d ep artm en ts  based  in  S in g a p o re , 
C le m e n ti 's  p ro p o sa l o f s h i f t i n g  th e  f e d e r a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  to  S in g ap o re  was 
tan tam oun t to  th e  d i s s o lu t io n  o f th e  F e d e ra tio n  as c u r r e n t ly  c o n s t i tu te d .
On th e  o th e r  hand , th e  c r e a t io n  o f a  new e x e c u tiv e  head in  K uala Lumpur 
n eg a ted  C le m e n ti 's  g o a l o f  d i r e c t in g  th e  Malay S ta te s  th ro u g h  th e  S e c re ta ry  
to  th e  High Com m issioner in  S in g a p o re .
F u rth e rm o re , W ilson d e s ir e d  th e  K uala Lumpur head to  c o -o rd in a te  n o t 
on ly  FMS b u t a ls o  a ll-M a la y a  m a tte rs  in  th e  hope o f  prom oting  M alayan 
u n i f i c a t i o n .  T his had been advoca ted  by A nderson in  1910 b u t had been 
abandoned b ecause  th e  UMS opposed any o f f i c i a l  d e a l in g s  w ith  th e  R e s id e n t-  
G e n e ra l. In  term s o f C le m e n ti 's  p o l ic y  i t  was a  s u b t le  and im p o rtan t s h i f t  
in  o f f i c i a l  th in k in g .  I t  had h i t h e r to  been th e  p r a c t i c e  f o r  th e  High
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Com m issioner to  c o -o r d in a te  UMS a f f a i r s  through th e  S e c r e ta r y  to  th e  High
Com m issioner in  S in g a p o r e . And C lem enti had s t r o n g ly  a s s e r te d  th a t  Pan-
Malayan m a tters  sh ou ld  be c o -o r d in a te d  through th e  same o f f i c e r .  W ilson
p o s s ib ly  f e l t  th a t  i t  would be more e f f e c t i v e  t o  prom ote a. Malayan
fe d e r a t io n  (e x c lu d in g  th e  C o lon y , as l e a s t  fo r  th e  tim e b e in g ) through an
o f f i c e r  in  th e  m ain land . I f  t h i s  was ind eed  th e  c a s e ,  th e  e n tr u s t in g  o f
a ll-M a la y a  a f f a i r s  p a r t ly  to  th e  care  o f  a K uala Lumpur head , as e f f e c t e d
l a t e r ,  may be regarded in  a se n se  as th e  f i r s t  s te p  towards th e  c r e a t io n  o f
30a se p a r a te  High Com m issioner fo r  th e  m ainland as occurred  in  19^8.
At t h i s  .juncture a s e r io u s  c le a v a g e  a ro se  betw een Malaya and London.
I t  seem s c le a r  th a t  C lem enti p e r s is t e d  in  h is  attem pt to  p la c e  th e  co ­
o r d in a tio n  o f  FMS p o l ic y  under th e  S e c r e ta r y  to  th e  High C om m issioner, 
th u s o b v ia t in g  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  new r e s id e n t  head at Kuala Lumpur. T h is  
p ro p o sa l was in  f a c t  r e i t e r a t e d ,  in  a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  form , by C a ld e c o tt  
to  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  in  August 193^-^ ' C a ld e c o t t ,  then  A ctin g  High 
C om m issioner, recommended th a t  t h i s  sh o u ld  be accom plish ed  in  two s t a g e s .  
F i r s t l y , th e  Under S e c r e ta r y  o f  th e  FMS sh ou ld  s te p  in to  th e  p la c e  o f  th e  
C h ief S e c r e ta r y  as th e  S e c r e ta r y  to  th e  High C om m issioner. H-errc-e-, For 
about a y e a r  th e re  would e x i s t  two S e c r e t a r ie s  to  th e  High C om m issioner, 
one a t S in gap ore and an o th er  at Kuala Lumpur, a move to  o b v ia te  th e  
im p ress io n  o f  h a sty  c e n t r a l i s a t io n  in  S in g a p o r e . Then, th e se  two s e c r e t a r i a t s  
would be amalgamated in to  a s in g le  s e c r e t a r ia t  a t S ingapore headed by a 
S e c r e ta r y  to  High Com m issioner o f  s t a f f  rank. The aim was to  en ab le  th e
High Com m issioner to  e x e r c is e  an e f f e c t i v e  u n ity  o f  d ir e c t io n  over  a l l  th e  
32Malay S t a t e s .  I f  e f f e c t e d ,  th e  p r o p o sa l would have been  an im portant 
move tow ards a Malayan u n io n , but i t  would have caused  a g r e a te r  degree  o f
c e n t r a l i s a t io n  in  S in gap ore
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R e la te d  to  th e  above su g g e s tio n  was C le m e n ti 's  p ro p o sa l in  1934 to
c o n s t i t u t e  a FMS E x e c u tiv e  C o u n c il s im i la r  to  t h a t  in  th e  C olony. A pparen tly
t h i s  was meant to  su g a r  h is  in t e n t io n  to  drop W ilso n 's  p ro p o sa l o f a FMS
r e s id e n t  h ead . A l te r n a t iv e ly ,  C lem enti sought to  s t u l t i f y  th e  p o s i t io n  o f
th e  FMS r e s id e n t  head by c e n t r a l i s i n g  powers in  h i s  own hands th ro u g h  th e
E x e c u tiv e  C o u n c il. T h is  c o u n c i l  would be p re s id e d  ov er by th e  High
Com m issioner and would c o n s is t  o f  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  (so  long  as th e  o f f i c e
re m a in e d ) , th e  fo u r  R e s id e n ts  and fo u r  Malay r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  nom inated by
th e  R u le r s .  I t  would r e p la c e  th e  R e s id e n ts ' C onference as a  body to  d is c u s s
and a d v ise  th e  governm ent on im p o rtan t common p o l i c i e s ,  in c lu d in g  f in a n c e .
To t h i s  E x ec u tiv e  C o u n c il would a ls o  be devolved  s t a t u to r y  powers in  th e
33FMS now v e s te d  in  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  o r  th e  High Com m issioner. T hus, th e  
C ouncil would be empowered to  su g g e s t amendments to  f e d e r a l  laws to  be ta b le d  
in  th e  F e d e ra l C o u n c il and to  is s u e  r e g u la t io n s  co n ce rn in g  m a tte rs  o f common 
i n t e r e s t  u n d er s t a t e  c o n t r o l .  The R u le rs  would n o t be d i r e c t l y  im p lic a te d  
in  th e  a c tu a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  b u t co u ld  make r e p r e s e n ta t io n s  to  th e  C ouncil 
th ro u g h  t h e i r  Malay nom inees. They would be k ep t f u l l y  inform ed o f  c o u n c i l
34a f f a i r s  and would j o i n t l y  v a l id a te  th e  a c t s  o f E x ec u tiv e  C o u n c il. 
S u b se q u e n tly , C a ld e c o tt  p roposed  to  c o n v e rt th e  F inance  Committee o f th e  
F e d e ra l C o u n c il in to  th e  A dvisory C o u n c il o u t l in e d  by W ilson on which non- 
Malay i n t e r e s t s  would be r e p r e s e n te d .  Hence a f t e r  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f th e  
C h ie f S e c r e ta r y s h ip ,  th e  High Com m issioner would be a s s i s t e d  by b o th  an 
E x ecu tiv e  C o u n c il and an A dvisory  C o u n c il in  th e  FMS.
C le m e n ti 's  p ro p o s a l  would have g iv en  th e  Malay e l i t e  a more a c t iv e  
b u t s t i l l  nom inal r o le  in  th e  f e d e r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n .  C le a r ly ,  m a tte rs  
coming to  th e  E x ec u tiv e  C ouncil would be d ec ided  by th e  High Com m issioner 
and th e  R e s id e n ts .  As C a ld e c o tt e x p la in e d :
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I t  w i l l  d o u b tle s s  be rec o g n iz e d  th a t  th e  p e rso n n e l 
o f  th e  G overnm ent's a d v is e r s  and c o u n c i l lo r s  in  
th e  FMS w i l l  rem ain  e x a c tly  th e  same u nder th e  p ro ­
posed  e x p e rim e n ta l a rrangem en ts  as a t  p re se n t*  A ll 
t h a t  i s  b e in g  p lan n ed  as a  reg ro u p in g  o f th e  p ie c e s  
so  as  to  en a b le  th e  game to  go on sm oothly  when th e  
C h ie f S e c re ta ry  i s  removed from th e  b e a r d .35
Through th e  E x ec u tiv e  C o u n c il, th e  High Com m issioner would a t  l e a s t  to
some e x t e n t ,  b o th  re p la c e  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  as th e  e x e c u tiv e  head o f
th e  FMS and n e g a te  th e  p o l ic y  to  make th e  s t a t e  c o u n c ils  s t a t u to r y  and
a d m in is t r a t iv e  b o d ie s .  I t  would a ls o  f u r th e r  c e n t r a l i s e  powers in  th e
hands o f  th e  High C om m issioner. In  o th e r  w ords, C lem enti d e s ir e d  to  e n te r
more d i r e c t l y  in to  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  th e  FMS th ro u g h  an E x ecu tiv e
C o u n c il.
D uring a D urbar in  S in g ap o re  e a r ly  in  F eb ruary  th e  FMS
36R u le rs  r e lu c t a n t ly  endo rsed  C le m en tifs  p ro p o sa l o f  an E x ecu tiv e  C o u n c il.
I t  was a ls o  su p p o rte d  by th e  Malay members o f th e  F e d e ra l C o u n c il. Con­
f id e n t  o f  o b ta in in g  W h ite h a ll’ s a p p ro v a l ,  C lem enti a u th o r is e d  C a ld e c o tt 
to  work th e  c o u n c i l  p r o v i s io n a l ly .  I f  t h i s  p roved  s u c c e s s f u l ,  th e  c o u n c i l  
would be fo rm a lly  c o n s t i tu te d  soon a f t e r  h is  r e tu r n  from le a v e  in  London.
In  London, s e r io u s  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  o p in io n  a ro se  betw een C lem enti 
and th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  ov er th e  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  o f  th e  FMS a f t e r  th e  a b o l i t i o n  
o f  th e  C h ie f S e c r e ta r y s h ip .  W h ite h a ll was deep ly  concerned  th a t  w ith o u t 
p r i o r  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S t a t e ,  C lem enti had d iv e rg e d  from 
th e  W ilson r e p o r t .  As re g a rd s  th e  E x ecu tiv e  C ouncil p ro p o s a l ,  he had once
a g a in ,  on h is  own, gone a  long  way tow ards com m itting  th e  B r i t i s h  Government
37to  a  f a r - r e a c h in g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  change in  M alaya. While a g re e in g  w ith  
C le m e n ti 's  aim o f  M alayan u n i f i c a t i o n ,  W h ite h a ll c o n s id e re d  th e  M alayan
p ro p o s a ls  m isconceived
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Whitehall's opposition to the idea of placing the federal secreta­
riat under the Secretary to the High Commissioner was easy to understand, 
London was aware that the proposal might revive the fear in the FMS of 
complete centralisation in Singapore, In view of the more effective 
control over the Malay States it foreshadowed, the move might also further 
scare the UMS Rulers who continued to be deeply suspicious of Clementi.
The Colonial Office therefore instructed Caldecott late in 1934 to defer 
the matter, dementi's proposal to create a FMS Executive Council was 
unhesitatingly rejected by the Colonial Office, It was considered both 
administratively unnecessary and a hindrance to progress towards a 
Malayan union. It might lead to a re-centralisation in the FMS which 
would prove even more difficult to loosen than the overcentralisation 
under the Chief Secretary. In any case, it would help perpetuate the
38distinction between the constitutional positions of the FMS and the UMS.
This serious difference in opinion between Clementi and Whitehall
was aggravated by Cunliffe-Lister's rejection of his decision to build the
39Penang Hill Railway and opposition towards his education policy. In
40mid-193^ the Secretary of State prematurely retired Clementi. It would 
appear that the Colonial Office feared that once back in Malaya, Clementi 
might proceed, on his own, to introduce constitutional changes that would 
throw Malaya into another round of political unrest. This fear was under­
standable in view of dementi's past intransigence as well as Whitehall's 
inability to exercise adequate control over him. The Colonial Office was 
already aware, as we shall see, that Clementi continued his tactless 
treatment of the UMS Rulers instead of trying to placate them. Probably 
Cunliffe-Lister was also influenced by the view of European commercial
interests in Malaya and London that Clementi was not the man to implement 
41the Wilson report.
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D e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  u n d er S i r  S hen ton  Thomas
The man s e le c te d  to  su cceed  C lem enti was S i r  Shen ton  Thomas whose
42c a r e e r  had been  c o n fin e d  to  B r i t i s h  A f r ic a .  As G overnor o f th e  Gold
C oast 1932-34, Thomas, l i k e  C lem en ti in  M alaya, face d  an economic c r i s i s
w ith  i t s  a t te n d a n t  p o l i t i c a l  u n re s t  among p o l i t i c a l ly - c o n s c io u s  Africans
To ta c k le  t h i s ,  he b e l ie v e d  t h a t  s tro n g  governm ent was e s s e n t i a l  and p ro -
44
ceeded  to  r u le  th e  Gold C oast w ith  a  very  f irm  hand . E a rly  in  1934 he
45s te a m ro lle re d  a  S e d i t io n  B i l l  and a  W aterworks O rdinance th ro u g h  th e  
L e g i s la t iv e  C o u n c il in  th e  t e e th  o f  A fr ic a n  o p p o s i t io n .  T h is  p r e d i l e c t i o n  
f o r  s t ro n g  governm ent was p o s s ib ly  th e  re a so n  why he was s e n t  to  M alaya 
w here th e  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  needed c lo se  s u p e rv is io n .  In  any case  
Thomas was no ad v o ca te  o f Malay r u le  and a cc ep ted  th e  p r e v a i l in g  view 
t h a t  th e  c e n t r a l  g o a l o f  B r i t i s h  r u le  in  M alaya was economic developm ent.
A month a f t e r  h is  a r r i v a l  in  M alaya in  Jan u ary  1935 he inform ed two 
E uropean u n o f f i c i a l  c o u n c i l lo r s  th a t  he was de te rm in ed  to  c o n t ro l  l e g i s l a -
46t i o n  and f in a n c e  and m a in ta in  th e  F e d e ra l C ouncil as a s tro n g  body.
He d e s i r e d  to  av o id  a n o th e r  p e r io d  o f  p o l i t i c a l  tu rm o il  and c o n s id e re d  
h is  ta s k  one o f  q u ie t  c o n s o l id a t io n  in  M alaya. In  p a r t i c u l a r  he s t ro v e  
to  con serv e  th e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u rc e s  o f  th e  FMS, w hich opened him to  f r e ­
quent c r i t i c i s m s  from com m ercial i n t e r e s t s  d u rin g  th e  boom o f th e  l a t e  
471930s. T hese o b je c t iv e s  c a l le d  f o r  c a u t io n  in  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  and 
in c l in e d  Thomas tow ards c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l .  Thomas was p e rm itte d  a  v i r t u a l l y  
f r e e  hand in  c a r ry in g  o u t th e  W ilson r e p o r t  s in c e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  cou ld  
no t be d i r e c te d  from London and b ecau se  th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  ag reed  w ith  th e
above o b je c t iv e s
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Thomas arrived in Malaya in the midst of the most thorny dynastic 
crisis in 20th century Malaya - the Selangor Succession Dispute - which 
was to engage his attention for the next three years. As discussed in 
Chapter two, this dispute arose when the Sultan of Selangor and a 
section of his family resisted the Government's attempt to impose on 
Selangor a heir apparent unacceptable to them. Three aspects of the 
issue seem relevant to decentralisation. Firstly, Adams' stipulation 
late in November 1934 that the heir apparent must have travelled overseas, 
which resulted in the election of the government-sponsored candidate, 
was imposed without the concurrence of Sir Shenton Thomas although Thomas 
had been appointed Governor-High Commissioner in August. As this 
stipulation led directly to the dispute with the Selangor Sultan and 
caused considerable embarrassment to London and the colonial government, 
Thomas appeared to have regarded it as a timely warning that tighter 
control over the Residents was necessary, This event as well as the 
absence of an additional check on the state authorities in the person of 
the former Chief Secretary apparently caused the Secretary of State,
49Ormsby-Gore, to complain later that the new order lacked central control. 
Secondly, the dispute shows how immensely difficult it was to keep an 
intransigent Sultan and members of his family under control. This was 
due, to some extent, to decentralisation which had made the Sultan (as 
well as those of the other states) more assertive. To the British the 
dispute underlined a danger inherent in decentralisation. Both aspects 
of the dispute seemed to have prejudiced Thomas' attitude towards 
decentralisation and strengthened his inclination towards central control.
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Lastly, British officials, who opposed decentralisation, used the
Selangor Succession Dispute 'as a stick to beat the f~devolution 7
51scheme'. They were supported by European commercial interests in
London and M alaya and the Association of British Malaya, Partly owing to
their pressure, T.S. Adams, a decentralisation enthusiast, was promoted
to Chief Commissioner of the Northern Province of Nigeria late in '1936.
By then nearly all the Malayophile officials, who valued decentralisation
32for its own sake, had left the Malayan scene. Another reason why
decentralisation lost its momentum was that Thomas was keenly susceptible
to pressure from the technocrats and commercial interests whose
53representatives were believed to surround him in Singapore.
The creation of the Federal Secretaryship
To Thomas was assigned the task of reorganising the federal
administration to pave the way for the abolition of the Chief Secretaryship.
He readily fell in with the views of the MGS and the commercial interests 
54in the FMS. Late in 1935 he endorsed Wilson's proposal of a resident 
head in Kuala Lumpur because he felt this officer was needed to ensure
uniformity, especially in relation to independent legislation by four
55 56State Councils. He also concurred, despite the Rulers' suspicions,
that this officer should be called Federal Secretary in order to emphasise
that the Federation still existed and that the new officer still exercised
57executive control over certain federal matters. Reflecting his
inclination towards central control, Thomas emphasised that he agreed
wholeheartedly with Clifford that the Federation required a strong Chief 
58Secretary. It seems clear that had it not been for the Wilson report, 
he would have returned to the status quo in the FMS. In recommending a 
strong Federal Secretary to the Colonial Office, he hinted that the 
officer might be promoted to staff rank in the future. Thomas was willing,
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as we s h a l l  s e e ,  to  c o n fe r  on th e  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry  th e  form er C h ie f
S e c r e t a r y ’s power to  te n d e r  'a d v ic e ' to  th e  R u le rs  though on ly  on
f e d e r a l  m a t te r s .  The F e d e ra l S e c r e ta r y ,  he a rg u ed , must be a  s t ro n g
r e s id e n t  head b ecau se  he was th e  on ly  o f f i c e r  to  c o -o rd in a te  p o lic y  in
th e  F e d e ra t io n ,  and re fe re n c e s  to  th e  High Comm issioner would alw ays be
e x te n s iv e  and s i g n i f i c a n t .  He s t r e s s e d  th a t  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f th e
F e d e ra t io n  would depend m ainly  on th e  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry  a s s i s t e d  by th e
59L eg a l A d v ise r and th e  F in a n c ia l  A d v ise r .
H is view s on th e  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry s h ip  were warmly acc ep ted  by th e
60C o lo n ia l O f f ic e .  Though a s tro n g  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry  ten d ed  to  p e rp e tu a te
th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een th e  FMS and th e  UMS, th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  found
Thomas' approach  a s a f e  one to  a d o p t. I t  d id  no t in v o lv e , a t  l e a s t  fo r
th e  p r e s e n t ,  any r a d i c a l  o v e r tu rn  o f  th e  FMS a d m in is t r a t io n .  In  o th e r
w ords, W h ite h a ll w ished to  work tow ards a  M alayan u n ion  in  a way th a t
would n o t cause d r a s t i c  s a c r i f i c  o f e f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  FMS.
Care was ta k en  th a t  th e  c r e a t io n  o f th e  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry s h ip  was
more th a n  a  change in  name as when th e  R e s id e n t-G e n e ra l became th e  C h ie f
S e c re ta ry  in  1909• The new f e d e r a l  head was low ered in  s t a t u s  and s a la r y
and became ju n io r  to  th e  R e s id e n ts .  The s e n io r  R e s id e n t,  no t th e  F e d e ra l
S e c r e ta r y ,  now p re s id e d  over th e  R e s id e n ts ' C onference and th e  F e d e ra l
C ouncil d u rin g  th e  absence o f th e  High Com m issioner. In  term s o f f u n c t io n s ,
th e  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry  was a c o -o rd in a t in g  o f f i c e r  o f  p r im a r i ly  f e d e r a l
m a t te r s ,  though  he was a u th o r is e d  to  d e a l w ith  a ll-M a la y a  a f f a i r s .  In
t h i s  connexion  he perform ed  d u t ie s  as  im p o rtan t as th o se  of th e  R es id e n ts
and was more c lo s e ly  in v o lv ed  w ith  th e  most v i t a l  com m ercial and economic
61problem s in  th e  FMS. He a lso  e x e rc is e d  some m easure o f  c o n t ro l  over 
f e d e r a l  d e p a rtm e n ta l heads such as th e  C o n tro l le r  o f Labour s in c e  he cou ld
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decide the less important federal questions when the issues were clear* In
state matters he only had authority to approve proposals from the Residents
but not to reject them unless sanctioned by the High Commissioner* Though
he ranked equally with the federal heads (Class IA) , the Federal Secretary
wielded considerable 1borrowed power1 by virtue of his federal functions
and his acting as the channel of communication between the High Commissioner
and the states* By subordinating him to the High Commissioner and sharply
reducing his authority over the Residents, the Government prevented the rise
of a quasi-independent head in the FMS. 'He will remember always' , Thomas
explained, 'that the authority in the States is the Ruler, and that the
British Resident is the High Commissioner's representative therein* It is
the right of the Rulers and of the British Resident that they should have
direct access to the High Commissioner.'^ Nevertheless, his considerable
residual powers drew forth a warning from one Colonial Office official:
I do foresee that some day when we get an 
officer like Sir George Maxwell in the post 
of Federal Secretary, we shall have to begin ^  
the process of decentralisation all over again*
Thomas intended to create the Federal Secretaryship in two steps*. 
Under the 1895 Treaty of Federation, the Chief Secretary was empowered to 
tender 'advice1 to the Rulers on all matters except those relating to Islam* 
In November 1935 Thomas proposed to transfer the Chief Secretary's advisory 
power to the High Commissioner or the Federal Secretary by amending the 
Federation Treaty* In practice, 'advice' on federal matters would be 
tendered by the High Commissioner or the Federal Secretary and on state 
matters by the Residents* The chief reason behind the proposal was Thomas' 
douhts as to whether the quasi-treaties with Selangor and Pahang authorised
64the Residents to tender 'advice' to the Rulers* This was only clearly
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s t a t e d  in  th e  l a t t e r ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry *  Thomas f e l t
th a t  th e  p roposed  t r e a t y  r e v is io n  would en su re  t h a t  he c o u ld , when n e c e s s a ry ,
co e rce  th e  S e la n g o r S u l ta n  to  a c c e p t th e  govern m en t's  c a n d id a te  in  th e
65S e la n g o r S u ccess io n  D ispu te*  I t  m ight a ls o  prove h e lp f u l  sh o u ld  th e  
Pahang S u lta n  c h a lle n g e  h i s  R e s id e n t 's  a d v iso ry  pow er, no t a l to g e th e r  an 
u n l ik e ly  even t in  view o f  th e  a s s e r t iv e n e s s  o f th e  Malay R u le rs  d u rin g  th e  
d is p u te .  A lready th e  R u le r  had u n s u c c e s s fu lly  ap p ea led  to  Thomas a g a in s t  
th e  ad v ice  o f  h is  R e s id e n t to  r e s c in d  an o rd e r  o f banishm ent made a g a in s t  
two C h in e se . A c o n t r ib u to ry  re a so n  was Thomas' d e s i r e  f o r  adequa te  c e n t r a l  
c o n t ro l  over th e  f e d e ra te d  s t a t e s .
T h is  s ig n i f i c a n t  r e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  p ro p o sa l was s tro n g ly  opposed by 
th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e .  As W h ite h a ll r i g h t ly  a ssu re d  Thomas, i t  was to o  l a t e  
to  q u e s tio n  th e  R e s id e n ts ' power to  te n d e r  'a d v ic e ' in  S e la n g o r and Pahang 
s in c e  t h i s  had been  e x e rc is e d  w ith  th e  R u le r s ' com plete acq u iescen ce  fo r  
more th a n  h a l f  a c e n t u r y . ^  The p ro p o sa l to  in v e s t  th e  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry  
w ith  a d v iso ry  power on f e d e r a l  m a tte r s  was r e je c te d  s in c e  i t  m ight t r a n s ­
form th e  o f f i c e r  in to  a n o th e r  C h ie f S e c r e ta r y .  The C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  was 
w i l l in g  to  p e rm it t h i s  in  th e  case  o f th e  High Comm issioner b u t though t 
th e  move p re m a tu re . F e d e ra l  m a t te r s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  cou ld  n o t be c l e a r ly  de­
f in e d  u n t i l  f u r th e r  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  had c l e a r ly  fo rm a lis e d  th e  r e l a t io n s
67betw een th e  s t a t e  and th e  f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  M oreover, i t  m ight hamper 
p ro g re s s  tow ards a  M alayan u n ion  by em phasising  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een 
th e  FMS and th e  UMS. The C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  th e r e f o r e  ru le d  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n  
t r e a t y  r e v is io n  be d e fe r re d  u n t i l  a  r e a l  f e d e r a t io n  was e s ta b l i s h e d  in  
th e  FMS.
Thomas a ls o  sough t to  t r a n s f e r ,  by an en ac tm en t, th e  e x te n s iv e
68r i g h t s  and powers o f th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  to  th e  High C om m issioner. T h is 
was very  r e lu c ta n t ly  a cc ep ted  by W h ite h a ll as a tem porary  e s p e d ie n t .
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Early in 1936 the Chief Secretary was abolished, and into his place 
stepped the Federal Secretary, A.D. Ahearne. While out of favour with 
both Clementi and Caldecott, Ahearne was popular with the planting 
community and had just convinced Thomas in 1935 that there existed a 
sizeable Indian domiciled community in Malaya. A year later the Chief 
Secretary*s administrative and statutory powers were distributed to the 
High Commissioner, the Federal Council or the Federal Secretary in regard 
to federal matters and to the Rulers-in-Council or the Residents in rela­
tion to state matters. To some extent, the change resulted in further 
centralisation in Singapore.
The State Councils
While creating a strong substitute for the Chief Secretary, Thomas 
acted to stabilise the state councils. As already discussed, the Govern­
ment had hitherto refused to define the legislative sphere of the state 
councils. Thomas shared the fear of European commercial interests that 
this provided scope for legislative devolution to proceed to an undesirable 
extent, thereby weakening the Federal Council and causing legislative 
chaos in the Federation. He therefore sought to set a limit to devolution 
to the state councils. Unable to appreciate the distinction between 
federal and state matters, Thomas attacked the existing procedure of the 
state councils passing four identical laws as extremely cumbrous and 
inefficient. During a Residents' Conference in January 1935» be ruled 
that laws covering matters of common interest to the states should not be 
enacted by the state councils. This retrogressive move drew a strong
protest from the Resident of Perak that it would violate solemn British
69pledges to the Rulers. As there was no earlier ruling on this point, 
Thomas sought instruction from the Colonial Office. Whitehall supported
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the Resident since the High Commissioners action would have negated all
efforts to create a real federation. It would also have destroyed all
hopes of assimilating the positions of the state councils in all the
nine Malay States. Thomas was therefore advised that the Federal Council
should deal only with matters of common interest in which uniformity was
70absolutely necessary.
Having thus been overruled, the High Commissioner called for a
division of federal and state subjects to guide the legislative activities
71of the Federal and State Councils. In 1935 twenty-three subjects were
reserved to the state councils, and twenty-eight others, dealing with
matters concerning the Federation as a whole, to the central legislature.
To ensure a strong Federal Council, the High Commissioner reserved the
right to declare subjects not included in the list as falling under federal
laws. To a great extent, this move crystallised the spheres of authority
of the respective legislatures. It hindered progress towards a real
72federation aimed at by decentralisation.
Despite this important concession, European unofficial councillors
continued to oppose the existing council procedure because it was unable
to realise maximum uniformity. This reflected the deep-seated hostility
of commercial interests to decentralisation. Already in 193^ + the tabling
of federal laws in the state councils for discussion had helped co-ordinate
federal and state legislation and prevent over-hasty legislation by the 
73Federal Council. In 1935 unofficials were given time to suggest amend­
ments to or improve proposed state laws in between the first and final 
readings of a bill in the state councils. Above all, tight British control 
over the state councils ensured a high degree of uniformity in state laws.
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The Rulers and the Malay intelligentsia were not satisfied with 
developments in the state councils during Thomas’ time. In 1937 the 
Sultan of Pahang pleaded with the Colonial Office to accelerate decentrali­
sation so that his council would be placed on the same footing as the
74Johore State Council. The Malay intelligentsia were increasingly aware
that the change in council membership since Clementi’s time amounted to
75a recognition by the government and tacitly by the Malays that the FMS
were no longer truly Malay States. Nor could the new state councils be
considered Malay bodies, except the Pahang legislature which retained a
Malay majority. Council affairs in the other three states tended to be
increasingly dominated by British officials and non-Malay unofficials who
*76together outnumbered the Malays in the councils. Many of the Malay 
members continued to be unlettered and conservative Malay chiefs unable 
to shoulder the greater legislative and executive responsibilities under 
decentralisation. To this extent, Malays were beginning to be swamped by 
non-Malays in the state councils in the late 1930s. This was a develop­
ment of increasing concern to the Malay intelligentsia. In 1937 they
called for the appointment of public-spirited and capable Malays or even
77the election of Malay members to the councils.
At the close of the period under study, the reorganisation had
failed to revive the Pahang State Council to any notable extent. In Negri
Sembilan the Council of Yam Tuan and Undangs was more active than the 
78Council of State. In Perak and Selangor, however, decentralisation did 
inject a new lease of life into the state councils. The members now 
debated and criticised council matters freely, and serious disagreements 
between the unofficials and the officials were promptly reported to the 
High Commissioner. In brief these councils did manage to convey a sense
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of the reality of state government and restore some form of individuality 
79to the states. It should be noted, however, that the Resident remained 
the moving spirit and controlling power in all the reorganised state 
councils.
Advisory Rule in the FMS
As discussed in the previous chapter, decentralisation sought, among
other things, to convert Resident rule in the FMS into Advisory rule. As
Caldecott explained, decentralisation would be a sham if it merely substi-
80tuted four state bureaucracies for a centralised federal administration.
This view was shayed by the handful of dementi's Malayophile officials
such as T.S. Adams, and was implicitly endorsed by the Wilson report.
81While eager to revive the state councils, the Colonial Office does not 
appear to believe in Advisory rule, although it had implicitly supported 
Maxwell on this issue. ’It is simply a question', Cunliffe-Lister declared 
in Parliament in 1933» ’of whether it is more convenient and more practi­
cable that the same British officers with the same responsibility should 
act through the conduct pipe of the Chief Secretary or be responsible to
ßp
the High Commissioner.' In any case to Whitehall the revival of the
state councils was only a means towards achieving a Malayan union.
By the time Sit Shenton Thomas arrived in Malaya, the Government had
taken two tentative steps towards Advisory rule. In 1933 a move was made
to fashion the state administrations in the Federation after that of
Kedah, partly because of the decentralisation policy but mainly because
83of the desire for administrative economies. In Kedah the districts were
administered by Malay officers under the guidance of British Assistant 
84Advisers. The change in the FMS involved districts and sub-districts 
which were almost all newly placed in the charge of Malay officers under
the supervision of senior British officers in the neighbouring districts.85
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T h is  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  by M alays was to  be c a r r i e d  ou t so
g ra d u a l ly  t h a t  no lo s s  o f  e f f ic ie n c y  would r e s u l t .  The governm ent ex p ec ted
to  p la c e  more d i s t r i c t s  u n d er Malay O f f ic e r s  in  th r e e  years*  tim e when
86th e  p o s i t i o n  would be rev ie w e d . In  193^ th e  Government a ls o  d ec id ed  to  
in v e s t  th e  s t a t e  c o u n c i ls  w ith  th e  power to  make r u l e s , w hich cou ld  be 
l e g a l ly  e n fo rc e d , as th e  f i r s t  s te p  tow ards d ev e lo p in g  them as d e c is io n ­
making b o d ie s  in  a l l  l e g i s l a t i v e  and e x e c u tiv e  m a tte rs  analogous to  th o se  
in  th e  UMS. As th e  l a t t e r  s te p  d id  n o t weaken B r i t i s h  c o n t ro l  o v e r r u l e -  
m aking, Thomas a u th o r is e d  th e  R e s id e n ts  to  p ro c e e d . He r e i t e r a t e d  h i s  
su p p o r t e a r ly  in  1936:
I f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  i s  to  su c c e e d , s u r e ly  i t  i s  
th e  R u le r to  whom power sh o u ld  be t r a n s f e r r e d  
w henever p o s s i b le ,  o r  th e  R u le r - in -C o u n c il  i f  
t h a t  i s  p r e f e r a b l e .  B r i t i s h  A dv isers  in  th e  
UMS have no (o r  v e ry  few) e x e c u tiv e  pow ers. ^
The in t r o d u c t io n  o f  A dvisory r u le  had n e c e s s a r i ly  to  be c a r r i e d  ou t 
more g ra d u a lly  and c a r e f u l ly  th a n  o th e r  a s p e c ts  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  S u ccess  
h e re  depended as much on Malay c a p a c i t i e s  to  ho ld  t h e i r  own a g a in s t  non- 
Malay p re s s u re  as on B r i t i s h  w il l in g n e s s  to  t r a n s f e r  c o n t ro l  to  Malay h a n d s . 
The problem  th a t  had to  be g ra p p le d  w ith  was th a t  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  non- 
M alays cou ld  no t be ig n o re d  in  th e  FMS. C le a r ly  i t  was n o t p r a c t i c a b l e  
to  hand over dynamic non-M alay i n t e r e s t s  to  Malay r u le  u n d er th e  R u le rs  
and t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  c h i e f s .  A dvisory  r u le  on ly  seemed p r a c t ic a b l e  i f  a  
s iz a b l e  body o f  t r a in e d  Malay a d m in is t r a to r s  e x is te d  in  th e  FMS backed  up 
by o rg a n ise d  Malay o p in io n . T h is  was th e  s i t u a t i o n  in  Kedah and , to  an 
im p o rtan t e x te n t ,  in  Jo h o re  where th e  non-M alay e lem en ts  were o f  c o n s id e r ­
a b le  s ig n i f i c a n c e .  But as d is c u s s e d  in  C hap ter S ix ,  Malay a d m in is t r a to r s
formed a s u b s id ia ry  o f  th e  MCS and were n o t ready  to  re p la c e  th e  l a t t e r  in
88th e  FMS. T h is  in  i t s e l f  would have s t u l t i f i e d  t h i s  a sp e c t o f d e c e n t r a l i ­
s a t i o n .  Nor cou ld  i t  be s a id  t h a t  th e  Malay n a t i o n a l i s t s  were s u f f i c i e n t l y
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confident and strong to mobilise Malay opinion in support of'Malay rule.' 
Hence, Advisory rule in the FMS was not a feasible proposition in the 
1930s.
To make matters worse, the MCS, as discussed in the previous 
chapters, opposed Advisory rule because it threatened the virtual monopoly 
of power it now enjoyed. The non-Malay interests condemned it as impracti­
cable and therefore dangerous. Even before T.S. Adams left Malays in 193&,
the MCS, supported by European unofficial councillors, set to work to
89negate this aspect of decentralisation. They succeeded since Thomas was
l >no champion of Malay rule# Under the Thomas regime* only a small measure?
of statutory power was transferred to the Rulers-in-Council. Even so, part
of this was deflected into the Residents' hands. It was Wilson's ruling
that the Chief Secretary's statutory powers over state matters should be
transferred to the Rulers-in-Council. This decision was effected in 1937,
but some of these powers concerning routine state matters were instead
90invested in the Residents. Likewise, the High Commissioner was persuaded 
by his advisers to confer the Chief Secretary's powers under the General 
Orders on the Residents. Furthermore the experiment to model the state 
administrations after that in Kedah was not continued. In fact Thomas
92strove to keep the Rulers out of the actual administration of the states.
For instance, he rejected the Sultan of Pahang's request in 1937 that
certain lower-paid state officers should be appointed by the Rulers-in-
Council. These officers, he explained, were currently appointed by the
Residents in accordance with the wishes of the Rulers. The Sultan was
accordingly advised not to try to concentrate all powers in his own hands
93or in the state council. ^ To all intents and purposes, the goal of 
Advisory rule was quietly abandoned late in 1937*
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Consequently, decentralisation only enhanced the prestige of the 
FMS Rulers, and helped to prolong the myth that the British were in Malaya 
to teach the Rulers and the Malay aristocracy how to administer Malay States. 
This helped to justify the continued exclusion of the Chinese and Indians 
from the MCS and the refusal to democratise the Federation. Decentralisa­
tion in the 1930s neither reorganised the federal administration over- 
drastically nor challenged the British virtual monopoly of power. In 
effect it increased the powers of the Residents. They now exercised a 
greater degree of control over those departments devolved to the states.
And assisted by the Financial Adviser, the Legal Adviser and the Federal 
Secretary, the Residents in Conference practically determined state legis­
lation and the size of the lump sums for the state budgets. They even had 
a stronger say now in federal finance because of their appointment, for 
the first time, to the Finance Committee of the Federal Council in 1932.^  
With the disappearance of the Chief Secretary, the Residents' Conference 
also became correspondingly more important as a co-ordinating authority 
advising the High Commissioner on matters of common interest to the states.
As a concomitant to these developments, the Residents no longer felt they
were robots of a centralised bureaucracy and began to show more personal
95interest and initiative in state affairs. And in the larger term of state 
administrations, exactly the same British officials continued to control 
and direct them.
The first stage of decentralisation came to a close at the end of
1937« But neither the official community nor the commercial interests
96seemed in a hurry to proceed to the second stage of the policy. It was
not until January 1939 that the government took the first concrete step 
in that direction. The State Treasuries, hitherto parts of a purely
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federal department, then became separate and distinct state departments.
Under the supervision of the Accountant-General (the former Federal
Treasurer), the State Treasurers were empowered to perform all the financial
work in the states, including advising the Residents on state financial 
97policy. Seven months later, a Residents' Conference recommended the
convening of a committee comprising two Residents and two financial experts
98to study the second stage of decentralisation. It is not known, however, 
whether the committee was in fact appointed. In effect decentralisation 
ended in 19^0 when official attention was diverted fully to building up 
Malayan defences against an impending Pacific War.
Effects on the UMS
Though Clementi succeeded, to a fairly important extent, in
decentralising the FMS administration, he made no headway towards his central
goal of a Malayan union. This Malayan ideal was generally accepted in Malaya
except the UMS. It had been expounded by Dr. Lim Boon Keng in the Colony's
Legislature Council as long ago as 1920 and reiterated by Tan Cheng Lock
in the same council six years later. Speaking on behalf of the European
unofficial community, Robson supported it in the Federal Council in 1921.
Even the Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan and the Sultan of Perak invited the
99UMS to join the FMS during the Kuala Kangsar Durbar in 1927« But this 
idea was regarded only as the ultimately inevitable and desirable goal in 
the distant future. Unlike Dr. Lim Boon Keng and Tan Cheng Lock, Straits 
mercantile interests opposed the inclusion of the Colony in a larger Malayan 
union. Until a way had been devised to safeguard effectively the Colony's 
free ports, the idea was considered disastrous to the prosperity of the 
settlements. It was also opposed by many in the FMS for fear that it would 
impose 'the fetters of Singapore' on the Federation. The FMS Rulers, on 
the other hand, feared that a Malayan union inclusive of the Colony would
216
e v e n tu a l ly  c o n v e rt t h e i r  p r o te c te d  s t a t e s  in to  a  Crown C olony. D uring th e  
in te rw a r  y e a r s ,  th e  governm ent th e r e f o r e  was p re p a re d  to  exclude th e  C olony, 
f o r  th e  tim e b e in g ,  from i t s  p roposed  lo o s e - k n i t  M alayan f e d e r a t io n .
As d is c u s s e d  in  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r ,  th e  s t r u g g le  a g a in s t  th e
M alayan u n io n  p ro p o s a l was m ainly u n d e rta k en  by th e  UMS. D uring h is  to u r
o f  M alaya, W ilson a ssu re d  th e  S u lta n  o f  Jo h o re  and th e  Regent o f  Kedah th a t
'H is  M a je s ty 's  Government have no in t e n t io n  o f r e q u i r in g  th e  R u le r o f any
UMS to  e n te r  a g a in s t  h is  w i l l  in to  any k in d  o f  M alaya League o r  U n io n .'
Im pressed  by th e  deep s u s p ic io n s  a ro u sed  by d e m e n t i 's  p o l i c y ,  he ru le d
t h a t  a l l  changes sh o u ld  be d e fe r re d  w hich m ight ap p ea r to  th e  UMS R u le rs
101as an a tte m p t to  fo rc e  them in to  any c lo s e r  u n io n . In  o th e r  w ords, th e  
M alayan Government was in s t r u c te d  to  c o n c e n tra te  on d e c e n t r a l i s in g  th e  FMS, 
w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e c o n tin u in g  to  f o s t e r  w id e r c o -o p e ra tio n  in  m a tte rs  
o f  common concern  among th e  Malay S t a t e s .  To London and S ingapo re  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  rem ained a t a c t i c  to  ach iev e  a more r a t i o n a l  and 
r e c e n t r a l i s e d  M alayan Government.
To u n d e rs ta n d  th e  e f f e c t s  in  th e  UMS o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  and o f  
C le m e n ti 's  f a i l u r e  to  b r in g  about a  M alayan u n io n , i t  i s  n e c e ssa ry  to  
examine A dvisory  r u le  in  g r e a te r  d e t a i l  th a n  in  C h ap te r T h ree . As a lre a d y  
m en tioned , th e  R u le r  and th e  Malay e l i t e  co n tin u e d  to  run  th e  a d m in is tr a t io n  
o f an u n fe d e ra te d  s t a t e ,  w h ile  th e  A dv iser was a  r e a l  a d v is e r  w ith o u t 
e x e c u tiv e  pow er. As f a r  as was consonan t w ith  im p e r ia l  p o l ic y ,  th e  l a t t e r  
u s u a l ly  sough t to  develop  th e  s t a t e  as a  t r u l y  Malay S ta te  in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f th e  Malay p o p u la t io n .  He th e r e f o r e  ag reed  w ith  th e  Malay a d m in is tr a to r s  
n o t to  E u ro p ean ise  th e  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  th e  s t a t e .  C onseq u en tly , 
th e  R u le r had a r e a l  sh a re  in  th e  governm ent o f h i s  s t a t e  th ro u g h  th e  S ta te  
C o u n c il, w hich had no non-M alay member ex cep t th e  A d v iso r, and th e  Malay 
S e c r e t a r i a t .  L e g i s l a t i v e ,  f i n a n c ia l  and e x e c u tiv e  powers were in  th e  hands 
o f  th e  R u le r - in -C o u n c il , w hile  th e  Malay S e c r e t a r i a t  was th e  main a d m in is t r a t iv e
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organ in the state. The chief administrative officer of the state, who
headed the Malay Secretariat, was a Malay, usually a member of the ruling
house. The judiciary system was run by Malay magistrates and judges
assisted by a few European judges in the high court. The heads of
departments, the district and land officers and nearly all the subordinate
officers were Malays. The only sphere of administration dominated by
European officers were the technical services such as the survey, medical,
public works and other departments. The few European officers not in these
services filled special posts such as Land Adviser, Legal Adviser, Protector
102of Chinese and Protector of Indian Labour. Finally, the language of
administration was Malay. There were of course variations in the five UMS,
especially in Johore where the system deviated from the norm to an important 
103extent. ' But in terms of the exercise of political powers Johore was 
akin to the other states.
During the interwar years, the Adviser, except of Johore, also
endeavoured to limit the inflow of non-Malay labour, especially Chinese,
104into the state. This was to ensure that basic economic control would,
at least to a substantial extent, remain in Malay hands. This objective
was easily achieved in Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis which were out of the
main run of economic development in the Peninsula. In Kedah there was
strong opposition to Chinese penetration of the state and all legitimate
105measures were pursued to block it. British rule did not lead to the
rise of a British-Chinese-Indian commercial complex as in the FMS, except 
in the case of Johore.
The rise of a markedly different system of indirect rule in the UMS 
was mainly due to the far-sighted policy of the Malay ruling class. Though 
confronted by financial difficulties and acute shortage of trained officers 
and despite their eagerness for economic progress in their states, the 
northern UMS were determined to drive for a better bargain than that 
obtain by their counterparts in the FMS. Above all, they desired to retain
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as f a r  as p o s s ib le  th e  h ig h  degree  o f freedom  th e y  had en joyed  under
S iam ese o v e r lo rd s h ip .  From th e  o u t s e t ,  th e  R u le rs  o f th e  UMS s tro n g ly
opposed any a ttem p t to  im pose on them an o f f i c i a l  on th e  R esid en t
p a t t e r n .  A ll th e  UMS f l a t l y  re fu s e d  to  jo in  th e  FMS.
In  th e  i n i t i a l  s ta g e s  o f Anglo-UMS c o n ta c t ,  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  d id
n o t commit them selves to  a  t r u l y  a d v iso ry  system  o f  a d m in is tr a t io n  in
t h e i r  newly a c q u ire d  s t a t e s .  A f te r  a l l ,  th e  B r i t i s h  aim to  develop  th e
FMS in to  ’ a  un ion  w ith  one system  o f  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  a  c e n t r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e
106and a common t r e a s u r y  was in  e f f e c t  n o t abandoned u n t i l  1920. Some
B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  s e n t  to  Kedah a f t e r  1905 w ere unsy m p ath e tic  to  th e
Malay s ta n d p o in t  and ad voca ted  t h a t  th e  th e n  B r i t i s h  F in a n c ia l  A dv iser
107sh o u ld  e x e rc is e  th e  powers o f  a  R es id e n t in  th e  FMS. I n i t i a l l y  S i r
John Anderson a ls o  h e ld  t h i s  view and p re d ic te d  t h a t  George M axw ell, th e
f i r s t  A dv iser to  Kedah, would soon ’dom inate th e  p a la c e  c l iq u e ’ .
D uring th e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f h i s  o f f i c e ,  Maxwell was co n s id e re d  by th e  Kedah
R u le r  and th e  Malay a d m in is tr a to r s  to  have o v e rs tep p e d  th e  bounds o f  h i s
d u ty . He b y -p assed  th e  S ta t e  C ouncil on s e v e r a l  o c c a s io n s , p roposed
th a t  a l l  o f f i c i a l  co rrespondence  sh o u ld  go th ro u g h  th e  Resid e n t -G en e ra l
o f th e  FMS, d e s ir e d  to  be ap p o in te d  V ic e -P re s id e n t o f th e  S ta te  C o u n c il,
109and a ttem p ted  to  s u p e rv is e  a l l  s t a t e  d e p a rtm e n ts . Had th e se  p r a c t i c e s
no t been fough t by Kedah Malay a d m in i s t r a to r s , i t  i s  co n c e iv a b le  th a t
th e y  might e v e n tu a lly  have le d  to  a  R e s id e n t- ty p e  a d v is e r  in  th e  s t a t e .
In  t h e i r  s t r u g g le  f o r  a t r u l y  a d v iso ry  sy stem , th e  hand o f  th e  Malay
a d m in is tr a to r s  was s tre n g th e n e d  by th e  e x is te n c e  o f a  r e l a t i v e l y  e f f i c i e n t
110a d m in is tr a t io n  w hich cou ld  e a s i l y  be m od ified  to  meet B r i t i s h  needs#
In  th e  case  o f Joh o re  th e  g r e a t e r  d eg ree  s t a t e  autonomy was ensu red  
even e a r l i e r  by two cap ab le  and f o r c e f u l  R u le r s ,  S u lta n  Abu Bakar and 
h is  so n , S u lta n  Ibrahim # The i n i t i a l  s u c c e s s fu l  r e s i s te n c e  o f Jo h o re  
and Kedah to  any a tte m p t by th e  B r i t i s h  to  e x e rc is e  e x e c u tiv e  a u th o r i ty  
s e t t l e d  th e  p a t te r n  o f  a d v iso ry  r u le  in  th e  UMS#
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B r i t i s h  p re s s u re  in  T rengganu , K e lan tan  and P e r l i s  was l e s s  marked 
s in c e  th e se  s t a t e s  were ou t o f th e  m ainstream  o f  developm ent in  th e  
c o u n try . N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  B r i t i s h  en co u n te red  s im i la r  Malay d e te rm in a ­
t i o n  in  th e  o th e r  u n fe d e ra te d  s t a t e s  n o t to  acc ep t a  R e s id e n t- ty p e  A d v ise r . 
Even th e  weak and v a c i l l a t i n g  S u lta n  o f K e lan tan  q u e rie d  th e  A d v ise r’s 
r i g h t  to  f ly  th e  Union Jack  o v er th e  l a t t e r ' s  re s id e n c e  in  1910. At th e
same tim e h is  a larm  induced  A nderson to  drop a su g g e s tio n  to  change th e
111t i t l e  o f  B r i t i s h  A dv iser to  B r i t i s h  R e s id e n t.  Malay r e s i s te n c e  was
more marked in  Trengganu where S u lta n  Z a in a l A bid in  I I I  had s u c c e s s fu l ly
f o i l e d  S iam ese a tte m p ts  to  e x e rc is e  c o n t ro l  and ap p o in t an A d v iser to  h is
s t a t e  u nder th e  A nglo-Siam ese T re a ty  o f  1902. He a g a in  re fu s e d  to  acc ep t
a  B r i t i s h  A dv iser when Trengganu was t r a n s f e r r e d  to  th e  B r i t i s h  under th e
112A nglo-Siam ese T rea ty  o f  1909* The B r i t i s h ,  on th e  o th e r  hand , r e a l i s e d
th ey  had to  'w alk  w a r i ly ' in  Trengganu l e s t  th ey  provoked a  j ih a d  in  t h i s
113in te n s e ly  f e l ig io u s  s t a t e .  C o n seq u en tly , on ly  a B r i t i s h  agen t w ith
mere c o n su la r  powers was s ta t io n e d  in  Trengganu and he was t r e a te d  as such
1 1  ii. , (
by S u lta n  A bidin  I I I .  Even so  th e  R aja  Muda, su p p o rte d  by a  r e fo rm is t
g ro u p , advocated  to u g h e r r e s i s te n c e  to  th e  B r i t i s h .  I t  was n o t u n t i l  1919
th a t  an A dv iser was ap p o in ted  in  Trengganu u nder a  new t r e a t y  c o n tra c te d
a f t e r  d i f f i c u l t  and b i t t e r  n e g o t ia t io n s  and a t  th e  c o s t o f th e  a b d ic a tio n
o f S u lta n  Ahmad (su c c e s so r  to  S u l ta n  A bid in  I I I ) .  H ence, Trengganu
had an a n t i - B r i t i s h  r e p u ta t io n  and i t s  Malay e l i t e  were c o n s id e re d  by th e
1 *16B r i t i s h  th e  most d i f f i c u l t  o f f i c i a l s  to  work w ith .  In  s h o r t  Malay 
d e te rm in a tio n  to  p re se rv e  th e  g r e a t e r  deg ree  o f  s t a t e  autonomy must have 
in f lu e n c e d  th e  B r i t i s h  not to  impose a R e s id e n t- ty p e  A d v iser in  T rengganu,
K e lan tan  and P e r l i s
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The system  hav ing  been  th u s  la rg e ly  d e term ined  a t  an e a r ly  s t a g e , i t
was easy  f o r  B r i t i s h  A d v ise rs  p o s te d  to  th e  UMS to  r e - o r i e n t a t e  them selves
to  a  new o rd e r .  Nor were th e y  a v e rse  to  do ing  s o .  L a rg e ly  owing to  th e
in f lu e n c e  o f  L ugard , i n d i r e c t  r u le  had a c q u ire d  an enhanced p r e s t i g e  by
th e  second  decade o f  t h i s  c e n tu ry .  The B r i t i s h  A d v ise rs  co n seq u en tly  had
more sympathy and t r u s t  in  Malay s o c ie ty  and i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Having seen
how a l i e n  p r o s p e r i ty  in  th e  FMS had been p u rch ased  a t  th e  c o s t o f  Malay
117i n t e r e s t s ,  th ey  d e s ir e d  to  av o id  a  s im i la r  s i t u a t i o n  in  th e  UMS. Hence,
th e y  c o -o p e ra te d  w ith  th e  Malay a d m in is tr a to r s  to  develop  th e  UMS along
d i f f e r e n t  l i n e s .  In d eed , some A dv isers  even used  t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  to  d i s -
118courage th e  UMS from c o n s id e r in g  e n try  in to  th e  FMS. I t  s h o u ld , how ever,
be n o te d  th a t  Malay r e s i s t e n c e  to  r e a l  o r  a l le g e d  B r i t i s h  encroachm ent on 
t h e i r  autonomy rem ained a  s a l i e n t  f e a tu r e  o f Anglo-UMS r e l a t i o n s  r i g h t  to  
th e  Second World War.
Under th e  c irc u m sta n c e s  , an e a r ly  f e d e r a t io n  o f  th e  FMS and th e  UMS
cou ld  be e f f e c te d  on ly  by r e s o r t  to  com pulsion . T h is  was ru le d  ou t d u rin g
A n d erso n 's  tim e because  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  d id  no t want ' a  s t a t e  o f a f f a i r s
119as o b ta in e d  in  Acheen f o r  n e a r ly  f o r ty  y e a r s ' .  D uring  th e  in te rw a r
y e a rs  th e re  was 'n o  p r a c t i c a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty ' to  ta k e  t h i s  extrem e 
120co u rse  o f  a c t io n .  The c o lo n ia l  power en co u n te red  no d i f f i c u l t i e s  in
c a r ry in g  ou t im p e r ia l  p o l ic y  in  th e  UMS o r  in  g e t t in g  them to  adhere to  a
121f a i r l y  h ig h  d eg ree  o f  u n ifo rm ity  w ith  g e n e ra l M alayan p o l i c y .  Nor d id  
th e  Malay a d m in is tr a t io n s  in  any way h in d e r ,  l e a s t  o f  a l l  end an g er, e f f e c t iv e  
B r i t i s h  c o n t ro l  over th e  s t a t e s .  In  an e r a  where th e  k e y -n o te s  o f  B r i t i s h  
p o lic y  in  M alaya w ere ' p eace  and p r o g r e s s ' , i t  c e r t a in l y  appeared  to  most 
B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  ex trem ely  unw ise to  rock  th e  M alayan b o a t .
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Indeed  any r e s o r t  to  com pulsion  would be met by open Malay r e s i s t e n c e
on th e  b a s is  o f  t r e a t y  r i g h t s .  As th e  a s tu te  R u le rs  o f  Jo h o re  and Kedah
122would c e r t a in l y  c a r ry  t h e i r  s t r u g g le  over to  London, th e  a c c u s a tio n  o f
'b a d  f a i t h '  would s e r io u s ly  em barass th e  B r i t i s h  Governm ent. I n t e r n a l l y ,
M alay c o -o p e ra t io n  would be f o r f e i t e d  -  a  fo rm id ab le  e v e n tu a l i ty  in  s t a t e s
w here th e  R u le rs  commanded p ro fo u n d  in f lu e n c e  among th e  r a 'a y a t  and w here
th e  a d m in is t r a t io n s  were to  a l l  in t e n t s  and pu rp o ses  manned and run  by 
123M alay o f f i c i a l s .  M oreover, any b e l i e f  o f  B r i t i s h  'b a d  f a i t h '  in  th e  UMS 
w ould ag g ra v a te  th e  d is c o n te n t  and d i s t r u s t  among th e  FMS R u le rs  and would 
underm ine B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  o f  s t r e n g th e n in g  in d i r e c t  r u le  in  th e  FMS. L a s t ly  
th e r e  was no u rgency  in  b r in g in g  th e  UMS in to  a w ider F e d e ra tio n  when th e  
B r i t i s h  were th e n  a t te m p tin g  to  overcome th e  b u re a u c a t ie a t io n  and o v e r­
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  in  th e  FMS w hich had reduced  th e  R u le rs  to  c y p h e rs . In  
s h o r t  b o th  London and M alaya co m p le te ly  ag reed  th a t  th e  on ly  a c c e p ta b le  
M alayan Union was one f r e e l y  and v o lu n ta r i ly  c o n tra c te d  by th e  Malay S ta t e s  
T h is  th e  UMS R u le rs  s t r o n g ly  opposed because  o f th e  f e a r  o f th e  lo s s
o f  th e  autonomy and th e  Malay c h a r a c te r  o f  t h e i r  s t a t e s .  A lthough th e
124W ilson r e p o r t  was g e n e ra l ly  welcomed in  th e  UMS, i t  f a i l e d  to  a l l a y  th e
R u le r s ' s u s p ic io n s  a l t o g e th e r .  A f te r  a l l ,  W ilso n 's  a s su ra n c e  t h a t  th e  UMS
would n o t be fo rc e d  to  jo in  a  M alayan u n io n  was on ly  a  r e i t e r a t i o n  o f  a
w ell-know n B r i t i s h  p ronouncem ent. What was more im p o rtan t was t h a t
C le m e n ti 's  a c t iv e  cam paign f o r  such  a  u n ion  had l e f t  en d u rin g  f e a r s  among 
125th e  UMS R u le r s .  Nor had th e  W ilson r e p o r t  p ersuaded  C lem enti to  adop t 
a  more t a c t f u l  and c o n c i l i a to r y  approach  tow ards them .
The fe a r  o f  the UMS was ev id en t from the p r o te s t  o f  the Regent o f  
Kedah in  1933 a g a in st  c e r ta in  s e c t io n s  o f  the R eport. He r ig h t ly  p erce iv ed  
th a t B r it is h  p o lic y  aimed u lt im a te ly  to  crea te  a Malayan fe d e r a tio n  in c lu ­
s iv e  o f  Kedah. As he saw i t ,  t h i s  was ev ident from W ilson 's d e s ir e  to  se e
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th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of some new c e n t r a l  machinery f o r  d e a l in g  w ith  Malayan
m a t te r s  i n t o  which th e  f e d e r a l  a d m in i s t r a t io n  o f  th e  FMS could  be ab so rb ed .
F e a r in g  t h a t  Kedah would be i n d i r e c t l y  coerced  i t i to  such  a u n io n ,  th e
Regent r e q u e s te d  a d e f i n i t e  s ta te m e n t  on th e  u l t im a te  aim o f  th e  Wilson
R e p o r t .  He em phasised t h a t  Kedah would r e s i s t  s t r o n g ly  even j o i n t
d i s c u s s io n  on common m a t te r s  i f  t h i s  shou ld  in  any way a f f e c t  the
*126' in d e p e n d e n c e '  o f  th e  s t a t e .
A pparen tly  f e a r i n g  t h a t  C lem enti would p r e s e n t  him w ith  a f a i t
accom pli ,  th e  Regent a l s o  asked f o r  a ssu ran ce  on two o th e r  i s s u e s .  F i r s t l y ,
he wished to  be a s s u re d  t h a t  the  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  departm en ts  l i k e  th e  P o s ts
and T e le g ra p h s ,  Malayan E s ta b l ish m e n t  O f f i c e ,  S e c r e t a r i a t  f o r  Chinese
A f f a i r s  and so on would no t a l t e r  th e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  Kedah
and would no t be imposed on h i s  s t a t e  w ith o u t th e  p r i o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  and
a p p ro v a l  o f  th e  Kedah S t a t e  C o u n c i l .  Second ly ,  he opposed any e x te n s io n
in to  Kedah o f  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  Advisory C ounc il  p roposed  by Wilson
to  h e l p  m ain ta in  un ifo rm  p o l i c y  r e l a t i n g  to  th o s e  FMS s e r v ic e s  t r a n s f e r r e d
to  th e  S t a t e s .  He f e a r e d  t h a t  th e  C ouncil would ta k e  over  th e  e x e c u t iv e
d i r e c t i o n  o f  those  departm en ts  in v o lv ed  from th e  form er f e d e r a l  h ead s ,  and
128would e v e n tu a l ly  ex tend  i t s  fu n c t io n s  over s i m i l a r  departm en ts  in  Kedah.
S a t i s f a c t o r y  a ssu ran ces  were o f f e r e d  by th e  Kedah B r i t i s h  A dviser on th e
l a s t  two m a t te r s .  But t o  th e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  r a i s e d  by th e  R egen t,  th e
129A dviser  cou ld  p rov ide  no s a t i s f a c t o r y  r e p ly  s in c e  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  d id  
in  f a c t  aim a t  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a Malayan u n io n .
T h is  was p ro b ab ly  one of t h e  rea so n s  why C lem enti de layed  sen d in g  th e  
R e g e n t 's  l e t t e r  to  th e  C o lo n ia l  O f f i c e  and tw ice  i n v i t e d  th e  r u l e r  to  d i s c u s s  
th e  m a t te r  w ith  him. At t h i s  s t a g e  C lem enti a p p a re n t ly  s t i l l  in ten d ed  to  
p la c e  th e  f e d e r a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  under  th e  S e c r e t a r y  t o  the  High Commissioner
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through whom he could effectively direct the affairs of the nine Malay
States. The main reason for the delay appears therefore to be that the
Regent's request might prejudice Whitehall's attitude towards Clementi's
reorganisation plan. To the High Commissioner's invitations for
130discussion, the Regent studiously declined to comply. This probably
reflected his dislike of Clementi's past high-handed dealings with the
Rulers as well as his fear that he might be led to withdraw his appeal.
After all, it was the Colonial Office's ruling, not the High Commissioner's,
that he was interested in. It subsequently emerged that the protest was
disavowed by Tengku Mahmud and by the State Council because they were not
consulted by the Regent. However, there is no doubt that the Kedah
Government shared the views of the Regent as also did the Sultan of Johore.
In fact Kedah and Johore continued to maintain a 'united front' against
Clementi on the question of a Malayan union. The Sultqn of Johore
apparently even advised the Regent to consult Roland Braddell, his private
legal adviser, on the latter's constitutional status under the Anglo-Kedah 
131Treaty of 1923» When pressed by the colonial government to account for
his action, the Regent insisted that he was empowered under the treaty to
write directly to the High Commissioner or the Secretary of State without
132the prior consent of the Kedah State Council.
It should be noted that the Regent did not ask for a greater degree 
of state autonomy or any change in the existing treaty relationship. The 
incident indicates that Clementi was still unable or unwilling to head 
Wilson's advice that every effort be made to avoid arousing UMS suspicions. 
Highly resentful of the Regent's conduct, he sought sanction from Whitehall 
to take two measures. Firstly, he wished the Regent censured for acting 
independently of the State Council on the ground that the ruler would
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o th e rw ise  be more d i f f i c u l t  to  c o n t ro l  in  th e  f u tu r e .  S eco n d ly , a r u l in g
from th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  was d e s i r e d  to  p re v e n t Malay R u le rs  from seek in g
p r iv a t e  l e g a l  a d v ic e  on any g r ie v a n c e  a g a in s t  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y .  The l a t t e r
re q u e s t  was r e j e c t e d  o u t r ig h t  by W h ite h a ll s in c e  th e  t r e a t y  d id  no t in v e s t
th e  governm ent w ith  such  a u t h o r i t y .  M oreover, as one C o lo n ia l O ff ic e
o f f i c i a l  em p h asised , th e  S u lta n  o f  Jo h o re  would r e s i s t  any such  r u l in g  to
134th e  l a s t  d i t c h .  No d e c is io n  on th e  f i r s t  r e q u e s t  was n e c e ssa ry  s in c e
th e  Regent d ie d  in  1934. The Kedah G overnm ent, how ever, co n tin u ed  to  be
135h ig h ly  s u s p ic io u s  o f  th e  W ilson R e p o r t.
D e sp ite  th e  W ilson R e p o r t ,  S u l ta n  Ib rah im  a ls o  co n tin u ed  to  f e a r  th a t  
B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  sou g h t to  u n ify  a l l  th e  s t a t e s  in  th e  P e n in s u la .  He s c ru ­
p u lo u s ly  avo ided  a s s o c ia t in g  h im se lf  w ith  any developm ent th a t  might be 
r e l a t e d  to  t h i s  B r i t i s h  g o a l .  Alone o f  a l l  th e  Malay R u le r s ,  Ib rah im  
re fu s e d  to  a t te n d  th e  second  A ll» R u le rs  D uriiar in  S ingapo re  in  F ebruary
1 9 3 4 .^ ^  To j u s t i f y  t h i s  he con tended  t h a t  Jo h o re  d i f f e r e d  l e g a l l y ,
137econ o m ica lly  and p o l i t i c a l l y  from th e  o th e r  Malay S t a t e s .  T h is  re v iv e d  
th e  c o n tro v e r s y ,  as d is c u s s e d  in  C h ap te r F o u r, ov er J o h o r e 's  t r e a ty  p o s i ­
t i o n  w ith  p a r t i c u l a r  r e fe re n c e  to  Ib ra h im 's  r ig h t  to  a d d re ss  C lem enti as
'G o v e rn o r '.  U n d e te rred  by th e  W ilson r e p o r t ,  C lem enti renewed h is  p ro p o sa l
138to  'a d v i s e '  Ib rah im  to  a d d re ss  him as 'H igh  C om m issioner'. As in  1932,
th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  d id  n o t c o n s id e r  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  is s u e  invo lv ed
s u f f i c i e n t l y  im p o rta n t to  w a rra n t a  c r i s i s  in  J o h o re . In  th e  l i g h t  o f the
W ilso n 's  r e p o r t ,  W h ite h a ll was now more eag e r th a n  e v e r  to  avo id  s t i r r i n g
UMS s u s p ic io n s  t h a t  th e  Government in te n d e d  to  sweep them in to  th e  FMS n e t .
C lem en ti was th e r e f o r e  ad v ise d  to  drop h is  p ro p o sa l to  d i s c i p l in e  Ib rah im .
A f te r  C le m e n ti 's  d e p a r tu re  from M alaya, th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e ,  under
139th e  a d v ic e  o f Edward G en t, was e a g e r  to  see  a more a s s e r t iv e  approach
tow ards th e  UMS th a n  th e  v ery  c a u t io u s  one s e t  out by th e  W ilson r e p o r t .
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H olding th a t  th e  c e n t r a l  aim o f  B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  sho u ld  be a lo o s e - k n i t
M alayan f e d e r a t io n ,  i t  c a l le d  f o r  s te p s  to  b u i ld  up a Pan-M alayan 
140m ach inery . To t h i s  en d , th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  was w i l l in g  to  drop W ilso n 's
p ro p o s a l o f  a  FMS A dvisory  C o u n c il in  fa v o u r o f  a Pan-M alayan A dvisory
C o u n c il. To t h i s  p roposed  body would be e n t ru s te d  th e  ta s k  o f a d v is in g
th e  governm ent on m a tte r s  r e f e r r e d  to  i t  by th e  High C om m issioner. The
C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  em phasised th a t  th e  c o u n c i l ,  i f  i t  were to  f o s t e r  M alayan
u n i t y ,  sh o u ld  com prise  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  th e  Malay S ta te s  and th e  C olony,
be p u re ly  a d v is o ry ,  and sh o u ld  n o t encroach  on th e  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  v a r io u s
l e g i s l a t u r e s  in  M alaya. L a te  in  1934, C a ld e c o tt was th e r e f o r e  i n s t r u c te d
to  c o n s id e r  th e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f t h i s  c o u n te r -p ro p o s a l .
T h is  p ro p o s a l was among th e  many d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  m easures w hich came
b e fo re  S i r  Shen ton  Thomas on h i s  a r r i v a l  in  M alaya. Thomas l a i d  i t  a s id e
f o r  a y e a r  to  a llo w  h im se lf  tim e to  a s s e s s  th e  M alayan scene  more th o ro u g h ly .
M eanw hile, in  view o f th e  UMS a t t i t u d e ,  S i r  Shenton  Thomas was e a g e r  to
av o id  je o p a rd is in g  th e  e v e n tu a l c r e a t io n  o f a  M alayan un ion  by p r e s s in g  too
142q u ic k ly  tow ards i t .  As a  Jo h o re  Committee d e sc r ib e d  i t  in  1939» t h i s ,
p o l ic y  ' i s  a nebu lous th in g  . . . .  I t  n ib b le s ,  som etim es making i t s  b i t s  and
som etim es b e in g  r e j e c t e d .  I t s  very  e x is te n c e  cou ld  even be d en ied  by a
14-3c a s u i s t ;  y e t  i t  n e v e r th e le s s  e x i s t s ' .  Under t h i s  p o l i c y ,  th e  p re v io u s  
p r a c t i c e  o f  en co u rag in g  th e  v a r io u s  s t a t e  a d m in is tr a t io n s  to  jo in  in  common 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  M alayan m a tte r s  was c o n tin u e d . Some advance was in d eed  
made in  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  T h is  r e f l e c t e d  a  su c c e ss  o f  B r i t i s h  diplom acy 
w hich c a r e f u l ly  avo ided  a l l  ap p ea ran ces  o f c o e rc io n  and r e l i e d  on c o n c i la -  
t i o n  and p e r s u a s io n .  In  so  sm a ll a  c o u n try  as M alaya w ith  so  many common 
p ro b le m s , g ra d u a l b u t c o n t in u a l  encroachm ent on th e  autonomy o f th e  UMS 
was a ls o  u n a v o id a b le . G e n e ra lly  th e  UMS ag reed  to  adopt M alayan m easures 
o n ly  when th e y  b e n e f i t t e d  from them in  term s o f  e f f ic ie n c y  o r  economy.
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In 1934 the UMS already agreed to the creation of the Malayan Esta­
blishment which unified and centralised the European services in the UMS 
(and the FMS) in Singapore, That year they also accepted the appointment 
of a Malayan Secretary for Chinese affairs who exercised executive powers 
in their states. After Thomas' arrival in Malaya, the UMS (except Johore), 
the FMS and the Colony formed a Customs Advisory Committee in 1935 to 
advise them on any alteration in customs tariff. The advice of the Commi­
ttee was not binding on the UMS but they undertook not to alter their
144tariff system without prior consultation with the Committee. That year
the UMS, the FMS and the Colony also agreed jointly to contribute to a
Malayan Currency Fund of $1 million. Hitherto the Straits currency was
backed up by a currency fund financed solely by the Colony. Under the new
system, the sovereign status of the Malay states was theoretically preserved
by separate legislation enacted by each state legislature. But state
autonomy was lost to the extent that each state surrendered its say over
the Malayan Currency Fund to a representative Malayan Currency Advisory
14SBoard, Finally, the government of the UMS, including Johore, increa­
singly sought the advice of the advisory head of Malayan departments, and 
in some cases even prepared a list of subjects for discussion during the
146latter's visit to their states. But Thomas' proposal to make the UMS 
contribute to the High Commissioner's salary failed to gain Colonial Office 
approval because the Sultan of Johore would undoubtedly oppose it.
Keenly gratified by these developments, Thomas believed that UMS 
suspicions, stirred by the decentralisation controversy during dementi's 
time, had largely disappeared. His optimism proved premature when he came 
to consider Whitehall's proposal of an All-Malaya Advisory Council. Early 
in 1936 Thomas informed the Colonial Office that the above proposal would 
be opposed by the UMS. He warned that to force it on them would only harden
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t h e i r  r e s i s t e n c e  and cause  a  se tb a c k  to  th e  p o lic y  o f w orking tow ards a
147M alayan f e d e r a t io n .  T h is  would be p a r t i c u l a r l y  u n fo r tu n a te  in  view o f 
th e  ’ rem arkab le  p r o g r e s s ' t h a t  was b e in g  made in  th e  f i e l d  o f  Pan-M alayan 
c o -o p e ra t io n .  B e s id e s ,  Thomas a s s e r te d  t h a t  th e  p roposed  c o u n c il  would 
n o t more e f f e c t i v e l y  c o -o rd in a te  M alayan is s u e s  th a n  th e  e x i s t in g  m ach inery . 
In  view  o f th e  UMS a t t i t u d e ,  th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  a cc ep ted  th e  High Commis­
s i o n e r 's  a d v ic e .  I t  f e l t  i t  unw ise to  fo rc e  Thomas to  p ro ceed  a t  a  pace
148f a s t e r  th a n  he c o n s id e re d  d e s i r a b le  tow ards th e  g o a l o f  a  M alayan u n io n .
At th e  same t im e , Thomas ag reed  w ith  W h ite h a ll to  drop W ilso n 's
p ro p o s a l o f an FMS A dvisory  C o u n c il. Having c re a te d  a  s tro n g  F e d e ra l
tUt
S e c r e ta r y ,  and h av ing  l im i te d  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  a u th o r i ty  o f ^ s t a t e  l e g i s l a ­
t u r e s ,  he was aware th a t  su ch  a  c o u n c il  was re d u n d a n t. The European u n o f f i ­
c i a l  c o u n c i l lo r s ,  how ever, s t i l l  p re s s e d  f o r  i t  s in c e  i t  m ight h e lp  r e a l i s e  
a h ig h e r  d eg ree  o f  u n ifo rm ity  in  th e  FMS. In  November 193&, amid p r o t e s t s  
from th e s e  c o u n c i l lo r s ,  Thomas announced in  th e  F e d e ra l C ouncil h is  d e c is io n  
no t to  form an A dvisory  C ouncil in  th e  F e d e ra t io n .
I t  was c l e a r  by th e n  th a t  Thomas' Pan-M alayan p o l ic y  was reg a rd ed  
w ith  deep s u s p ic io n s  by S u lta n  Ib rah im  o f  J o h o re . T h is  seems e v id e n t when 
S u lta n  Ib rah im  in te rv e n e d  in  th e  S e la n g o r S u ccess io n  D isp u te  l a t e  in  1936.
At t h a t  t im e ,  th e  S u lta n s  o f  Jo h o re  and o f S e la n g o r were in  London, one on 
le a v e ,  th e  o th e r  f o r  m ed ica l t r e a tm e n t .  P a r t ly  on th e  ad v ice  o f  S u lta n  
Ib rah im  th e  S e la n g o r R u le r  re v iv e d  th e  d is p u te ,  th e re b y  s e r io u s ly  embar­
r a s s in g  th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  and th e  M alayan G overnm ents. P o s s ib ly ,  th e  
e x te n t  to  w hich th e  Government was p re p a re d  to  go th ro u g h  to  impose on 
S e la n g o r  i t s  own ch o ice  o f a  h e i r  a p p a re n t aroused  Ib ra h im 's  f e a r  t h a t  he 
m ight even be deposed i f  he opposed to o  s t ro n g ly  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  to  c r e a te  
a  M alayan u n io n . I t  would ap p ea r t h a t  in  o rd e r  to  s t r e n g th e n  h is  hand 
a g a in s t  t h i s  p o l ic y ,  S u l ta n  Ib rah im  in te rv e n e d  in  th e  S e la n g o r S u c c e ss io n
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Dispute. Knowing that British action in Selangor rested on questionable 
grounds, he intended to embarrass the Colonial Office and the Malayan 
authorities as far as possible. The aim was to strengthen the treaty 
rights of the Rulers (which were violated in Selangor by British action) 
and to restrain the Government from pressing its Pan-Malayan policy on 
Johore. If the above analysis is correct:* he succeeded to some extent.
For after the Selangor Succession Dispute, the Government was more 
cautious in tampering with the treaty rights of the Malay States.
The Selangor Succession Dispute also induced the Colonial Office to 
review British policy towards the Malay States. Whitehall rightly con­
cluded from the dispute that decentralisation, by emphasising the indivi­
duality of the states, tended to encourage inter-state jealousies and
149exclusiveness. ' It was also forced to recognise that 'the easy associa­
tion with us of the Malay Rulers and their people in a subordinate position
150in the FMS is not a condition likely to continue'. Advised by Gent,
Whitehall revived its earlier idea of creating some Pan-Malayan body. It
advised Thomas to ascertain whether it was practicable to form an All-
Rulers Council first and then a Pan-Malayan Consultative Council comprising
151representatives from the various governments. The former was intended 
to help check inter-state rivalries and direct the Rulers' assertiveness 
into acceptable channels; the latter to advise the Government on matters 
of Malayan concern.
The idea of an All-Rulers Council was sounded out in Malaya but
met with a blank response from the Rulers. As the High Commissioner
explained, the Rulers distrusted one another too deeply and would squabble
152over precedence in the council. The Pan-Malayan Consultative Council 
does not appear to have been raised among the Rulers since the UMS still
strongly opposed it
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The 1930s c lo se d  w ith  a  s t ro n g  d e n u n c ia tio n  o f  B r i t i s h  Pan-M alayan
p o lic y  by a Jo h o re  M a la y a n isa tio n  Committee o f  S ta te  C ouncil u n o f f i c i a l s
153convened by th e  S u lta n  to  s tu d y  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h a t  p o lic y  on Jo h o re .
I t s  r e p o r t  c lo s e ly  r e f l e c t e d  th e  u n e a s in e s s  o f  th e  S u lta n  about th e  i n s i ­
d ious e f f e c t s  o f M a la y a n is a tio n  on J o h o r e 's  'in d ep e n d en ce* . By M alay- 
a n is a t io n  was meant th e  p ro c e s s  o f  c e n t r a l i s i n g  c o n t ro l  over th e  Malay 
S ta te s  a t  S in g ap o re  u n d er th e  g u ise  o f  common p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by th e  s e v e r a l  
a d m in is tr a t io n s  in  m a tte r s  o f  common co n ce rn . The u l t im a te  g o a l o f
M a la y a n is a tio n , th e  Comm ittee b e l ie v e d ,  was a  p o l i t i c a l  u n ion  o f th e  Malay
154S ta te s  and th e  C olony.
The com m ittee h e ld  th e  view th a t  M a la y a n isa tio n  became an a c t iv e
p o lic y  s in c e  th e  tim e o f  C le m e n ti. Jo h o re  was c a u tio n e d  about M alayan isa-
t i o n  m easures such  as th e  M alayan E s ta b lish m e n t O f f ic e ,  th e  Malayan
C urrency Fund, and Im m ig ra tio n  o f  A lien s  Fund, and e s p e c ia l ly  th e  system
of a d v iso ry  heads o f M alayan D epartm en ts . C ro ssin g  ov er to  th e  w ider
q u e s tio n  o f  a M alayan u n io n , th e  com m ittee rem inded th e  c o lo n ia l  government
th a t  su ch  a un ion  would v io l a t e  t r e a t y  o b l ig a t io n s  so lem nly  u n d erta k en  by
H is M a je s ty ’ s Government and r e -a f f i rm e d  by th e  W ilson R e p o r t. In  th e
view o f  th e  Com m ittee, th e  e x i s t in g  p o l i c y ,  i f  a llow ed to  d e v e lo p , *was
155f ra u g h t w ith  th e  dan g er o f  more p o l i t i c a l  t r o u b le  in  M a la y a '• The
S u lta n  was th e r e f o r e  ad v ise d  to  a c t  to  g e t th e  M a la y a n isa tio n  p o lic y  p ro p e r ly
156d e f in e d  and l im ite d  by open agreem ent among a l l  th e  governm ents in  M alaya.
The High Com m issioner a ssu ed  Jo h o re  th a t  th e r e  was no M a la y a n isa tio n  p o lic y
A
157in  th e  se n se  o f  c e n t r a l i s i n g  c o n t ro l  ov er the Malay S t a t e s .  But th e
absence o f any d e n ia l  o f th e  charge  th a t  th e  u l t im a te  B r i t i s h  g o a l was a
M alayan u n io n  confirm ed  Malay f e a r s  about M a la y a n is a tio n . The Jo h o re  re p o r t
was th e r e f o r e  k een ly  su p p o rte d  by Malay new spapers and Malay le a d e rs  in c lu -
158d ing  th o s e  o f  th e  S e la n g o r  Malay A s s o c ia t io n .
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Effects on Malays and Chinese
Malay support for the Johore Malayanisation Report should be 
understood in the light of the fact that decentralisation had not only 
forced politics into the public consciousness but had also strengthened 
racial considerations in political and economic questions. Already by 
the late 1920s the Chinese had requested admission into the MCS. Indeed 
Chinese demands for political rights in Malaya was unavoidable in view 
of the emergence of a Chinese domiciled community. Along with the Aliens 
Ordinance and especially the pro-Malay employment and retrenchment policy, 
decentralisation in the early 1950s made the Chinese, including the.Straits- 
born, feel they were in Malaya on sufferance. This had given a boost to 
Chinese demands for equal rights with the Malays and forced this very much 
into the open. During Thomas’ time Chinese pressure continued to worry 
Malays, including the Sultan of Pahang even though Pahang was not as yet 
dominated by Chinese and other non-Malay interests. In other words the 
Chinese had now thrust themselves upon the political stage and were there 
to stay. However, as it appeared clear that the Wilson policy would not 
upset the existing order, and as the government dropped its aggressive pro- 
Malay employment policy (as discussed in Chapter Six), the Chinese began 
to press their claims in, a less overt and controversial manner. For once 
again the government had sought 'refuge behind the traditional facade of 
doing its duty negatively by simply preserving the country for the Malays'. 
Understandably, Thomas was praised by Chinese newspapers as 'a most popular 
Governor /""whose7 personal interest in Overseas Chinese has earned him the
161gratitude of millions of Chinese in Malaya'.
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The d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  movement had a  more perm anent e f f e c t  on th e  
Malay e l i t e .  T here had emerged by th e  l a t e  1920s an in c ip ie n t  Malay 
n a t io n a l  s e l f - c o n s c io u s n e s s  w hich was s t r u g g l in g  to  f in d  e x p re s s io n  in  
Malay l i f e .  T h is  was due to  th e  sp re a d  o f e d u c a tio n  among th e  M alays, 
th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement, th e  b eg in n in g  o f 
C hinese p re s s u re  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s ,  and th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  p o lic y  
in  th e  1920s. But f e e l in g  p o l i t i c a l l y  in c a p a b le ,  econo m ica lly  in e p t  and 
c u l t u r a l l y  i n f e r i o r  to  o th e r s ,  th e  Malay n a t i o n a l i s t s  had c o n c e n tra te d  on 
th e  i l l s  o f  Malay s o c ie ty  and th e  means o f overcom ing them . D uring th e  
e a r ly  1930s Malay n a t io n a lis m  took  on an o v e r t ly  p o l i t i c a l  and a n t i-n o n -  
Malay o r i e n t a t i o n .  'M alaya f o r  th e  M alays' and th e  w arning o f  ' Bahaya 
K uning ' (Y ellow  P e r i l )  became th e  s lo g a n s  o f Malay n a t io n a l i s m . T his was 
due in  p a r t  to  Malay r e s t iv e n e s s  a r i s i n g  from th e  p r e v a i l in g  h a rd sh ip  
d u rin g  th e  d e p re s s io n  and from f e a r  o f fo re c lo s u re  o f M alay-held  land  
by non-M alay m oney-lenders  to  whom M alays were h e a v ily  in d e b te d . In  th e
163main how ever, i t  stemmed from th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  C o n troversy  and 
from th e  pronounced pro-M alay  p o s tu re  e s p e c ia l ly  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the  
re tre n ch m en t and employment o f  governm ent o f f i c e r s .  C hinese defence 
o f  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  in  M alaya, coup led  w ith  doub ts  c a s t  on th e  p o s i t io n  o f 
th e  Malaya as  's o n s  o f  th e  s o i l ' , f u r th e r  hardened  th e  a n ti-C h in e se  
u n d e rc u r re n t  in  Malay n a t i o n a l i s t  th in k in g .
Along w ith  th e  b u i ld in g  up o f th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  Malay e l i t e ,  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  encouraged  th e  Malay n a t i o n a l i s t  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  to  re g a rd  
i t s e l f  as  th e  in s tru m e n t to  p re s e rv e  Malay s o c ie ty  and c u l tu r e  from th e  
a l i e n  t h r e a t .  The Malay n a t i o n a l i s t s  were th e re fo re  no t on ly  d i s s a t i s f i e d  
w i th ,  b u t w ere a ls o  ap p reh e n siv e  a b o u t, Thomas' r e tu r n  to  a  p o lic y  o f  
n e g a t iv e ly  p re s e rv in g  th e  Malay S ta te s  fo r  th e  M alays. On th e  one hand ,
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they viewed with grave concern Thomas' abandonment of the pro-Malay policy 
in the recruitment of subordinate government officers* To aggravate the 
situation, the government tended to admit non-Malays into the middle-
164ranking and lower-paid senior posts in the various government departments*
As we shall see in the ensuing chapter, the admission of non-Malays into 
the senior medical service was opposed by the Rulers* Thomas* policy so 
worried Malays that the Sultan of Pahang, on leave in London in 1937, 
sought and obtained a personal assurance from the Secretary of State that
165non-Malays would not be admitted into the MCS. - In the late 1930s this 
policy was strongly condemned by Malay newspapers.
The Malay nationalists were also seriously concerned that 
decentralisation had slowed down under Thomas and had abandoned the goal of 
Advisory rule. As the Majlis rightly pointed out in 1937, decentralisation
166had not improved the comparative position of the Malays. Instead, the
abolition of the Chief Secretaryship and the shifting of departmental heads
'i 6 7to Singapore had resulted in centralisation in Singapore. To safeguard the
rights of the Malays, the Malay intelligentsia demanded a new decentralisation
policy based on the Sultan of Perak*s memorandum to the Colonial Office in
1924. In other words, the government was called upon to maintain the 'exact
terms' of the Anglo-Malay treaties and to treat 'the Ruler as a ruler* with
the Resident carrying out 'on his behalf* and with his co-operation the policy
168arrived at by them in consultation with a more powerful State Council*.
This was a demand for accentuated decentralisation and implicitly for the 
establishment of Advisory rule in the FMS.
With considerable justification, the Malay intelligentsia attributed 
the change in Thomas' decentralisation and Malay employment policy to 
British desire to accommodate the views of non-Malays and especially to 
commercial interests. To make matters worse, the Malay aim to enter to
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world of commerce and industry could not be materially assisted by the 
colonial government. With considerable justification, the Malay news­
papers bitterly complained in 1939 that Malay aspirations tended to be
ignored by younger British officials who were inclined to be pro-Chinese
169and inadequately sensitive to Malay nationalist stirrings. As discussed
in Chapters One and Four, officials thinking in London and Malaya had by
the 1930s come to recognise that the non-Malays were in Malaya permanently
and that their demand for a share of political power would have to be
conceded in the future. Understandably, the Malay intelligentsia felt
that unless Malays organized themselves politically their rights would be
170'unceremoniously spirited away'.
The result was the rise of Malay political organisations in Malaya 
in the late 1930s. As discussed in Chapter One, a small group of radical 
Malays formed the Kesatuan Melayu Muda with the aims of overthrowing the 
colonial power and bringing about a union of Malaya and Indonesia. The 
majority group, which included the westernised Malay elite, formed quasi­
national Malay State Organisations to safeguard Malay interests and meet 
the non-Malay challenge effectively. These moderate nationalists still 
chose to rely on the British to advance their political and economic 
position. This was considered essential until Malays could on their own, 
effectively compete with non-Malays. But having had its expectations 
heightened and its assertiveness strengthened by the token decentralisation, 
the Malay intelligentsia was more prompt to criticise the government# This 
criticism was under-laid with xenophobia, and took a strong line.
On the one hand, the Malay newspapers asserted that the non-Malays 
remained aliens owing loyalty to their countries of origin
and were therefore not entitled to political rights. On the other,
the Thomas government was persistently reminded to fulfil the terms
of the Anglo-Malay treaties. The gist of their argument was that the
British were pledged not only to protect the Malay States from external
17-1
attack but to preserve the M$lay share in trade and commerce.
But sixty-three years of British protection, they declared, had allowed
y~) 2
the Malays to be left far behind in practically all spheres of activity.
They warned the government of dire consequences to the country if Malay
dissatisfaction was not arrested by more British efforts to help Malay#
I73play a greater role in trade, industry and administration* In 
particular they pressed the Government to halt Chinese immigration into
Malaya lest the country be eventually transformed in an overseas Chinese
A
province. They also desired to see Malay made the offical language in
Malaya, the exclusion of non-Malays from the public service and of their
influence in Malayan politics, and the restriction of non-Malay land
174ownership. These demands were not entertained by the British, but they 
indicated a heightened Malay awareness of their comparative backwardness and 
a sense of disillusion with Thomas' decentralisation policy*
The Johore Malayanisation Report touched on Malay central concern, 
about British ultimate intentions towards the non-Malays, especially the 
Chinese* For some time already, the Malay nationalist intelligentsia sus­
pected that British policy sought to Malayanise the Malay States and the 
Colony. The Rulers and the Malay intelligentsia always feared that 
Malay anisation; by the Johore committee, would convert the Malay States 
into a Crown Colony* This was considered disastrous because the fact that 
their States remained theoretically Malay States was the only justification 
for Malay claims for special treatment* In a Colony, Malays would have no
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case  a t  a l l  to  b a r  non-M alays from a sh a re  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power and a 
M alayan c i t i z e n s h i p .  In  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n , i t  sho u ld  be r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  
C hinese le a d e r s  l i k e  Tan Cheng Lock had advoca ted  a M alayan union  
in c lu d in g  th e  Colony s in c e  1920. Presum ably what f r ig h te n e d  M alays most 
was th e  f e a r  t h a t  th e  governm ent’s M a la y a n isa tio n  aim connoted B r i t i s h  
su p p o rt f o r  C hinese g o a ls .  I t  i s  a g a in s t  t h i s  background th a t  Malay 
su p p o r t f o r  th e  Jo h o re  M a la y a n isa tio n  R eport sho u ld  be u n d e rs to o d .
C onclusion
The e a r ly  1930s w itn e sse d  th e  most in te n s e ,  acrim on ious and f a r -  
re a c h in g  c o n tro v e rsy  d u r in g  th e  p rew ar y e a r s .  The is s u e s  in v o lv ed  were 
b a s ic a l ly  s im i la r  to  th o s e  o f G u illem ard ’s t im e . U n like  G u illem ard ,
C lem enti cam paigned p u b l ic ly  f o r  a M alayan u n io n , th e re b y  le a v in g  e n d u rin g  
f e a r s  among th e  UMS R u le rs  and th e  Malay e l i t e .  He a ls o  a ttem p ted  to  
in tro d u c e  a  m easure o f A dvisory  r u le  in  th e  FMS. P a r a l l e l  to  t h i s  
developm ent was an immense w idening  in  th e  o p p o s itio n  to  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  
w hich in c lu d e d  no t on ly  FMS com m ercial i n t e r e s t s  and most M alayan B r i t i s h  
o f f i c i a l s  b u t th e  C o lo n ia l O ff ic e  as w e l l .  In  view o f t h i s  on ly  d e m e n t i 's  
d e te rm in a tio n  and in t r a n s ig e n c e  en ab led  him to  ach iev e  an im p o rtan t m easure 
o f d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  H is main achievem ent la y  in  th e  s tre n g th e n in g  o f  th e  
s t a t e  governm ents in  th e  1930s. In  form th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f th e  C h ief 
S e c re ta ry s h ip  was a n o th e r  m ajor ach ievem en t. However, to  C lem enti t h i s  
s te p  was m eant to  pave th e  way f o r  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f th e  f e d e r a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  
to  S in g a p o re . T h is was b locked  by th e  c r e a t io n  o f th e  F e d e ra l S e c re ta ry s h ip  
which was Thomas' p r in c i p a l  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  Thomas 
slow ed down th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  movement and dropped th e  g o a l o f  
e s t a b l i s h in g  A dvisory r u le  in  th e  FMS. N e ith e r  C lem enti no r Thomas made any 
headway to w ard s  a M alayan u n io n . To th e  C o lo n ia l O f f ic e  a n d ,to  g re a t  e x t e n t ,
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to Clementi, decentralisation was only a means towards that end. Both 
in view of this and of the failure to shift the federal secretariat to 
Singapore, Clementi may be considered to have failed completely in his 
policy. However, durihg his time decentralisation became a ’public' 
issue with unforeseen effects on Chinese and Malay attitudes. Along 
with other issues, decentralisation hastened Chinese entry onto the 
political stage. To the extent that decentralisation contributed 
significantly to the rise of Malay national consciousness, Clementi may 
be considered to have succeeded in preparing the Malays to face the 
non-Malay challenge more effectively.
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CHAPTER SIX
Training Malays for the Public Service
The necessary complement to the decentralisation policy discussed in 
the previous chapters was a movement to train Malays for the public service. 
A larger role for Malays in the administration first stirred the British 
conscience late in the 19th century. But except in the Malay Administrative 
Service (MAS), only lukewarm efforts were made towards that end till 1920 
mainly because of the lack of English-speaking Malays and British 
preoccupation with economic development. That year witnessed a movement to 
give the MAS a ’new deal' and to prefer Malays for the public service in 
general. As in decentralisation, this movement was influenced by British 
sensitivity to the relative Malay backwardness. It was also affected by the 
need, as discussed in Chapter Three, to strengthen the Malay base of 
indirect rule in the FMS. This would be realised to a great extent by 
enabling the Malay elite to play a more active role in the administration 
since they still provided the leadership and dynamism for a subservient mass 
following. During dementi’s time the decentralisation policy itself had an 
important impact on the movement. The influence of these factors was 
particularly evident in the MAS. As regards the subordinate service, and in 
the early 1930’s even the senior service, the most important factor was the 
drive for administrative economies during the slumps in the interwar years.
The administration of the FMS, as already discussed, was controlled 
and directed by British officials. The premier service was the Malayan 
Civil Service (MCS) which consisted preponderantly of British cadets. 1116 
MCS officers filled all the administrative posts in the secretariats and the 
district offices. To the great anguish of the specialists,^ they also 
headed certain quasi-technical and professional departments such as Posts 
and Telegraphs, Customs, Co-operatives, Land, Education and (until 1933) the
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Legal Adviceship. Furthermore, the MCS officers manned and ran three
2departments, namely the Treasury, Labour, and Chinese Affairs. Other 
departments like Railways, Public Works, Mines, Survey, Forests, Police and 
Museums were headed by British specialists. Each of these department had 
its own schemes of service closed to officers in other departments. The 
senior departmental services, except in the Medical Department after 1937, 
were monopolised by British specialists. This explains the official
3tendency to regard the senior service as one filled by Europeans. In this 
chapter however, the senior service is defined as one which performed 
policy-making and executive duties. Below it was the middle-ranking service 
which undertook largely executive or specialist functions. Belonging to 
this were the MAS Officers, Police Inspectors, Technical Assistants and 
Senior Agriculture Assistants. Further down was the subordinate service 
which executed clerical, technical and routine office duties.
The Malayan Civil Service
To understand fully the policy of training Malays for the 
administration, it is necessary to examine in some detail the MCS. In terns 
of a more active Malay role in public life, the Civil Service was of crucial
importance. The MCS establishment totalled more than two hundred officers
U 5during the interwar years, about half of whom were stationed in the FMS.
As the decision-making and executive agency of the government the MCS
wielded a near monopoly of power in the FMS.
The origin of the MCS may be traced to the Straits Civil Service which
since 1869 had consisted of cadets recruited by open competitive examination.
When British rule was established in Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and
Pahang late in the 19th century, each of these states had its own civil
service manned by cadets nominated by Whitehall. These services were
distinct from, and only loosely controlled by, the Colony’s authorities.
Following the federation of the four states in 1896, they were incorporated
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into a single FMS Civil Service. Thereafter the FMS and the Straits Civil
Services were officially considered as two branches of the same service, and
recruits were transferable between the Colony and the Federation.^ By the
1910’s the FMS and the Straits officers, realising the advantages of
speaking with a single voice, had begun to regard themselves as belonging to
7a Malayan Civil Service. This was officially recognised in 1920 when 
Whitehall agreed with Guillemard that the distinction between the two 
services was artifical and that a common title might curb jealousies existingg
between the officers and facilitate transfers between the two areas, But
the amalgamation of the two establishments appeared to have been realised
fourteen years later when all the MCS officers were placed under the control
oof a Malayan Establishment Office in Singapore.
From 1896 to 1932, the MCS officers were recruited from the successful
candidates of the open examination held in London for the Indian Civil
Service, the Home Civil Service and the Far Eastern Cadetship. The
outstanding candidates, however, generally chose to join the two former
services whereas the rest enrolled in the Far Eastern Cadetship which was
not very prestigious. Among the latter, Ceylon and then Hong Kong were
preferred to Malaya.^ This was welcomed by the Colonial Office since the
Malayan intake nearly doubled the combined recruitment of the other two
colonies."^ Likewise, the MCS managed to attract a good proportion of the
12more outstanding of the Far Eastern cadets.
The unpopularity of the MCS stemmed from the fact that the privations,
the meagre salaries and the uncongenial conditions borne by the early
13pioneers had given Malaya a notorious reputation. The Far Eastern cadets 
continued to be unaware that by the 1920s the MCS enjoyed both higher 
salaries and far better promotional prospects than the Ceylon or the Hong 
Kong Civil Service.^ In 1928, for instance, the prospects of advancement 
for the cadets were excellent since there were then nearly double as many
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15posts in Class One as in Class Five, the lowest grade in the MCS.
Furthermore, the MCS was tacitly accepted by the Colonial Office as a
Closed service' in which promotion was virtually restricted to its
members.^ On the other hand, this failed to prevent many officers from
17securing top posts in Africa and other colonies.
Nevertheless there was a shortage of recruits for the Far Eastern
Cadetship in the 1920s. After the War, young British university graduates
had more opportunities to enter industry and commerce at home and had a
keener interest in the various African Civil Services where entry was through
nomination by the Secretary of State. From 1923 onwards, Malaya was unable
18to obtain its required number of cadets. To overcome this difficulty, the
competitive examination was abolished in 1932, and MCS cadets were henceforth
recruited through selection by the Secretary of State, It is not possible to
ascertain whether the selection system improved the calibre of MCS recruits.
At the same time Whitehall launched a movement to unify the various branches
of the colonial services in the Empire in order to increase their prestige
and widen the prospects of advancement of their members. Hence the MCS
became a part of the Colonial Administrative Service. This, however, hardly
affected the MCS either in terms of transfer or promotion outside Malaya.
The MCS consisted of administrative generalists who relied on two main
attributes. As products of the English public schools and universities,
these British officials prided themselves on "a liberal education, a just
19and flexible mind, commonsense, and a high character". They also generally 
considered themselves experts in the Malay language, character and way of 
life. This was regarded as an asset essential in ruling a Malay country like 
Malaya. It should be noted, however, that by the 1920s the MCS officers 
were much less knowledgeable about Malay affairs than their prewar 
precedessors. As discussed in Chapter Two, the vast increase in paper work 
in the districts and especially the rise of an exclusive English society in
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which British officers spent their leisure made this development inevitable.
An ambitious MCS officer desired to have a varied career in the 
districts, the secretariats and the big departments but at all times to 
avoid specialisation. His ultimate aim was to reach one of the staff posts
of British Adviser, Resident or Chief Secretary which were reserved for the
20MCS. This attitude was generally shared by the Colonial Office which, for
instance, considered Andrew Caldecott an example of an excellent
21administrative generalist. Oxford-trained Caldecott spent his early career 
in the districts before serving in the FMS and Straits Secretariats. From 
there he proceeded to head specialist departments like the Posts and 
Telegraphs without ceasing to be a general administrator. In the years 
1928-31, Caldecott acted as Resident in Negri Sembilan, Perak and Selangor 
before he became Resident of the last state. Early in 1931 he was hand­
picked by Clementi to become Acting Chief Secretary. Three years later he 
was promoted to Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements and ended his 
career as Governor of Ceylon. Caldecott’s career charted out the main
channel of the MCS which an ex-MCS official called "the Malay side of the 
22service".
There was, however, the specialist side of the service which the MCS
officers either welcomed as a temporary expedient or avoided "like the
plague." The desire to head semi-specialist departments was justified on
the ground that the function of the departmental head was essentially
political and administrative since detailed administration lay with the
senior experts of the departments. It was contended that the MCS officers
were best able to view problems in a wider perspective and to evaluate the
various ramifications of departmental policies. The MCS incumbents, however,
desired and usually managed to avoid a lengthy attachment to departmental
headships. They were aware that such an experience might hamper their race
23towards staff appointments. To justify this, the MCS argued that the
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short spell as departmental heads acted as a spur to efficiency, the acid 
test for further promotion to the officers concerned, whereas professional 
heads tended to slacken when they saw no further advancement ahead of
p]
them. During the inter-war years the MCS successfully fought a rearguard
battle against attempts by YJhitehall to appoint experts to head the semi-
technical and professional departments. However, as discussed in Chapter
Two, two specialist departments, namely the Labour Department and the
Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, were extremely unpopular chiefly because
officers attached to them were virtually barred from staff appointments.
Though put in charge of the Chinese and Indian communities, these
departments attracted only about twenty percent of the MCS cadets.
As the elite of the administration, the Malayan Civil Servants were
continually reminded that they were not of other services nor of the
European unofficial community and that they should preserve a distinct
esprit de corps. This task was facilitated by the fact that by the turn of
the century the MCS was increasingly manned by members of the English
middle-class with a Public School-Oxbridge backgrounds who shared a uniform 
25scale of values. The esprit de corps of the MCS was reinforced by many
locally famous names such as Hugh Low, Frank Swettenham and High Clifford.
It assisted the Malayan Civil Servants to maintain high standards of
performance and a remarkable integrity in financial matters. However, many
of them appeared to have invested in the rubber and tin industries. Both
Clifford and Cleraenti urged the Colonial Office to take strong measures to
26check this, but the situation does not seem to have improved.
The Origin of the MAS
Despite th&§ acute shortage of candidates, non-Europeans were barred 
from joining the MCS. This ’colour bar’ was introduced in 1904 at the 
insistence of Anderson. In his opinion non-European officers both lacked 
character and commanded little respect among Malayans and Europeans. He
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warned that the existing seven non-European Civil Servants were already a
hindrance to efficiency, and further recruitment of non-Europeans would only
27end in the hopeless disorganisation of the MCS. The main reason behind the 
ban, however, appears to be the fear that in the absence of suitable Malaya- 
b o m  candidates, too many Indians might be admitted to the MCS. ' Already 
before 1904 several Ceylonese, Indian mu slims or Anglo-Indians had managed 
to enter the MCS by passing the competitive examination in London. Though 
these officers continued to serve in the MCS, cadets recruited in London 
from 1904 to 1948 were invariably men 'of pure European descent on both 
sides' ^
Strictly speaking, the 1904 ruling barred Malays from entry into the
MCS. In practice Malays were hardly affected by it since the policy of
training the Malay traditional elite for the administrative service was more
honoured in the breach than in the observance. Sir Frank Swettenham's policy
30of selecting promising Malay students for training at the Malacca School
produced only two Malay Civil Servants, Raja Mansur and Raja Chulan, both
sons of ex-Sultan Abdullah of Perak. On the other hand, the Malay elite
trained in the traditional order could not fit in with the European
administration that had arisen in the FMS. While strongly concerned about
Malay backwardness, the British doubted whether Malays were of a calibre for 
31the civil service. They were concerned about the lack of formal education
among the Malays, and many believed that the latter were 'devoid of 
32usefulness'. This attitude was strengthened by British pride in having 
established a civil service the like and calibre of which was not easily 
matched.
It was not until after the Conference of Rulers in 1903 that some 
action was taken to train Malays for the public service. This was partly 
motivated by Malay disillusionment with developments after the Federation. 
During the conference Sultan Idris of Perak criticised administrative
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c e n t r a l i s a t io n ,  demanded a r e tu rn  to  s t a t e  autonomy, and urged th e
appointm ent o f Malays to  im portan t p o s ts .  O thers p u b lic ly  a s s e r te d  t h a t ,
be ing  th e  ’sons o f th e  s o i l ’ , Malays should enjoy p r e f e r e n t ia l  tre a tm e n t in
33m a tte rs  o f government employment. The d is c o n te n t o f th e  Malay e l i t e  was 
probab ly  aggravated  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  c o u n te rp a r ts  in  th e  Siam ese- 
c o n tro lle d  n o rth e rn  S ta te s  and in  Johore co n tinued , to  a la rg e  e x te n t ,  to  
c o n tro l and d i r e c t  th e  a d m in is tra t io n s .
I t  should be noted  th a t  Malay d is c o n te n t was no t s u f f ic ie n t ly  s tro n g  
to  fo rce  th e  government to  t r a i n  Malays fo r  a  g re a te r  ro le  in  th e  
a d m in is tra tio n . The subsequent c re a t io n  o f a ju n io r  a d m in is tra tiv e  s e rv ic e  
was m ainly th e  r e s u l t  o f a ’pro-M alay' campaign conducted by a group o f
Q  I
younger B r i t i s h  o f f ic e r s  le d  by B irch  and W ilkinson. These o f f ic e r s
p ressed  fo r  more p o s i t iv e  e f f o r t s  to  advance Malays in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and
economic sp h e res . A fte r  a l l  th e  non-Malay predominance in  th e  sphere o f
economic development g la r in g ly  outweighed th e  p resence o f two Malays in  th e
lower rung o f th e  MCS and f iv e  o th e rs  in  m inor a d m in is tra tiv e  p o s ts .  A
secondary c o n s id e ra tio n  was th e  h igh  co st o f th e  e la b o ra te , w este rn ised  
35a d m in is tra tio n  and th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  e x is t in g  o f f ic e r s  were sev e re ly
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overworked because o f th e  ra p id  expansion  o f  th e  F ed e ra tio n .
In  1903 Rodger, th e  R esiden t o f P erak , had proposed a school to  t r a i n
sons o f S u ltan s  and C hiefs f o r  th e  p u b lic  s e rv ic e . H is id e a  was
unaccep tab le  to  Governor Frank Swettenham who clung to  th e  p o lic y  o f sending
se le c te d  Malays to  be t r a in e d  a t  th e  M alacca School. Follow ing th e
d is c u ss io n s  a f t e r  th e  C onference, W ilk inson , th e  F ed e ra l In sp e c to r  o f
Schools, re s u rre c te d  R odger's  id e a  in  a m odified  form in  1904. He proposed
’’th e  e stab lish m en t a t  a  s u i ta b le  l o c a l i t y  in  th e  FMS a s p e c ia l  r e s id e n t i a l
school f o r  th e  ed u ca tio n  o f Malays o f  good fam ily  and fo r  th e  t r a in in g  o f
37Malay boys fo r  adm ission to  c e r ta in  branches o f th e  Government S e rv ic e " .
This p ro p o sa l was con sid ered  n ecessa ry  because th e  e x is t in g  schools were
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unable to provide the special attention and encouragement needed by Malay
students. As Wilkinson envisaged it, the residential school would retain
its Malay character and help ’’disseminate Malay literature". It was to be
an object lesson to all Malays as to the importance of education. By
educating the sons of Sultans and Chiefs, the school would help modernise
the Malay aristocracy whose influence was considered important to British
rule. Above all, Wilkinson expected the school to produce an educated
38higher class of Malays for the administrative service.
Despite the misgivings of Governor Anderson, the Resident-General, the
39Residents and certain Malay Chiefs about the outcome of the project,
Wilkinson managed to persuade the Government to try out his idea. The site 
selected for the school was Kuala Kangsar where there was already a small 
Malay school and where Sultan Idris could devote his encouragement and 
assistance. The project met with a ready response from a considerable 
section of the Malay elite who had realised the value of education.^ In 
January 1905 the residential school was officially opened on a trial basis, 
and three years later was put on a permanent footing. It was renamed the 
Malay College and was frequently known as the "Eton of the East" or to the 
Malays as the "Bab-ud-Dara.iat’’ (The Gate to High Positions).^
By then the character of the Malay College had already changed in two 
important aspects. In contrast to Wilkinson many officials, including Birch,
J O
the new Perak Resident, visualised the College as an English public school.
It was Birch who eventually determined the development of the Malay College, 
though Wilkinson became his Secretary after 1906. The College acquired the 
manners and ethos of the English public school system and offered a general 
education with a bias for the Humanities, ? Furthermore, under the 
Wilkinson scheme merit took precedence over status in the admission of 
students to the college, and only about a fifth of the vacancies were 
reserved for Malays of royal or aristocratic birth.^ After 1907, however,
2 46
th e  Malay C ollege became th e  p re se rv e  o f th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e .  The m in o rity
o f  commoners were u su a lly  sons o f Malays c lo se ly  a s so c ia te d  w ith  th e  Malay
a r i s to c r a t s  o r o f th o se  who had perform ed good s e rv ic e  fo r  th e  l a t t e r  and
U5consequen tly  enjoyed t h e i r  fav o u r. The c h a ra c te r  o f th e  Malay C ollege 
underwent l i t t l e  change th roughou t th e  in te rw a r y e a r s . I t  l e f t  an enduring 
im pression  on th e  Malay e l i t e  in  p a r t i c u la r  and on th e  shape o f modem Malay 
s o c ie ty  in  g e n e ra l.
Once th e  Malay C ollege proved a su ccess , th e  Government was compelled 
to  f u l f i l  i t s  promise to  r e c r u i t  i t s  more prom ising g rad u a tes  in to  th e  
a d m in is tra tiv e  s e rv ic e . By th e n  th e  q u estio n  o f employing R ajas and C hiefs 
no t e l ig ib le  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  a llow ances o r  pensions had become p r e s s i n g .^  In  
1908 Anderson d ire c te d  th e  FMS Government to  fo rm ulate  a scheme fo r  a  Malay 
a d m in is tra tiv e  cadre c o n s is tin g  o f Malay C ollege g ra d u a te s . The r e s u l t  was 
th e  '‘Scheme fo r  th e  Employment o f  Malays (H igher S ubordinate  C la s s )” which 
came in to  o p e ra tio n  e a r ly  in  1910. In  th e  l i g h t  o f th e  com position o f th e  
c o lle g e , t h i s  scheme e f f e c t iv e ly  l im ite d  e n try  to  th e  Malay A d m in is tra tiv e  
S erv ice  to  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e .
Under t h i s  scheme, a  maximum o f te n  s tu d en ts  w ith  a Seventh S tandard  
c e r t i f i c a t e  from an E ng lish  School were s e le c te d  by th e  R esiden t-G eneral as
j r j
P ro b a tio n e rs  fo r  a th re e -y e a r  course  a t  th e  C o lleg e . The t r a in in g  
c o n sis te d  o f th e  normal school cu rricu lum  lead in g  to  th e  Ju n io r  Cambridge 
C e r t i f i c a te  and s p e c ia l  su b je c ts  re le v a n t  to  t h e i r  c a re e r  such as o f f i c i a l  
correspondence, elem entary  law, land  o f f ic e  and t r e a s u ry  work. Upon 
s a t i s f a c to r y  com pletion o f t h i s  course  th e  P ro b a tio n e rs  were appoin ted  as 
Malay A s s is ta n ts ,  Grade I I I ,  in  a s e p a ra te  Malay A d m in is tra tiv e  S erv ice  
(MAS). Competent Grade I I I  o f f ic e r s  m ight be promoted to  Grade I I  and th en  
Grade I  when vacanc ies e x is te d  and a f t e r  se rv in g  th e  r e q u is i te  number o f 
y ears  and pass in g  th e  s t ip u la te d  exam inations. A ll t h i s  tim e, Malay 
o f f ic e r s  perform ed la rg e ly  c l e r i c a l  d u tie s  which were meant to  t r a i n  them fo r
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more responsible posts.
When they possessed ’special ability', Grade I officers might be
promoted to Special Grade officers, thereby doing the largely administrative
work of a Magistrate, an Assistant District Officer or an Assistant
ZlSConservator of Forests. The Special Grade was created both as a training
ground for potential MCS officers and as a concession to those with long and
faithful service. In other words the MAS was senior to the Clerical Service
but junior to the Civil Service. It was tacitly agreed that outstanding
Malay Officers might in time be admitted to the ranks of the MCS.
The 1910 Scheme operated for seven years, enlisting a total of nineteen
Malay Assistants from the Malay College. Ten clerks, eight settlement
officers and three other officers, a great many of whom had graduated from
the college before 1910, were also absorbed into the MAS. This increased the
49number of Malay Assistants to forty by 1916. 7 But in terms of the
administration of the country, Malay Officers held a position of little
consequence. In view of their level of education and training, they were
not considered fit to occupy posts of responsibility and their duties were
consequently largely clerical. Even Special Grade Officers were posted to
small, predominantly Malay, and economically backward districts of Perak
and Selangor. Promotion through the grades was both slow and irregular,
being dependent on the occurrance of vacancies in the upper levels of the
MAS establishment. Moreover, salaries were low and in many cases below those
50paid to English-educated clerks of similar age and experience. In terms of 
the schone formulated and the numbers of recruits into the service, the first 
stage to prepare Malays for high and responsible appointments in the 
administration was neither ambitious nor satisfactory.
In 1916 steps were taken to revise the 1910 scheme to better the 
prospects of Malay Officers and allocate them increased responsibilities. 
During the First World War, the MCS experienced acute manpower shortage as
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th e  younger o f f ic e r s  were sen t to  f ig h t  in  th e  European war f r o n ts .
C onsequently  se v e ra l Malay O ff ic e rs  were appo in ted  to  a c t in  re sp o n sib le
p o s i t io n s  and c a r r ie d  out t h e i r  p a r t  honourab ly . As th e  High Commissioner
d e c la red  in  th e  F ed era l C ouncil in  1917? "The D u ties  o f  A ss is ta n t D is t r i c t
O ff ic e rs  and o th e r  s im ila r  appointm ents a re  now in  many cases being
perform ed by Malays w ith  an e f f ic ie n c y  th a t  has led  th e  Government to
in tro d u ce  a new scheme o f fe r in g  them a w e ll rem unerated and im portan t 
51caree r* '. The re v is io n  a lso  sought to  r e c t i f y  c e r ta in  shortcom ings in  th e
1910 scheme. As th e  w r i te r s  o f th e  new scheme ex p la in ed ,
Five y e a rs  o f th e  working o f th e  1910 scheme has shown th a t  th e  
p ra c t ic e  o f r e le g a t in g ,  fo r  a p e rio d  o f th re e  y e a rs , a 
p ro b a tio n e r , who has completed a s p e c ia l  t r a in in g  fo r  an 
a d m in is tra tiv e  c a re e r ,  to  th e  work and s ta tu s  o f a th i r d  c la s s  
c le r k ,  r e s u l t s  in  producing , n o t u n n a tu ra l ly , a sense o f 
d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  in  such an o f f i c e r ?o r  even a d i s t a t e  fo r  
f u r th e r  s e rv ic e  under Government.
The new scheme came in to  o p e ra tio n  in  1917 and la s te d  u n t i l  1921 when 
i t  was a b o lis h e d . Under th e  1917 scheme MAS cad e ts  were h en ce fo rth  known as 
"Malay O ff ic e rs " .  Promotion from Grade I I I  to  Grade I  was made autom atic  on 
th e  o f f i c e r  concerned p ass in g  th e  r e q u is i te  exam inations. The o th e r  m ajor 
change was th a t  Grade I  and S p ec ia l Grade O ff ic e rs  were a l lo c a te d  enhanced 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s ,  in c lu d in g  a number o f p o s ts  h i th e r to  occupied by B r i t i s h  
MCS c a d e t s . ^
At th e  same tim e th e  government was compelled to  co n sid e r th e  p o s i t io n
o f a few o u ts tan d in g  o f f ic e r s  w ith te n  o r  more y e a rs  o f s e rv ic e  who now
deserved to  be promoted to  th e  MCS. But as prom otion w ith in  th e  MCS depended
on th e  occurrence o f v a ca n c ie s , B r i t i s h  C iv il  S ervan ts  fea red  th a t  t h e i r
advancement in  th e  s e rv ic e  m ight be hampered by com petition  from Malay 
54c a d e ts . To o b v ia te  t h i s ,  they  in s is te d  th a t  'Malays p o ssess in g  th e  
r e q u is i te  q u a l i f i c a t io n s ' should only  be adm itted  in to  th e  MCS as 
supernum erary o f f i c e r s .  These o f f ic e r s ,  th e  B r i t i s h  decided , would be 
e l ig ib l e  fo r  fu r th e r  prom otion to  h ig h e r c la s s e s  b u t always as su p e r-
2^ 9
55numeraries and not to rank with cadets for seniority. In the event only
the most senior MAS officer, Raja Said Tauphy, son of ex-Sultan Abdullah of
Perak, was promoted to the MCS. On the whole the 1917 scheme did little to
remove the frustrations among Malay Officers or change significantly the
nature of Malay participation in the administration. As the Chief Secretary
later admitted, Malay Officers continued to be 'kept back and no one
56bothered about them.'
The MAS during the Interwar Years
The general neglect of Malay Officers came to an end with the arrival
of Guillemard in Malaya in 1920. Apart from the general factors already
discussed, three specific causes led to the introduction of a new MAS scheme
in 1921. Firstly the MCS was 'almost at the end of its tether' after the
war. It was seriously understaffed and the existing officers were deplorably 
57overworked.' ‘ To make matters worse, many officers began to lose touch with
the Malays in the kampongs. Secondly, there was widespread dissatisfaction
within the MAS chiefly because of the tardy rate of advancement in the 
58service. This was aggravated by the phenomenal rise in the cost of living
after the War which was keenly felt by Malay Officers. The increase in the
pay of Clerical Officers in 1920 made an upward revision of MAS salaries
inevitable. Lastly Malay newspapers and even Malay villagers strongly
believed that Malays were permitted to acquire^ only that level of
59education which would fit them for subordinate posts. The glaring 
disparity between the salaries of Malay and British administrators and the 
occupation of all the important posts by the latter also came under severe 
Malay attack.^ Mainly to meet Malay discontent, Brockman ordered the 
preparation of a new MAS scheme.
This scheme was drafted by T.S. Adams and A. Caldecott, both Assistant 
Secretaries in the Federal Secretariat. It made generous improvements in 
the MAS in order to assist the Malays take their 'proper share' in the
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administration of the country. The new scheme had a mixed reception among
British officials. Supporting it were those officials like the Resident of
Negri Sembilan who argued that Malays now had 'more character and honesty’
62for higher posts in the administration. Others, however, continued to 
regard Malays as a "practically untried race" whose advancement in the service
£  «3
must be stringently "watched and regulated." ^ To the latter the scheme was 
"drafted on too high a plane to square with the general educational 'timbre' 
of the present day Malay".^ Its generous terms, they feared, would result 
in over-rapid promotion of comparatively mediocre Malays to senior positions. 
Despite these misgivings, the scheme was accepted by Guillemard and was 
implemented in 1921. The High Commissioner himself had been forcefully 
impressed by the Sultan of Perak during their first meeting in March 1920 when 
the latter pressed for the employment of efficient Malays in senior 
administrative posts.^
After the War the system of recruiting MAS Probationers only from the 
Malay College came under severe public criticism. It was considered unjust 
to Malay graduates from the other English schools and a hindrance to Malay 
progress in general.^ The system also deprived the Government of the 
service of other Malays who, owing to the rising level of education, were
£rt
sufficiently qualified for the administrative service. ' But the government
was not prepared to build a second college to train commoners for the MAS,
2 68nor to end the policy of reserving the Malay College for "anak baik ". The 
difficulty was resolved by a new ruling in the 1921 Scheme whereby one half 
of the Probationers were recruited from the Malay College and the other half 
from the other English schools in the FMS.
These Probationers were admitted on similar terms as those under the 
earlier schemes, but in practice it appears that the entry qualification was 
now a Junior Cambridge Certificate. The Probationers were required to 
undergo another two-year training in the College to prepare them for the
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69S en io r Cambridge Exam ination and subsequent se rv ic e  in  th e  MAS. They were
s e le c te d  a f t e r  p ass in g  a common q u a lify in g  exam ination s e t  by th e  Government
bu t t h e i r  exam ination r e s u l t s  were no t th e  so le  c r i t e r io n  fo r  t h e i r
nom ination . C andidates of lo c a l  Malay p a ren tag e , fo r  in s ta n c e , were
70p re fe r re d  to  th o se  o f  immigrant s to c k . Above a l l ,  p re fe ren ce  was accorded
can d id a te s  belong ing  to  th e  a r is to c r a c y  o r to  fa m ilie s  who had c lo se  c o n ta c ts
w ith  o r had rendered  good s e rv ic e  to  R ulers o r C h ie fs . Hence, though th e
1921 Scheme o ffe re d  a b e t t e r  d e a l to  Malay commoners, th e  MAS continued to
71draw i t s  members m ainly from th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e .
72The 1921 Scheme s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in c re ase d  th e  s a la r ie s  o f Malay O ffic e rs
and widened t h e i r  p ro sp ec ts  o f prom otion in  th e  s e rv ic e . A ccepting th e
recommendation o f th e  P ub lic  S erv ice  Commission o f 1919> i t  in tro d u ced  a
tim e -sc a le  w ith  two e f f ic ie n c y  b a r s .  Under t h i s  system  th e  average o f f ic e r
would ascend th e  t im e -sc a le  by o rd in a ry  s ta g e s  su b je c t to  h is  pass in g  th e
e f f ic ie n c y  b a r s .  He was th u s  assu red  o f  reasonab le  increm ents in  s a la ry .
To th e  more competent o f f i c e r s ,  th e  tim e -s c a le  provided a t r a in in g  ground fo r
73ev en tu a l prom otion to  th e  MCS.
P ro sp ec ts  fo r  advancement in  th e  s e rv ic e  were improved in  th re e  
d i r e c t io n s .  F i r s t l y ,  more o f f ic e r s  could  now be appoin ted  to  th e  S p e c ia l 
C lass s in ce  i t s  h i th e r to  r ig id  e s tab lish m en t was ab o lish ed  under th e  1921 
Scheme. Secondly, th e  requirem ent o f te n  y e a r s ' s e rv ic e  fo r  prom otion to  a 
Grade I  or S p e c ia l Grade post was h a lv ed , provided th e  o f f ic e r  concerned had 
passed th e  C adets ' Law Exam ination and had perform ed th e  d u t ie s  o f an
n I
A ss is ta n t D is t r i c t  O ff ic e r  fo r  two y e a r s .  F in a lly  th e  new scheme made
p ro v is io n s  to  in c re a se  th e  number o f Malay O ff ic e rs  a tta ch ed  to  th e  d i s t r i c t
o f f ic e s  to  enab le  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  su p e r io rs  to  keep in  touch w ith th e  kampong
Malays. To t h i s  end, S i r  George Maxwell in troduced  a sub-scheme o f Deputy
A ss is ta n t D is t r i c t  O ff ic e r  confined to  Malay a d m in is tra to rs  above th e  second 
75e f f ic ie n c y  b a r . D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e rs  were s p e c i f ic a l ly  in s tru c te d  to  t r a i n
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th e s e  o f f ic e r s  fo r  prom otion to  A ss is ta n t D is t r i c t  O ff ic e rs  and e v en tu a lly
r y /
t o  th e  MCS. However, th e  1921 scheme allow ed th e  government to  p reven t
Malay O ffic e rs  from being  promoted to  th e  MCS a t  a r a te  th a t  would damage th e
p ro sp e c ts  o f B r i t i s h  C iv il  S e rv an ts . This o b je c t was ensured by a
s t ip u la t io n  th a t  e n try  in to  th e  ’A d m in is tra tiv e  A ppoin tm ents ', through which
Malay O ffic e rs  must pass to  e n te r  th e  MCS, depended on th e  e x is ten c e  o f
77v a c a n c ie s . With th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  scheme began a new phase fo r  th e
MAS.
The 1921 scheme d id  no t fu n c tio n  a l to g e th e r  sm oothly. P ro b a tio n e rs
from th e  o rd in a ry  E nglish  schoo ls wasted a y e a r b e fo re  th e y  could tak e  th e
78S en io r Cambridge Exam ination, and caused overcrowding in  th e  C o lle g e .'
T h e ir presence was a lso  questioned  by th e  C o lle g e 's  Board o f Governors as
w e ll as B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  who were determ ined to  p re se rv e  th e  ex c lu s iv en ess
o f  th e  C o llege . In  1924 th e  scheme was acco rd ing ly  amended to  enable th e se
P ro b a tio n e rs  to  remain in  t h e i r  own schools and s i t  f o r  th e  S en io r
exam ination . Another d e fe c t in  th e  scheme was th e  requirem ent th a t
P ro b a tio n e rs , a f t e r  pass in g  t h e i r  S en io r, should remain in  th e  College to
study  Law and E n g lish . Owing to  th e  shortage  o f te a c h e rs  in  th e  C o llege,
th e se  P ro b a tio n e rs  were h a rd ly  ta u g h t th e se  s u b je c ts .  The 1924 amendments
th e re fo re  p e rm itted  a l l  P ro b a tio n e rs  to  jo in  th e  MAS once th e y  had passed
79t h e i r  S en io r, and to  m aster Law and E ng lish  w hile in  h a rn e ss .
Along w ith  th e se  changes came a v i t a l  d e c is io n  to  admit Malay o f f ic e r s
as  fu l l - f le d g e d  members o f th e  MCS. This was no lo n g er considered  a th r e a t
to  th e  advancement o f B r i t i s h  o f f ic e r s  who were given autom atic  prom otion
up to  C lass I I  in  th e  MCS in  1919. This concession  to  Malay O ffic e rs  was
b e la te d ly  made in  a n t ic ip a t io n  o f  s tro n g  demand by educated Malays fo r  a
la r g e r  say in  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  FMS. A ccordingly , R aja Said Tauphy
and Hamzah b in  Abdullah (who was appoin ted  MCS supernum erary in  1920) became
81fu l l - f le d g e d  MCS cad e ts  in  th a t  y e a r . This ex ten s io n  o f th e  1921 Scheme
253
marked th e  maximum concessions th e  B r i t i s h  were w il l in g  to  o f f e r  th e  MAS.
The generous improvements in  th e  MAS scheme aroused o f f i c i a l  an x ie ty
over th e  com paratively  low ed u ca tio n a l q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f Malay O ff ic e rs .  I t
was f e l t  th a t  th e  Malay C ollege o ffe re d  them n e i th e r  an adequate t r a in in g  nor
an a p p ro p ria te  degree o f c o l le g ia te  l i f e .  The in te rw a r years  th e re fo re
w itn essed  e f f o r t s  to  r a i s e  th e  e d u c a tio n a l le v e l  o f  th e  MAS in  two d i r e c t io n s .
A p o lic y  was adopted in  1924 to  t r a i n  Malay O ffic e rs  as b a r r i s t e r s  in
law in  England. I b is  p o lic y  d id  not sp e c ify  th e  number o f Malays to  be sen t
82to  England a t  any one tim e and proposed to  t r e a t  each case on i t s  m e r i ts .
T h e o re tic a l ly  th o se  s e le c te d  must have shown ex ce p tio n a l a b i l i t y  and a p titu d e
in  le g a l  work. In  p r a c t ic e ,  however, th e  s e le c t io n  was s ig n i f ic a n t ly
in flu en ced  by th e  s o c ia l  backgrounds o f th e  a p p lic a n ts .
Of th e  f iv e  Malays s e n t to  England under t h i s  p o lic y , fo u r came from
th e  most a r i s to c r a t i c  fa m ilie s  in  th e  FMS. The f i r s t  o f f ic e r  sen t to  England
in  1924 was Raja Musa b in  R aja Bot who was r e la te d  to  th e  Selangor ro y a l
fam ily  and was th e  son o f th e  famous w a r r io r - c h ie f ,  R aja B ot. Commenting on
R aja M usa's s e le c t io n ,  G uillem ard dw elt a t  some len g th  on th e  a s s is ta n c e
83rendered  by Raja Bot to  th e  e stab lish m en t o f B r i t i s h  ru le  in  S e langor.' J 
Follow ing Raja Musa in  th e  same y e a r went R aja Azman Shah, a member o f th e  
Perak ro y a l fam ily  and son o f Raja Chulan, th e  R a ja -d i -H i l i r  o f Perak .
Chulan was in tim a te ly  a sso c ia te d  w ith th e  c o lo n ia l  regime fo r  n e a r ly  h a l f  a 
cen tu ry , both  as th e  second Malay member o f  th e  MCS and then  as an 
u n o f f ic ia l  member o f th e  Perak S ta te  and th e  F ed era l C o u n cils . H is s ig n a l  
se rv ic e  to  th e  c o lo n ia l  regime earned him a knighthood in  1930. The th i r d  
cand ida te  in  192$ was Tengku Abdul Rahman, son o f th e  Yam Tuan o f Negri 
Sem bilan, who in  th e  1930s was regarded  by th e  B r i t i s h  as a model Malay r u le r .  
H is u n c le , Tengku Ism a il b in  Tungku Mohamed J a s in ,  follow ed him in  1928.
Tengku Ism a il re s ig n ed  from th e  MCS in  1937 to  become one o f th e  two Malay
r t  I
law yers in  p r iv a te  p r a c t ic e  in  th e  FMS, and a y ea r l a t e r  founded th e
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As T.S. Adams
admitted in 1934, both Raja Musa’s and Tengku Ismail’s records of service
86did not disclose a penchant for law and legal work. The system of 
selection therefore caused some complaints among Malay officers, though the 
policy itself was welcomed as an improvement of their prospects of
When the policy came under review in 1930, the Legal Adviser pointed 
out that only the judgeship required the training of a barrister. And since 
only a very exceptional Malay could qualify for such an appointment, he 
regarded the policy of sending Malays to England as ”an expensive form of
considered unfit to be Judges. Though Raja Musa had successfully acted as
a puisne Judge in the late 1930's, he was not confirmed in that post until
after the Second World War. Further, in the matter of promotion in the
MCS, as we shall see, the interests of British Officers were invariably given
priority over those of their Malay colleagues. Since 1924 the British
expected England-trained Malays to demand a stronger role in public life,
and were now worried about an increasing tendency among Malay officers to
press for improvement in the terms of service. 7 A contributory factor was
that Malay students in England tended to get involved with English ladies or
90into money problems. In this connexion the British apparently disapproved
of the marriages of two of the selected candidates to English women. Anglo-
Malay marriages were officially considered inimical to the prestige and
91status of the Malay aristocracy.
It was therefore decided to heed the Legal Adviser's warning against 
raising false hopes among Malay Officers by training them in England. The 
resultant decision to send only very exceptional Malays to England to all 
intents and purposes marked the end of the policy. But the keen interest of 
a large number of Malay Officers to become barristers kept the issue alive.
87advancement to the MCS.
philanthropy” The truth of the matter was that Malay Officers were
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When the policy was again reviewed in 1935, all the Judgeships were already
92confined to members of the newly-formed Colonial Legal Service. Hence the
government officially ended the policy except for exceptional Malay
93graduates from the Raffles College. It seems clear that the Colonial
Office could have been persuaded to appoint Malay Civil Servants who were
barristers as Judges. This view was in fact held by the FMS Chief Justice
9Uin 1938 and implicitly by the Resident of Pahang three years earlier.
After all, Straits-born Chinese barristers in the Colony were admitted as
95members of the Colonial Legal Service in 1938. But despite the appeals of
96the Chief Justice, Malay Officers and Malay newspapers, the government
refused to send Malay Officers to study in the Inns in England.
Efforts were also made in Malaya to raise the educational standards of
the MAS. The entry qualification for Probationers was raised from the
Seventh Standard in 1910 to the Senior Cambridge Certificate in 1929. Four
years later it was decided to admit Malay honours graduates from Oxford or
Cambridge into the MAS on a salary higher than that of an ordinary 
97Probationer. Along with the rise in the general educational level, and
with the enrolment of graduates from other English schools in the MAS, the
Malay College declined as a centre for the training of Malay Officers. By
1930 even the Rulers tended to educate their sons in the ordinary English
schools in their home state where a comparatively good education could be 
98obtained. When the government was compelled by the depression to impose
student fees in 1931 > the Malay College lost further appeal and student
intake dropped to some extent. Both the Pahang and Selangor royal families
thereupon withdrew their members from the College, though the latter case
was mainly due to a conflict of opinion between the Raja Muda and the acting
Headmaster. In 1933 the College was almost converted into a centre for Malay
99and non-Malay students studying for the Higher School Certificate. Only 
the Rulers' disapproval and British anxiety to preserve the College as a
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2meeting ground to widen the outlook of anak baik saved the institution from 
the economy axe. Likewise, the Retrenchment Commission’s proposal for its 
abolition was rejected.
In 1932 Caldecott proposed a two-year course at Raffles College for
Malay Probationers to improve their training. The Residents felt that
Singapore, where Raffles College was located, provided neither the
appropriate rural setting wherein the Probationers would feel at home nor the
100collegiate life of Cambridge or Oxford. The main objection, however, was 
the fear that the proposal would unduly accelerate the promotion of Malays 
into the MCS. This was considered undesirable both because of the belief 
that Malay Officers were not sufficiently self-disciplined and trained for 
it and because it would jeopardise the interests of British cadets. As T.S. 
Adams pointed out, it would become increasingly difficult to restrict the 
number of Malay Civil Servants as the educational standards of Malay Officers 
approached those of their British c o l l e a g u e s . T h e  proposal of a two-year 
course at Raffles College was accordingly deferred. Instead in 1934 a
Higher School Certificate course was introduced in the Malay College for
2 102 anak baik , but was abandoned two years later. By then Johore had
successfully trained its Malay Officers in Raffles College. The government
therefore reluctantly agreed to send the MAS Probationers for a three-year
course in the same college, thereby causing a further decline in the status
of the Malay College. On the whole, the educational attainment of the MAS
had improved considerably by the late 1930s.
The practical training of Malay Officers depended on the positions to
which they were attached. After 1921 they usually served in their home state
where they were almost invariably posted to the district administrations. At
times junior officers stationed in their home districts were unable to
withstand frequently undesirable local pressure. To obviate this, the
government ruled in 1936 that only experienced officers with ten years’
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103service should be posted to their home districts. In 1928 out of seventy- 
eight Malay Officers, seventy-two were attached to land and district 
offices.10 1^-
This situation came under frequent criticisms from Malay Federal
Councillors, Malay newspapers, and the Sultan of Perak. To meet this,
several feeble attempts were made to employ Malay Officers in the Treasury,
the Customs, Agriculture, Forests, Medical and Museums Departments.
Departmental response was usually lukewarm and at times hostile.10'5 On the
other hand, Malay Officers themselves preferred land and district work and
tended to avoid serving in departments. Apart from a general reluctance
to venture into new field, they desired to remain, like British Civil
Servants, administrative generalists.10 *^ A secondary factor was the far
higher cost of living in the big towns where the departments were located.10^
At the close of the period under study, there were at most ten Malay Officers
108with experience of working in departments.
Malay eagerness to serve in the Secretariats, however, was ignored by 
the government. This was mainly due to the scramble among British cadets 
for positions in the secretarists (and big departments) Where rapid 
promotions could be secured. The three or four Malay Officers stationed 
there disappeared altogether When all secretariat posts were reserved for 
B**itish officers after 1932.10^ In regard to district administration, the 
policy was to post Malay Officers, whenever possible, to outlying districts 
where Malays predominated. Demands from Malay unofficial councillors and 
Malay newspapers to allow Malay Officers to study Chinese and Tamil and 
serve in the Labour Department and the Chinese Secretariat were studiously 
ignored by the government.110 This was partly because Malay Officers were 
generally considered unfit to sit in judgement over the non-Malay 
communities. The main reason for pcs ting Malays to predominantly Malay 
districts was that it was in these areas that they could most effectively
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help consolidate and strengthen the Malay base of British indirect rule.
The duties of Malay Officers in the district administrations may be
divided into two major spheres. The more important sphere covered land work
which involved knowledge of finance, land alienation and settlement
A key British official in the 1920s was believed to have directed that the
brighter MAS officers should be allocated land work to avoid serious losses
from errors made in land matters. The 'duds' were sent to do legal work in
112the belief that their mistakes could always be corrected by the judges.
Court work formed the second main sphere of duties of Malay officers. In
fact, nearly all the magisterial functions in the districts (for the most
part involving petty criminal cases) were performed by Malay Magistrates.^^
Admittedly the legal training of Malay Officers was superficial, and
they received no advice or guidance in the f i e l d . A w a r e  of this, Che
Hamzeh bin Abdullah urged the Government during a Conference in 1929 to
devote more attention to overcome this shortcoming. Consequently, Raja
Musa's brother, Raja Ayoub was sent to be trained in legal work in the
115Official Assignee's office. The MAS scheme was also amended that year
to require Malay Probationers to spend a year studying Law in the Malay
College. The situation, however, did not improve. The work of land and
district officers increasingly required an intimate knowledge of law. More
lawyers also appeared on the scene and spread into the rural areas.
Consequently, Malay Officers found it increasingly difficult in the 1930s
to cope with their legal duties. In 1937 the FMS Bar Committee, for
instance, bitterly complained to the government about the gross incompetence
117of Malay magistrates.
Already worried by this, the government directed Raja Musa to conduct
a legal course for Malay Probationers in Raffles College in 1938. A series
of steps soon followed as a result of a severely adverse report on the
118Malay magistracy by the FMS Chief Justice. ' The Legal Adviser now ran a
259
practical course on law to Malay Officers, and District Officers were
instructed to guide them in court work. For the guidance of Malay
magistrates, the Supreme Court issued ciculars on criminal cases involving
important and intricate legal points in law. The Residents now exercised
more care in appointing Malay magistrates, and the notoriously inefficient
119Malay Officers recruited in the early 1930s were dismissed. Thereafter, 
the government was satisfied with the performance of Malay magistrates. 
Hov/ever, while the district work of Malay Officers was of high standard, 
their legal work was by no means impressive at the close of the period under 
study.
In the first flush of enthuasism, Sir George Maxwell had been prepared
120to recruit more than ten Malay Probationers a year. In fact the intake
in 1921 was eleven Probationers but slumped to two the following year.
Thereafter the annual recruitment by the MAS generally varied between four
121and six Probationers. As in the MCS, the main factor behind recruitment
was the desire to maintain, as far as possible, an even level of enrolment
122in order to ensure a balanced 'cadre1. But the government also took 
into consideration the calibre of the candidates, the vacancies in the 
service, the ability of London to fill MCS posts, and the general economic 
situation in the country. During the boom years of the late 1930s when 
MCS recruitment at the imperial end encountered stiff difficulties, the 
intake reached eight, apparently the second highest figure during the interwar 
years.
After the introduction of the 1917 scheme, the British endeavoured to
close the MAS to officers belonging to other branches of the administration.
123However one or two outsiders still managed to enter it before 1922. That 
year Maxwell ruled that the MAS had 'crystallised and set' and that 
'backdoor admissions' of other officers should be strictly prohibited,"^^
This helped to stabilise the MAS by mid-1920s, and official attention now
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turned to establishing a ’normal cadre’. This was not accomplished till 1930
125when the normal establishment was ’fixed’ at eighty-one officers. The
MAS in fact does not appear to have grown to this size except in 1928 and 
1261929. “ The number of Malay Officers declined in the 1930s. In other words
the MAS cadre constituted about twenty-five percent of the MCS in the second
half of the 1920s, and increased to thirty-odd percent in the 1930s because
of a corresponding fall in the MCS establishment.
As the junior arm of the MCS, the MAS was encouraged to cultivate a
strong esprit de corns. As Sir George Maxwell advised them in 1925, they
should feel they belonged to a 'body incorporate' and should emulate the MCS.
At all times they were reminded to bear two things clearly in mind-their
127religion and their loyalty to the Rulers and the British flag.
The decision to make the MAS a closed service significantly helped the
growth of a strong esprit de corps. This was reinforced by deliberate
efforts to treat Malay Officers in official life as the equal of their British 
128colleagues. No effort was spared to impress upon Malay Officers the need
to keep up their station in life. As magistrates in the districts, they
must join the European district club and play no games elsewhere. If they
visited the cinema, they were told to patronise only the expensive seats.
After 1929 they enjoyed the privilege of travelling first-class in trains.
They were constantly reminded not to associate with clerks and other
subordinate officers. It was thought desirable, especially if they were of
commoner origin, that they should contract a good marriage. As Adams told
Ishak b. Haji Mohammed on more than one occasion: "If you want to get
130married, I can fix you up with the daughter of a Dato”. By the time they
reached Class One, Malay officers found it a part of their duty to entertain
Europeans. For those in the MCS, a real knowledge of European customs and
habits was considered essential if they were to fulfil their role
131effectively in the administration of their country. Partly for this
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reason, Malay Officers were sent, once in their career, on a v is i t  to England.
VÖiile comparatively lowly-paid, they had to mdet much of the o f f ic ia l  demands
132and followed the rather extravagant way of l i f e  of British C ivil Servants.
Consequently, indebtedness was fa ir ly  widespread among them. Furthermore,
despite severe penalties, including dism issal, Malay magistrates seemed to be
133quite frequently corrupt. These socia l stigmas constituted a serious 
weakness in the MAS, even though Malay Officers imbibed much of the MCS 
esprit de corps.
Malay Entry to the MCS
Promotion of Malay Officers to the MCS continued, as Raja C'hulan 
b itter ly  complained in 1932, to be agonisingly slow. Though the Colonial 
Office was quite keen to see the lower administrative b i l le t s  f i lle d  by 
Malays, especially  in view of the increasing d if f ic u lt ie s  in MCS 
recruitment, i t s  attitude was determined by the Malayan authorities. For 
one thing, i t  had scanty knowledge of the performance of the MAS. There was 
also no strong loca l pressure for a faster rate of Malay entry into the 
C ivil Service. The Malayan Government therefore had a free hand in the 
matter.
British officialdom adhered to the view that Malay Officers needed
close supervision and that their  advancement in the service should be
scrupulously regulated. The attitude of the British towards the MAS was
succinctly described by Guillemard in 1923:
There are fifty -th ree  o fficers in the MAS. A few of the best of 
them have proved themselves f i t  to rank with the MCS and to be 
entrusted with the duties of D istrict Officers or of other 
positions of responsib ility . Others are men of solid  reliab le  
merit, f i t  for a limited amount of responsib ility such as an 
Assistant D istrict O fficer. Others again (about ha lf of the 
to ta l number) are industrious and worthy ’donkey workers'. Only 
a small proportion,have shown themselves unfit for any position  
of responsib ility . ^
Subscribing to th is  view, T.S. Adams, the man who contributed most to the 
advancement of the MAS, conceded that Malays were not yet f i t  to make up
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"l *36fifty percent of the MCS. It was generally assumed that Malay Officers
had still not developed a ’high character’ to shoulder increased
responsibilities and rank equally with British cadets. With a strong sense
of paternalism, the British envisaged their task to be one of assigning that
amount of responsibilities which Malay Officers could ’safely’ execute and
of carefully training them for more. To justify this attitude, the British
repeatedly pointed out the relatively low educational level of Malay 
137Officers. The view was generally held that Malays could neither afford
nor obtain an English university degree which was the minimum qualification
for direct entry into the MCS.^^ Not only did the British feel that a fair
139deal had already been accorded Malay Officers but tended to regard the
latter as ’privileged children’ Hence Malay requests for improvement in
the terms of service were strongly disapproved. For instance, during a
conference in 1929 the Chief Secretary complained to Malay Officers of a
’tendency to show lack of appreciation of benefits conferred, and to make
increasing efforts to ask for more /""whichJ had grown very much in recent 
’141years.
After the mid-1920s the desire to ensure that the advancement of 
British cadets would not be impeded by their Malay colleagues became an 
increasingly important consideration behind British policy. Along with 
British paternalism, this was responsible for the retrogressive amendments 
of the MAS scheme after 1924. These changes consisted of improvements in 
the salary scale of Malay Officers on the one hand and a whittling down of 
their advancement prospects on the other. In 1926 the requirement of at 
least five years’ service for a Grade One or Special Grade Officer to fill 
an ’Administrative Appointment’ was changed back to ten years. It was 
further stipulated that those occupying such appointments must serve for 
three years to qualify for admission to the MCS. As Adams warned at the 
time, these retrogressive changes stirred widespread dissatisfaction within
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the MAS. In 1929 therefore the requirement for promotion to 'Administrative 
Appointment' was shortened to at least seven years’ s e r v i c e . B u t  
promotion was slowed down for officers below the efficiency bar a year 
later. Hitherto bright Malay Officers were able to pass their Law and 
General Orders examinations and cross the efficiency bar in less than five 
years. It was now stipulated that five-years' service was necessary for a 
Malay Officer to pass the efficiency bar.1^  On the whole the changes in 
the MAS scheme after the mid-1920s slowed down the movement of Malay Officers 
into the MCS. In fact these officers did not normally become eligible for 
such promotion until around thirty-eight years of age, instead of the thirty
I L Kyears envisaged under the 1921 scheme.
British paternalism and the desire to safeguard British interests 
operated against Malay Officers in another direction. There was a tendency 
after the mid-1920s to convert MCS Class V posts into 'Administrative 
Appointments'.^4^  This meant that more Special Grade Officers could be 
trained for the MCS and thus help relieve the pressure for promotion among 
the large body of officers at the top rung of the MAS. But it obviated the 
necessity to promote the existing 'Administrative Appointees' to make way 
for Special Grade Officers. It also meant that fever Malay Officers could 
be made to act in MCS posts and prove their capacities. This policy 
therefore also tended to retard the promotion of deserving officers into the 
MCS.
During the years, 1917-1928, only seven Malays joined the MCS, while
T Zi7a larger number filled or acted in "Administrative Appointments".'^'' From 
1928 onwards the rate of promotion accelerated. This was partly because of 
the large number of Special Grade and Grade I officers who could no longer 
be held back indefinitely without aggravating the dissatisfaction that had 
arisen among them. As discussed earlier, the MCS was also unable to obtain 
its annual quota of cadets from London, and its establishment fell short by
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1Z ftfifty officers in 1923. J But the most important factor was the depression
of the 1930s, reinforced by the policy of decentralisation. The Malay
Federal Councillors seized the occasion to complain bitterly about the
irregular and snail-pace rate of promotion for M S  officers and the
extravagance of a European administration. They pressed the Government to
promote more Malays into the MCS in keeping with the need for economies and
149the decentralisation policy. In 1932 therefore the number of Malay Civil
Servants reached twelve in 1932 while seven others were acting in MCS posts.
Clementi agreed with the views of the Malay Federal Councillors. His
attitude to this question was conditioned by his decentralisation policy
which aimed, among other things, to assimilate the positions of the FMS and
the UMS. Hence he would have liked to reconstitute the M S  into a self-
contained service like the Johore Civil Service vhose members were not
150eligible to enter the MCS. Since this was not practicable, he fell in
with the prevailing view of British Civil Servants on Malay promotion to the
MCS. While deciding in 1932 to accelerate further Malay entry into the MCS,
he at the same time divided the Civil Service posts into 'British Reserved
Posts' and 'Unreserved Posts'. The former consisted of about three-quarters
of the MCS posts which, for 'political and other reasons', were reserved for 
151British cadets. Among these were all the staff posts, nearly all the
Class I posts and all the more important positions in the lower rungs of the
MCS. After the retrenchment of ten MCS posts, the 'Unreserved Posts'
152numbered forty-two. Of these, twenty-one were already occupied by British 
administrators, and until these officers moved to other posts, they invariably 
blocked the advancement of their Malay colleagues. Ten of the reserved posts 
were earmarked for the Straits Administrative Service which was established 
in the Colony in 1 9 3 4 . This indirectly affected Malay Officers because it 
reduced the number of reserved posts that could be relegated to the
unreserved list in the future.
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Admitting that the previous rate promotion for Malay Officers was
unduly slow, Clementi desired to take a minimum of two Malays annually into
the MCS till 1937 when the intake would be increased to three. Accordingly,
the year 1934 witnessed the promotion of the largest number of Malays to the
MCS throughout the interwar years. Six Malays became Civil Servants,
followed by another three a year later. But after Clementi*s departure from
Malaya, it was ruled that only two Malay Officers should be admitted to the 
154MCS a year. During Thomas’ time this ruling was strictly followed,
Malay reaction to these changes is by no means clear. Probably Malay Officers
were mainly interested in the faster rate of promotion, regarding most of
the posts, even if they remained open, as out of their reach. The rate
of two promotions a year was accepted by “Whitehall as a ’safe* basis on
■which to operate until 1946, when nearly all the unreserved posts were
expected to be filled by Malays. In case of unforeseen developments, the
Colonial Office decided, the rate of promotion could be retarded by delay
155in filling those unreserved posts vacated by British officers.
The years of service put in by Malay Civil Servants before promotion
ranged from nine to twenty-two, with an average of about sixteen. Mainly
owing to the retrogressive amendments of the MAS scheme after the mid-1920s,
Malays who entered the MCS during the years 1928-34* tended to be more
mature in age than those promoted earlier. After 1935 Malay Officers again
tended to join the MCS at a younger age because of the more certain
156prospects of promotion. In view of British elitist attitude, it may be 
assumed that Malay promotion to the MCS was influenced by the social status 
of the officers concerned. The main criteria for promotion, however, were 
seniority in service and especially efficiency. These factors remained 
decisive as regards Malay promotion within the MCS, subject to prior 
consideration of the interests of British Civil Servants. This likewise 
applied to the handful of non-European Civil Servants recruited before 1904
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as evident in the case of one Hafiz Chulan Sarwar. Commenting on Sarwar's
petition to the Colonial Officer for promotion to Class I, Guillemard wrote,
'Mr. Sarwar is a native of India, and in this Colony at any rate there are
strong reasons why /"he_7 cannot be considered suitable for promotion to
157many appointments'. In the case of Malay Officers, the introduction of
the 'British Reserved Posts', as one Colonial Office official rightly
pointed out, was already a breach of faith with the MAS. Hitherto Malay
administrators were theoretically eligible to ascend to the very top of the
MCS (excepting the Chief Secretaryship and Residentship). Nevertheless,
British Officers continued to entertain strong views against allowing Malay
1^ 8Officers to occupy Class I or even Class II positions. " It was therefore 
with grave misgivings that the government promoted Hamzah bin Abdullah to a 
Class IB post in 1940. Despite his undoubted capacities, Hamzah's 
promotion seems to have been allowed mainly because he was due to retire a 
year later. These misgivings were generally shared by the Colonial Office.
As one official minuted, Malays could not wisely be allowed to occupy Class 
IA posts except probably as Commissioner of Land or Director of Co­
operatives."^
In the final analysis British policy towards the MAS was very cautious 
and conservative. In 1940 there were only twenty-seven Malay Civil Servants, 
about one-eightieth of the total MCS officers.^“* Except for one Class IB 
and one Class II officer, the rest crowded in the lower rungs of the MCS. 
Furthermore, like Malay Officers, most of them were stationed in 
predominantly Malay districts. In other words, during the interwar years 
the Malay Civil Servants neither jeopardised the promotion of their British 
colleagues nor challenged their effective monopoly of power.
Nevertheless, the MAS was a significant concession to the Malay 
community and was a partial restoration of political power to the traditional 
elite. The entry of Malay Officers into the MCS also halted the tendency
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s in c e  1904 to  make th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  se rv ice  a p u re ly  European p re se rv e . 
F u r th e r ,  th e  MAS m ain ta ined  and enhanced th e  p o s i t io n  o f th e  Malay 
a r is to c r a c y  v i s - a - v is  th e  r a *a y a t . W ithin  t h i s  a r is to c r a c y  now emerged wa 
new Malay le a d e rsh ip  group, E n g lish -ed u ca ted  and in c re a s in g ly  in flu en c ed  by 
W estern id e a s  of government and s o c ia l  o rg a n is a tio n , drawing i t s  a u th o r i ty  
in  p a r t  from in h e r i te d  s o c ia l  s t a tu s ,  in  p a r t  from i t s  a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  th e
B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  regime“ . 161 I t  was t h i s  new le a d e rsh ip  which, to g e th e r
(<U.
w ith  th e  Malay e l i t e  in  th e  UMS, movement fo r  n a tio n a l independence and th e
A
complete M alayan isa tion  of th e  p u b lic  se rv ice  a f t e r  World War I I .
Malays in  Government Departments
The employment of lo c a l-b o ra  and dom iciled  Asians in  s e n io r  p o s ts  in  
te c h n ic a l  and p ro fe s s io n a l departm ents became a l iv e  is su e  e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  
1930s. M ainly f o r  reasons o f economy, th e  C o lo n ia l O ffice  p re ssed  f o r  i t  bu t 
made no headway. The departm en ta l heads adopted an ex trem ely  h o s t i l e  stand  
and succeeded in  keeping th e  se n io r  s e rv ic e  as a p u re ly  European p re se rv e  
except f o r  th e  M edical and th e  J u d ic ia ry  departm en ts. By an unreasonab le  
amount o f  emphasis on 'l o c a l  know ledge', th e y  a lso  managed to  re se rv e  most 
o f th e  lo c a l  prom otions fo r  B r i t i s h  Malayan o f f i c e r s .  Like th e  MCS o f f i c e r s ,  
on th e  o th e r  hand, many sen io r B r i t i s h  s p e c ia l i s t s  secured  prom otion o u ts id e  
M alaya.162
In te r e s te d  m ainly in  e f f ic ie n c y , and r e l a t i v e ly  in s e n s i t iv e  to  B r i t a i n 's  
m oral o b lig a tio n s  to  th e  M alays, th e  te c h n o c ra ts  made no e f f o r t  to  t r a i n  
Malays f o r  s e n io r  appoin tm ents. B esid es, n e a r ly  a l l  th e  q u a l i f ie d  lo c a l -  
born f o r  th e se  p o s ts  were non-M alays. To th e  te c h n o c ra ts  th e re fo re  th e  
problem was an A sian , not a Malay one, as in  th e  C iv il  S e rv ic e . N ev erth e le ss , 
a t  th e  in s is te n c e  o f the  government s e v e ra l  fe e b le  s tep s  were taken  during  
th e  1920s to  he lp  Malays e n te r  government departm en ts. For in s ta n c e , a f t e r  
1922 two o r th re e  Malays were sen t an n u ally  to  study  a t  th e  King Edward VII 
M edical C ollege in  S ingapore.1^3 The r e s u l t  was th e  appointm ent o f a few
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Malay doctors to middle-ranking posts in the medical department. But 
attempts to make these doctors undergo a postgraduate course and to train 
Malays as engineers and agricultural officers in England for the senior 
service f a i l e d , T h i s  was due either to lack of Malay response or to the 
intransigent attitude of departmental heads.
In 1931 Clementi secured Colonial Office sanction to force the medical 
department to open its senior service to Asian doctors. In fact a similar 
attempt made by Whitehall in the early 1920s had been blocked by the 
department. The professional competence and the demands of local-trained 
doctors for entry to the senior service had then been readily admitted. But 
the medical head had contended that Asian doctors lacked ’character' and 
could not shoulder administrative duties, and that the move would hinder
I65recruitment in England. This contention could not withstand the impact
of decentralisation in the early 1930s and especially the austerity drive
during the slump. However, Clementi1s policy was not effected until January
1937 partly because of the opposition of the Malay Rulers who feared non-
Malay Asian declination much more than they disapproved of the current British
supremacy in the department. The main reason was the delay in formulating
a scheme acceptable to British medical o f f i c e r s . I n  1937 six Malay
doctors joined the senior medical service, but the great majority of Asian
"I 6 * 7medical officers were Indian or Ceylonese.
In 1931 the director of the Agriculture Department was prepared to
l6Sadmit three Malays in the next decade as senior agricultural officers.
He appeared to have been favourably impressed by the performance of middle­
ranking Malay officers in the department. However, he insisted that these
Malays must first secure a British university degree or an equivalent diploma
169in agricultural science. This meant that they had to be trained in 
England. By then however, the policy of sending Malays to England for further 
studies, as discussed earlier, had already been abandoned. Instead the
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government t r i e d  to  send Malay g rad u a tes  from th e  School o f A g ric u ltu re  a t
Serdang to  study a t  th e  Im p eria l C ollege of A g ric u ltu re  in  T r in id a d . This
f a i l e d  because Serdang was n o t considered  adequate p re p a ra t io n  f o r  th e
170a g r ic u l tu r a l  t r a in in g  th e r e .  Hence, du ring  th e  in te r -w a r  y ea rs  th e re
171was no se n io r  Malay a g r i c u l tu r a l  o f f ic e r  in  th e  FMS and on ly  one in  th e  UMS.
Once A sians had been adm itted  in to  th e  s e n io r  m edical s e rv ic e , i t  was
v i r t u a l l y  im possib le  to  b a r Asian e n try  in to  o th e r  departm ents on p u re ly
r a c i a l  ground. The c lo sed -door p o lic y , however, was e f f e c t iv e ly  m ain ta ined
by an in s is te n c e  th a t  e n try  to  th e  s e n io r  s e rv ic e  re q u ire d  a B r i t i s h
u n iv e r s i ty  degree or diplom a. In  th e  sh o rt te rm , t h i s  blocked dese rv in g
A sian O ff ic e rs ,  many w ith  en g in ee rin g  degrees from Hong Kong o r In d ia  and
172perform ing the  d u tie s  o f  B r i t i s h  en g in ee rs , from s e n io r  p o s ts  in  te c h n ic a l
departm en ts. I t  a lso  prolonged th e  e x is t in g  p o s i t io n  in d e f in i t e ly  in  view
of the  scan ty  o p p o r tu n itie s  f o r  h ig h e r educa tion  f o r  lo c a l-b o rn  A sian s . By
th e  l a t e  1930s however, th e  te ch n o c ra ts  were being  put in c re a s in g ly  on th e
d e fe n s iv e . For one th in g ,  th e  s e n io r  Asian m edical o f f ic e r s  were
acknowledged not to  lower th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f th e  M edical D epartm ent. More
im p o rta n tly , th e  Government and W h iteh a ll were in c re a s in g ly  concerned about
th e  extreme d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  rec ru itm en t and th e  consequent acu te  sh o rtag e  of
173B r i t i s h  en g in ee rs  in  th e  te c h n ic a l  departm en ts. Aware th a t  non-Malays were 
s te a d i ly  becoming permanent r e s id e n ts ,  th e  Government was a ls o  r e lu c ta n t ly  
and g ra d u a lly  coming to  term s w ith  t h e i r  a s p i r a t io n s .  During Thomas' tim e , 
th e re  was a tendency to  admit A sians to  th e  s e n io r  and th e  m id d le-rank ing  
se rv ic e  in  th e  departm en ts.
T his culm inated in  1938 when Thomas convened th e  Cow gill Committee to  
recommend s e n io r  te c h n ic a l  p o s ts  th a t  might 's a f e l y '  be opened to  A sians.
This committee p ressed  fo r  th e  rec ru itm en t o f  two A sian en g in eers  a y ea r f o r  
departm ents l ik e  P u b lic  Works and R ailw ays. By now Malay o p in ion  was 
s e r io u s ly  w orried  about th e  o f f i c i a l  tendency to  employ more non-Malays in
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middle-ranking and senior departmental posts. With considerable justification,
the Rulers therefore strongly opposed the Cowgill Report on the ground that
Malays were not sufficiently trained in this field to compete effectively 
175with non-Malays. No effort appeared to have been made to persuade the 
Rulers to change their mind. The Cowgill Report was in the end dropped.
The failure of local-born Asians to make any inroad into the technical 
and professional departments was mainly due to two factors. One of these 
was the sordid determination of the British to keep senior posts as a purely 
European preserve. In fact racial discrimination affected even the few non- 
Malay members of the Judiciary Department. For instance, Sproule, a Senior
Puisne Judge who had acted successfully as head of the Judiciary in the
ary m<r
Colony and the FMS, was not appointed Chief Justice, FMS, because/
'Guillemard says that he is of Ceylonese Burgher descent and of a very dusky 
176hue', r He was again passed over four years later because he was
considered unable to 'adequately maintain the dignity of the post' in a
177Malay Protectorate. Such racial prejudices were also evident in the
attitude of the technocrats towards grooming Malays for technical
appointments. Officially Malays were entitled to admission to these posts
since the 1920s. In 1927 Guillemard rejected a Colonial Office request that
European engineers be gradually replaced by local-born Asian engineers on
178the pretext that only Malays were admissible to these appointments. But
very few Malays were technically-inclined, and those who were prepared to
undergo the requisite training as engineers were invariably blocked by
departmental heads. For instance, in 1937 an exceptionally brilliant Malay
graduate^ from the Technical School at Kuala Lumpur, Che Waad bin 
179Jamaluddin, was not sent to England for training as a mechnical engineer 
because of strong opposition from the General Manager of the Railway 
Department. The latter strongly disputed Waad's ability to handle Indian 
labour. Indeed this prejudice that Asians could not be entrusted with
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a d m in is tra tiv e  o r f in a n c ia l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  was shared  by the  heads of th e
180o th e r  departm en ts. The proven c a p a c it ie s  o f A sian M edical O ff ic e rs  and 
e s p e c ia l ly  of Malay C iv i l  S e rv an ts  were co n ven ien tly  ig n o red .
The crux  o f th e  m a tte r  was th e  absence o f f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  t r a in in g  
A sian s p e c ia l i s t s  excep t f o r  th o se  ab le  to  study o v e rseas . In  t h i s  connexion 
th e  MCS and th e  B r i t i s h  te c h n o c ra ts  had a v ested  i n t e r e s t  in  p ro long ing  th e  
s ta tu s  quo. As a lre a d y  d iscu ssed , B r i t i s h  C iv i l  S e rv an ts  were aware th a t  
the  r e l a t i v e ly  low e d u ca tio n a l le v e l  o f Malay O ffic e rs  was a s tro n g  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  exclud ing  th e  l a t t e r  from most o f th e  MCS p o s ts .  For 
in s ta n c e ,  though p repared  to  employ s e n io r  Asian a g r i c u l tu r a l  o f f i c e r s ,  th e  
R e s id e n ts ’ Conference in  1932 re je c te d  th e  id e a  o f  sending Malays to  England 
f o r  th e  r e q u is i te  t r a in in g .  O therw ise, i t  would have s e r io u s ly  weakened th e  
case o f th e  MCS to  stop  t r a in in g  Malay O ffic e rs  in  th e  Inns in  England. In  
o th e r  w ords, th e  requ irem ent o f a B r i t i s h  u n iv e r s i ty  degree o r  diploma f o r  
e n try  in to  the  s e n io r  se rv ic e  enabled the  te c h n o c ra ts  to  co n ta in  government 
p re ssu re  to  appo in t A sians.
This cou ld , of co u rse , be circum vented by promoting th e  e x is t in g  
m idd le-rank ing  A sian o f f ic e r s  o r  ad m ittin g  th o se  w ith  non-E nglish  
u n iv e r s i ty  degree to  s e n io r  p o s ts . This does not appear to  have been 
considered  and, i f  i t  had, i t  would c e r ta in ly  have met unanimous o p p o sitio n  
from th e  te c h n o c ra ts . The o th e r  a l te r n a t iv e  would have been to  drop th e  
B r i t i s h  u n iv e rs ity -d e g re e  requirem ent and prov ide th e  r e q u is i t e  t r a in in g  in  
Malaya th rough  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t i e s .  Again t h i s  s tep  would have opera ted  
a g a in s t  both  th e  in t e r e s t s  of th e  te c h n o c ra ts  and th e  MCS in  th e  long run . 
Unless th e  e x is t in g  employment p o lic y  was changed, th e  government knew th a t  
i t  would e v e n tu a lly  c rea te  a p o o l of d isco n ten te d  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  The end 
r e s u l t  would be th e  c a ta s tro p h ic  p o l i t i c a l  u n re s t o f In d ia . On th e  o th e r  
hand, th e  absence of u n iv e r s i ty  ed u ca tio n  in  Malaya, w ith  i t s  a tte n d a n t 
l im i ta t io n  on th e  numbers of h ig h ly -q u a lif ie d  A sian s , was a c r u c ia l  fa c to r
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behind the relatively weak local demand for entry to the senior service.
It is in this light that official reaction to the McLean-Channon
Report of 1939 on higher education in Malaya can best be understood. This
report recommended the merger of Raffles College and King Edward VII Medical
College into a University College as a step towards the eventual
establishment of a university in Malaya. It refrained from recommending
an Engineering Faculty in the proposed university college because the Cowgill
Report had stressed that only a small number of senior posts could be opened
to Asian engineers. Instead it suggested that the training in the Kuala
Lumpur Technical School be raised so that a few of the brigther graduates
could be selected to study for an external London degree. Thomas viewed the
idea of a university college with grave misgivings. It seems clear that
Malay opposition to the establishment of a university was used as a pretext
for his hostile attitude. The Malayan Director of Education as well as
Whitehall believed that Malays could be persuaded to accept a university
college. The real reason behind Thomas’ attitude appears to be the
opposition of the MCS which feared that better-educated Asians would
181eventually challenge their effective monopoly of power. No decision had 
been taken on the Report when the Japanese occupied Malaya in 1942. In 
other words the British appeared to have refused to provide higher education 
in Malaya in order to maintain their near monopolisation of the senior 
service in the administration.
From the narrow viewpoint of the technocrats, the interests of British 
officers could be most effectively maintained and promoted by making the 
whole senior hierarchy a British preserve. To admit Asians into one branch 
of the senior service would invariably have weakened British ability to 
monopolise the others. This was in fact the effect of the entry of Malays 
into the MCS and of Asians into the senior medical service. For all its 
ambiguous intentions, the government could not, if the status quo was to be
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effectively maintained, propose in 1938 the employment of more than a 
handful of senior Asian specialists in other departments. But even this 
would have entailed taking steps which would have ultimately threatened the 
position of the MCS itself. This was a main reason behind the abandonment 
of the Cowgill Report. In short no Malay was appointed to senior technical 
posts, while Qualified’ non-Malays were excluded from them.
During the interwar years Malays managed to enter middle-ranking 
service in government departments, especially in the Agriculture, Co­
operatives, Forests and Police Departments. This was partly because these 
departments had intimate dealings with the Malay public or were not popular 
with non-Malays. It was also due to the sustained efforts made by the 
Government to enable Malays to penetrate these departments. Schemes of 
service, patterned after the MAS scheme, were formulated in addition to 
departmental training for Malay officers. However, these officers were not 
entitled to promotion to the MCS or the senior service in their departments. 
Generally Malay graduates from the Malay College were preferred to those 
from elsewhere for the middle-ranking service. Except in the Forests
Department, many of the officers, especially in the Police Service, were in
182fact of a calibre almost comparable to MAS officers.
By the 1910s Malays already filled most of the subordinate posts in
the Agriculture Department. To create an efficient Malay intermediate staff,
183the Government introduced a Malay Agriculture Probationer Scheme in 1917. J 
The intention was to select Malays with a Seventh Standard qualification for 
a three-year course of training in the Malay College on subjects relevant to 
their future career. Mainly owing to the opposition of the College’s Board 
of Governors who desired to maintain the exclusiveness of the College, this 
course was not conducted and was officially abandoned in 1925. Instead, 
Malay Agriculture Probationers were given training in the department and 
(after 1931) in the School of Agriculture at Serdang. By the mid-1920s
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most of the middle-ranking posts such as Senior Agriculture Assistant and 
Agriculture Inspector were staffed by Malays, During the 1930s the 
departmental head suggested that more Chinese should be employed in middle­
ranking posts to deal with the sizable proportion of Chinese agriculturalists. 
Though this view had the support of Thomas, very few Chinese were appointed.
In 1922 a Malay Co-operatives Probationer Scheme was introduced to 
train Malays for the newly-formed Co-operatives Department. To attract the 
best candidates, Maxwell was prepared to create positions that would carry
the salary scale of ’Administrative Appointment1 or even of an MCS Class V 
ISA.post. Subsequently, despite the unpopularity of the department, the 
government only offered Co-operatives officers similar salary scale and 
terms of service as Malay Officers in 1929. The Forests Department was also 
not popular with Malays but some middle-ranking posts such as Extra 
Assistant Conservator of Forests were manned by them. Despite the protests 
of Malay newspapers, Thomas tended to employ more non-Malays to fill these 
posts.
Malays made more impressive inroads in the Police Department. Before
the war the Inspectorate had been filled by poorly educated and low-class
British officers from the British Army, the Irish Constabulary and the
Colonial Prisons Service. These officers were lowly-paid, intensely
1ÖSdiscontented, and frequently corrupt. ? In 1923 the government introduced
a scheme to replace them with Malay Inspectors. By 1940 nearly the whole
Inspectorate was staffed by Malay Inspectors and Assistant Commissioners.^^
It should be noted, however, that by the late 1930s non-Malays had begun to
1Ö7show an interest in the police service. ‘ Under Thomas there was also a
1ÖÖtendency to employ more non-Malay Inspectors.
Attempts to train Malays as technical assistants in departments like 
Public Works, Mines, and Railways were disappointing in the 1920s. Though 
the technocrats reluctantly agreed to provide departmental training their
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intransigence negated government policy to an important extent. In 1926 a
technical school was established in Kuala Lumpur at the initiative of
Maxwell. Owing to preferential treatment, nearly all the ninety students
189or so were Malays. By the late 1930s, although the majority of technical 
assistants in Railways and Public Works were non-Malays, there was a 
substantial Malay element.
Malays in Subordinate Services
As in the senior service, no concrete step was taken to train Malays
for the subordinate service before the Conference of 1903. Soon after the
Conference, a General Order was issued pledging to uplift the position of
Malays and employ them in the public service whenever possible. Heads of
Departments were directed to prefer Malays to other applicants in filling
posts like orderlies, peons, punkah-pullers and apprentices. For filling
clerkships and similar appointments, local-born applicants were to enjoy
190preference over those from overseas. To the list of posts for which Malays
enjoyed preferential treatment was added in 1910 Malay clerk, bailiff,
outdoor customs officer, Malay writer and other lower-paid subordinate 
191appointments. At the same time a Malay Settlement, Kampong Bahru, was
established in Kuala Lumpur partly to enable Malays to acquire an English
192education and qualify for the clerical service. Results however were 
disappointing so that the government continued to recruit English-educated 
Tamils from India and especially Ceylon to fill subordinate posts requiring 
an English education.
The lack of English-educated Malays for the government service sprang 
from two basic factors. In accordance with the policy of indirect rule, the 
British strove to preserve Malay peasant society. To the Malay ra1ayat, 
therefore, was offered a Malay vernacular education geared to preparing them 
as peasants and fishermen. Secondly, an English education was generally out 
of the reach of Malays because they lived predominantly in rural areas. Until
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the 1920s English education was almost who&ly provided by mission schools
in the towns. The small community of urban Malays either could not afford
an English education or avoided it altogether because they feared the
193proselytising aim of the various Christian missions. Owing to the
concentration of English schools in the towns, the strong Malay demand for
an English education was not met throughout the interwar years. This demand
had arisen by the second decade of the present century^^ because Malay
clerks felt unable to compete with their better-educated non-Malay 
195colleagues and mainly because the MAS stood as a symbol of the value of
an English education. But as late as 1920 there were only 600 to 700 Malays
196out of a total enrolment of 10,000 in English schools in the FMS.
The subordinate service in the FMS was therefore dominated by Chinese,
Indians and Ceylonese (Jaffnese), but this was not as marked as commonly
believed. It was estimated in 1922 that, excluding contract labourers, the
total of 8912 Asian officers was made up of 32$ Malays, 12$ local-born Chinese,
1973$ Others and 53$ aliens from India and Ceylon.
Most of the Malay officers came from Malay vernacular schools and were
lower-paid subordinate officers. They congregated in the land offices, the
198Malay teaching service, the native establishments , and the Agriculture
and other departments which had intimate dealings with the Malay community.
Most of them were state officers, and in 1922 they constituted the majority
199in the total establishments of the four Federated States.
The non-Malay officers, on the other hand, were employed chiefly in
200the secretariats and the large departments. They dominated the clerical
and the technical services entry to which generally required a Cambridge
Junior or Senior Certificate. In 1919 Malays only formed 10.5$ of the
1,001 clerks in the General Clerical Service; the proportion of Malay
clerical and other officers in departments like Railways, Medical, Public
201Aorks, and Posts and Telegraphs was even smaller. In the subordinate
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service British policy in the interwar years concentrated on training Malays
to play a larger role in the above areas.
As noted earlier, this policy was introduced mainly because of the
slump of 1920-1922 which led to widespread soul-searching among British
officials. It was generally concluded that the federal administration was
not only unduly extravagant and top-heavy but was also "not agreeable to the
202Malays for whose benefit we profess to administer the country." A 
significant section of the MCS led by Sir George Maxwell subscribed to this 
view, as did the Retrenchment Commission of 1922. It was, therefore, 
decided to employ more local-bom Asians, especially Malays, in order to 
economise and to meet Malay discontent with the existing administration.
The Association of British Malaya went even further, appealing to the 
Secretary of State "to secure an earlier and more definite employment of
203Malays then seems to be contemplated by the Retrenchment Commissioners".
Until this was accomplished, the Association warned, the existing system of
administration might soon create an explosive Malay situation in the FMS.
Accordingly the Government decided that Malay officers should be the
last retrenched and Malay retrenchees the first to be re-employed when
201vacancies occurred. ^ Had it been practicable, the Government would have
reserved all subordinate posts for local-born candidates. But as Maxwell
pointed out, many departments still depended on foreign-born recruits because
205of the lack of local-born applicants. He proposed that no local-born
candidate should be overlooked before an overseas applicant was recruited.
The General Order was accordingly amended in 1922 to prevent the offer of
employment to foreign-born applicants without the written approval of the
206Resident or the federal head of department concerned. It was also tacitly 
agreed that among the local-born, Malays would invariably be given preference 
in government employment
The first concrete step had thus been taken to build a subordinate
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se rv ic e  f u l l y  manned by lo c a l-b o m  and dom iciled  A sians, The more im portan t 
fe a tu re  o f  t h i s  p o lic y  was th e  d i s t in c t io n  between fo re ig n -b o m  and lo c a l -  
bo m  o f f i c e r s .  The f u r th e r  d i s t in c t io n  between lo c a l-b o m  and dom iciled 
non-M alays on th e  one hand and Malays on th e  o th e r was le s s  s ig n if ic a n t  
because th e re  were s u f f ic ie n t  openings in  th e  government fo r  bo th  u n t i l  th e  
l a t e  1920s. L ikew ise, most of th e  non-Malay re tre n c h ee s  d u ring  th e  slump 
were fo re ig n -b o m  A sians. As we s h a l l  see , th e  l a t t e r  d i s t in c t io n  d id  n o t 
have any im portan t e f f e c t  on th e  Malay p o s i t io n  in  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  in  th e  
1920s. In s o fa r  as th e  p o lic y  l im ite d  th e  in ta k e  o f fo re ig n -b o m  A sians, i t  
f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  e n try  o f bo th  Malays and lo c a l-b o m  and dom iciled  non-Malays 
in to  th e  su b o rd in a te  s e rv ic e .
The problem concerning Malay employment, in  th e  op in ion  o f B r i t i s h
o f f i c i a l s ,  was to  s t r ik e  a ba lance  between t h e i r  m oral o b lig a tio n  to  advance
Malays in  th e  government and th e  need to  safeguard  a d m in is tra tiv e
e f f ic ie n c y . Maxwell, and th e  R esid en ts  h e ld  th e  view th a t  under th e  e x is t in g
c ircu m stan ces , th e  employment o f Malays on a s u b s ta n t ia l  sca le  would low er
e f f ic ie n c y . However, t h i s  could be m inim ised, i f  no t av erted  a l to g e th e r ,
by g iv in g  Malays p ro p e r t r a in in g  and gu idance . This view was doubted by th e
non-Malay u n o f f ic ia ls  o f th e  F ed e ra l C ouncil and challenged  by most heads o f
te c h n ic a l  and p ro fe s s io n a l departm en ts. However, th e  hand o f th e  Government
was s tren g th en ed  by th e  Retrenchment Commission and e s p e c ia l ly  th e  Malay
Employment Committee R ep o rts . The l a t t e r  re p o r t  contended th a t  p ro p e rly
tra in e d  and su p e rv ised , Malay o f f ic e r s  would prove more e f f i c i e n t  than  ’th e
in f e r io r  men from In d ia  and Ceylon' except in  work in v o lv in g  su p e rv is io n  of 
208non-Malay la b o u r . The r e a l  im portance o f th e  Malay Employment Committee
R eport, however, la y  in  th e  v a rio u s  s tep s  i t  o u tlin e d  tow ards e f f e c t in g  th e
new p o lic y . I t  i s  no t c le a r  w hether th e  Government endorsed th e  Com m ittee's
su g g estio n  th a t  th e  su b o rd in a te  se rv ic e s  should u l t im a te ly  comprise seven ty
209p ercen t Malays and t h i r t y  p e rcen t lo c a l-b o m  non-M alays.
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Many of the Malay Employment Committee’s proposals on assisting Malay
admission to the public service were effected after 1922. With the assistance
of school teachers, Rulers, chiefs and Penghulus, and through official
notices in Malay, the Malay public was more fully informed about the various
avenues of employment in the administration. A register of Malay candidates
was also maintained in each State Secretariat to keep departmental heads
210fully informed of the supply of Malays for government service. English- 
speaking Malays who had no Junior School Certificate were helped by three ad 
hoc committees in Kuala Lumpur, Taiping and Ipoh in their search for 
employment in either the private or the public sector#". British officers in 
departments like the Railways were now required to master Malay to cross 
their efficiency bar.
The crux of the problem was education. But only a lukewarm effort was
made to increase the supply of English-educated Malays for the public service.
The English schools in the FMS were directed to admit no foreign-bom
students until all local-born applicants, particularly Malays, had been
enrolled. In 1923 Maxwell also authorised the scattering of English schools
in the smaller towns to bring English education nearer to the reach of 
211Malays. This significant decision was reversed after Windstedt became
Director of Education in 1925. As the foremost exponent of the doctrine
that English education would disrupt the rural regions, Windstedt strove to
restrict the output of graduates from the English schools. Of these
graduates, the overwhelming majority continued to be non-Malays throughout
212the inter-war years. To an important extent this stultified the various
steps taken to employ more Malays in the Government.
This was evident in the case of the General Clerical Service. Although
the brighter Malay school students were sent to English schools for training
213as clerks since 1916, the number selected was too small to improve the 
Malay position in the service. During the early 1920s, despite every attempt
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made to prefer Malays for the clerical service, even at the risk of some
loss of efficiency, Maxwell made little headway because of the shortage
of Malay candidates with Junior or Senior Cambridge Certificate, ■u+
Likewise British education policy caused a dearth of qualified local-born
non-Malay applicants for the clerical service. The situation improved to
some extent after 1925 when the students enrolled after the War graduated
from school. But this was offset by other developments. The rubber and tin
boom of the years 1925-27, easily absorbed the increase in the number of 
215qualified Malays. Subsequently, the Malay employment movement lost much 
of its momentum when, owing to greater consideration for efficiency, Malays 
tended to be by-passed in favour of more qualified non-Malay candidates. 
During the 1920s the General Clerical Service drew most of its recruits 
from India and Ceylon. This would have become even more marked but for the 
relegation of the more routine clerical work to Malay clerks, writers, 
bailiffs and even peons in the district administrations and the departments. 
In short the Malay employment movement made little impact on the General 
Clerical Service in the 1920s.
The hostile attitude of technical and professional departments towards
training Malays as senior officers, as already discussed, -was also evident in
2l6
the subordinate service. Accustomed to either educated European
subordinates or 'docile Tamils', senior European officers showed little
sympathy towards the supposedly unreliable and indolent Malays. Instances
of the failure of Malay recruits to adapt themselves to the preponderantly
217Tamil working force, who tended to be hostile to the new-comers, or of
their early resignations for other reasons were considered ample proof that
Malays were not suited to technical work. Until after the War, the
departmental heads had generally ignored altogether the official policy of
218assisting Malays to join the public service, and had recruited their 
workers almost wholly from India and Ceylon.
The first sustained effort to help Malays get into the technical
departments was launched by Maxwell in 1922 when the Railway Department was
directed to provide departmental training for Malay recruits. A batch of
twenty Malays with a Standard Six Certificate from an English school were
thereupon trained half-yearly or annually as station-masters.21^ By 1927
220a whole branch of the Selangor railway was manned by Malay officers.
Another move to replace Punjabi guards resulted in Malays forming a quarter
221of the Railway Police Force in 1929. In addition, as already mentioned,
a technical school was opened in Kuala Lumpur but its success was not
evident till the 1930s when a substantial number of Malays had graduated
from it. Finally, efforts to push Malay recruitment in the Posts and
Telegraphs, Public Works, Electricity and Mines Departments brought
indifferent results except in certain categories of lower-paid subordinate 
222posts. As happened in the General Clerical Service, pressure on 
technical heads to employ Malays slackened considerably during Clifford’s 
time. Efficiency again became the most important yardstick for the 
recruitment of subordinate officers. As the Undang of Rembau bitterly 
complained in the Federal Council in 1929, the various departments could 
have recruited more Malay clerks and technical officers than actually 
admitted. There was a large number of Malays who qualified for posts 
requiring an education below the Cambridge Junior or entry to which required 
a Cambridge Junior or Senior except for Malays.22'' On the whole, the results 
of the Malay employment policy in the technical departments in the 1920s 
were not impressive.
During the early 1930s the handful of Malayophile officials in positions 
of power gave the policy a new and more aggressive turn. This was evident 
early in 1931 when T.S. Adams became the Under Secretary and A. Caldecott 
the Acting Chief Secretary. Soon afterward the General Order was amended to 
state clearly that Malays should enjoy preference over all other applicants
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in public appointments. It became most marked at the height of the
depression in 1932 and 1933* following Adams’ rise to the Selangor Residency 4
and the Selangor Sultan’s demand for a more vigorous ’pro-Malay’ policy.
Pointing to the minority of Malays in practically every branch of the public
service, the Sultan protested bitterly that the policy had not been
faithfully implemented. With considerable justification, he attacked heads
of technical departments for overlooking Malay claims for preferential
225treatment in favour of administrative efficiency. At the Sultan's
suggestion, strict instructions were issued directing the Residents, the
Federal Secretariat and the Departments to give Malays preference in public
226appointments whenever possible.
During the 1930s the Malay employment policy was vitally affected by
the employment scarcity during the slump and of the larger supply of local-
born candidates for the administration. No foreign-born non-Malays were
engaged during the depression, and very few after 1935. To a fairly
significant extent the policy benefitted Malays during the early 1930s. It
p3.aced a new interpretation on the General Order pledging to advance Malays
in the public service. Hitherto Malays had been preferred only so long as
they were considered as well qualified as the non-Malay applicants, although
there was a tendency during the early 1920s to overlook this qualification.
During Clementi's time, Malay preference in terms of both recruitment and
227retrenchment was no longer restricted by this specification. This was so
vigorously implemented in Selangor by Adams that it aroused widespread non-
228Malay resentment and apparently antagonished even many British officials.
The willingness to sacrifice some efficiency, as implied in the above 
ruling, also led to other steps in favour of Malays. The most important of 
these was the creation of four lower-paid State Clerical Services which gave 
preference to their respective state-bom candidates. To these services 
were transferred many posts in the General Clerical Service as well as those
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c le rk s  who f a i le d  to  pass t h e i r  dep artm en ta l exam inations. The S ta te
C le r ic a l  S e rv ic e s  were a n c i l la r y  to  th e  G eneral C le r ic a l  S erv ice  which would
con tinue  to  p ro v id e  th e  m a jo rity  of th e  c l e r i c a l  o f f i c e r s .  But s ev e n ty -f iv e
p e rc en t o f fu tu re  R ec ru its  would go to  th e  form er w hile tw e n ty -fiv e  to  th e
229G eneral C le r ic a l  S e rv ic e . As non-Malays r ig h t ly  fe a re d , th e  S ta te
C le r ic a l  S e rv ices  were ta i lo r e d  fo r  M alays, many o f whom possessed  th e  e n try
q u a l i f i c a t io n  o f S tandard  S ix  from an E ng lish  sch o o l. As i t  tu rn ed  o u t, th e
m a jo rity  o f S ta te  C le r ic a l  O ff ic e rs  were Malays from th e  in c e p tio n  of th e
230Scheme in  September 1933* A s im ila r  low er-grade c l e r i c a l  se rv ic e  
rep laced  th e  P ro b a tio n e r  C le r ic a l  Schemes in  th e  Railway and th e  P o s ts  and 
T elegraphs D epartm ents. The la r g e r  in ta k e  of Malay c le rk s  by th e se  
departm ents was due more to  th e  Malay employment p o lic y  i t s e l f  th an  to  th e  
new se rv ice  s in ce  e n try  in to  th e  form er schemes had a lread y  re q u ired  only  a 
S tandard Seven q u a l i f i c a t io n .
O ther a c tio n s  in c lu d ed  a d e c is io n  in  1931 to  com pletely  re p la ce  In d ia -
born Sub-Wardens in  th e  P r iso n s  Department by M alays. The subsequent
r e a l i s a t io n  th a t  a m u l t i - r a c ia l  s t a f f  might c o n tro l 'mixed* p riso n s  more
e f f ic ie n t^  le d  to  a new ru l in g  two y e a rs  l a t e r  which s t ip u la te d  th a t  th e
231Sub-Wardens should com prise h a l f  Malays and h a l f  Sikhs and P u n ja b is .
This ru lin g  was s t i l l  being  e f fe c te d  a t  th e  end o f th e  p e riod  under s tu d y .
I t  was a lso  ru le d  th a t  a f t e r  1931 no non-Malays could be appointed
o r d e r l ie s ,  peons, p u n k ah -p u lle rs  and m essengers w ithou t th e  san c tio n  of th e  
232government. F in a l ly  e f f o r t s  to  re p la ce  Chinese c o n tra c t lab o u r and 
Tamil 'ro ad -m ak ers’ by Malays had no l a s t in g  r e s u l t s .  In  o th e r  words th e  
more v igorous 'p ro -M alay ' p o lic y  d id  no t s ig n i f ic a n t ly  in c re a se  Malay 
rec ru itm en t excep t in  th e  S ta te  C le r ic a l  S e rv ic e s . There were, a f t e r  a l l ,  
so fewr openings in  th e  p u b lic  s e rv ice  during  th e  slump.
However, th e  p o lic y  opera ted  to  th e  g re a t advantage of th e  Malays in  
term s of re tren ch m en t. As sp e lle d  out by th e  S tanding  Retrenchment
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Committee of which T.S. Adams was a member, the policy sought f ir s t  of a l l
to weed out a l l  in e ffic ien t o ff ice r s . Of the remaining s ta ff , the f ir s t  to
233be retrenched were the foreign-bom officers and the la st the Malays.
The f ir s t  part of th is  policy was not s tr ic t ly  followed in practice and 
whenever possible, non-Malays were sacrificed in favour of Malays. In 1931* 
for instance, forty-one clerks in the Railway Department were retrenched 
because they happened to be the most junior of those who were both foreign- 
born and foreign-educated. Although th is  could be seen as ’pro-local’
U
discrimination, benefitted Malays more than local-born non-Malays. I f
A
seniority and effic iency  had been the cr iter ia  behind the above retrenchment, 
twenty-six Malays as against four local-bom  non-Malays would have been
po r
expelled. Moreover in e ffic ien t Malays were retrenched only i f  they failed
235to heed a warning to improve their performance within three or s ix  months.
To what extent th is  was used as an alternative to the dismissal of 
in effic ien t Malays i s  not known, though i t  seems clear that rela tively  
e ffic ien t non-Malays were at times sacrificed on th is  account. The 
retrenchment axe did not even spare domiciled o fficers who were treated as 
foreign-bom even though they had been considered local-bom  in terms of 
recruitment.  ^ I t  is  clear that the retrenchment policy was pro-Malay 
v is-a -v is  the domiciled and, at times, local-born non-Malays in the 
subordinate service.
From July 1930 to February 1932, only 541 Malays were dismissed,
237scarcely a tenth of the to ta l retrenchees. Of these many were either on
the threshold of retirement or were untrained school teachers, while others
came from departments such as Agriculture which employed a majority of 
238Malays.’ The retrenchment exercise improved the relative position of
239Malays in the administration to some extent. Moreover, the Government 
publicly undertook to give preference to Malay retrenchees or new Malay 
applicants when employment resumed in the future. L ittle  wonder that the
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re trenchm ent p o lic y  aroused b i t t e r  resentm ent and w idespread f e a r  among th e
non-Malays t h a t  th e  Malay employment p o lic y  sought u l t im a te ly  to  exclude
prothem com pletely  fro n  th e  p u b lic  s e rv ic e . ^
I f  v ig o ro u s ly  e f fe c te d  th roughout th e  1930s, th e  ’new’ p o lic y  would 
have s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in c reased  th e  number of Malays in  th e  Government^ 
because o f a l a r g e r  supply of E ng lish -ed u ca ted  M alays. U n fo rtu n a te ly  fo r  
th e  M alays, as m entioned in  C hapter F iv e , t h i s  p o lic y  was quit^ely 
abandoned w ith  th e  d e p a r tu re  o f C lem enti, C a ld eco tt and Adams. A keener 
d e s ir e  fo r  e f f ic ie n c y  and a growing awareness o f th e  changing s ta tu s  o f 
lo c a l-b o m  and dom iciled  non-Malays in  th e  FMS brought th e  p o lic y  back to  
th a t  o f th e  l a t e  1 9 2 0 s . O n  th e  in s t r u c t io n  o f C u n lif f e -L is te r ,  
re tren ch ed  government o f f ic e r s  were a lso  accorded p re fe ren ce  when
pi  O
rec ru itm en t resumed in  1935- 4 Furtherm ore, as th e  M a.ilis p o in ted  o u t, th e  
d e l ib e ra te  l im i ta t io n  o f enrolm ent in to  th e  G eneral C le r ic a l  S erv ice  drove 
many lo c a l-b o rn  non-Malays w ith Cambridge Ju n io r  or S en ior c e r t i f i c a t e s  to
O J  O
apply  fo r  th e  S ta te  C le r ic a l  S e rv ic e s . J  This squeezed out most o f th e
le s s  q u a l i f ie d  Malay c a n d id a te s . By 1938 Malays no lo n g e r appeared to  be
^\%)x
a m a jo rity  among r e c r u i t s  fo r  th e  S ta te  C le r ic a l  S e rv ic e s . ^ As th e  Malay
R ulers  had f re q u e n tly  com plained, t h i s  p o lic y  o f more or l e s s  equal
com petition  p laced  Malay can d id a te s  a t  a g re a t d isadvan tage  because E n g lish -
educated non-M alays f a r  outnumbered M alays. During Thomas' tim e , th e  p o lic y
of c re a tin g  a f u l ly  lo c a l ly - s ta f f e d  su b o rd in a te  s e rv ic e  in  e f f e c t  tended to
b e n e f i t  lo c a l-b o m  and dom iciled  non-Malays more th an  M alays. U nderstandably ,
245
Thomas' p o lic y  on Malay employment was condemned by th e  Malay new spapers.
The e th n ic  c o n fig u ra tio n  o f th e  su b o rd in a te  s e rv ic e  in  1940 remained 
b a s ic a l ly  s im ila r  to  th a t  in  1920. The Malays continued  to  dominate th e  land  
and d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s ,  th e  n a tiv e  e s ta b lish m e n ts , and th e  A g ric u ltu re , Co­
o p e ra tiv e s , and F o re s ts  D epartm ents. The G eneral C le r ic a l  S erv ice  and th e  
b ig  s p e c ia l i s t  departm ents remained la rg e ly  non-M alay. I t  m ust, however, be
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conceded that the Malay employment policy and the larger supply of English- 
speaking Malays had enabled Malays to make fairly important inroads in 
certain directions. In 1938 they comprised more than sixty percent in the 
State Clerical Services, and were the largest single ethnic group within the 
combined General and State Clerical Services. Their number in the 
Railways had trebled since 1922 and in the Posts and Telegraphs had increased
21/7
more than five times, though they remained minorities in both departments.
In technical posts like apprentices and overseers Malays showed an even more
o i g
impressive rise,fc^  a result mainly of a steady stream Malay apprentices
A
from the Kuala Lumpur technical school. Taken overall, however, Malay 
control over the most vital sections of government did not increase 
substantially during the inter-war years.
Conclusion
It was within British power to enable Malays to play a larger role in 
the administration of the FMS. But more than sixty years of British 
protection had permitted only a small coterie of Malay aristocrats to enter 
the MCS. And despite a policy of Malay preference, the subordinate service 
continued to be dominated by non-Malays in 19A-0. This situation was partly 
due to the fact that the Malay employment policy was not consistently 
effected throughout the interwar years. During Thomas’ time, for instance, 
Malay advancement in the administration slowed down considerably. Another 
factor was British fear that over-rapid admission of Malays into the 
government would lower efficiency. Furthermore, British determination to keep 
the senior service as a British preserve seriously retarded Malay entry into 
and advancement in the MCS and effectively barred all Asians from senior 
technical and professional appointments except in the Medical and Judiciary 
Departments. The root cause of the Malays’ relative backwardness, however, 
was the British education policy which was geared to preparing Malays not 
for the administration but for agricultural pursuits.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The object of this study has been to examine British efforts to uplift 
the Malays politically in the FMS through a policy of decentralisation and 
of grooming Malays for the public service. The study began by outlining the 
rapid modernisation of the Protected Malay States, which had caused the 
Malays to be left far behind in the political and economic spheres. This 
development was satisfactory neither to the Malay Rulers and aristocrats nor 
to postwar top British administrators in London and Malaya. While the former 
were discontended with their loss of power and influence, the British 
officials felt they had not adequately fulfilled their treaty obligations to 
the Malays. Moreover, the existing policy of amalgamating the Federated 
States offered no likelihood of unifying the diverse administrative units 
into which Malaya had been divided. The arrival of Sir Lawrence Guillemard 
in 1920 therefore heralded a new policy of loosening the centralised 
administration and restoring power to the States. Broadly speaking, this 
decentralisation policy aimed, on the one hand, to enable Malays to have a 
larger say in state affairs and, on the other hand, to create a genuine 
federal system in the FMS as a prelude to a Peninsular federation.
What stood out in bold relief in the decentralisation movement was the 
great diversity of importance attached by the various interest group* to each 
of its goals. To Whitehall decentralisation meant chiefly a tactic to 
realise a recentralised Malayan federation. This interpretation was shared 
by the UMS Rulers who, in contrast, vehemently apposed such a federation 
because it might deprive them of the autonomy of their states. While the 
High Commissioners also desired a Malayan federation, they were equally if 
not more interested in securing real control over the FMS, which had been 
effectively checked under the existing arrangement by a strong FMS head, 
the Chief Secretary. The FMS Rulers and the Malay elite supported 
decentralisation because they believed it foreshadowed Advisory rule and
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a greater degree of state autonomy. They had their protagonists in the 
minority of Malayophile administrators, but the great majority of the MCS 
officers adopted a different stand. Like the non-Malay economic interests, 
most MCS officers were mainly interested in the policy as a means of 
simplifying and rectifying a federal administration which had become over­
centralised, top-heavy and extravagant. They were however, prepared to 
push decentralisation to a greater extent than the commercial interests. 
Finally, decentralisation was anathema to the technocrats because in any 
interpretation it threatened to subvert the maximum efficiency they desired 
and to tighten lay control over their departments.
The prospects for decentralisation appeared rosy when the movement
started in 1920. Except for the technocrats, all interested parties endorsed
the policy. Since in the early stages decentralisation was essentially anA
FMS affair, it also appeared sound that the direction of the movement should 
lie not with Guillemard but with Maxwell. Thus, it would not become 
entangled with the traditional jealousies and rivalries between Kuala Lumpur 
and Singapore. To what extent then could decentralisation have proceeded 
if Guillemard had given Maxwell quiet but firm support without at the same 
time attempting to bring the FMS under real control? It seems clear from 
the official records that Maxwell could have achieved as much as, if not 
more than, what actually materialised at the time of Guillemard's retirement 
in 1927- For instance, the idea of a lump sum grant to the State Councils, 
which represented Guillemard's central achievement, was realisable in 1924 
had Maxwell not gone on leave^ and had secured Singapore's support. But it 
was unlikely that during his term of office Maxwell could have pushed 
decentralisation radically beyond the Hose Report or succeeded in investing 
the Rulers-in-Council with any real degree of authority. Apart from being 
a centraliser by temperament, he was inherently conservative and shared the 
MCS's desire for efficiency. As he himself cautioned, decentralisation was 
necessarily a long-term affair.
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Had decentralisation been left under the direction of the Chief
Secretary and the MCS, it would have been conditioned by certain basic
factors. Accustomed to wielding political authority for half a century, the
MCS was determined not to hand over power to other groups. On the contrary,
it should be noted that decentralisation in the period under study benefitted
largely the MCS itself. It should also be emphasised that the integrity,
tradition and efficiency of the federal system represented the greatest pride
of the MCS among its many and varied contributions to the modernisation of
the Malay States. It seems clear that the great majority of MCS officers
shared the view of Frank Swettenham and George Maxwell that the Chief
Secretaryship was an integral and indispensable part of the federal system
they had painstakingly helped to establish. Under the existing order the
Chief Secretary had always tried and usually managed to check real control
over the FMS by the High Commissioner. It is therefore difficult to envisage
a Chief Secretary voluntarily decentralising to the extent that he became a
mere co-ordinating agent of federal affairs, thereby compelling the High
Commissioner to absorb part of his executive power in order that effective
direction and co-ordination of policy could have been maintained in the
Federation. Under these circumstances decentralisation was likely to
transfer the power of many Federal Heads to the Residents and extend the
legislative and financial authority of the State Councils. The Chief Secretary
would have continued as the chief executive officer, possibly heading a
y a u a cA Auoi*/ of"
federation in which the balance of power would have r e m a i n e d ^ t h e  centre. 
The division of power between the centre and the states was likely to be 
drawn at the point beyond which it would have involved centralisation in 
Singapore or major sacrifice of efficiency. In view of the conservatism of 
the MCS and the 'British desire for efficiency', this federation could not 
in any case have been achieved by the close of the period under study.
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This MCS’s conception of decentralisation did not altogether coincide 
with that of the High Commissioner and of the Colonial Office. As early as 
1920, Collins proposed that the Chief Secretary should be transformed into 
a co-ordinating agent of federal affairs. Unable to exercise real control 
over the FMS, Guillemard came to advocate the same move in 1924. Indeed, 
it is difficult to see how any energetic and determined High Commissioner,
tAof
as head of British Malaya, would have tried to gain Undivided control overA
the FMS or take over the direction of what was in fact the most momentous 
policy of the interwar years. From the outset therefore decentralisation 
became entangled with the power struggle between Guillemard and Maxwell.
As decentralisation had the blessing of Whitehall and other interest groups 
at the time, it was used by both the High Commissioner and the Chief Secretary 
for opposing ends : one to justify his attempt to exercise real authority in 
the Federation, and the other to remove a strong reason for external 
interference in the FMS administration. The result was that after 1924 
decentralisation came under the direction of the High Commissioner in 
Singapore. This meant that decentralisation henceforth necessarily involved 
centralisation in Singapore because the policy sought either to transform 
the Chief Secretaryship into a co-ordinating agency or to abolish it 
altogether. It was now hampered by the fear of FMS commercial interests 
that it would impose the ’fetters of Singapore’ on the Federation, thereby 
damaging their interests which they believed differed from those of the 
Colony. Furthermore, the demoralising effects of the Guillemard-Maxwell 
squabbles on the administration were partly responsible for Clifford putting 
a stop to the movement. However, if decentralisation was to achieve more 
than the MCS’s conception of its end-product, it had to be directed by the 
High Commissioner.
When Clementi picked up the threads left by Guillemard in 1930» he 
developed the movement in four directions. In the first place, as the
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movement came more under Singapore's direction, the High Commissioner's 
desire to wield real power in the FMS became more evident. While Anderson 
only changed the title of the FMS executive head from 'Resident-General' to 
'Chief Secretary' in order to make it indisputable that the latter's status 
was that of his principal adviser, Guillemard sought to replace the Chief 
Secretaryship with a co-ordinating officer called the Federal Secretary.
Clementi went a step further, intending not only to abolish the Chief 
Secretaryship but also to shift the major part of the federal bureaucracy, 
including the Federal Secretariat, to Singapore. In the event only the Chief 
Secretaryship was abolished in 193&, but Singapore's real control over the 
FMS was thereby secured.
The goal of converting the FMS into a genuine federation was tacitly 
assumed when Whitehall endorsed a decentralisation policy in 1920, and was 
publicly stated by Guillemard in 1925- No attempt, however, was made to 
divide powers between the centre and the states until Clementi and the 
Colonial Office made a tentative division in 1931 in the form of a draft 
treaty. To attain a genuine federation, the Wilson Report phased 
decentralisation over a long period of time and left a rigid division of 
power to be worked out as the movement proceeded. It was conceivable that 
such a federation could have been established over a long period if war had 
not broken out in the East.
The ultimate goal of decentralisation also underwent a significant 
change. Before 1930 the principal British vision was a federation of the 
nine Malay States under the undivided control of the High Commissioner who 
was at the same time Governor of the Colony. Even Maxwell subscribed to this 
though he seemed to have envisaged the Chief Secretary as the real liad of the
A
FMS which would remain intact within the wider unit. As Guillemard admitted 
in 1925i the exclusion of the Colony was essential because the Rulers and FMS 
commercial interests opposed the federation of the Malay States with the Colony. 
Clementi's vision of Malaya's future, however, was a Malayan federation
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consisting of the nine Malay States and the Colony under the direction of 
the Governor-High Commissioner. This became the British goal in the 1930's 
although Whitehall ruled that, for the time being, the Colony should be 
excluded in order to safeguard its vast entrepot trade. By way of contrast 
the idea of a Governor for the Colony and a separate High Commissioner for 
the FMS was openly voiced by Frank Swettenham in 1926 and by a section of 
FMiS commercial interests. It is a point of some significance that the Rulers' 
opposition was not considered sufficiently important by both Singapore and 
London as to kill the goal of a Malayan federation including the Colony. In 
the late 1930's Malay fear of such a federation was therefore well-founded.
Finally the decentralisation movement experienced change in another 
direction. Maxwell's aim to introduce some form of Advisory rule in the FMS 
was lost sight of after 1924. If Guillemard shared the idea at all, he 
appeared to think that steps towards that end should be postponed to an 
indefinite future. To contain Chinese pressure for political rights,
Clementi, in cohtrast, urged the conversion of Resident rule into Advisory 
rule. Under Thomas however, this was quietly abandoned after 1937-
Parallel to these changed was the enormous widening of opposition to 
decentralisation. While the controversy was almost confined to the Europeans 
in the 1920s, it now affected every section of the population. The importance 
of this should be considered in relation to what may be called 'the British 
way of doing things' in Malaya. The government always sought to have policy 
accepted through discussions, conciliation and co-operation with interested 
parties who mattered. This was effected through private consultation with 
leaders in the confidence of Government and through public disaussions in 
the various legislatures and Malayan newspapers It offered European 
commercial interests, the best organised and most articulate lobby in the 
FMS, considerable scope influence official policy. In this connection
(>f
their social ties with the British administration and their social/ ties withA
the British Parliament proved extremely useful. The agitation against the
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Clementi scheme by these interests and by their influential supporters in 
London was particularly effective with the Colonial Secretary, Sir Philip 
Cunliffe-Lister. And Whitehall's opposition to Clementi's method and scheme 
was a major block to the complete realisation of the aims of decentralisation.
The British approach, on the other hand, placed the Malays in a disadvantageous 
position since Malay opinion was not effectively organised in the FMS. In 
1932 the Majlis conceded that there are no Malay leaders to convene a 
conference to prepare the Malay case on decentralisation for submission to 
the Wilson mission. Only in the UMS was the Malay elite able to exploit the 
British receptiveness to pressure, but this was exerted against decentralisation. 
In other words, the ‘British way of doing things' favoured forces working 
for the maintenance of the status quo.
To a substantial extent, the outcry against decentralisation was a 
reaction against dementi's bulldozing approach to the problem. What 
infuriated British official and especially commercial communities was 
Clementi's steadfast refusal to follow the established practice of conciliating 
and co-operating with 'public opinion'. But a more skilful and diplomatic 
approach could not have enabled Clementi to secure more concrete results.
It should be stressed the Lord Passfield's approval of the policy was 
dependent on a sympathetic response from the UMS Rulers. This in fact ruled 
out any sanction for the dementi scheme because the UMS opposition to a 
Malayan union was indisputable. Moreover, the policy was bound to be rejected 
once Cunliffe-Lister became Colonial Secretary because of his intimate ties 
with Malayan commercial interests whose hostility to the Clementi scheme was 
deep-seated. It was Clementi's intransigence and determination that made it 
possible to abolish the Chief Secretaryship and implement a limited degree 
of decentralisation in other directions. His failure to achieve a greater 
measure of decentralisation and Advisory rule was chiefly due to the 
opposition of the MCS, which was supported by Whitehall and FMS commercial 
interests. The goal of a Malayan Union was blocked by the UMS Rulers.
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D uring th e  in te rw a r  y e a rs  a l l  th e  G overnor-H igh Com m issioners excep t 
C l i f f o r d  came to  M alaya w ith o u t p r i o r  ex p e rie n c e  and were more in c l in e d  to  
r e o r g a n is e  an a d m in is t r a t iv e  s e t -u p  th e y  had n o t h e lp ed  to  e s t a b l i s h .  As 
a l re a d y  m en tioned , a f t e r  1924 th e y  were th e  main fo rc e  beh ind  th e  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  movement in  th e  FMS. C o n seq u en tly , d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  tended  
to  march w ith  th e  s t r i d e s  o f th e  p a r t i c u l a r  G overnor-H igh Comm issioner in  
o f f i c e .  T h is  b e tra y e d  a  w eakness in  th e  movement. S in ce  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  
was n e c e s s a r i ly  a lo n g -te rm  a f f a i r ,  th e  s h o r tn e s s  o f  t h e i r  te n u re  o f o f f ic e  
p re v e n te d  G u illem ard  and C lem enti from c a r ry in g  th e  p o lic y  to  i t s  lo g ic a l  
c o n c lu s io n .  T h e ir  s u c c e s s o rs  e i t h e r  sh e lv e d  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  a l to g e th e r  o r 
slow ed  i t  down. I t  i s  a  h i s t o r i c a l  iro n y  th a t  G u illem ard  and C lem enti fough t 
v ig o ro u s ly  to  a b o l is h  a  s t ro n g  r e s id e n t  e x e c u tiv e  head in  K uala Lumpur only  
to  be fo llo w ed  by s u c c e s s o rs  who b e l ie v e d  th a t  such  an e x e c u tiv e  head was 
e s s e n t i a l .  Hence th e  F e d e ra l  S e c re ta ry  who was a p p o in ted  in  1936 r e ta in e d  
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s id u a l  pow ers o f h is  p re c e d e s s o r ,  th e  C h ie f S e c r e ta r y .
O b v io u s ly , no H igh Com m issioner cou ld  s in g le -h a n d e d ly  advance a  com plete 
scheme o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  f o r  th e  FMS. Much o f th e  d e ta i le d  p la n n in g  as w e ll 
as th e  im p lem en ta tio n  o f  th e  p o l ic y  would f a l l  on th e  MCS. In  t h i s  connexion 
th e  B r i t i s h  M alayan way o f  re s o lv in g  im p o rtan t q u e s tio n s  th ro u g h  com m ittees, 
on w hich th e  a d m in is t r a to r s  in v a r ia b ly  s a t , p ro v id ed  th e  MCS w ith  a  h ig h ly  
e f f e c t iv e  means to  b lo c k  a s p e c ts  o f d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  i t  opposed . I t  was 
r a r e l y  p o s s ib le  fo r  a  High Comm issioner to  r e j e c t  th e  recom m endations o f 
su ch  su p p o sed ly  im p a r t i a l  i n q u i r i e s .  No a ttem p t th e r e f o r e  was made by 
G u illem ard  to  q u e s tio n  th e  recom m endation o f  th e  L eg a l Committee o f 1926 
a g a in s t  any e x te n s io n  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power o f th e  S ta te  C o u n c ils . N e ith e r  
d id  C lem enti c h a lle n g e  th e  r e j e c t i o n  o f a M alayan Customs Union by th e  S t r a i t s  
Customs Union Committee in  1932.
S in ce  f in a n c ia l  c o n s id e ra t io n s  perm eated  alm ost every  m ajor m easure o f 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  th e  F in a n c ia l  A dv iser and T re a s u re r  e x e rc is e d  a  c r u c i a l l y  
im p o rta n t in f lu e n c e .  These e x p e r ts  were members o f  th e  MCS and , by th e  n a tu re
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of their function, were always figures of prudence. Whether it was during 
the boom of the mid-1920's or the slump of the early 1950's, the safeguarding 
of the credit and financial stability of the Federation remained their 
overriding concern in any scheme of decentralisation. These experts were 
most reluctant to make any change in the FMS financial system. It needed 
the strong pressure of the Guillemard policy to force them to concede the 
granting of lump sums to the State Councils, and the even stronger political 
turmoil during Clementi's time to push them into vesting the State Councils 
with the authority to sanction supply. Notwithstanding these concessions, 
the reports of the Financial Devolution Committees of 1926 and 1952 seriously 
stutified the policy of financial devolution to the States.
The other factor which enabled the MCS to condition the evolution of 
the policy was that decentralisation had unavoidably to be phased over a 
long period of time. All the steps of devolution could not be projected in 
advance, since each step had to be guided by experience and other considerations 
For instance, the conversion of Resident rule into Advisory rule hinged on 
Malay advancement in general and the rise of a body of Malay administrators 
to take over from the MCS officers in particular. Meanwhile, Malaya witnessed 
changes in its High Commissioner, and each High Commissioner set his own tone 
and speed to the decentralisation movement. The MCS, however, remained 
unchanged, and over the interim period was able to transform decentralisation 
into something nearer to its own conception and liking. The aim was to 
prevent decentralisation from over-drastically reorganising the administrative 
system or from distributing its powers to other hands.
After the departure of Clementi, Caldecott, and Adams, the MCS set to 
work to slow down and even modify the decentralisation movement. This was 
accomplished without much difficulty since the new High Commissioner was not 
a fervent champion of decentralisation. Under the influence of the MCS, the 
goal to transform Resident rule in the FMS into Advisory rule was soon abandoned 
In any case even if decentralisation had continued to be directed by Malayophile
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officers, Advisory rule could only be attained in the distant future.
T.3. Adams, who was generally regarded as a ’pro-Malay fanatic’, considered 
that the MAS administrators were not yet fit to occupy fifty percent of the 
MCiS posts. In the event only one-eightieth of MCS officers were Malays in 
19^0. This in itself would have negated any endeavour to convert Resident 
rule into Advisory rule in the interwar years. The MCS, therefore, continued 
to exercise a near monopoly of political power in the FMS.
Decentralisation raised questions that lay too uncomfortably near the 
roots of British imperialism in Malaya. The Federation was established not 
to promote the interests of the Malays but to accelerate economic growth.
For the previous fifty years or so, the success of British policy had been 
measured in terms of the growing revenue and exports of the FMS. Likewise, 
the highly efficient federal administration that had been established in the 
process bore no relation to Malay peasant society. By the second decade of 
this century, the FMS had become an important segment of Empire and world 
trade. This had been realised by the complementary efforts of the colonial 
government and strong capitalist interests, one providing the basic facilities 
necessary to economic growth, the other the needed investment, expertise and 
labour.
Decentralisation enthusiasts now questioned the wisdom of this central 
goal of British colonial rule in Malaya. In its place, they proposed the 
promotion of Malay welfare and the training of Malays to take over essentially 
Malay States in the future. In this clash of basic goals the decentralists 
stood in a singularly disadvantageous position. The case for decentralisation 
was not altogether convincing to the Malayan public since it was based mainly 
on potential rather than actual political dangers to British rule. Nor was 
its necessity clearly understood since it could not be fully explained in 
public without either scaring the UMS or antagonising the Chinese. The case 
against decentralisation, on the other hand, was clear-cut and fully 
understood in Malaya. In a country the size of Malaya, a centralised
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administration was clearly conducive to efficiency and economic development. 
Above all, the FMS was already very much interwoven into the fabric of world 
trade.
During the Thomas regime, this was tacitly recognised in official 
circles. Hence, no protest emerged when the goal of Advisory rule in the 
FMS was quietly abandoned. But the government refused to opt unambiguously 
for the goal of fully developing Malaya as a bustling outpost of the world 
economy. This would have entailed further centralisation of the administration 
and possibly the conversion of Malaya into a single colony. Instead the 
federal administration was decentralised to a limited extent as a result of 
political considerations, including Malay discontent with the existing system. 
The result was ^policy of drift, which offered certain advantages to British 
rule. It enabled the government to continue the myth that the British were 
in Malaya to help the Rulers and the Malay aristocracy run what were 
essentially Malay states. By using the Rulers as nominal centres of power, 
the British could also justify the continued exclusion of the Chinese and 
Indians from any share of political power. In other words, the Thomas regime 
side-tracked many of the issues raised by Clementi and sought refuge in the 
traditional policy of negatively preserving the Malay States for the Malays.
The decentralisation controversy strikingly showed the predominance 
of sectional interests in Malayan political life. The Sultan of Johore, 
Caldecott and the FMS Bar Committee from their different viewpoints all 
concurred that Malaya could not yet be considered a single political and 
economic unit. The major block to a Pan-Malayan union was the strongly 
parochial attitude of the UMS. It was generally agreed that, short of a 
resort to compulsion, the only hope of overcoming this obstacle lay in 
decentralisation in the FMS. It was hoped to accomplish this when the FMS 
and the UMS were placed in virtually the same position. But in a wider 
Federation, the various states would necessarily have to surrender part of 
their autonomy to the central authority. This was opposed by unfederated
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s t a t e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when th e y  r i g h t ly  su sp e c te d  th a t  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  in ten d ed  
to  r e c e n t r a l i s e  th e  w id e r F e d e ra tio n  once i t  had been form ed. E q u ally  
im p o r ta n t ,  th e  UMS R u le rs  were h o s t i l e  to  R esid e n t r u le  in  th e  FMS, which 
th e  MCS would n o t p e rm it to  be tran sfo rm e d  in to  A dvisory r u l e .  In  s h o r t ,  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  as p u rsu ed  in  th e  FMS was u n l ik e ly  to  le a d  to  a  Malayan 
u n io n  o f a l l  th e  Malay S t a t e s .
To r e a l i s e  such  a f e d e r a t io n ,  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  would have to  be 
suP P lemente d  by a  p o lic y  o f  f o s te r in g  th e  r i s e  o f a Malay n a t io n a l  c o n sc io u sn e ss . 
Once th e  Malay e l i t e  in  b o th  groups o f  s t a t e s  were convinced  th a t  Malay 
s u r v iv a l  depended on e th n ic  s o l i d a r i t y  on a n a t io n a l  s c a l e ,  th e y  would 
p resum ably  be p re p a re d  to  subsume t h e i r  s t a t e s  in  a l a r g e r  p o l i t i c a l  
fram ew ork. In  c e r t a in  d i r e c t io n s  how ever, B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  ten d ed  to  h in d e r  
th e  grow th o f  a  Malay n a t io n a l  c o n sc io u sn e s s . By k eep in g  th e  Malay r a 1ay a t 
on th e  la n d ,  th e  governm ent in s u la te d  them from th e  s o c i a l  change in  th e  
u rb an  c e n t r e s ,  and th u s  slow ed down th e  r i s e  o f n a t io n a l  co n sc io u sn ess  among 
them . I t  a l s o  e f f e c t iv e l y  r e s t r i c t e d  Pan-M alayan ex p e rie n c e  to  sm a ll groups 
o f Malay governm ent s e r v a n ts ,  j o u r n a l i s t s  and te a c h e r s .  Even among th e se  
g ro u p s , B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  sough t to  d isc o u ra g e  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f a s s o c ia t io n s  
w ith  a M alayan sc o p e , and ru le d  in  1932 th a t  no such  o rg a n is a t io n  sho u ld  be 
r e g i s t e r e d  w ith o u t p r i o r  re fe re n c e  to  a l l  a d m in is tra tio n s  co n ce rn ed . The
i v U t  «t* CrJ «.5 oU lo  L d- pYCStYvi-,  1 4  e
p o lic y  o f  enhanc ing  th e  s t a t u s / l o y a l t i e s  w hich predom inated  d u rin g  th e  p e r io d
r
u nder s tu d y .  M oreover, by em phasising  th e  i n d iv id u a l i ty  and autonomy o f th e  
S t a t e s ,  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  ten d ed  to  in c re a s e  i n t e r - s t a t e  j e a lo u s ie s  and 
e x c lu s iv e n e s s  in  th e  FMS. In  th e  UMS th e  manner w ith  w hich C lem enti pu rsued  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  l e f t  en d u rin g  s u s p ic io n  and f e a r  among th e  UMS R u le rs  and 
made them more r e lu c ta n t  to  c o -o p e ra te  in  Pan-M alayan p r o j e c t s .  In  view o f 
th e  absence o f  a Malay n a t io n a l  c o n sc io u sn e s s , th e  UMS Malay e l i t e  
u n d e rs ta n d a b ly  f e l t  t h a t  th e y  have e v e ry th in g  to  lo s e  and n o th in g  to  g a in  
by jo in in g  a  M alayan F e d e ra t io n .
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The n e c e ssa ry  complement to  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  was a  p o lic y  o f t r a i n in g  
M alays f o r  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n .  Both in  f a c t  stemmed from b a s ic a l ly  s im i la r  
c a u s e s , a lth o u g h  a l a r g e r  r o le  f o r  M alays in  th e  governm ent f i r s t  s t i r r e d  
th e  B r i t i s h  co n sc ien ce  in  th e  l a t e  19th c e n tu ry . But u n lik e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n ,  
w hich  would p ro b ab ly  in c re a s e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  c o s t s ,  th e  d r iv e  f o r  economy was 
a key  f a c t o r  beh ind  Malay employment in  th e  G overnm ent. The v ig o u r  w ith  w hich 
M alays were r e c r u i te d  in to  ( o r  r e tre n c h e d  from) th e  p u b lic  s e r v ic e  depended 
c r u c i a l l y  on th e  men a t  th e  helm o f pow er. H ence, th e  movement ex p erien ced  
l a r g e ly  th e  same v i c i s s i t u d e  undergone by d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  B r ie f ly ,  th e  
in te r w a r  y e a rs  w itn e sse d  two p e r io d s  o f  in te n s iv e  e f f o r t s  to  adm it Malays 
i n t o  th e  Governm ent, each  succeeded  by a p e r io d  o f  r e l a t i v e  p a s s i v i t y .  T h is 
seq u en ce  c o in c id e d  w ith  t h a t  ex p e rie n c e d  by d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .
T h is  en ab led  th e  heads o f  t e c h n ic a l  and p r o f e s s io n a l  dep artm en ts  to  
s t u l t i f y  th e  Malay employment movement to  an im p o rtan t e x te n t d u rin g  th e  
p a s s iv e  p e r io d s .  Being l e s s  aware o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s ig n i f ic a n c e  beh in d  th e  
movement, th e s e  te c h n o c ra ts  w ere governed c h ie f ly  by a d m in is t r a t iv e  e f f ic ie n c y  
in  s e le c t in g  o f f i c e r s  f o r  t h e i r  d e p a r tm e n ts . M oreover, th ey  were accustom ed 
to  non-M alay o f f i c e r s ,  had r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  M alays, and 
h a rb o u re d  s tro n g  p r e ju d ic e s  a g a in s t  th e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  Malays as government 
s e r v a n t s .  Had th e  MCS o f f i c e r s  l i k e  Maxwell and Adams and Malay le a d e rs  
su c h  as th e  Undang o f  Rembau n o t been so p e r s i s t e n t  in  p re s s in g  them to  f u l f i l l  
B r i t i s h  m oral o b l ig a t io n s  to  th e  M alays, th e  Malay p o s i t i o n  in  th e  v a r io u s  
d ep a rtm en ts  would n o t have im proved a t  a l l .
The main cause why th e  Malay employment movement cou ld  n o t p roceed  
f u r t h e r  th an  i t  a c tu a l ly  d id  la y  in  B r i t i s h  e d u c a tio n  p o l i c y .  The v i r t u a l  
ab sen ce  o f f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  h ig h e r  e d u c a tio n  in  M alaya was c r u c i a l l y  im p o rtan t 
i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  And when s u i t a b l e  M alays were p re p a re d  to  undergo th e  
n e c e s s a ry  t r a i n in g  o v e rse a s  in  o rd e r  to  g e t in to  th e  s e n io r  s e r v ic e ,  they  
w ere in v a r ia b ly  b lo ck ed  by in t r a n s ig e n t  d e p a rtm e n ta l h e a d s . W hile adm ission  
to  th e  MAS d id  no t r e q u ir e  a  u n iv e r s i ty  d e g re e , th e  p rom otion  o f  Malay
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Officers to and within the MCS was substantially slowed down oh the ground 
of their relative educational backwardness. Finally, the British education 
policy, which was oriented to training the bulk of Malays for agricultural 
pursuits, could not be expected to change fundamentally the basis of Malay 
participation in the public service.
This study of the decentralisation and Malay employment policy reaffirmsA
the axiom that British policy in a colonial dependency sought first and foremost
to safeguard and promote British political and economic interests. Except for
a minority of Malayophile officials who were equally, if not primarily,
interested in promoting Malay welfare, the British were prepared to implement
the policy only on two conditions. To the MCS its implementation should not
result in a transfer of their power to other hands or a drastic overturn of
the federal system. To the British in general it should not cause any
important sacrifice of administrative efficiency. Even the approval of the
Colonial Office for a recentralised federation was subject to the latter
consideration. As already noted, the central goal of British rule in Malaya
remained one of economic development of the states. This goal had in fact
been enhanced after the war by an imperial policy of developing the resources
2of the Empire to the utmost. But the decentralisation and Malay employment 
movement threatened to lower the efficiency of the federal administration and 
thus came into conflict with British interests. The result was that it was 
allowed to be effected only to a limited extent.
There was also a basic contradiction between the Malay employment 
movement and the British concept of indirect rule. As a westernised 
administration directed and controlled almost wholly by British officers, the 
language of administration in the FMS was English. Even for the lower-paid 
subordinate officers such as Malay Writers and Outdoor Customs Officers who 
entered the Government on the basis of their vernacular education, a knowledge 
of English was considered essential for promotion beyond a certain level. The 
aim of a predominately Malay subordinate service could only be realised, without
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s a c r i f i c i n g  e f f i c i e n c y ,  by b r in g in g  E n g lish  e d u c a tio n  to  th e  d o o r-s te p s  o f 
r u r a l  M alays. T h is  was c o n s id e re d  dangerous because  o f  th e  f e a r  o f p o l i t i c a l  
u n r e s t  a r i s i n g  from o v e r -e d u c a tio n  and o f  s o c ia l  and economic d is r u p t io n  in  
th e  r u r a l  a r e a s .  S hould  t h i s  e v e n tu a te ,  i t  would have weakened B r i t i s h  
i n d i r e c t  r u le  w hich r e l i e d  on a t r a n q u i l  Malay p e a sa n t base  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
and on th e  p r e s e r v a t io n  o f  Malay s o c ie ty  in  g e n e ra l .  In  t h i s  c la s h  o f 
fundam en ta l g o a ls  betw een a p red o m in an tly  Malay s u b o rd in a te  s e rv ic e  and th e  
p r e s e r v a t io n  o f in d i r e d t  r u l e ,  m oral o b l ig a t io n s  were j e t t i s o n e d  f o r  th e  
sake o f  s e c u r i t y .  In  t h i s  co nnex ion , i t  i s  p e r t in e n t  to  n o te  th a t  t h i s  
c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s  was ab sen t in  th e  case  o f th e  MAS and MCS. The 
m o d e rn isa tio n  and th e  a s s o c ia t io n  o f th e  Malay t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e  w ith  th e  
a d m in is t r a t io n  n e i th e r  th re a te n e d  to  d is r u p t  Malay s o c ie ty  no r ch a llen g e d  
B r i t i s h  r u l e .
I t  has o f te n  been  a s s e r te d  t h a t  th e  adm ission  o f  Malays in to  th e  
C iv i l  S e rv ic e  was a v o lu n ta ry  B r i t i s h  d e c is io n  and th a t  t h i s  r e f l e c te d  th e  
M alayoph ile  t r a d i t i o n  w ith in  th e  MCS, T h is  s ta te m e n t canno t be accep ted  
w ith o u t im p o rtan t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  I t  was t r u e  on ly  to  th e  e x te n t  th a t  Malay 
p re s s u re  was n e i th e r  s tro n g  n o r o rg a n ise d  enough to  fo rc e  th e  MCS to  open 
i t s  doors to  M alays, But Malay d is c o n te n t  was e v id e n t as e a r ly  as 1903 when 
S u lta n  I d r i s  o f  P erak  re q u e s te d  th e  employment o f M alays in  a d m in is tr a t iv e  
p o s t s .  I t  i s  indeed  d i f f i c u l t  to  en v isag e  how th e  B r i t i s h  cou ld  have r e je c te d  
t h i s  r e q u e s t  and b a r re d  th e  M alays from th e  MCS. To do t h i s  would have 
exploded  th e  myth th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  were in  th e  FMS to  te a c h  M alays how to  
govern  e s s e n t i a l l y  M alays S ta t e s  and weakened f u r th e r  th e  concep t o f  i n d i r e c t  
r u l e .  I t  sh o u ld  a l s o  be n o te d  th a t  when th e  MAS was c re a te d  in  1910, th e re  
was a t  b e s t  on ly  a  t a c i t  agreem ent th a t  th e  Malay O f f ic e r s  cou ld  e v e n tu a lly  
e n te r  th e  MCS, They were on ly  a d m itted  as f u l l - f l e d g e d  members o f th e  MCS 
fo u r te e n  y e a r s  l a t e r  when t h e i r  e n try  no lo n g e r  th re a te n e d  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f
B r i t i s h  c a d e ts
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By the admission of Malays into the MCS, the British reaped vast 
political advantages* Instead of driving the Malay intelligentsia into 
co-operation with their nonJMalay counterparts against the 'colour bar' 
which would have been the likely result if the MCS door was closed to all 
Asians, the presence of Malays in the Civil Service strengthened the British 
position in several directions. It intensified Malay opposition to non-Malay 
entry into the Civil Service. With Malay support, the British were bfetter 
able to perpetuate the myth that the FMS was a Malay country under British 
protection, thereby justifying the exclusion of the non-Malays from a share 
of political power. Finally, the Malay MAS and MCS officers helped strengthen 
the Malay base of indirect rule at a time when British District Officers 
found it increasingly difficult to keep in touch with the Malay ra* ayat.
As members of the traditional elite, these officers commanded wide and 
profound respect within Malay society. It was mainly for this reason that 
they were nearly all stationed in the districts where Malays congregated.
But imbibed with much of the esprit de corps of the MCS, the Malay 
administrators formed an arm of the British colonial administration rather 
than of the autonomous administration of a Malay State. As administrators, 
they gained experience not in the art of self-government but in the European 
techniques of administering subject communities.
Malay entry into the MCS, on the other hand, caused little inconvenience 
to the British or damage to their interests. It prevented the rise of an 
all-white Civil Service which British official and commercial communities 
would have preferred, but did not lower the prestige of the MCS to any 
significant extent. It hindered the desire of the technocrats and professional 
officers to maintain the senior departmental service as a British preserve.
But within the MCS, Malay cadets were a smal^minority, crowded in the lower 
rungs of the service, and were largely stationed in predominantly Malay 
districts. In short they neither threatened the effective monopolisation 
of power by their British colleagues nor challenged the latter's promotional 
prospects.
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At a l l  tim es  th e  p rom otion  o f  Malay O f f ic e r s  in to  th e  MCS was 
th o ro u g h ly  su p e rv is e d  and s t r i n g e n t ly  r e g u la te d .  The B r i t i s h  em phasised 
th a t  Malay a d m in is t r a to r s  were n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y  m ature o r  t r a in e d  f o r  e n try  
in to  th e  MCS on a s u b s t a n t i a l  s c a l e .  W ith a  s tro n g  f e e l in g  o f  p a te rn a l i s m , 
T .S . Adams, th e  man who c o n tr ib u te d  most to  th e  MAS, endorsed  t h i s  l i n e  o f 
re a s o n in g .  But no e f f o r t s  were made, n o r was i t  p o s s ib le ,  to  j u s t i f y  th e  
d e l ib e r a t e  s te p s  ta k e n  to  en su re  t h a t  th e  advancement o f B r i t i s h  c a d e ts  
would n o t be ham pered by t h e i r  Malay c o l le a g u e s .  The r o le  th e  B r i t i s h  had 
d e f in e d  f o r  th em se lv es  as th e  a r b i t e r s  o f  th e  v a r io u s  r a c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  was 
a ls o  t in g e d  w ith  a  s t r o n g  elem ent o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  W hile i t  was h e ld  to  
be unw ise to  ap p o in t M alays to  s i t  in  a u th o r i ty  ov er non-M alays, th e  
Government c o n v e n ie n tly  ig n o re d  th e  f a c t  t h a t  s e v e r a l  Malay C iv i l  S e rv a n ts
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had s u c c e s s f u l ly  a d m in is te re d  ra c ia l ly -m ix e d  d i s t r i c t s .  C a rr ie d  to  i t s  
l o g i c a l  c o n c lu s io n , B r i t i s h  th in k in g  would have in d e f i n i t e l y  excluded  M alays 
from a s u b s t a n t i a l  s h a re  o f  power s in c e  th e  th r e e  w es te rn  f e d e ra te d  s t a t e s  
were p re p o n d e ra n tly  non-M alays. I t  ap p ea rs  c l e a r  t h a t  n e i th e r  e f f ic ie n c y  
n o r th e  d e s i r e  to  h o ld  a b a la n c e  betw een th e  d i f f e r e n t  com m unities was as 
s i g n i f i c a n t  a f a c t o r  b eh ind  th e  B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  tow ards th e  MAS as th e  
d e te rm in a tio n  n o t to  r e l i n q u is h  th e  power th e  MCS had w ie lded  f o r  h a l f  a 
c e n tu ry .
From th e  above a n a l y s i s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  c o n d itio n e d  
th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and Malay employment movement. N e v e r th e le s s ,  t h i s  
movement r e p re s e n te d  an e f f o r t  to  advance th e  M alays v i s - a - v i s  th e  non-M alays 
in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s p h e re .  T h is  was c e r t a in ly  th e  in t e n t io n  a lth o u g h  n o t th e  
most im p o rtan t re a so n  b eh ind  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  D e c e n t r a l is a t io n  a lso  
r e s to r e d  a f a i r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  deg ree  o f power to  th e  s t a t e s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  
P erak  and S e la n g o r , a lth o u g h  th e  R e s id e n ts  were th e  c h ie f  b e n e f i c i a r i e s .
To th a t  e x te n t ,  i t  o f f e r e d  th e  R u le rs  more leeway to  in f lu e n c e  s t a t e  p o l i c y .
In  a  genuine f e d e r a l  system  M alays would have e x e rc is e d  more in f lu e n c e  on 
s t a t e  a f f a i r s  th a n  w ith in  th e  e x i s t in g  c e n t r a l i s e d  a d m in is t r a t io n .  However,
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if a wider Malayan federation were achieved, certain contradictions within 
the decentralisation scheme could have operated against Malay interests. 
While the revitalised Malay Sultanates under the Clementi plan would have 
helped exclude the Chinese from political power, it would be more difficult 
in a Malayan union to resist non-Malay demands for a Malayan citizenship 
with its attendant rights and privileges. Within such a union the resultant 
increase in efficiency in the existing UMS might also have encouraged 
greater non-Malay economic penetration of these states. Hence, unless the 
formation of a Malayan federation was paralleled by the rise of a Malay 
national consciousness which would enable Malays to meet the non-Malay 
challenge more effectively, the ultimate goal of decentralisation might 
have damaged Malay interests.
The Malay employment policy was explicitly meant to advance the 
relative Malay position in the public service. The most impressive result 
occurred in the Civil Service where there were more than a hundred MAS and 
MCS officers in 1940. They were the only Asians sharing political power 
with the British administrators and were thus placed one step above the 
Chinese and Indians. While the principle of Malay preference applied in 
the senior departmental service, the result was virtually negative. Owing 
to the larger number of qualified non-Malay candidates, non-Malay medical 
officers far exceeded their Malay colleagues in the Medical department, one 
of two areas where Asians succeeded in penetrating the senior departmental 
service. In the subordinate service British policy again favoured Malays 
provided they possessed the required educational qualification and were 
considered as well equipped as their non-Malay competitors. The latter 
specification tended to be overlooked in the early 1920s and was abandoned 
altogether in the early 1930's. British policy did advance the Malay 
position in the subordinate service without at the same time seriously 
blocking non-Malay entry into it, except in the early 1930's. Overall, the 
Malay employment movement was more successful than decentralisation in 
enabling Malays to play a more active role in the administration.
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I t  sh o u ld  be n o te d  th a t  Thomas' p o lic y  d i f f e r e d  s ig n i f i c a n t l y  from 
C le m e n t i 's ,  As a lre a d y  m en tioned , he reneged  on th e  g o a l o f  A dvisory ru le  
in  1937* He a ls o  dropped  th e  pronounced pro-M alay p o s tu re  o f th e  e a r ly  
1930 ' s and r e s to r e d  th e  p r in c i p le  th a t  M alays would be p r e f e r r e d  on ly  when 
th e y  were as w e ll q u a l i f i e d  as t h e i r  non-M alay c o m p e tito rs  f o r  government 
a p p o in tm e n ts . As th e  q u a l i f i e d  non-M alay c a n d id a te s  outnum bered th e  M alays, 
t h i s  p o l ic y  o p e ra te d  in  fa v o u r o f th e  fo rm e r, B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  th e re fo re  
f a i l e d  to  im prove to  any im p o rtan t e x te n t th e  r e l a t i v e  Malay p o s i t io n  in  th e  
s u b o rd in a te  s e r v ic e  in  th e  l a t e  1 9 3 0 's .  F u rth e rm o re , th e re  was now a 
g row ing  r e a l i s a t i o n  in  London and M alaya th a t  th e  C hinese (and In d ia n s )  were 
in  th e  co u n try  p erm an en tly  and th a t  t h e i r  demand f o r  a  sh a re  o f p o l i t i c a l  
pow er would have to  be conceded in  th e  f u tu r e .  Meanwhile th e  government 
te n d e d  to  ap p o in t non-M alays to  th e  m id d le -ra n k in g  and s e n io r  d e p a rtm e n ta l 
p o s t s ,  c u lm in a tin g  in  th e  i l l - f a t e d  C ow gill R eport o f 1938, But C hinese 
p r e s s u r e  in  th e  l a t e  1 9 3 0 's  was no t s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t ro n g  to  fo rc e  th e  i s s u e .
In  a sen se  th e  M alayan Union c o n s t i tu t i o n  o f  19^6, w hich c o n fe rre d  e q u a l i ty  
o f r i g h t s  on a l l  M alayan c i t i z e n s  , was a c u lm in a tio n  o f  t h i s  p rew ar tre n d  
in  o f f i c i a l  a t t i t u d e .
The d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and Malay employment movement had a  s ig n i f i c a n t  
im pact on C hinese and Malay p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  C hinese demands f o r  a 
s h a re  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power were in  f a c t  u n av o id ab le  because  o f  th e  grow th o f 
th e  d o m ic ile d  C hinese com m unity. By th e  l a t e  1920*s th e  C hinese had a lre a d y  
begun  to  re q u e s t  e n try  in to  th e  MCS. The d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  and Malay employment 
movement was im p o rta n t to  th e  e x te n t  th a t  i t  h a s te n e d  t h i s  p ro c e s s  and th r u s t  
th e  C h inese  d i r e c t l y  on to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s ta g e  in  th e  e a r ly  1 930 's .  T his 
movement had a  more e n d u rin g  im pact on th e  M alays, To a  g r e a t  e x te n t ,  i t  
gave th e  i n c ip ie n t  Malay n a t i o n a l i s t  movement an o v e r t ly  p o l i t i c a l  and 
a n ti-n o n -M a la y  o r i e n t a t i o n .  Along w ith  o th e r  f a c t o r s ,  i t  encouraged  th e  
M alay i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  to  assume th e  r o le  o f  s a fe g u a rd irg  Malay s o c ie ty  and 
c u l tu r e  from th e  a l i e n  t h r e a t .  Having had t h e i r  e x p e c ta t io n s  h e ig h ten ed  and
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their assertiveness strengthened by the movement, they were no longer 
satisfied with Thomas' policy of negatively preserving the Malay States 
for the Malays* This is clearly reflected in the severe criticisms of the 
government by Malay newspapers. This dissatisfaction was aggravated by the
Ufact that bhe Malays desire to enter the world of commerce and industry
4could not be materially assisted by the colonial government. The Malay 
intelligentsia was also sufficiently perceptive to sense the growing 
realisation among British officials of the permanent status of the non- 
Malay, especially Chinese population. Worried that Malays might lose their 
rights by default, they took to quasi-national organisations such as the 
Malay State Associations by the late 1930's.
British policy strengthened Malay preparedness against the non-Malay 
challenge in another direction. It provided nascent Malay nationalism with 
a westernised leadership linked functionally with the colonial regime and 
socially with the Malay traditional establishment. Of the three new elite 
groups that emerged during the interwar years, only the westernised elite, 
who were mainly MAS and Malay MCS officers, could provide an alternative 
leadership to the traditional ruling class. They had tka support of the 
British, commanded wide respect and influence among the Malay ra1ayat, 
and had administrative experience and organisational ability not possessed 
by the reformists or the radical leaders. Along with the UMS elite, these 
westernised bureaucrats led the struggle for the complete Malayanisation of 
the public service and for national independence after the Second World War.
The decentralisation and Malay employment movement also helped 
perpetuate the myth that the Federated States were Malay States at a time 
when the Malays had become a minority in their own country and had begun 
to be challenged politically by the domiciled non-Malays. One of the 
advantages thus accruing to the Malays was that this myth ruled out any 
danger of the FMS being converted into a crown colony. Had this materialised, 
it would have deprived them of the only justification for their claims for
507
special rights. The extent to which the United Malays’ National 
Organisation (UMNO) condemned the Malayan Union Scheme in 1946 for ending 
the sovereignty of the Malay States reflected this significant point.
Once Malaya was again recognised as a Malay country under the Federation 
Agreement which replaced the Malayan Union Scheme in 1948, the UMNO had 
a case to justify Malay special rights and insist that the non-Malay 
residents conform to the traditions and ethos of Malay States.
Finally, by excluding the non-Malays from the MCS, British policy
gave the Malay elite an important in the race for the control of the
r
administrative service. The tradition that political power was an Anglo- 
Malay preserve continued unchanged until independence, save that non-Malays 
were admitted to the MCS after 1948 on a ratio of one to every four Malays.
In other words British policy paved the way for the rise of a Malay 
dominated post-war Civil Service. Moreover, it inculcated a strong bias 
among Malays for the public service. While this tended to divert Malay 
attention away from the private sector, it had the advantage of concentrating 
Malay efforts in an area where they could more easily progress because of 
less intense non-Malay competition. This helped the Malays make the 
impressive advance in the postwar administration which facilitated their 
continued control of political power in the country.
The decentralisation and Malay employment movement has often been 
regarded as pro-Malay. In fact the movement left a lasting impression to 
this effect on the non-Malays during the interwar years. However the term 
'pro-Malay' had never been defined or considered in relations to British 
policy in general. Taking the latter point first, the Malays could 
justifiably point out that while the plural society was the price of Malaya's 
modern development, they paid that price without reaping commensurate 
rewards as did the Europeans and the non-Malays. The henefits that the 
European and Chinese capitalists obtained from British policy in the economic 
development of the states far outweighted the advantages that the Malays
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secured from the decentralisation and Malay employment policy. On balance 
therefore, this policy could hardly be considered pro-Malay during the 
interwar years no matter how the term 'pro-Malay* is defined.
If the term 'pro-Malay' is taken to mean that Malay interests 
prevailed over all other considerations or even that they received equal 
attention with British interests^the decentralisation and Malay employment 
movement does not merit that description. It could be considered pro-Malay 
if the term is interpreted as a tendency, subject to overriding British 
interests, to give prior consideration to Malay as against Chinese and 
Indian political interests. In the very narrow sense of preferential 
treatment of Malays , the British Government conceded that the Malay 
employment policy was pro-Malay. However, it should be pointed out that 
neither this policy nor decentralisation in practice adversely affected 
non-Malay interests to any important extent. The existence of the MAS and 
of Malay Civil Servants was the clearest indication that the policy was 
pro-Malay as defined above. Perhaps the movement could best be considered 
in Ma}.ay interests in term of its unforeseen and unintended effects on the 
Malays. In other words, the decentralisation and Malay employment movement 
unintentionally contributed to the rise of a Malay nationalist movement 
after the war, which took over the Malay States as the "Heirs to the
Inheritance."
